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Welcome: Dr. Robert (Bob) Mortlock, Principal 
Investigator, Acquisition Research Program 
Dr. Robert Mortlock, PhD, CMBA, PMP, PE, COL USA (Ret), — Dr. Mortlock is the 
Principal Investigator, Acquisition Research Program, Naval Postgraduate School, managed defense 
systems development and acquisition efforts for the last 15 of his 27 years in the U.S. Army, 
culminating in his assignment as the project manager for Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment 
in the Program Executive Office for Soldier. He retired in September 2015 and now teaches defense 
acquisition and program management in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He holds a Ph.D. in chemical engineering from 
the University of California, Berkeley, an MBA from Webster University, an M.S. in national resource 
strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and a B.S. in chemical engineering from 
Lehigh University. He is also a recent graduate from the Post-Doctoral Bridge Program of the 
University of Florida’s Hough Graduate School of Business, with a management specialization. He 
holds DAWIA Level III certifications in program management (PM), test & evaluation (T&E), and 
systems planning, research, development & engineering (SPRDE). 
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Keynote Speaker: Dyke D. Weatherington, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Information & 
Integration Portfolio Management 
Mr. Dyke Weatherington is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Information & 
Integration Portfolio Management (I&IPM), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)), Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He manages and is responsible for 
acquisition shaping, analysis and oversight of warfighter capability portfolios across the Department in 
the nuclear weapons systems; nuclear command, control, and communications; missile defense; 
cyber; and space domains. He leads assessments of cost, schedule, and performance risks of 
acquisition programs, and works directly with the Services, the Intelligence Community, and the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to address identified gaps in 
program strategies. His DoD portfolio includes Ground Based Strategic Deterrence, Long Range 
Stand-Off weapon, GPS Enterprise, Space Launch, Space Control, Missile Defense, and cyber 
enabling programs. His Intelligence Community portfolio includes major system acquisition programs 
of the National Reconnaissance Office, National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, National Security 
Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency. He serves as the I&IPM Senior Acquisition Officer and the 
primary liaison between Joint Staff, Services, Agencies, and Congress, facilitating actions to achieve 
cost, schedule, and performance goals and advising the Milestone Decision Authority on program 
acquisition decisions. 
Mr. Weatherington’s prior duties included Deputy Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance in OUSD(A&S), Space, Strategic and Intelligence Systems (SSI). Mr. Weatherington 
was also the OUSD(AT&L) functional lead for the Defense Space Council. Prior to his assignment to 
SSI, Mr. Weatherington was the Deputy Director, Unmanned Warfare and ISR, Strategic & Tactical 
Systems. 
Mr. Weatherington holds a Bachelor of Science degree in engineering mechanics from the 
United States Air Force Academy (1981) and a Master of Arts in National Securities Studies from 
California State University (1993). He is also a graduate of the Air Force Air Command and Staff 
College and the Defense Systems Management College. He has been awarded numerous OSD and 
Air Force decorations including the Airman’s Medal, OUSD Exceptional Civilian Service Award, and 
FY17 Presidential Rank Award. 
Mr. Weatherington was born and raised on his family’s farm near Burnside, Illinois, and is 
married with four children. He resides with his family in Northern Virginia. 
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Panel 1. Middle-Tier Acquisition and the 2018 
National Defense Strategy 
Wednesday, May 8, 2019 
9:05 a.m. – 
10:15 am. 
 
Chair: Hon. David Berteau, President and CEO, Professional Services Council 
Panelists:  
Andrew Hunter, Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, and Senior 
Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 
Hon. Katharina McFarland, Chair of the Army Research and 
Development Board, National Academies of Science 
Hon. William LaPlante, Senior Vice President and General Manager, The 
MITRE Corporation 
Stan Soloway, President and CEO, Celero Strategies, LLC 
Defense Acquisition Trends 2019: A Preliminary Look 
Andrew Hunter, Rhys McCormick, Greg Sanders, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 
 
Hon. David Berteau—Mr. Berteau is PSC President and CEO, with 400 member companies 
of all sizes providing federal contract services. Mr. Berteau was ASD for Logistics and Materiel 
Readiness and served 14 years in the Defense Department, under six defense secretaries.  Earlier, 
Mr. Berteau was at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Syracuse University’s 
National Security Studies Program, and SAIC.  He is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public 
Administration and taught graduate courses for 14 years at the Maxwell School, Georgetown, and the 
LBJ School.   
Andrew Hunter—Mr. Hunter is a senior fellow in the International Security Program and 
director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS. From 2011 to 2014, he served as a senior 
executive in the Department of Defense, serving first as chief of staff to undersecretaries of defense 
(AT&L) Ashton B. Carter and Frank Kendall, before directing the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. From 
2005 to 2011, Mr. Hunter served as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services 
Committee. Mr. Hunter holds an M.A. degree in applied economics from the Johns Hopkins University 
and a B.A. in social studies from Harvard University. 
Hon. Katharina McFarland—Ms. McFarland is a leading subject-matter expert on 
government procurement. Her positions include serving on the board of directors of SAIC, serving as 
Chairman of the Board of Army Research and Development at the National Academies of Science, 
serves as a Commissioner of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, and as a 
Director on the Procurement Round table. She recently retired from her position as Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics 
& Technology) after nearly thirty years of public  as an accredited Materials, Mechanical, Civil and 
Electronics Engineer. She has received an Honorary Doctoral of Engineering from the University of 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 4 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
Cranfield, United Kingdom; the Presidential Meritorious Executive Rank Award, the Secretary of 
Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the Department of the Navy Civilian Tester of 
the Year Award, and the Navy and United States Marine Corps Commendation Medal for Meritorious 
Civilian Service. She is DAWIA Level-III-certified in Program Management, Engineering, and Testing 
as well as having a professional engineer license and having attained her PMP certification. 
Hon. William LaPlante—Mr. LaPlante is senior vice president and general manager for The 
MITRE Corporation, leading MITRE’s National Security Sector (MNS). With more than 30 years of 
experience in defense technology, he is also a commissioner on the congressionally mandated 
Section 809 Panel for defense acquisition reform. Previously, LaPlante spent three years as assistant 
secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, during which time he brought the $43 billion Air Force 
acquisition enterprise budget into alignment with the Air Force vision and strategy. At MITRE, 
LaPlante oversees operations of two federally funded research and development centers 
(FFRDCs)—The National Security Engineering Center (NSEC), and The National Cybersecurity 
FFRDC. He is accountable for increasing MITRE’s strategic value across the company’s DoD, 
intelligence and cybersecurity portfolios. 
Stan Soloway—Mr. Soloway is President & CEO of Celero Strategies, LLC, a full-service 
strategic consultancy focused on the federal market. Prior to founding Celero Strategies in January, 
2016, Stan served for 15 years as the President & CEO of the Professional Services Council, the 
largest and most influential national association of government technology and professional services 
firms. During the second half of the Clinton Administration, Stan served as the Deputy Undersecretary 
of Defense and was responsible for wide-ranging reforms to defense acquisition and technology 
policy and practices, and broader department-wide re-engineering.  Stan was awarded both the 
Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service and the Secretary of Defense Medal for 
Distinguished Public Service, and received the 2016 Consumer Electronics Show (CES) Government 
Technology Leadership Award. He was also was named the IT Industry Executive of the Year in 2013 
by Government Computer News; is a Fellow of both the National Academy of Public Administration 
and the National Contract Management Association, a principal at the Partnership for Public Service, 
and served from 2007 to 2013 as a Senate-confirmed member of the Board of Directors of the 
Corporation for National and Community Service, the federal agency that oversees AmeriCorps and 
other national service programs. 
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Defense Acquisition Trends 2019: A Preliminary Look 
Rhys McCormick—is a Fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group (DIIG) at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His work focuses on unmanned systems, global defense 
industrial base issues, and U.S. federal and defense contracting trends. Prior to working at DIIG, he 
interned at the Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy at CSIS and the Peacekeeping and Stability 
Operations Institute at the U.S. Army War College. He holds a bachelor’s degree in security and risk 
analysis from Pennsylvania State University and a master’s degree in security studies from 
Georgetown University. [rmccormick@csis.org] 
Greg Sanders—is a Fellow in the International Security Program and Deputy Director of the 
Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS, where he manages a research team that analyzes data 
on U.S. government contract spending and other budget and acquisition issues. In support of these 
goals, he employs SQL Server, as well as the statistical programming language R. Sanders holds a 
master’s degree in international studies from the University of Denver, and he holds a bachelor’s 
degree in government and politics and a bachelor’s degree in computer science from the University of 
Maryland. [gsanders@csis.org] 
Andrew Hunter—is a senior fellow in the International Security Program and director of the Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS. From 2011 to 2014, he served as a senior executive in the 
Department of Defense, serving first as chief of staff to Under Secretaries of Defense (AT&L) Ashton 
B. Carter and Frank Kendall, before directing the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. From 2005 to 2011, 
Hunter served as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee. Hunter holds 
an MA degree in applied economics from the Johns Hopkins University and a BA in social studies 
from Harvard University. [ahunter@csis.org] 
Abstract 
This paper presents a preliminary look at the Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Department of 
Defense (DoD) contracting trends available in the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS). This year’s study focuses on the defense acquisition’s systems response to the 
2018 National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on peer and near-peer competition, forging a 
new relationship between the DoD and the National Security Innovation Base, and the need 
for increased investment in emerging technologies. In particular, this report looks at whether 
there has been a significant shift in the DoD’s investment posture between equipment 
(Products) and research and development. Additionally, this report includes analysis of the 
topline DoD contracting trends. 
Introduction 
This paper presents a preliminary look at the Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Department of 
Defense (DoD) contracting trends available in the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS). The FY 2018 DoD contract data provides critical insights into the defense 
acquisition system’s response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy and new 
administration priorities (DoD, 2018). Last year, the FY 2017 DoD contract data show that 
although DoD contract spending has rebounded between FY 2015 and FY 2017, the growth 
has been largely concentrated amongst existing product lines over research and 
development or services. Given previous NPS-funded research showing that it often takes 
two years for the contract data to reflect acquisition reforms or changes in priorities, the FY 
2018 contract data can illuminate whether the administration’s priorities are better reflected 
in its second year (McCormick et al., 2015).  
This report uses the methodology used in Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) reports on federal contracting. For over a decade, the Defense-Industrial 
Initiatives Group (DIIG) has issued a series of analytical reports on federal contract 
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spending for national security by the government. These reports are built on FPDS data, 
which is downloaded in bulk from USAspending.gov. DIIG now maintains its own database 
of federal spending that includes data from 1990–2018. This database is a composite of 
FPDS and DD350 data. For this report, the study team relied on FY 2000–FY 2018 data. All 
dollar figures are in constant FY 2019 dollars, using the latest Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) deflators. For additional information about the CSIS contracting data analysis 
methodology, see https://github.com/CSISdefense/Lookup-Tables. 
For this paper, CSIS focused on the following research questions: 
• Area: Has there been a significant shift in the DoD’s investment between 
products, services, and research and development (R&D) to reflect the 2018 
National Defense Strategy priorities? 
• Platform Portfolio: Have there been significant changes across the different 
sectors of the defense industrial base? 
• R&D: Has the DoD started to recover from its trough in the development pipeline 
for major weapon systems? 
• Composition of the Industrial Base: What has the defense contracting rebound 
meant for the composition of the defense industrial base? What has it meant for 
vendors of different sizes? Has the number of prime vendors and new entrants 
doing business with the DoD continued to decline?  
• Other Transaction Authorities (OTA): What are the significant trends in OTA 
usage across the DoD? 
• Components: Have there been significant shifts in defense contracting trends 
between the major DoD components? 
DoD Contract Spending in a Budgetary Context  
The defense contracting rebound that began in FY 2016 continued into FY 2018. As 
shown in Figure 1, total defense contract obligations increased from $331.1 billion in FY 
2017 to $364.5 billion in FY 2018, a 10% increase. Over the last three years, defense 
contract obligations grew 25% between FY 2015 and FY 2018. 
 
 Defense Contract Obligations vs. Budget Authority, 2000–2018 
Note. Sources: FPDS; DoD, National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 2019 (Green Book), Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 2018; DoD, Defense Budget Overview: United States 
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
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What Is the DoD Buying? 
Despite the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizing modernization 
priorities, there has not yet been a significant shift toward NDS-related technology in the 
DoD’s investment posture. During the first two years of the defense contracting rebound, 
defense contract obligations for products significantly outpaced both services and R&D. In 
FY 2018, services caught up to products, as defense services and products contract 
obligations increased 10% and 11%, respectively, a rate in-line with total defense contract 
obligations growth. Meanwhile, defense R&D contract obligations only increased 4%, well 
below the 10% increase in total defense contract obligations. As a result, R&D fell to its 
lowest share of defense contract obligations this century. 
Looking at total growth over the course of the defense contracting rebound, defense 
products contract obligations are up 35% over the last three years. Comparatively, defense 
services contract obligations increased 17% between FY 2015 and FY 2018, while R&D 
contract obligations increased just 10% over that same period.  
Figure 2 shows defense contract obligations by area from FY 2000 to FY 2018.  
 
 Defense Contract Obligations by Area, 2000–2018 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Defense Contract Obligations by Platform Portfolio 
While there have not been significant shifts in the DoD’s investment between 
products, services, and R&D, there were more significant changes at the sector level in FY 
2018. 
Aircraft contract obligations increased the most amongst the eleven platform 
portfolios during the first year two years of the defense contracting rebound but declined in 
FY 2018. Between FY 2015 and FY 2017, Aircraft obligations increased 34% (McCormick et 
al., 2018, p. 9). However, in FY 2018, Aircraft defense contract obligations fell from $88.6 
billion in FY 2017 to $84.6 billion, a 5% decline. This decline is not outside the norm, as the 
Aircraft sector, as previously shown during sequestration and the defense drawdown, has 
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been known to whipsaw between growth and declines (McCormick, Hunter, & Sanders, 
2017, p. 23). In total over the course of the defense contracting rebound, Aircraft defense 
contract obligations have increased 29% since FY 2015, a rate slightly higher than topline 
growth (25%). 
Air & Missile Defense contract obligations increased 53% in FY 2018, continuing the 
whipsaw this sector has seen throughout the defense contracting rebound (McCormick et 
al., 2018). Over the last four years, Air & Missile Defense contract obligations rose from 
$9.97 billion in FY 2015 to $10.49 billion in FY 2016 and fell to $8.92 billion in FY 2017, 
before rising again to $13.65 billion in FY 2018. Despite the whipsaw, total Air & Missile 
Defense contract obligations are up 37% since FY 2015. 
After several years of declining contracting obligations, the Facilities & Construction 
sector experienced a large up-tick in FY 2018. Facilities & Construction defense contract 
obligations increased from $39.5 billion in FY 2017 to $47.3 billion in FY 2018, a 20% 
increase.  
Land Vehicles, the sector heaviest hit by sequestration and the defense drawdown, 
continued rebounding in FY 2018 (McCormick et al., 2017). Land Vehicles defense contract 
obligations totaled $12.9 billion in FY 2018, a 51% increase from the $8.5 billion obligated in 
FY 2017. Between FY 2015 and FY 2018, Land Vehicles defense contract obligations have 
risen from $7.95 billion to $12.9 billion, a 62% increase.  
The Ordnance & Missiles continued to steadily grow in FY 2018, a trend that has 
been ongoing through the course of the defense contracting rebound. Ordnance & Missiles 
contract obligations increased 17% in FY 2018, rising from $18.9 billion to $22.2 billion. 
Since FY 2015, Ordnance & Missiles contract obligations have increased 56%. 
Figure 3 shows defense contract obligations by platform portfolio from FY 2000 to FY 
2018. 
 
 Defense Contract Obligations by Platform Portfolio, 2000–2018 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Defense Contract Obligations by Stage of R&D 
Previous CSIS research showed that in FY 2017, the “seven-year trough in major 
weapon systems development pipeline appeared to have bottomed out but does still exist in 
some stages of R&D and it will still be some time before DoD fully recovers” (McCormick et 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 9 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
al., 2018, p. 11). The FY 2018 data show that while this largely still holds true, there are 
notable differences across the different R&D activities.  
Figure 4 shows defense contract obligations by stage of R&D from FY 2000 to FY 
2018.  
 
 Defense R&D Contract Obligations, 2000–2018 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
The data show that the two earliest stages of R&D, Basic Research (6.1) and 
Applied Research (6.2), experienced significantly different trends in FY 2018. Defense Basic 
Research contract obligations increased 11% in FY 2017, a rate nearly three times the rate 
of the overall growth in defense R&D contract obligations, while Applied Research defense 
contract obligations declined 1%.  
Both the two mid-stage R&D activities, Advanced Technology Development (6.3) and 
Advanced Component Development & Prototypes (6.4), grew at rates notably above the 
overall growth in defense R&D contract in FY 2018. Advanced Technology Development 
defense contract obligations increased from $4.3 billion to $4.8 billion, an 11% increase. 
Advanced Component Development & Prototypes defense contract obligations increased 
14%, rising from $5.3 billion in FY 2017 to $6.0 billion in FY 2018. Of note, as the DoD 
pushes for increased usage of experimentation and prototyping in the acquisition process, 
Advanced Component Development & Prototypes accounted for 23% of total defense R&D 
contract obligations in FY 2018, well above its 14% historical average (McCormick et al., 
2019). 
After System Development & Demonstration (6.5) contract obligations declined in FY 
2018 after having increased in FY 2017, the first year-to-year increase in System 
Development & Demonstration contract spending since FY 2005. Defense System 
Development & Demonstration contract obligations fell from $4.33 billion in FY 2017 to 
$4.06 billion, a 6%. As a share of total defense R&D contract obligations, System 
Development & Demonstration fell from 17% in FY 2017 to 15% in FY 2018, well below the 
historical average of 27%.  
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OTA Usage Across the DoD 
OTAs have had a recent resurgence in the DoD thanks in large part to recent 
legislative changes aimed at incentivizing their usage and the emphasis of acquisition 
officials in this administration. Previous CSIS research has shown that DoD OTA obligations 
increased 195% between FY 2015 and FY 2017 (McCormick et al., 2018, p. 14). DoD OTA 
obligations continued rising in FY 2018, increasing 81% from FY 2017. In total, DoD OTA 
obligations have increased 352% over the last three years.  
As shown in Figure 5, the base and all options (total potential value) of OTA 
agreements signed in the last few years is increasing at a rate quicker rate than actual OTA 
obligations. This last year, the total potential value of OTA agreements increased from $11.1 
billion in FY 2017 to $26.8 billion in FY 2018, a 138% increase. Since FY 2015, total value of 
OTA agreements has increased 758% compared to the 352% growth in OTA obligations. 
Although the DoD will not ultimately exercise all the options contained in these recently 
signed OTA awards, nor necessarily obligate 100% of the value of even those options that 
are exercised, there is clearly a widely based increase in the potential scope of OTAs, 
suggesting that OTA obligations are likely to continue rising in the coming years as these 
OTAs are executed.  
 
 Defense OTA Obligations vs. Total Value, 2014–2018 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
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 Defense OTA Obligations by Customer, 2014–2018 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Across the DoD, the Army has been at the forefront of the DoD’s OTA resurgence, 
largely due to its OTA Center of Excellence located at Army Contracting Command New 
Jersey (ACC-NJ) at Picatinny Arsenal, but over the last year most of the other DoD 
components substantially increased their usage of OTAs (McCormick et al., 2019, pp. 77–
78).  
Army OTA obligations increased 86% in FY 2018 and rose as a share of total 
defense OTA obligations from 68% in FY 2017 to 70%. Over the last three years, Army OTA 
obligations have increased 348% between FY 2015 and FY 2018. 
Prior to the recent legislative changes, the Air Force made some limited use of 
OTAs, but the service has significantly increased their usage in recent years, particularly this 
last year. Air Force OTA obligations rose from approximately $0.19 billion in FY 2017 to 
$0.53 billion in FY 2018, a 176%. Air Force OTA obligations have grown 9982% since FY 
2015. 
Prior to FY 2018, the Navy accounted for less than 1% of total defense OTA 
obligations between FY 2015 and FY 2017. While the Navy still makes very limited use of 
OTAs, it started to make greater usage of them in FY 2018, spending $24.96 million in 
OTAs in FY 2018 compared to the $7.3 million the service spent in total from FY 2015 to FY 
2017. 
Composition of the Defense Industry 
Defense Contract Obligations by Vendor Size 
During the initial two years of the defense contracting rebound, the Big Five fared the 
best amongst the four vendor size categories, followed by Small and Medium-sized vendors, 
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declining 1%.1 However, these trends did not hold true in FY 2018, as the Big Five declined 
slightly while the other three vendor size categories grew at roughly equal rates.  
Defense contract obligations awarded to the Big Five fell from $115.9 billion in FY 
2017 to $114.8 billion in FY 2018, a 1% decline. As a share of total defense contract 
obligations, the Big Five went from 35% in FY 2017 to 32% in FY 2018. In total over the 
course of the defense contacting rebound, defense contract obligations awarded to the Big 
Five increased 32% from FY 2015 to FY 2018.  
Large vendors initially fared the worst during the initial two years of the rebound, 
declining 1% between FY 2015 and FY 2017, but experienced their own rebound in FY 
2018. Defense contract obligations awarded to Large vendors totaled $102.4 billion in FY 
2018, a 14% increase from FY 2017’s $89.9 billion. However, Large vendors have yet to 
recover as a share of total defense contract obligations, accounting for only 28% of total 
defense contract obligations in FY 2018 as opposed to their 31% market share in FY 2015.  
Small and Medium vendors both continued to benefit from the defense contracting 
rebound. In FY 2018, defense contract obligations awarded to Small and Medium vendors 
increased 16% and 18%, respectively. Between FY 2017 and FY 2018, the share of total 
defense contract obligations awarded to Medium size vendors rose from 19% to 21%, while 
Small vendors rose from 19% to 20%.  
Figure 7 shows defense contract obligations by vendor size from FY 2000 to FY 
2018. 
 
 Defense Contract Obligations by Vendor Size, 2000–2018 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
                                               
 
 
1 The Big Five are the five largest defense contractors as measured by total defense contract 
obligations: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrup Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics. 
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Vendor Count 
Previous CSIS research showed that both the total number of prime vendors doing 
business with the DoD and the number of new prime entrants to the defense market had 
been declining in recent years (McCormick et al., 2017; Cohen et al., 2018). As shown in 
Figure 8, both of these trends continued in FY 2018. The data show that in FY 2018, the 
number of total prime vendors doing business with the DoD declined 9%, while the number 
of new prime vendors declined 7%. Since FY 2015, the total number of prime vendors doing 
business with the DoD has fallen 15%, while the number of new prime vendors has declined 
16%. These trends, particularly the continued decline in the number of new entrants, is 
troublesome as the DoD emphasizes the National Security Innovation Base and tries to 
attract non-traditional defense companies to do business with the DoD.  
 
 DoD Vendor Count, 2005–2018 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Defense Components 
Navy contract obligations grew 25% between FY 2015 and FY 2017, the most of any 
component, but fell in FY 2018. Navy contract obligations decreased from $113.1 billion in 
FY 2017 to $109.7 billion in FY 2018, a 3% decline. As a share of total defense contract 
obligations, the Navy fell from 34% to 30%, a market share more in line with historical 
averages. 
The Air Force continued its year-to-year whipsaw in FY 2017, as Air Force contract 
obligations increased 15% last year. Air Force contract obligations are up 30% from FY 
2015, but the year-to-year data shows the volatility of Air Force contracting trends in recent 
years. Over the last four years, Air Force contract obligations have gone from $56.2 billion in 
FY 2015 to $68.4 billion in FY 2016 before declining to $63.1 billion in FY 2017 and then 
increasing again in FY 2018 to $72.8 billion.  
The Army had been growing at a slow but steady rate over the last two years after 
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upswing in FY 2018 (McCormick et al., 2018). Army contract obligations increased 15% in 
FY 2018, going from $80.97 billion to $93.17 billion.  
Both the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
grew at rates significantly above the defense topline in FY 2018. In FY 2018, DLA and MDA 
contracting obligations reached near-historic levels, increasing 26% and 51%, respectively.  
Figure 9 shows defense contract obligations by component from FY 2000 to FY 
2018. 
 
 Defense Contract Obligations by Component, 2000–2018 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Conclusion 
No significant shift in the DoD’s investment between products and R&D to reflect 
modernization priorities emphasized in 2018 National Defense Strategy 
There was not a significant shift in the DoD’s FY 2018 investment between products, 
services, and R&D despite the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizing modernization 
and the importance of great power competition. Although DoD spending on defense 
services caught up to spending on products in FY 2018, R&D contract obligations continue 
to trail far behind the other two areas of the DoD’s investment portfolio. At the same time 
that the DoD is emphasizing the importance of modernization to meet the 2018 National 
Defense Strategies’ priorities, in FY 2018, R&D fell to the lowest it has ever been this 
century as a share of total defense contract obligations.  
Aircraft down; Land Vehicles and Facilities and Construction bounce back; Air & 
Missile Defense, and Ordnance & Missiles up 
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While there have not been significant shifts in the DoD’s investment between 
products, services, and R&D, there were more significant changes at the sector level in FY 
2018. 
Land Vehicles and Facilities and Construction, two of the sectors hardest hit by 
sequestration and the defense drawdown, rebounded rather significantly in FY 2018. Land 
Vehicles contract obligations increased 51% in FY 2018, rising from $8.5 billion in FY 2017 
to $12.9 billion in FY 2018, the highest level of Land Vehicles spending in the last six years. 
Facilities and Construction defense contract obligations increased 20% in FY 2018, twice 
the overall rate of growth. 
Aircraft contract obligations, which had been the biggest beneficiaries of the first two 
years of the defense contracting rebound, declined 5% in FY 2018. This decline isn’t too 
surprising as the Aircraft sector has been previously shown to be vulnerable to whipsawing 
back and forth between growth and declines.  
Other notable trends include the year-to-year whipsaw in the Air & Missile Defense 
sector and steady growth in Ordnance & Missiles spending. While Air & Missile Defense 
contract obligations increased 37% from FY 2015 to FY 2018, a rate well above the 25% 
growth in total defense contract obligations, there has been a significant whipsaw year-to-
year. After Air & Missile Defense contract obligations declined 15% in FY 2017, contract 
obligations subsequently increased 53% in FY 2018. Comparatively, Ordnance & Missiles 
contract spending increased 56% from FY 2015 to FY 2018, but with consistent growth 
year-to-year. In FY 2018, Ordnance & Missiles obligations increased 51%, and spending 
last year totaled levels not seen since FY 2007 to FY 2009. 
Uneven recovery from the trough in the development pipeline for major weapon 
systems 
The data show that the DoD has made some recovery in its development pipeline for 
major weapon systems, but recovery has been uneven across the different R&D activities. 
Despite System Development & Demonstration contract obligations increasing in FY 2017 
for the first time since FY 2005, they subsequently declined 6% in FY 2018. In FY 2018, 
System Development & Demonstration contract obligations accounted for just 15% of total 
defense R&D contract obligations, whereas they have historically accounted for 
approximately 27% of annual defense contract obligations.  
The largest recovery came in the mid-stage of the weapon systems pipeline where 
Advanced Technology Development (6.3) and Advanced Component Development & 
Prototypes (6.4) grew at rates well above the overall growth in defense R&D contracts in FY 
2018. Of note, as the DoD has been emphasizing increasing experimentation and 
prototyping in the acquisition process, Advanced Component Development & Prototypes 
accounted for 23% of total defense R&D contract obligations in FY 2018, well above the 
historical average of 14% (McCormick et al., 2019). 
OTA usage continues increasing across DoD 
OTAs continue to gain popularity across the DoD following the recent legislative 
changes aimed at incentivizing their usage. Total OTA obligations across the DoD increased 
81% in FY 2018 from FY 2017. Over the last three years, total DoD OTA obligations have 
increased 352% from FY 2015.  
The data also show that total potential value of OTA agreements signed in recent 
years is growing at over twice the rate of OTA obligations. Between FY 2015 and FY 2018, 
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the total potential value of OTA agreements, were they to exercise all of their options, 
increased 352%.  
The Army remains the predominant user of OTAs across the DoD, in large part due 
to its OTA Center of Excellence located at Picatinny Arsenal, but the other components 
have substantially increased their usage of OTAs in the last year. Army OTA obligations 
increased 86% last year and are up 348% from FY 2015. The Air Force made some limited 
use of OTAs prior to the recent legislative changes but has seen a 9982% increase in Air 
Force OTA obligations since FY 2015. Finally, the Navy has historically made little use of 
OTAs, accounting for less than 1% of all defense OTA obligations prior to FY 2018. While 
the Navy did make significantly greater usage of OTAs in FY 2018 than it had previously, it 
still only accounted for 1% of FY 2018 defense OTA obligations.  
Big Five decline in FY 2018; Growth relatively evenly between Small, Medium, and 
Large 
The Big Five benefited the most from the first two years of the defense contracting 
rebound but declined 1% in FY 2018. Instead, the 10% increase in total defense contract 
obligations in FY 2018 was relatively evenly distributed between Large, Medium, and Small 
vendors. Of note, Small vendors accounted for 20% of total defense contract obligations in 
FY 2018, their highest share of total defense contract obligations this century.  
Number of prime vendors and new entrants doing business with DoD continues to 
decline 
The data show that the number of prime vendors and new entrants doing business 
with the DoD continued declining in FY 2018. In FY 2018, the number of prime vendors 
doing business with the DoD declined 9%, while the number of new prime entrants declined 
7%. Although defense contract obligations have increased 25% since FY 2015, the number 
of prime vendors doing business with the DoD has fallen 15%, while the number of new 
prime entrants has fallen 16%. Given the importance the DoD has placed on attracting new 
entrants, particularly non-traditional defense companies, these trends are worrisome.  
Air Force bounces back; Navy starts decline; Army sees large upswing; MDA and DLA hit 
near-historic levels 
There were notable differences in the contracting trends between the military 
components during the first two years of the defense contracting rebound and the FY 2018 
trends.  
Air Force contract obligations bounced back in FY 2018, increasing 15% from FY 
2017. This continued the Air Force’s year-to-year whipsaw between total contract 
obligations growing one year and declining the next, a trend that has been ongoing since FY 
2015. 
The Navy benefited the most during the first two years of the defense contracting 
rebound, hitting historic levels this century as a share of total defense contract obligations, 
but returned to more historic levels in FY 2018, experiencing a 3% decline in contract 
spending from FY 2017.  
Army contract obligations, which had been growing at a slow but steady rate over the 
last two years after being the heaviest hit during sequestration and the defense drawdown, 
increased 15% in FY 2018.  
Finally, DLA and MDA contract obligations increased 26% and 51%, respectively, in 
FY 2018 as these components’ contract spending totaled near historic levels for this 
century.  
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Final Thoughts 
The FY 2018 defense contracting data provides critical insights into the defense 
acquisition system’s response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy and new 
administration’s priorities. While the new administration had the opportunity to influence 
some of the trends seen in the FY 2017 defense contracting data, FY 2018 represents the 
first fiscal year fully executed by this administration.  
Overall, the defense acquisition system has had a mixed response to the 2018 
National Defense Strategy and the new administration’s priorities. While you can look at 
most of the contract characteristics analyzed in this paper and see reflections of the National 
Defense Strategy and administration priorities, the interconnective thread that sews together 
the disparate data points is seemingly missing. For example, you look at the platform 
portfolio contracting trends and see increased investment in Air & Missile Defense in FY 
2018, but this is not reinforced by any significant shifts in the composition of the DoD’s 
investment portfolio between products and R&D. You look at the weapon systems pipeline 
trends and see Advanced Component Development & Prototypes (6.4) contract obligations 
at historic levels in FY 2018, as a share of total defense R&D contract obligations, but also a 
return to declining System Development & Demonstration (6.5) contract obligations.  
If the DoD is to succeed at refocusing itself on peer and near-peer competition and 
forging a new relationship between the DoD and the National Security Innovation Base, and 
better recognize that interconnective threads are missing from the emerging from the FY 
2018 defense contracting trends and explore why that is. How does the DoD balance its 
investment portfolio while also maintaining readiness through procuring and maintain 
existing platforms and fielding new modernization programs in the near-term despite 
continued cuts to System Development & Demonstration (6.5) while also leaving room for 
longer-term modernization funding? Why has the DoD continued to struggle to attract new 
entrants in recent years despite defense contract spending increasing 25% the last three 
years and several policies aimed at attracting new vendors, to include non-traditional 
defense companies? Understanding and addressing these missing interconnective threads 
are an evergreen issue for every administration but are of critical importance given that 
decisions today could transform the defense acquisition system and supporting industrial 
base for the next 10 to 20 years.  
This paper presents only the initial findings of CSIS’s analysis of the FY 2018 
defense contracting trends in the FPDS. CSIS will continue to refine and expand its analysis 
on the trends presented in this paper and more in future reports.  
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Abstract 
The increasing importance of software has created an opportunity for the 
Department of Defense (DoD) to harness innovation through the acquisition and 
modification of systems that are (1) inherently multifunctional and (2) designed for 
continuous modification. Examples of these types of systems include radars, electronic 
warfare pods, and electro-optical sensor suites and are referred to here as adaptable 
systems. Identifying an acquisition approach to these types of adaptable systems that are 
software-defined and hardware-intensive is particularly challenging from an acquisition 
perspective. The optimal timeline for these systems does not fall into typical acquisition 
phases that discretely differentiate between phases such as research and development 
and production. The study team at CSIS has examined how the DoD presently acquires 
these systems and identified potential solutions to overcome the barriers found when 
adopting adaptable systems, some of which include more agile acquisition processes, open 
systems architecture, DevOps, flexible funding, development sprints, increased user 
feedback, and prototyping. 
Introduction 
Today’s security environment requires the United States to prepare for defense 
against a wide range of adversaries. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
emphasizes that both the prosperity and security of our country is challenged by the 
reemergence of long-term strategic competition, a resilient but weakening post-WWII 
international order, and rogue regimes and non-state actors that destabilize regions critical 
to international security (DoD, 2018). Each of these adversaries is adopting and deploying 
technology in new and innovative ways, challenging the United States to be able to rapidly 
respond and adapt to a variety of threats. The Department of Defense (DoD) must 
reexamine almost every facet of its operations to assess what changes are required to 
enable effective responses to these new threats, and as part of this effort, the acquisition 
system is rightly considered a central element requiring reform. 
Reform of the acquisition system is a continuous process undertaken by both the 
DoD and Congress in pursuit of objectives that are sometimes, but not always, aligned. In 
light of the 2018 NDS, the impetus for acquisition reform has shifted for both the DoD and 
Congress from a previous priority on cost control to a new emphasis on speed. This shift, 
while necessary in many respects, is not sufficient to address the requirements of the NDS. 
In addressing the need for greater speed, great attention has been given to streamlining, 
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accelerating, and reforming how the acquisition process works. Comparatively less 
attention, however, has been given to the question of what the process is being optimized to 
deliver. This problem is critical because systems capable of responding to the wide range of 
changing threats identified in the NDS—adaptable systems—face a number of barriers in 
the current acquisition system. This paper identifies the need for and characteristics of 
adaptable systems, the barriers they face in the current acquisition system, the enablers that 
can allow for their successful development and deployment, and potential changes for the 
acquisition system that result from this analysis.  
Section 1: The Need for Adaptable Systems 
As the NDS notes, today’s security environment is increasingly complex and defined 
by rapid technological advancement and changing character of war, where “the drive to 
develop new technologies is relentless, expanding to more actors with lower barriers to 
entry, and moving at accelerating speeds” (DoD, 2018). This rate of change challenges the 
United States to meet a variety of different threats, which are advancing and changing by 
the day. It states, “Success no longer goes to the country that develops a new technology 
first, but rather to the one that better integrates it and adapts its way of fighting” (DoD, 
2018). The future threat environment suggests technological superiority or inferiority will not 
be static; instead, with the rise of peer competitors, defending national security necessitates 
the ability to quickly and flexibly leverage areas of strength and mitigate areas of weakness. 
History demonstrates that technological superiority may not always win wars; however, 
refusal to adapt to changing technology will almost always lose wars. Future success is 
therefore dependent on the nation’s ability to adapt and rapidly adjust to uncertainties in 
threats, nimble adversaries, rapidly emerging (and obsolescence of) technologies, and new 
domains.  
The rapid technological change occurring in commercial technology is a key driver in 
the strategic environment. Commercial technology development methods have advanced 
toward more agile processes that are better able to meet a rapidly evolving set of user-
needs and customer demands. This shift is especially true in the area of software. 
Commercial industry is deploying continuous, iterative software-development that can 
harness technology advances, merge previously separate functions, continuously upgrade, 
utilize machine learning, and better leverage user feedback. The ability to use rapid 
developing commercial technology to drive adaptability in military operations is as equally 
available to potential U.S. adversaries as it is to United States and its as allies.  
What Adaptable Systems Can Bring to Defense 
The U.S DoD can capitalize on technology trends that have developed to meet 
rapidly evolving user-needs and customer demands through the design of adaptable 
systems. Adaptable systems are systems that have the inherent ability to deliver a wide 
variety of capabilities from a single basic design (multifunctionality) and can readily add 
capability over time (growth) at what former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis would term “the 
speed of relevance.”  
Adaptable systems are not new. Traditionally, features such as multifunctionality and 
growth potential were delivered in defense by very expensive, high-end systems that 
designed in excess space, weight, and power to support the addition of additional sensors 
and weapons. The classic example of this traditional approach to adaptable systems in 
defense are Navy ships, which grew ever larger in the 20th century to support a wide variety 
of missions and address a wide range of threats. In the 20th century, adaptability was an 
aspect of the most expensive systems in the arsenal and was a major cost driver. 
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The commercial technology sector has embraced a different approach to adaptable 
systems, using continuous, iterative software-development that can harness technology 
advances, merge previously separate functions, continuously upgrade features, utilize 
machine learning, and better leverage user feedback. The classic commercial sector 
example of an adaptable system is the smartphone, which has developed to absorb the 
functions of many previously separate devices, almost entirely through added software and 
networking. Increasingly, however, it is becoming clear that the characteristics of adaptable 
systems can also be achieved more cheaply and more successfully in the defense sector 
through writing new software rather than building and adding new hardware.  
Today’s systems don’t require massive scale and expense to achieve adaptability. 
Increasingly, they achieve adaptability because the most important elements of functionality 
are defined in software and can be modified without substantial changes to the hardware. 
As a result, a piece of gear that can transmit and receive electrons may be a radio, radar, 
and an EW asset simultaneously, and it can be upgraded quickly as the technology evolves. 
These systems are hardware-based, but software-defined. 
Additional Advantages of Adaptable Systems 
While there is a compelling rationale for developing adaptable systems to compete 
with adversaries who are likely to be attempting to do the same, there are additional, 
inherent benefits to the use of adaptable systems. Adaptable systems, because they are 
designed to readily add additional capability, can speed the deployment of the key new 
technologies identified in the NDS, such as artificial intelligence and directed energy. 
Deploying these technologies in support of military missions requires integrating them in 
some form into new or existing military platforms, which adaptable systems can support. 
Adaptable systems can also reduce risk. The iterative, evolving nature of adaptable systems 
means that individual modifications are continuous and highly incremental. This creates the 
opportunity to reduce the scope of risk included in any individual upgrade as well as the 
ability to fail fast and move on when necessary. 
While adaptable systems will present challenges to industry, particularly prime 
contractors who will have to manage in a far more dynamic environment, they also bring 
benefits to industry at multiple tiers of the supply chain. At the level of subsystem suppliers 
and component developers, adaptable systems create the opportunity for enhanced 
competition as the frequent modification and upgrade cycles generate new market 
opportunities on a regular basis. While electronics obsolescence is always a challenge, 
adaptable systems may be able to effectively avoid and mitigate technology obsolescence in 
subsystems and components more effectively, extending the useful service life of adaptable 
systems. Similarly, adaptable systems can ease the process of adapting U.S.-built systems 
for allied needs and/or incorporating interoperability with U.S. systems into allied equipment. 
In terms of life cycle costs, individual adaptable systems may not be cheaper to own than 
systems that hew closer to a static baseline, but it is possible that the efficiency of adaptable 
systems spending, in terms of capability delivered per dollar expended, could be high. Such 
increased efficiency in the DoD’s acquisition spend could translate into savings elsewhere in 
the overall defense budget.  
The Challenges of Adaptable Systems 
Adaptable systems are inherently hybrid in nature. Because they are hardware-
based, that is, they often have a metal superstructure such as on the array on a radar 
system, they look like hardware systems to the acquisition system and are generally 
handled as such. Because they are software-defined, however, it is the 1s and 0s of code 
that truly generate the bulk of the military capability that they deliver. However, acquisition 
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processes developed solely for software may not address important aspects of what the and 
adaptable system is required to do. Adaptable systems still need to develop their 
sophisticated hardware elements as well as their software elements. An acquisition system 
that can successfully leverage the software components of hardware-based systems will 
harness continuous development, multi-functionality, and adaptability. 
The multifunctionality of adaptable systems also can present challenges due to the 
interdependent nature of these functionalities. The Defense Science Board notes that 
“Unexpected complications can arise from unanticipated interdependencies within the 
software itself, often driven by the underlying architecture. A current DoD acquisition best 
practice is to reduce project risk by specifying the function of the software in detail at the 
beginning of a program” (Defense Science Board, 2017, p. 7). The more multifunctional and 
adaptable a system is, the more challenging it is to forecast the scope of its functionality and 
predict the independencies from the start. 
Section 2: Adaptable Systems Usage in Defense 
Before further discussing the barriers and enablers associated with developing and 
deploying adaptable systems for military missions, it is useful to examine some examples of 
the usage of adaptable systems in defense in greater detail. 
Battlefield Airborne Communications Node  
An example of adaptable systems in defense is the Air Force’s Battlefield Airborne 
Communications Node (BACN), which originally leveraged a commercial aircraft base, 
relatively simple networking nodes, and lots of software to serve as a critical theater network 
hub connecting disparate parts of the joint force (Hlad, 2017). Since its initial development, 
the BACN capability has also been incorporate on unmanned platforms such as the Global 
Hawk. BACN is the opposite of the exquisite, expensive multi-functional military platforms of 
previous decades. It leverages the inherent ability of software-defined systems to deliver 
multifunctionality and growth by adding new code rather than new hardware incorporating 
additional communications links that allow it to connect more systems together as needed 
over time.  
BACN provides a communications relay by translating data links and voice systems 
into a common output. This data sharing contributes to three objectives: it improves 
interoperability of platforms and systems using disparate communication forms, it allows 
ground troops to “see” the battlespace beyond the horizon, and it provides improved 
situational awareness and a common battle picture for all parties in a joint operation. BACN 
was initially developed as a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) to address a Joint Urgent 
Operational Need (JUON) and was named a Program of Record in 2018. The system was 
originally meant to be a technology demonstration, but the Air Force was able to accelerate 
BACN development and fielded the system ultimately delivering four integrated BACN 
systems within 16 months (Northrop Grumman, n.d.). 
Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program  
The Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) is an electronic 
warfare system comprised of radar warning receivers and active jamming systems and is 
integrated with a ship’s self-defense system to trigger the deployment of decoys and flares 
in the event of an attack (Defense Industry Daily, 2019). SEWIP supports early detection, 
analysis, threat warning, and protection from anti-ship missiles. 
The program uses an “evolutionary acquisition and incremental development” 
strategy to upgrade each system (U.S. Navy, 2017). SEWIP is modular with open 
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architecture and is upgraded in blocks; SEWIP Block I was focused on obsolescence 
mitigation and special signal intercept, Block II provided electronic support capability 
improvement, Block III is in the process of adding electronic attack capabilities, and Block IV 
will integrate EO/IR capabilities onto the existing electronic warfare system (LaGrone, 2015). 
The most recent upgrade to Block III includes a shift to solid-state digital receivers and 
transmitters, allowing for more reliability and easier maintenance while making the system 
more adaptable (Freedberg, 2016). SEWIP exemplifies the multifunctionality available in an 
adaptable system by using primarily software changes to allow it to perform electronic 
warfare, electronic attack, and electronic intelligence functions. 
AEGIS 
The Aegis Weapon System is one of the more high-profile examples of a system 
shifting from a closed, hardware-dependent structure to an open, software-dependent one. 
Aegis was first fielded on a commissioned U.S. Navy ship in 1983, and the Navy’s fleet of 
Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers have all been outfitted with 
Aegis. The newest 11 cruisers and the whole fleet of destroyers are undergoing 
modernization that converts Aegis into an open architecture format, in addition to various 
HM&E upgrades (U.S. Navy, 2019). Additionally, the USS Arleigh Burke will be the first 
destroyer to be modernized to merge Aegis open architecture with Aegis BMD with the goal 
of ultimately giving the entire destroyer fleet BMD capabilities (Pearn, 2008). 
The business model for Aegis’ open architecture transition is composed of four parts. 
First, it requires concurrent development, integration, and testing to upgrade software 
capabilities. Second, it applies modern software engineering processes with agile 
development, rather than the traditional waterfall development. Third, it opens competition 
up to multiple commercial vendors for individual components of the software. Finally, it 
leverages points of overlap in capability development across weapons systems (DeLuca et 
al., 2013). 
This process has taken place over multiple decades and ship upgrades. The first 
step was to implement COTS infrastructure and systems onto cruisers and destroyers to 
simplify the upgrade process and set a common standard. Next, some systems were broken 
down into component-based software decoupled from hardware to allow for a layered 
architecture and spiral development (software upgrades can now occur every two years 
while hardware refreshes occur every four). In recent years, more systems within Aegis 
have been transitioned to this open architecture framework based on their common set of 
components and application programming interfaces, referred to as “Baseline 9” (Durbin & 
Scharadin, 2011). As a result of the evolution of Aegis, it now functions as an adaptable 
system. 
The current Aegis modernization program builds on previous upgrades and software 
developments. The next phases of development will include Aegis Modernization (AMOD) 
Advanced Capability Build 12 for both destroyers and cruisers, with each phase focused 
transitioning more components of Aegis to open architecture and allowing increased data 
sharing and communication between Aegis ships and the rest of the fleet.  
Joint Tactical Radio System  
An example of a program that experienced major challenges in part because it 
struggled to develop the characteristics of an adaptable system is the Joint Tactical Radio 
System (JTRS). The JTRS program (the JTRS program office was disbanded in 2012) 
sought to develop a set of software-defined radios intended to replace all existing radios in 
the U.S. military. JTRS sought to enable communication across a range of frequencies and 
waveforms, allowing increased interoperability both within the U.S. military and with U.S. 
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allies by converting analogue signals to digital. The JTRS program was built around the 
Software Communications Architecture (SCA) as an open architecture framework to enable 
rapid, flexible upgrades, and all JTRS components had to be SCA compliant (Military and 
Aerospace Electronics, 2004). The system comes in various formats: Network Enterprise 
Domain (NED); Ground Mobile Radios (GMR, now cancelled); Handheld, Manpack & Small 
Form Fit (HMS); Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS); and Airborne & 
Maritime/Fixed Station (AMF). All systems can be upgraded with new software via a wireless 
information network, allowing for rapid insertion of new technologies across a broad range of 
systems. 
However, the JTRS program has faced significant challenges along the way. 
Although GMR was certified for use in 2012, the Army ultimately cancelled that branch of 
the program due to cost overruns and technical challenges the program faced along the 
way. When the program first started, SDR technology was in its infancy, but JTRS GMR 
tried to accomplish too much and was constantly shifting hardware design and software 
requirements throughout the development phase. Furthermore, JTRS failed to adopt an 
agile approach that would have allowed for user feedback throughout the development 
process—instead, the program adopted a waterfall methodology that only allowed users to 
interact with the system after 13 years of development, by which point the problems in GMR 
were solidified and difficult to reverse (Gallagher, 2012). At the same time, developments in 
commercial SDR led industry to develop radios outside the JTRS program that provided 
capabilities the JTRS program had not been able to deliver. As a result, the JTRS GMR 
program was terminated in 2011. 
Some programmatic descendants of the JTRS program are continuing to move 
forward. MIDS/JTRS has been successfully integrated onto platforms both in the United 
States and sold overseas, allowing for increased data interoperability between NATO 
countries. Both JTRS HMS and AMF has been fielded at low-rate initial production and its 
variants continue to be tested (Gallagher, 2018). 
Section 3: Barriers to Adaptable Systems 
While the case for the use of adaptable systems in defense is strong and there is a 
history of developing such systems in certain instances, there are reasons why such 
systems are not widespread. There are substantial barriers to the development and 
deployment of adaptable systems inherent in the defense acquisition system. It is crucial to 
understand what these barriers are and how they operate in order to develop an approach 
to overcoming them. 
Design of the Traditional Acquisition System 
For the DoD, adaptable systems are essential to fully leverage the capabilities of 
existing technologies to meet future warfighting needs. Software-defined, adaptable systems 
will play an increasingly critical role going forward. But these types of systems test the limits 
of the current acquisition system, which is accustomed to acquiring systems in a much more 
tightly defined and linear manner. As a result, the DoD has struggled to evolve at the same 
pace as commercial technology. The defense acquisition system was originally focused on 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) with long development cycles, enormous 
quantities, and tightly defined requirements because the system was designed to provide 
oversight to high-value hardware systems that were planned to remain in production for 
decades. 
MDAPs almost always begin with highly detailed, highly defined requirements that 
specify in advance what threats a system is likely to confront and how it is expected to 
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operate in military missions. While useful, this approach introduces the risk of over 
specifying systems toward problems which may morph rapidly over the long development 
and delivery time scales of defense acquisition.   
The DoD 5000.02 acquisition milestone process is designed to progressively reduce 
technical risk by proceeding through discreet phases of development, test, and evaluation 
before entering full-rate production (DoD, 2015). If upgrade increments are planned, they 
are usually executed serially, not simultaneously. There are high transaction costs for 
change and high thresholds for justifying a new increment. Communication between the 
different elements of the acquisition system are organized around acquisition milestones 
and toward executing Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) directives. Such events are rare, 
and the stakes are high because the system is loath to deviate from or reverse these 
decisions. 
However, adaptable systems (like other software-oriented development efforts) work 
best when developed in conjunction with frequent iterative feedback loops throughout the 
process. Under an adaptable systems approach, acquisition programs would be engaged 
simultaneously in development, production, and sustainment, which are not easily 
disentangled for review according to the traditional milestones. Instead, adaptable systems 
require continuous communication on requirements, budgets, and acquisition benchmarks. 
Traditional acquisition metrics can be a major problem for adaptable systems. The 
Earned Value Management System (EVMS) is a common tool for measuring progress in 
acquisition programs. It is designed around breaking down a program’s master schedule 
throughout its entire development into discrete work packages that register as earned value 
when they are completed at or below expected costs. EVMS as traditionally implemented, 
however, requires an almost entirely static program baseline, to function. When the content 
of work packages is subject to continuous change, the ability of EVMS to meaningfully track 
progress on the program decays rapidly. Given this contrast between the DoD 5000.02 
acquisition system’s need for discreet acquisition phases and benchmarks and adaptable 
systems’ more fluid development processes, the traditional approach to acquisition hinders 
the critical elements for success for an adaptable system.  
Budgeting 
Current acquisition budgeting also presents roadblocks for adaptable system given 
the defense acquisition system orientation around MDAPs. Budgets for acquisition programs 
provide prescriptive funding at levels set years in advance that may be incompatible with the 
rapidly evolving needs of an adaptable system. Adaptable systems consider multiple new 
and expanded features for the upgrade cycle simultaneously. They will struggle in a budget 
process that requires both projections five years into the future for every technology 
insertion and detailed production and sustainment plans before moving forward on allocating 
development resources. There is precious little evidence of success in technology 
development that is budgeted outside of an MDAP and then transitioning into a major 
system, something that would have to happen frequently for adaptable systems to realize 
their true promise. 
The DoD’s budgeting process also includes separate “colors of money” for research 
and development, production, and operation and maintenance designed to support systems 
as they move through the acquisition lifecycle. Adaptable systems, however, do not move 
through the acquisition lifecycle in a linear way. They are almost constantly engaged in 
development, production, and sustainment simultaneously. While it is entirely possible for 
programs to budget multiple colors of money at the same time, it is almost inevitable with 
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adaptable systems that these budget estimates will not keep pace with program 
developments creating the need for constant reprogramming of funds. 
The multifunctionality of adaptable systems is also a major challenge for a budget 
process that organizes around distinct program offices and organizational lines of 
responsibility. A multifunctional adaptable system is difficult to procure in an acquisition and 
budget system accustomed to handling major functions such as communications, 
battlespace awareness, and electronic warfare as separate systems, procured by separate 
offices, using separate budgets. 
Misaligned Business Incentives 
Business incentives for industry can be misaligned for adaptable systems. Prime 
contractors derive their return on investment from anticipated work shares and the 
integration of known technologies. Configuration and design churn from adaptable systems 
could undermine prime contractor profitability and also create business uncertainty for first 
and second tier subcontractors whose business may be displaced. Additionally, defense 
prime contractors complain that adoption of iterative development methods is hampered by 
DoD contract requirements of documentation, milestone reviews, and incentives based on 
traditional waterfall-based models (Defense Science Board, 2018). 
Rigid contract structures, such as fixed price development contracts, are a 
substantial barrier to the development of adaptable systems. Because these contract 
structures create powerful incentives for the government and the contractor to try to stick to 
the original contract terms to the letter, the ability to dynamically reshape program content 
and add capability is effectively precluded. 
As RAND’s Jonathan Wong (2016) has noted,  
If the Pentagon wants to reproduce the speedy results of rapid 
acquisition programs in peacetime, it must find more direct and efficient 
ways to determining effectiveness that involve the operational user 
earlier—and not penalize the contractor and the military for going back to 
the drawing board when something does not work. 
Lack of In-House Technical Expertise 
Both in-house technical expertise as well as external partners are essential for 
adaptable systems in delivering the technical level of software engineering needed as well 
as establishing appropriate requirements for software functionality. The DoD has struggled 
to acquire top software talent, which makes it difficult for all parties to speak in a common 
language and communicate software-based problems, as well as interact effectively with 
developers and testers to communicate needs, understand opportunities, and test 
performance. This has made it challenging to plan for and takes time to deploy upgrades to 
operating fleets and to train personnel on how to use them. Software-based systems not 
only require the necessary software talent but also the understanding of process and 
expectations from both commanders and policymakers. Finally, even as new systems are 
built to incorporate adaptability, the DoD is faced with the challenges of backward 
compatibility, cross-system interoperability, and increased variation in existing systems. This 
complicates both training and sustainment.   
Section 4: Enablers  
A variety of enablers exist to overcome or mitigate these barriers. Overall, these 
enablers encourage earlier and more rapid testing, flexibility in funding, requirements and 
new designs that are base platform/open architecture with ability to add on new, 
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interoperable software-based payloads/capabilities that are each advancing with iterative 
and continuous development. They must also incorporate distributed, continual, and agile 
testing based on shared core architecture to make sure each update is integrated 
effectively, does not interfere with other component. 
MOSA and Adaptable Architecture 
MOSA enables adaptable systems by easing the process of integrating and 
replacing subsystems and components, as well as enabling flexibility, competition, and 
opportunities for distributed development. Architectures that are designed for adaptability 
from the ground-up make flexibility easier. This includes building systems that can easily 
incorporate new software-defined capabilities. MOSA should be a baseline 
expectation whenever a system will require adaptability. 
Army Major General Bruce T. Crawford has explained that “the industrial base that 
supports the Department of Defense has been using software to modernize, instead of focusing on 
just hardware as the mechanism by which they've been able to increase capability.” Software 
modernization in an open-architecture environment enabled this approach (Osborn, 2017). 
Open standards allow for many different developers to contribute to a system over 
time, regardless of whether they were involved in the initial system development. This allows 
for more freedom of innovation and application due to dispersed development. According to 
Nick Guertin, senior software systems engineer at the Carnegie Mellon University Software 
Engineering Institute, MOSA “has helped the Defense Department improve its buying 
power. It opens up the market opportunities for the greatest possible number of buyers” 
(Brust, 2018). 
In addition, MOSA can help outline possible modernization paths going 
forward. Maj Gen Zabel said, 
Open mission systems is a requirement for how every new system is built … and 
we are finding that it’s been a great advantage in not only opening us up 
immediately to a larger part of the industrial base, but also giving us … a step by 
step modernization path. (Owens, 2017) 
Incremental and Iterative Development 
A variety of tools for incremental and iterative development can be adopted for 
software-based systems. These include the adoption of commercial software development 
techniques, such as agile development, DevOps, and development sprints, which enable 
adaptable systems by providing a foundation for iterative change and reducing, especially if 
combined with oversight regimes that eliminate the rigid predictability demands of the 
current acquisition system. Software-defined systems, if built for flexibility and adaptability, 
can prolong the effective lifecycle of their base hardware platforms while lowering cost of 
technology currency and potentially simplify hardware sustainment through reduced 
obsolescence.   
According to Vice Admiral Mat Winter, Program Executive Officer for the F35, 
 
The current acquisition strategy has us doing a serial [and] 
sequential design, develop, integrate, test [and] deliver strategy. I’m not 
convinced that’s the most efficient and effective way, most importantly, to 
deliver and continuously deliver capability to our war fighters … as we go 
beyond Block 3F. 
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Winter has worked to develop more of an adaptable systems approach to F-35 
upgrades as part of the continuous development and delivery approach. “I am going to be 
asking the system to do things it’s never done before,” he said. “I’m asking the system to do 
true model-based systems engineering simultaneously with capabilities-based testing. The 
same time. With DT [developmental testing] and OT [operational testing happening at the] 
same time. Real time. Allowing us to be able to truly change the way we contract and cost 
estimate” (Insinna, 2017). 
Increased User Feedback and Testing 
Increased user feedback is necessary for software-based adaptable systems to both 
improve the functionality of the system, as well as incorporate the desired changes in real 
time. Increased feedback loops, a critical part of the agile process, will make sure the 
product that is delivered is the product the warfighter actually needs. This means increased 
use of things like prototyping, which provides real-time testing of systems in warlike 
environments, and expanding the use of virtual twin testing, where deployed systems can 
take real-time data and interact in real-time environments. For example, the Navy currently 
uses versions of virtual twin testing for its combat systems “so that new technologies can be 
tested by the crew and commanders before its uploaded into the main combat system, a 
hedge against reaping unintended consequences by uploading a feature or patch without 
knowing exactly how it will fit into the ship’s systems” (Larter, 2018). The army has 
implemented the use of beta-testing squadrons in order to field systems in real 
environments in Europe as well (Pawlyk, 2017). The air force is using a virtual twin 
prototyping approach for its program to reengine the B-52 bomber (Mayfield, 2019). 
Increasing user feedback has a number of benefits. It recognizes that requirements 
and perceived optimal design may not actually operate as expected or anticipated. 
Additionally, this process encourages innovation among developers and the user 
community. “Maybe all the requirements aren’t met at the first go, but you have something 
that you can put in the hands of the operator and they can use it,” explained Air Force 
General Ellen Pawlikowski. “Once you put it in the hands of the operator, maybe some of 
the requirements you had in the beginning don’t make sense anymore, because [operators] 
see how they can actually use it and requirements change” (Owens, 2017). This means the 
traditional system to create test and evaluation as a separate phase from development is 
incompatible with iterative development. Even as systems are fielded, they will always be in 
a state of evaluation and upgrade. Air Force Maj Gen Zabel states, “In order to do that you 
need to integrated development and test to make sure that what you’re delivering to the field 
is actually worth delivering to the field” (Owens, 2017). 
Finally, faster user feedback and real-time testing assists in developing software that 
can adapt to new environments and problems are emerging in close-to real time. Currently, 
the feedback time for warfighters to deliver input back from the field is too long to 
incorporate the changes into software in a timely manner. The DoD is therefore losing an 
opportunity to gain advantage. 
Budgeting for Adaptable Systems and Flexible Funding 
Budgeting for adaptable systems involves multiple aspects. In the first instance, it 
means budgeting within programs with the recognition that an adaptable system will not 
make a linear progression through development to production to sustainment. Rather, the 
program will be involved simultaneously in all three phases, with funding to support 
continuous software development remaining at a fairly constant level throughout most of the 
system’s lifecycle. Different services have adopted different budgeting strategies for 
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software development, but the need to adopt budget mechanisms to support this is 
consistent across the DoD (McQuade, 2019, pp. 31–32). 
The Defense Innovation Board has specifically recommended a new category of 
appropriation for software that would cover software activities currently funded variously 
through the operation and maintenance; procurement; and research, development, test, and 
evaluation appropriations (McQuade & Murray, 2019). Such a new appropriation would 
provide substantial flexibility in funding software development and fielding needs with a 
minimum of process friction compared to today’s budgeting system. Existing tools could also 
be modified to reduce the friction currently caused by the need to reprogram funds from one 
appropriation to the another to facilitate agile software development. Helpful measures 
include clarifying and narrowing the definition of new starts, reducing the rigidity in colors of 
money so that reprogramming requests are less often necessary, broadening budget 
justification language to cover broader scopes for research and development, and providing 
more readily used mechanisms for adjusting color of money. 
Budgeting for adaptable systems can also mean creating programmatic space 
outside of MDAPs for maturing subsystem technologies that may have application across 
multiple platforms. Congress provided a potential framework for this approach in the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 by creating funds in each 
service for subsystem and component development and prototyping (NDAA, 2016). This 
approach would allow the military services to budget significant funding for research and 
development for technologies not directly associated with a program of record (and 
therefore likely not tied to a program of record requirement). Currently, the Small Business 
Innovative Research program is one of the only significant sources of R&D funding outside 
of programs of record, but the SBIR program is not accessible to firms that are not small 
businesses. Increased use of portfolio-based acquisition management may also be an 
enabler for more technology development outside of MDAPs (ACT-IAC, 2019). The Section 
809 panel records managing acquisition more on a broad portfolio basis rather than focusing 
on individual programs of record. Such an approach could allow for technology developed in 
a portfolio to be adopted widely among adaptable systems within the portfolio. 
Contracting Mechanisms 
Contracting mechanisms that best support adaptable systems are likely to be those 
that foster collaboration between the government and the prime contractor. The more 
collaboration there is in this relationship, the less effort that is required to establish tight 
specifications for every aspect of work. This suggests that it would be challenging, if not 
impossible, to carry out an adaptable systems program in a fixed price for development 
contracting model. Other Transaction Authority agreements (OTAs) and flexible contracting 
mechanisms, such as multiple award IDIQs, can allow for more flexibility in contracting for 
adaptable systems that can readily add and subtract work scope as needed. In cases where 
the collaboration may require coordination across large elements of an industrial sector the 
use of consortia and alternative competitive constructs may facilitate the coordination and 
continuous evolution of requirements throughout the acquisition process. 
The Section 809 Panel recommendations for acquisition of technology that is readily 
available, and readily available with modification, can facilitate contracting for adaptable 
systems (ACT-IAC, 2019). Similarly, the Defense Innovation Board has proposed a 
streamlined authority creating software acquisition pathways that can provide a useful 
mechanism for adaptable systems, particularly for systems that were not original set up to 
be adaptable systems that are transitioning toward an adaptable systems structure 
(McQuade & Murray, 2019). 
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Dynamic Marketplace 
A dynamic marketplace approach to working with industry, especially in acquiring 
technology with strong commercial elements, is recommended by the congressionally 
mandated panel on acquisition streamlining, also known as the Section 809 Panel (ACT-
IAC, 2019). The dynamic marketplace approach involves fostering competition by obtaining 
proposals from industry prior to establishing discrete performance requirements. The goal of 
this approach is to leverage commercial innovation and non-traditional partners, 
placing military mission at the center of government/industry dialogue. Industry consortia 
can be a good enabler for many of these discussions. The dynamic market place approach 
can support adaptable systems by encouraging commercial practitioners of agile software 
development approaches to participate in defense acquisition and by reducing the impetus 
to define highly detailed performance requirements at the front end of acquisition programs. 
Functionally-Aligned Workforce and Increased Training in SW Expertise 
A functionally-aligned workforce and increased training in software expertise will also 
enable leadership and understanding of the opportunities posed by adaptable systems. With 
leadership buy-in, the DoD can specify technical career tracks, adjust for competitive talent 
acquisition, cross-service collaboration, develop a broader knowledge across the 
Department of Technology and offer competitive compensation for potential applicants. 
Air Force Chief Technology Officer Frank Konieczny has discussed how the human 
element is a major factor in the success of agile software development in the Air Force. 
Turnover in the work force and challenges in tracking programming skills as part of a career 
field when making assignments make it difficult to have personnel continuity and the right 
mix of skills in pursuing agile software development (Williams, 2018). 
The DoD must enhance its talent by both leveraging current expertise as well as 
attracting and retaining new talent. Specifying technical career tracks and establishing 
competitive compensation will significantly help. According to the NDS, the DoD plans to 
“emphasize new skills and complement our current workforce with information experts, data 
scientists, computer programmers, and basic science researchers and engineers—to use 
information, not simply manage it” (DoD, 2018).  
Issues with the workforce are not limited to dealing with the development and 
management of software expertise among those writing and working directly with software. 
As emphasized in the workforce recommendations of the Defense Science Board study on 
software acquisition, the DoD also needs to increase software awareness and 
understanding among program managers and program executive officers as well as in 
managers in industry (Defense Science Board, 2018). Establishing a culture supportive of 
adaptable systems will take time and will entail taking a different view of risk. According to 
DIUx Managing Partner Raj Shah, “For us internally, if a team or project team really 
stretches to try a technology or approach that’s really novel but there’s technical risk 
involved … technology risk is acceptable and for a certain level we encourage it” (Carberry, 
2017). 
Section 5: Overall Strategy 
While the enablers required for adaptable systems already exist and do not 
necessarily need new authorities to be implemented, actually combining these tools in an 
effective and coordinated way remains difficult. It is ultimately essential to understand how 
these enablers work together and begin a larger environmental transition toward their use. 
While elements across the DoD are taking steps to implement a variety of the enablers listed 
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above, the use of many of them is still comparatively rare and it is even rarer to see several 
of them used together. 
In order to achieve success in the acquisition of adaptable systems, the DoD may 
consider the creation of a clearly defined adaptable systems lane. The DoD currently 
describes its Adaptive Acquisition Framework as one that includes a variety of approaches 
including the Section 804 Middle Tier of Acquisition approach, rapid acquisition, and 
traditional acquisition. This framework could be expanded to include an adaptable systems 
lane as well. Systems in the adaptable systems lane would default to the use of the enablers 
described above rather than using them by exception. More traditional approaches could still 
be used, but they would be the exceptions in the adaptable systems lane. If an adaptable 
systems lane were created, however, it would be important to ensure that it not monopolize 
the use of these enablers. The goal of this effort is to enhance the ability of program 
managers and other acquisition leaders to appropriately use the right tools to acquire 
adaptable systems, not to impose limitations or straightjackets on them. 
Conclusion 
Deploying systems that are adaptable and agile is not just a technology strategy, but 
a security imperative. Success will ultimately depend on the DoD’s ability to adjust rapidly to 
uncertainty in threats—nimble adversaries, new domains, and unanticipated applications of 
technology utilizations. Our current acquisition debate is currently failing to directly address 
the changing nature of what we need to be buying, and as a result, we may be heading 
towards another round of acquisition reform recriminations in a few years. A successful 
approach to adaptable systems requires using the enablers identified in this report to 
overcome the barriers to adaptable systems. 
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Abstract 
There is ample evidence that cyber-attacks and cyber warfare are a growing concern 
for the United States. Our warfighting systems and networks have inherent vulnerabilities 
and so are targets for cyber adversaries. By nature, cyber warfare is an asynchronous 
strategy, so the danger posed by a cyber threat is not proportional to the size of the entity 
initiating the attack. The United States’ traditional adversaries, state and non-state actors, 
domestic terrorists, and even individuals can pose an equally dangerous threat. 
The various types and astonishing number of cyber-attacks on the DoD has focused 
efforts to limit exposure to cyber-attacks and mitigate unavoidable vulnerabilities. The most 
effective way to “harden” systems against potential cyber-attacks is to develop the system 
with a cyber warfare mindset. To do this, program managers must have an in-depth 
understanding of their system’s cyber vulnerabilities and exercise control over the design 
and configuration of those vulnerable subsystems. 
There are several challenges in both understanding and controlling a system’s cyber 
vulnerabilities, including that the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is designed to cede 
most of the design decisions to the contractor. All known and potential cyber vulnerabilities 
need to be treated as system Configuration Item, so that design and configuration is under 
government control. 
Fortunately, there are tools, techniques, and analyses that can augment the DAS to 
gain a better understanding and provide more control over the design and configuration of 
those subsystems presenting cyber vulnerabilities. This research analyzes the integration of 
these tools and the expected improvement in cyber performance resulting from the 
implementation. The tools include the integration of the Maintainability, Upgradeability, 
Interoperability, Reliability, and Safety/Security (MUIRS) analyses; Software Engineering 
Institute’s Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW); Software Engineering Institute’s Architecture 
Trade-off Analysis Methodologysm; and the Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA). 
Background 
Hardly a day has gone by during my tenure at Cyber Command that we have not 
seen at least one significant cybersecurity event occurring somewhere in the world. We face 
a growing variety of advanced threats from actors who operate with ever-more sophistication 
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and precision. —Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (Pellerin, 
2017) 
Threats from cyber-attacks have clearly emerged as one of the most significant 
threats to the United States and to the Department of Defense (DoD). The sources of attack 
are varied and include state and non-state actors, traditional adversaries, as well as 
domestic sources. The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) cyber-attacks has added to 
the threat significantly. “Automation and artificial intelligence are beginning to ‘make 
profound changes to the cyber domain,’ a threat that the military hasn’t yet fully grasped 
how to counter, Robert Behler, the Defense Department’s director of operational test and 
evaluation, said” (Capaccio, 2019). 
Cyber-attack is an extremely effective, asynchronous warfare tactic, meaning that 
adversaries that could not possibly face the U.S. military can still be very effective in the 
cyber environment. While traditional adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran 
are certainly players in the cyber-warfare arena, non-state actors, domestic terrorists, and 
even individuals can pose a disproportionate threat in the cyber world.  
The relatively inexpensive cyber options being employed today by 
both state and non-state hacking groups make it an incredibly efficient 
“leveler” of power. A small group of hackers using simple spear-phishing 
tactics, for example, can have massive impact on military installations, 
government operations, critical infrastructure and potentially even weapons 
systems. (Martini, 2016) 
Obviously, this opens up the cyber-threat adversaries list to an unimaginable number that 
would be nearly impossible to manage or even prioritize. 
The types and sophistication of cyber-attacks are growing exponentially. Denial-of-
Service (DoS) or Directed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have impacts on 
communications, networks, internet, intranet, and systems using Global Positioning System 
(GPS) to name a few. Malicious software (malware) is a common cyber-attack methodology 
that can take several forms from passive collection of data to destructive applications 
designed to destroy or disrupt operating systems. Spoofing is the introduction of erroneous 
or misleading information into systems that can dramatically affect operations and can even 
include voice or video communications assembled by AI that appear to be authentic, but are 
compilations from available sources. Can you imagine getting verbal commands in the 
recognized voice of the commander that are realistic in appearance, but totally constructed 
by AI? Take-over of systems is certainly of concern and in 2011, Iran claimed that it took 
over a U.S. RQ-170 surveillance drone, although that is disputed by the United States. It 
was not clear how Iran acquired the drone intact. Some U.S. experts dismiss the possibility 
that Iran could hack and then take over the drone’s controls, as Iran claims. And yet similar 
disruptions have proven possible in other battlefields, notably with the Iran-backed 
Hezbollah militia in Lebanon and drones from Israel.  
“Those jamming capabilities exist, and a lot of them are not as new as we 
would like to imagine,” says former U.S. Navy electronics warfare officer 
Densmore. “Anything that has a sensor, that takes communications links—
as does the RQ-170, which has two, one for the satellite, and the other is 
line-of-sight with the ground control station—all it takes is disrupting that.” 
(Peterson, 2011) 
In 2015, the FBI filed a report regarding a United Airlines passenger who had repeatedly 
gained engine thrust controls of Boeing 737 airliners through the entertainment port: 
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During the conversations, [FBI investigating special agent Mark] 
Hurley wrote, [Chris] Roberts disclosed that he had previously hacked into 
IFE [in-flight entertainment] systems, manufactured by Panasonic and 
Thales—which provide video monitors in the passenger seatbacks—about 
15 or 20 times on various flights between 2011 and 2014. According to the 
document, Roberts said he gained access to the systems by plugging his 
own laptop computer into the IFE system’s electronic boxes mounted under 
passenger seats. Once in the system, he said he was able to access other 
systems—including the jets’ Thrust Management Computer, which is 
responsible for providing power to the plane’s engines. (Ware, 2015)  
Software hacking with active systems designed to destroy, take over, or spoof 
software applications have exploded. In addition, stealthy software attacks designed to 
gather data, log keystrokes, or lay in wait for a particular event, peer connection, or timing 
event are more and more common. In short, there appears to be no end to the types of 
cyber-attacks or the combinations and permeations of those known today.  
The methods for conducting cyber warfare appear to be continuing to expand, and 
with AI-generated attacks, the differing types of attacks are likely to continue to expand. The 
proliferation of types of cyber-attacks was one of the drivers for the transition from the 
Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Program (DIACAP), which 
tended to be a terminal process once the certificate was issued, to the Risk Management 
Framework (RMF), which is a continuous risk management process. While this is a logical 
approach given the constantly advancing cyber threats, it causes more work for the PM as 
the iterative process will be examined numerous times during the developmental process. 
DoD Acquisition Cyber Exposure 
An ever-increasing number of DoD weapon systems are leveraging technology that, 
unfortunately, places them in danger of cyber-attacks. The DoD’s warfighting systems have 
degrees of dependence on GPS, communications, networks, and software, which all have 
opportunities for cyber vulnerabilities. The DoD is in the process of developing more 
extensive networks to leverage the inherent advantages with the communication 
capabilities, as well as the situational awareness that networks can provide. These more 
extensive networks will include more and more platforms, thus increasing their cyber 
vulnerabilities, as well. All of these will be extremely valuable cyber targets for adversaries. 
The advantages of the system technologies and networks will continue to be desired by the 
DoD, so planning effectively to counter cyber vulnerabilities will be a reality for system and 
network developers. 
This all means that the DoD will continue to develop systems and networks with 
inherent cyber vulnerabilities, managing those vulnerabilities with a continuous RMF 
process. This puts the program manager (PM) in a nearly constant state of cyber 
vulnerability assessment, reacting to the ever-emerging cyber threats from the vast array of 
entities involved in cyber warfare against the United States. This could potentially require 
significant time and resources to track and assess every emerging cyber threat and perform 
a vulnerability assessment on the system under development.  
The PM cannot control the emergence of new cyber threats, so must concentrate on 
what can be controlled: the system’s cyber vulnerabilities. Understanding the system’s 
vulnerabilities allows the PM to quickly and efficiently assess any new cyber threat and 
quickly perform an RMF iteration to verify the severity of the threat and any mitigation efforts 
available. The PM must identify all system potential or actual cyber vulnerabilities and take 
control of managing the design and architecture of each one. All cyber vulnerabilities must 
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be designated as a Configuration Item (CI), placing it under government control, or at least 
be treated the same way as a CI. 
Barriers to Effective Cyber Performance Design 
There are significant barriers to achieving a complete understanding of any system’s 
vulnerabilities, but overcoming these barriers is a key to being able to rapidly respond to 
new cyber threats. Any communications conducted by the system are a potential 
vulnerability, but especially wireless communications such as those used by unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), transmitting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, 
systems using GPS or other guidance/positioning information, and many autonomic systems 
that passively transmit system health data. While this seems to be rather straight forward, 
some commercial components may have communications abilities that are not apparent. For 
example, virtually all cell phones include an FM radio chip that can be activated: “That’s 
right; today’s smartphones have a built-in FM chip that gives them the ability to receive radio 
signals in your area” (OPB, n.d.). An in-depth understanding of any subsystem capable of 
transmitting or receiving information is required. 
System software development is a particular challenge in ensuring that any cyber 
vulnerability is known. The software must be engineered carefully to minimize vulnerabilities, 
and significant design and engineering needs to be included for software-intensive systems 
to be able to self-check for cyber intrusion attempts. For example, cyber vulnerabilities could 
be significantly reduced if the software application could detect and immediately report any 
attempt to modify or add software lines of code, or access to system software at all. Any 
authorized access or maintenance activities would need to have a rigorous authentication 
protocol to ensure only authorized access or changes were accepted.  
Software engineering needs to be conducted with cyber vulnerabilities as a hard 
parameter. One of the challenges in software engineering is to keep the software from 
communicating and interacting with other connected software systems or modules. The 
Boeing 737 example of accessing flight controls through the entertainment system is a good 
example of this concept. With all of the engineering discipline needed to reduce cyber 
vulnerabilities, using commercial software or reused software is extremely problematic, if not 
impossible. Any existing software to be added to the architecture of a developmental system 
would have to be thoroughly vetted and the inner working known to a very high degree. With 
most commercial software, this is not possible as the DoD does not own the data rights and 
they are most often not obtainable because there is so much of the commercial company’s 
proprietary practices evident in the code. In addition, there are a significant number of 
coders who code in what is known as a “back door” to the software that allows them access, 
bypassing the normal security protocols built into the programs.  
The National Grid could be at risk of a cyber attack after a hacker group 
linked to China create a “back door” in software used by big businesses. 
Companies at risk from this latest attack include American weapons firm 
Lockheed Martin, Russian energy supplier Gazprom and French bank 
Société Générale. (Tarrant-Cornish, 2017) 
This means that software reuse and using most commercial software would be 
nearly impossible when considering potential cyber vulnerabilities unless the engineering 
structure was completely known and verified to ensure that any potential cyber 
vulnerabilities associated with the reused code were understood and included in the risk 
management. While this seems logical, the amount of software engineering needed to 
achieve this in the reused software may actually exceed the engineering effort in the original 
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design and build of the app. Again, this presupposes that the original software is even 
accessible, which is not the case in most commercial software. 
The Challenge 
The PM must have control and insight to the system architecture, build processes, 
and verification methodologies that far surpasses the current state of practice in the DoD 
acquisition environment to gain control of known and future cyber threats.  
This challenge is exacerbated by the existing DoD acquisition environment for 
developing systems.  
Since the implementation of Acquisition Reform in the nineties, detailed 
specifications have been replaced with performance specifications in order 
to leverage the considerable experience and expertise available in the 
defense contractor base. In most hardware-centric engineering disciplines, 
the expertise that the DoD seeks to leverage, includes a mature 
engineering environment in which materials, standards, tools, techniques, 
and processes are widely accepted and implemented by industry leaders. 
This engineering maturity helps to account for derived and implied 
requirements not explicitly stated in the performance specification. 
(Naegle, 2014, p. 8) 
The DoD requirements generation system has been designed to provide the 
contractor with performance specifications to be met within some parameters. In short, the 
design control and engineering has been placed in the hands of the contractor to leverage 
the advancements obtained in the commercial sector. In the current and rapidly advancing 
cyber warfare environment, the DoD now finds that it needs to have much more positive 
control of the engineering design and build processes that it had significantly ceded to the 
contractor. 
A Way Forward 
Fortunately, there are existing analyses, tools, and techniques that can augment the 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS) to gain more insight and control over the critical cyber 
design elements. I have previously researched several of these and integrated them into the 
DAS.  
Tools, Techniques, and Processes 
The tools, techniques, and processes are briefly described as follows.  
• The Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI’s) Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW) 
• The Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability, Reliability, & Safety and 
Security (MUIRS) analytic technique 
• The Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodology 
(ATAMsm) 
• The Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW)  
The QAW is primarily a method for more fully developing system software 
requirements and is intended to provide stakeholders’ input about their needs and 
expectations from the software (Barbacci et al., 2003, p. 1). As the system requirements are 
developed, software quality attributes are identified and become the basis for designing the 
software architecture. By adding in the desired system cyber performance as a system 
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quality attribute, software design activities will necessarily include analyses of possible 
system cyber vulnerabilities as part of the design process. 
The Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI’s) Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW) is 
implemented before the software architecture has been created and is intended to provide 
stakeholder input about their needs and expectations from the software (Naegle, 2007). The 
QAW process provides a vehicle for keeping the combat developer and user community 
involved in the DoD acquisition process, which is a key goal of that process. In addition, the 
QAW includes scenario-building processes that are essential for the software developer to 
design the software system architecture (Barbacci et al., 2003, pp. 9–11). These scenarios 
will continue to be developed and prioritized after contract award to provide context to the 
quality attribute identified for the system.  
Although the QAW would certainly be useful after contract award, conducting the 
workshop between combat developers/users and the program management office before 
issuance of the Request for Proposal (RFP) would provide an improved understanding of 
the requirements, including cyber performance, enhance the performance-specification 
preparation, and improve the ability of the prospective contractors to accurately propose the 
cost and schedule. This approach would support the goals of the System Requirements 
Review (SRR), which is designed to ascertain whether all derived and implied requirements 
have been sufficiently defined (Naegle & Petross, 2007, pp. 5–6). 
The QAW process is primarily designed to more fully develop system software 
requirements so that the government Request for Proposal (RFP) is clearer to potential 
contractors. In turn, the resulting proposals should be more accurate and realistic, reducing 
requirements and project scope creep. This is critical in communicating the cyber security 
expectations of the system so that they remain a priority when designing the system 
(Naegle, 2014, p. 25). 
Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability/Interfaces, Reliability, and 
Safety/Security (MUIRS) Analytic Technique 
The MUIRS analytic technique is designed to provide a framework for better 
understanding of essential supportability and safety/security aspects that the warfighter 
needs and expects, but often doesn’t communicate clearly with the capabilities-based 
JCIDS documents. This analytic technique helps compensate for the immature software 
engineering environment as the MUIRS analysis illuminates the derived and implied 
requirements that the immature environment cannot (Naegle, 2014, p. 25). 
Much of the software supportability and safety/security performance that typically 
lacks consideration and is not routinely addressed in the software engineering environment 
can be captured through development and analysis of the MUIRS elements. Analyzing the 
warfighter requirements in a QAW framework for performance in each MUIRS area will help 
stakeholders identify software quality attributes that need to be communicated to potential 
software contractors (Naegle, 2006, pp. 17–24). The system safety and security (the “S” in 
MUIRS) would certainly address the cyber performance and vulnerabilities as part of the 
analysis process. The MUIRS analysis assists the QAW process by focusing on those 
elements that are, too often, overlooked during the requirements generation process.  
MUIRS primarily addresses the immature software engineering environment as it 
provides an analytic approach for critical sustainment and safety/security attributes that are 
often missing, weakly articulated, or vaguely stated in the requirements produced. With its 
capabilities and performance-based requirements processes, the DoD significantly depends 
on mature engineering environments to “fill the gaps” left from the requirements generation 
and communication processes, but the software engineering environment is unable to do so. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 43 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
The MUIRS analysis is also an enabler for the QAW and ATAMsm architectural processes 
discussed next (Naegle, 2014, p. 25). 
Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodology (ATAMsm) 
The Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Trade-off Analysis Methodology 
ATAMSM (ATAM) is an architectural analysis tool designed to evaluate design decisions 
based on the quality attribute requirements of the system being developed. The 
methodology is a process for determining whether the quality attributes are achievable by 
the architecture as it has been conceived before enormous resources have been committed 
to that design. One of the main goals is to gain insight into how the quality attributes trade-
off against each other (Kazman et al., 2000, p. 1). Obviously, the system’s capabilities will 
necessarily be traded off with their inherent cyber vulnerabilities as part of the ATAM 
process. Those unavoidable cyber vulnerabilities will then need to be mitigated throughout 
the design of the system. 
Within the Systems Engineering Process (SEP), the ATAM provides the critical 
Requirements Loop process, tracing each requirement or quality attribute to corresponding 
functions reflected in the software architectural design. Whether ATAM or another analysis 
technique is used, this critical SEP process must be performed to ensure that functional- or 
object-oriented designs meet all stated, derived, and implied warfighter requirements. In 
complex systems development such as weapon systems, half or more than half of the total 
software development effort will be expended in the architectural design process. Therefore, 
DoD program managers must ensure that the design is addressing requirements in context 
and that the resulting architecture has a high probability of producing the specified 
warfighters’ capabilities described in the JCIDS documents, with increasing emphasis on the 
cyber performance and vulnerabilities (Naegle, 2014, pp. 26–28). 
The ATAM focuses on quality attribute requirements, so it is critical to have precise 
characterizations for each. To characterize a quality attribute, the following questions must 
be answered: 
• What are the stimuli to which the architecture must respond? 
• What is the measurable or observable manifestation of the quality attribute by 
which its achievement is judged? 
• What are the key architectural decisions that impact achieving the attribute 
requirement? (Kazman, Klein, & Clements, 2000, p. 5) 
The ATAM is designed to elicit the data and information needed to adequately 
address the three questions above. These questions, focused on requirements and quality 
attributes, are user-centric, and so the ATAM scenarios must be constructed by the user 
community (Naegle & Petross, 2007, p. 25). The methodology keys on scenario 
development in three main areas: 
• Use Case Scenarios. As the name suggests, these scenarios describe how the 
system will be used and sustained in the harshest environments envisioned. It 
includes all interoperability requirements and duty cycles as well. These user-
created scenarios convey critical cyber performance information to the system 
developer including who uses it (and how do we know that it is an authorized 
user), how they use it (does it involve communication, sensors, GPS, automated 
inputs, software, etc.), how they maintain it (e.g., would software maintenance be 
done remotely, which would be a huge cyber vulnerability, etc.), how they use it 
(does any of the use or maintenance create cyber vulnerabilities, what does it 
interoperate with, etc.), when and for how long they use and maintain it, and of 
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course, all of the known ways that the adversary will attack the system, including 
cyber. 
• Growth Scenarios. Growth scenarios focus on known and anticipated system 
change requirements over the intended life cycle. These scenarios include 
upgrades and technology refreshments planned; interoperability requirements, 
such as inclusion in future warfighting networks; changes in sustainment 
concepts; and other system changes expected to occur over time. For each 
growth event impacting a cyber vulnerability component, a full Risk Management 
Framework iteration should be planned. 
• Exploratory Scenarios. Exploratory scenarios focus on operations in unusual or 
stressful situations. These address user expectations when the system is 
degraded or operated beyond normal limitations due to emergency created by 
combat environments. These scenarios would necessarily include operations 
while under cyber-attacks of all sorts. The exploratory scenarios include Failure 
Modes and Effects Criticality Analyses (FMECA) to identify the essential 
functions that must not fail. For the DoD, failure modes must include failures that 
are adversary induced, so understanding all vulnerabilities and how they might 
be exploited is essential to these analyses. This would obviously include cyber 
vulnerabilities of all types, which would become the basis for conducting risk 
analyses on all future types and modes of cyber-attack. 
As important to the software engineers, FMECA also identifies those enhancing 
functions that should not preclude the system from functioning when that enhancing function 
is degraded or non-operational. For example, the M1 Abrams tank uses the ambient 
temperature as an enhancer to the main gun accuracy but needs the ability to be fully 
operational in the case where the ambient temperature sensor is malfunctioning. The 
software engineers need that information to properly design the software.  
Testing 
Test cases are developed out of the scenarios, which firmly link the test program with 
the user requirements in the context of the scenarios. This methodology also helps to 
ensure that there are verification events for cyber performance, software, and sustainment 
requirements, which are too often missing from the testing program (Naegle, 2014). 
System cyber testing is extremely challenging, requiring specialized skill sets, such 
as software hackers, communications and sensor experts, and software engineers, to create 
software viruses, worms, and the cyber-attack artificial intelligence entities. In addition, 
significant resources are required to perform some of the cyber-attack scenarios like denial 
of service attacks. The challenges are exacerbated when combining different types of 
attacks in the same scenario, as cyber-attacks often do. 
It is nearly impossible to keep up with the ever-changing cyber threat environments 
that should be represented in system testing, and the potential threats created by AI-based 
cyber-attacks is nearly limitless. This makes it imperative that PMs understand and manage 
their system’s vulnerabilities, and not simply react to the latest iteration of cyber-attack. 
As shown in Figure 1, the ATAM is an integrating function for many of the tools and 
techniques discussed here. It is designed to be an iterative process and would be most 
effective when started in early concept development, then continued through contract 
award, prototyping, and into the design review process. 
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 Quality Attribution Workshop and Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
Methodology Integration Into Life-Cycle Management 
(Naegle & Petross, 2007, p. 25) 
The ATAM process addresses four primary problem areas: 
• The scenario development provides much more operational context than the 
typical Operational Mission Statement/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) provides. This 
level of detail helps to compensate for the immature software engineering 
environment and is critical for the proper design of the software architecture. The 
details provided by the ATAM scenarios helps to inform system designers to 
potential cyber vulnerabilities and is critical to the discovery process and 
optimizing the cyber design. 
• The ATAM serves as a very effective software design metric function. With the 
software development team using 50% or more of the available resources for 
requirements analysis and software design before the Preliminary Design Review 
(PDR), it is critical to have an effective software design metrics function. Any 
significant redesign is extremely costly in both funding and schedule. If the 
design is reacting to cyber threats, the design process will be in chaos. 
Traditional software design metrics focus on the design complexity and do not 
address whether the design is adequate. ATAM directly links the user 
requirements to the system architectural design. 
• As the testing program is developed from the scenarios, it becomes difficult to 
omit any critical testing event. In addition, the system developer understands the 
tests or verification events that must be passed for user acceptance. This would 
feed the Risk Management Framework the valuable information needed to 
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assess the system’s cyber performance. It would also help identify cyber 
vulnerabilities and create mitigation actions. 
• By integrating the MUIRS analyses into the ATAM scenario development, 
sustainability and safety/security aspects cannot easily be omitted from the 
system design. As the testing plan flows from the scenarios, the MUIRS design 
elements will have corresponding test or verification events identified in the test 
plan. All of the MUIRS elements need to be considered for cyber vulnerabilities 
and the safety and security should help drive the cyber performance design 
(Naegle, 2014, pp. 28–29). 
Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
As the title indicates, this analysis methodology is designed to identify system failure 
modes, to identify the effects of those failures on the system, and to ascertain the relative 
criticality of that type of failure. In his book titled Logistics Engineering and Management, 
Benjamin S. Blanchard (2004) describes FMECA as follows: 
Given a description, both in functional and physical terms, the 
designer needs to be able to evaluate a system relative to possible failures, 
the anticipated modes and expected frequency of failure, their causes, their 
consequences and impact(s) on the system overall, and areas where 
preventative measures can be initiated to preclude such failures in the 
future. (p. 275)  
He goes on to state, “The FMECA is an excellent design tool, and it can be applied in the 
development or assessment of any product or process” (Blanchard, 2004, pp. 275– 276). 
Including ATAM FMECA scenarios with the software systems and subsystems 
provides architectural design cues to software engineers. These scenarios provide analysis 
for designing redundant systems for mission-critical elements, “safe mode” operations for 
survivability- and safety-related systems, and drive the software engineer to conduct “what 
if” analyses with a superior understanding of failure-mode scenarios. For example, nearly all 
military aircraft are “fly-by-wire,” with no physical connection between the pilot controls and 
the aircraft-control surfaces, so basic software avionic functions must be provided in the 
event of damage or power-loss situations to give the pilot the ability to perform basic flight 
and navigation functions. Obviously, this would be a major design driver for the software 
architect (Naegle & Petross, 2007). 
The primary problem areas addressed by FMECA include requirements clarification 
and prioritization, and helping to ensure a sound architecture design. This analysis also 
ensures that the most critical software systems are designed with the requisite reliability and 
will continue to function in degraded modes (Naegle, 2014, pp. 29–30). 
The user needs to describe what is expected from the system when a cyber-attack 
occurs. For example, does the system actively counter the attack or merely report the attack 
to operators? How does the system detect and report passive cyber-attacks? What happens 
to system operations when remote nodes lose user authentication, and how is connectivity 
eventually restored? What actions will be taken in a denial of service attack? All known 
system cyber vulnerabilities need to be included in the exploratory scenarios, as this gives a 
baseline for reacting to emerging cyber threats.  
As previously stated, one of the main functions of performing FMECA is to identify 
those software functions that are not critical, and to ensure that failures or anomalies in 
those non-critical functions do not preclude or negatively affect system capabilities. Today’s 
systems typically have numerous enhancing functions that improve performance but are not 
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critical, and the software developers have no way to discern the difference between a critical 
system and an enhancing one without employing FMECA. In addition to identifying those 
non-essential functions, cyber vulnerability analyses need to be conducted on these non-
essential systems as they are a prime target for cyber-attack. Hackers attempt to find the 
path of least resistance to affect a system’s operations, and this path is often through non-
essential functions similar to the hacker going through the in-flight entertainment system to 
access the 737 engine controls. 
Integrating the Tools, Techniques, and Analyses 
All of the tools, techniques, and analyses presented in this research must integrate 
with the existing Defense Acquisition System, or they will not be useful for DoD PMs. Figure 
2 depicts how they integrate in the development of the system from the user requirements 
towards the Critical Design review (CDR). 
 
 
 Tools, Techniques, and Analyses Integration Into Design Activities 
Figure 2 shows how the government (green) controls the early functions and then 
monitors the contractor (blue) efforts in the system design process. The QAW is part of the 
requirements development process and assists in the requirements translation into the 
performance specification for the Request for Proposal (RFP). The requirements are 
formally set in the Systems Engineering Process (SEP) at the System Functional Review 
(SFR) depicted in the figure. The ATAM becomes an integral process within the Design 
Review (purple) iterative process and serves as the government’s input during the early 
design reviews. The ATAM assists with the contractor’s architectural design process and the 
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ATAM test case development contributes to the development of both the contractor and the 
government testing concept development. With the proper focus on cyber performance, the 
system will be designed from the initiation with cyber at the forefront and the testing concept 
will provide validation of cyber vulnerability mitigation efforts. The purposeful design with 
traceable cyber elements and associated testing validation fully supports the tenets of the 
RMF depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
 The DoD Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
(DoD, 2015, p. 4) 
As depicted in Figure 3, the RMF is a continuous and iterative process to continually 
assess the cyber security aspects of a system. Following the RMF steps, it is clear that the 
addition of the tools, techniques, and analyses to the DAS provides a method to conduct the 
RMF assessment from concept to implementation. In step 5, “Authorize,” the system’s Plan 
of Action and Mitigation (POA&M) is submitted as part of the security authorization package 
to the authorizing official (AO), who makes the final cyber risk determination and 
authorization for the system. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The explosive growth of cyber-attack types and variations, especially with the advent 
of AI-generated attack modes, makes it nearly impossible to be reactive to new threats. To 
avoid reacting to every new cyber threat, PMs must thoroughly understand and manage 
their system’s cyber vulnerabilities. To achieve this, PMs must exercise much more control 
over their system’s architectural design than is currently anticipated with the Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS), which cedes much of the design control to the contractor.  
System components that are particularly vulnerable to cyber threats must be 
designated as Configuration Items and the design and configuration management must be 
completely controlled by the government. These include any components that have 
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communications ability, system sensors, virtually all system software, and any other 
components deemed to have cyber vulnerabilities. This has significant implications for using 
commercial components and software, or even reuse of software. To understand the 
system’s cyber vulnerabilities, the system component architecture, including software, must 
be thoroughly understood and controlled. To achieve this in software, the total code 
architecture must be known and most commercial software will not allow that level of 
access, as it is considered proprietary. Commercial software data rights are typically 
unobtainable. Even if data rights could be obtained, the level of engineering effort required 
to understand the inherent cyber vulnerabilities may exceed the effort to actually build the 
software from scratch, reducing or eliminating the acquisition cost advantage. 
The tools, techniques, and analyses presented in this research augment the DAS to 
help the PM gain visibility and control of the system design, which is necessary to gain a 
complete inventory of system cyber vulnerabilities. Effective application of these tools, 
techniques, and analyses helps inform the Risk Management Framework (RMF) cyber 
vulnerability assessment techniques, which is what the RMF authorizing official needs to 
make the final risk assessment and authorization for the system under consideration. 
MUIRS (Maintainability, Upgradeability, Interoperability, Reliability, and 
Safety/Security) Analyses 
The MUIRS analyses was designed to help compensate for the DoD requirements 
generation shortcomings, which too often omit or vaguely articulate performance in each 
one of these areas even though they are important to the warfighter and impact the system 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) significantly. The MUIRS elements also include areas where 
cyber vulnerabilities may exist and these analyses will likely help identify areas for cyber 
vigilance.  
QAW (Software Engineering Institute’s Quality Attribute Workshop) 
While the QAW is a software-oriented technique, it is highly effective in fully 
developing a system’s requirements, including the requirements for cyber performance. It 
was designed to help identify a more complete inventory of requirements, including derived 
and implied requirements not well identified or defined from the JCIDS and RFP 
Performance Specification processes. Including the MUIRS analyses as part of the QAW, 
the resulting requirements inventory is more complete and helps identify potential cyber 
vulnerabilities to be managed and mitigated. 
ATAM (Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Trade-Off Analysis 
Methodologysm ) 
Another software-oriented methodology, ATAM is designed to more fully develop the 
system operational and lifecycle context needed to produce a far superior architectural 
design, especially in software. ATAM is most effective when it integrates the QAW and 
MUIRS processes. It features user-produced scenarios providing operational context detail 
not typically provided in the government-generated Operational Mode Summary/Mission 
Profile (OMS/MP), but absolutely essential for the software engineer to design an effective 
software system. The scenario development is extremely valuable in identifying potential 
areas for cyber vigilance including use cases, growth cases that can identify future 
interoperability needs and technology refreshment events, and exploratory scenarios that 
identify user expectations while the system is under attack, including cyber-attack. The 
exploratory scenarios include system FMECA (Failure Modes and Effects Criticality 
Analysis) scenarios, which can identify both critical and non-critical systems and functions 
that may reveal potential cyber vulnerabilities. 
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FMECA (Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis) 
The “failure modes” analyses include failure modes induced by adversaries through 
attacks or intrusion into the systems, so includes cyber warfare as part of the analyses. The 
“effects” analyses may help in developing cyber vulnerability mitigation strategies. The 
“criticality” analyses are designed to separate the critical from the non-critical failure modes, 
but may also help find non-critical systems that pose substantial cyber vulnerabilities as 
adversaries seek non-critical systems for cyber-attack as they typically have weaker or non-
existent cyber defense mechanisms. 
Summary 
Integrating these tools, techniques, and analyses into the defense acquisition system 
provides the PM a far superior ability to identify, control, and mitigate the system cyber 
vulnerabilities in a cost-effective manner. Managing the system vulnerabilities is a better 
strategy than reacting to the constantly emerging cyber threats and fully supports the DoD 
Risk Management Framework tenets. 
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Contracting Agency, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Wright-
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enterprise, utilizing a $6.4 billion annual budget to provide installation and mission support capabilities 
to 77 Air Force installations, 10 major commands and two direct reporting units. The center also 
serves as the parent organization for 10 detachments co- located at each major command and six 
primary subordinate units including the Air Force Civil Engineer Center, Air Force Financial 
Management Center of Expertise, Air Force Financial Services Center, Air Force Installation 
Contracting Agency, Air Force Security Forces Center and Air Force Services Activity. 
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Joint Center for Flexible Computer Integrated Manufacturing, was the first program manager for 
Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts, and has served as Technical Director of Information 
Technology Initiatives at the Naval Supply Systems Command. In these positions she has developed 
logistics programs for the Department of Defense, implemented one of the first integrated and agile 
data-driven manufacturing systems, and directed the development of complex technical data systems 
for the Navy. 
As the Director of Joint Logistics Systems Center, Ms. Estep carried out the duties of a 
commanding officer for a major subordinate command. In addition, she acted as the Logistics 
Community Manager, an emerging organization to coordinate and implement the revised Defense 
Department logistics strategy for achieving Joint Vision 2010 through modern information techniques 
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and processes. She has also served as Chief Information Officer for the Naval Sea Systems 
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A Study of Financial and Non-Financial Incentives for 
Civilian and Military Program Managers for Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs 
David E. Hunter—joined IDA in 1997 shortly after earning a PhD in operations research from the 
State University of New York at Buffalo, and is currently the Deputy Director of the Cost Analysis 
and Research Division (CARD). During his 20-plus years at IDA, he has led numerous high-
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Tate holds bachelor’s degrees in philosophy and mathematical sciences from the Johns Hopkins 
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[dtate@ida.org] 
Abstract 
The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) was asked to conduct a comprehensive 
study of financial and non-financial incentives for civilian and military program managers 
(PMs) for major defense acquisition programs in response to the requirement in Section 
841(b)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. In this study, 
the IDA team reviewed relevant previous research, interviewed government and industry 
personnel, analyzed data, and identified and assessed incentives to recruit, retain, and 
reward Department of Defense PMs. 
Introduction 
The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) was asked to conduct a 
congressionally-mandated comprehensive study of financial and non-financial incentives 
for civilian and military program managers (PMs) for major defense acquisition programs 
(MDAPs). Specifically, IDA was asked to examine and assess additional pay options for 
PMs to provide incentives to senior civilian employees and military officers to accept and 
remain in PM roles, a financial incentive structure to reward PMs for delivering 
capabilities within budget and on time, and a comparison between financial and non-
financial incentive structures for PMs in the Department of Defense (DoD) and an 
appropriate comparison group of private industry companies. 
IDA took a multi-faceted approach to this assessment, including conducting 
numerous interviews, reviewing the extensive collection of existing literature, and 
collecting and analyzing data on past PMs. A summary of our approach and our main 
findings are described later. A more complete description of our methodology and 
findings can be found in Hunter et al. (2018). 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 58 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
Literature Review 
An extensive body of published literature addresses DoD materiel acquisition, 
including the duties, authority, responsibilities, and performance incentives of DoD PMs. 
Schwartz, Francis, and O’Connor (2016) report that 150 major studies on acquisition 
reform have been published since the end of World War II. The most influential of these 
have articulated that improvement of the acquisition workforce is the key to acquisition 
reform. Most of the official literature that describes the DoD acquisition system makes 
little distinction between a civilian and a military PM (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2017), other than that 
some PM positions are designated as military only (United States Army Acquisition 
Support Center, 2014, p. 19).  
Career Overview 
A DoD PM generally “manages” multiple interrelated projects. Fox (2011, p. 194), 
among others, points out that the duties of DoD managers of large acquisition programs 
are not those classically associated with the term “manager” because the DoD does not 
develop or produce its weapon systems in-house; rather, the development and 
production work is contracted through prime contractors. The principal functions of PMs 
and their staffs are planning, contracting, monitoring, controlling, and evaluating the 
schedule, cost, and technical performance of the contractors and government agencies 
that provide services and support. 
The Congress, as a matter of policy, has mandated that  
appropriate career paths for civilian and military personnel who wish to 
pursue careers in acquisition are identified in terms of the education, 
training, experience, and assignments necessary for career progression of 
civilians and members of the armed forces to the most senior acquisition 
positions. (10 U.S.C. § 1722(a), 2019)  
Military personnel are not given exclusive access to senior acquisition positions, 
including PM positions. The Congress has provided, 
The Secretary shall establish a policy permitting a particular acquisition 
position to be specified as available only to members of the armed forces 
if a determination is made, under criteria specified in the policy, that a 
member of the armed forces is required for that position by law, is essential 
for performance of the duties of the position, or is necessary for another 
compelling reason. (10 U.S.C. § 1722(b)(2)(A), 2019)  
Each Military Department is required “to establish policies and issue guidance to 
ensure the proper development, assignment, and employment of members of the armed 
forces in the acquisition field” (10 U.S.C. § 1722a(a), n.d.). 
While there are important differences in how the Military Departments have 
chosen to implement these directives, the passage of the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA; Pub. L. No. 101-510, 1990) and subsequent amendments has 
ensured that the basic structure of military acquisition workforce careers is the same 
across the DoD. Military officers elect to enter the acquisition workforce after six to 
seven years of service, joining an acquisition-related career field. Program management 
is one such career field. After completing certain mandatory training requirements and 
time in acquisition-related positions, they are eligible to join the Acquisition Corps, 
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typically at a rank of O-4 (GAO, 2018).1 While in theory these officers compete for 
promotion with the general pool of officers, in practice all three departments monitor the 
proportion of officers promoted to ensure that promotion rates within the Acquisition 
Corps are comparable to those in operational command tracks. Promotion reviews occur 
every three years; promoted officers are transferred to new duties commensurate with 
their new ranks. Officers passed over for promotion in two successive reviews are retired 
from the Service. 
The Congress has pushed back in recent years against having all military 
acquisition career paths feature a one-time permanent transition into the acquisition 
workforce. Section 842 of the National Defense Acquisition Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 
added the language quoted previously that distinguishes single-track from dual-track 
acquisition careers. The House report on this bill characterized this section as 
“reinstituting a dual-tracking system of primary and functional secondary career fields” 
(H. Rept. No. 114-201, 2015, to accompany H. R. 1735). The Senate report said, 
This provision is designed to increase the attractiveness of acquisition 
functions to skilled military officers and enlisted personnel and would: (1) 
provide for credit for joint duty assignments for acquisition related 
assignments in order to broaden the promotion preference and career 
opportunities of military acquisition professionals; (2) provide for an 
enhanced dual track career path in combat arms and a functional 
secondary career in acquisition to more closely align military operational 
requirements and acquisition; (3) include business and commercial training 
as joint professional military education; and (4) require an annual report to 
Congress on promotion rates for officers in acquisition positions. (S. Rept. 
No. 114-49, 2015, to accompany S. 1376) 
While it is not explicitly stated in the statute or the conference reports, it seems 
likely that the intent of the Congress was to re-establish career paths that move back 
and forth multiple times between acquisition and combat arms assignments. This is not 
current practice within any of the Military Departments. 
Civilians in all Services are managed and promoted within civilian workforce 
management systems common across the DoD. The vast majority of these civilians fall 
within the General Schedule for federal employees or the Acquisition Workforce 
Demonstration Project (AcqDemo), which is discussed in more detail in Section 0. 
DAWIA sets requirements for certification, including education and years of experience, 
for both civilians and uniformed personnel occupying PM positions. It is DoD policy that 
anyone occupying a key leadership position, as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) I or IA 
PM, must be Level III-certified in their respective functional area, and they must have 
eight years of acquisition experience or equivalent demonstrated proficiency. ACAT II 
PMs and deputy PMs must have six years of acquisition experience.  
                                               
 
 
1The GAO notes that the Air Force typically identifies future Acquisition Corps officers 
earlier in their careers and tailors their early career assignments toward that goal in ways that the 
Army and Navy do not. 
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Data Analyses on the Tenures of MDAP Program Managers 
To observe historical tenure of MDAP PMs, we obtained data from December 
1997 to December 2017 on 705 PMs of 202 MDAPs from the Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs) stored in the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR) System.2 Specifically, each SAR lists the name, contact information, and 
assignment date of the PM at the time the SAR was produced. The prefix for each name 
identifies either the rank, for military PMs, or the title (e.g., Mr., Ms.), for civilian PMs, 
enabling us to identify each PM’s personnel type (military or civilian). From the 
assignment dates, we were able to construct a timeline of PMs for each program. 
Because the SARs are only submitted once each year, it is possible that the timelines 
we constructed missed a few PMs who may have very briefly served in between the end 
of one SAR and the assignment date of the PM who is listed on the subsequent SAR. In 
these cases, the timelines will overstate the tenures of the PMs immediately preceding 
the “missing” PMs.3 
Table 1 shows the distribution of MDAPs and PMs across the Services from the 
DAMIR data. We observe a total of 705 PMs for 202 past and present MDAPs. 
Seventeen percent of these PMs are civilians. Of the Services, the Air Force currently 
has the highest percentage of civilian PMs (36%), although the Navy has the highest 
number of civilian PMs over the whole sample (24%). About half of PMs for (the 
relatively small universe of) DoD-wide programs have been civilians. 
 
Table 1. Summary of MDAPs and PMs by Service from December 1997 to December 2017 

















Army 17 15 2 64 166 23 
Navy 40 34 6 63 183 58 
Air Force 28 18 10 71 227 29 
DoD-wide 2 1 1 4 9 10 
Total 87 68 19 202 585 120 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of tenures for completed MDAP PM positions by 
personnel type. The tenure distributions are very similar between military and civilian 
PMs. Half of the 82 civilians PMs served less than 2.92 years, with 75% serving 3.92 
years or less. Half of the 390 military PMs served for less than 3.04 years, with 75% less 
                                               
 
 
2SARs are annual comprehensive status reports that each MDAP is required to submit to 
the Congress. 
3For example, suppose there are three PMs: Amy, Bill, and Carl. The December 2000 
SAR reports Amy as the PM with an effective date of January 1, 2000, and the December 2001 
SAR reports Carl as the PM with an effective date of June 1, 2001. If Bill served as PM from 
January 1 to May 31, 2001, his tenure is not reported on any SAR, and our constructed timelines 
incorrectly assume that Amy served as PM from January 2000 until Carl’s start date in June 
2001. 
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than 3.95 years. Not surprisingly given the structured promotion process, military PM 
tenures tend to cluster around the 2-, 3-, and 4-year marks. 
 
 
 Distribution of Completed Tenures for Civilian and Military MDAP 
PMs 
Figure 1 shows the average time in position broken out by Service. Overall, the 
average experience of MDAP PMs has grown from about 18 months in December 1997 
to about two years in December 2017. The Services’ averages show the same general 
trend. 
 
Note. Each line represents the averages of time in position for every MDAP PM within a Service at each moment in time. 








Dec 1997 Dec 2001 Dec 2005 Dec 2009 Dec 2013 Dec 2017
All Army Navy Air Force
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The SARs also list past and projected milestone dates for each program. Since 
the milestone dates can slip over time, we collect data on completed milestones (i.e., 
milestones that occurred before the SAR date). Error! Reference source not found. 
shows how these milestone dates compare to changes in PMs for 15 current programs.4 
Visually, it appears that while most PMs within four years of a milestone complete that 
milestone, many PM transitions are unrelated to upcoming milestones. For example, 
there were at least three PM transitions in the four years leading up to Milestone C of the 
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6 Block I) program.  
 
 
Note. Only milestones that occurred since 1990 are shown. Also, when the same program milestone took place more than 
once, only the latest one is presented. 
 PM Tenures Compared Against Milestones for Selected MDAPs 
                                               
 
 
4Specifically, these are the 15 current programs that are either ACAT I or IA, have at 
least six PM transitions, and have most of the program milestones. 
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Summary of Findings 
Additional Pay Options to Provide Incentives to DoD PMs 
Senior Civilian Employees 
Government civilians, like their military counterparts, are motivated by 
challenging work, a sense of accomplishment, and career-enhancing opportunities. 
Financial rewards have been found to be low on the priority list for public employees. 
However, our analysis showed that average compensation for DoD civilian PMs is 
significantly lower than for similar military PMs and those in private industry. Establishing 
a separate, higher pay scale for civilians who have chosen the Program Management 
career track could incentivize more and higher quality civilians to pursue such careers. 
Some efforts in this direction have already been made. AcqDemo, introduced in 1999, 
established an alternative personnel system for qualifying civilian acquisition workforce 
employees. Expanding AcqDemo further and/or making it permanent would almost 
certainly enhance future recruiting and retention.  
One of the largest non-financial changes that could be made to encourage future 
civilian PMs is Component Acquisition Executive slating of more MDAP PM positions to 
civilians and a gradual lessening of the perception that civilians do not have much of a 
chance of being selected. Presently, civilians may be unmotivated to pursue a career 
leading to an MDAP PM position if they see little chance of ever being selected and see 
no future career path in the rare event that they are.  
The ability to have more control over planning one’s career path would be 
another important non-financial incentive for civilians in program management and 
acquisition. Currently, qualified civilians may shy away from applying for MDAP PM 
positions due to uncertainty about the location and responsibility of their subsequent 
assignments.  
Military Officers 
Given existing constraints on the military pay system, the primary financial 
incentive available to the uniformed services is special and incentive pay. The literature 
on financial incentives for military personnel is mixed, but the consensus has been that 
financial incentives are less effective in the public sector—including in the military—than 
in private industry. 
Currently, the strongest incentives for military officers are related to the 
promotion process. Failure to be promoted not only reduces current salary and eventual 
retirement pension, but also can curtail a career due to the “up-or-out” provisions of the 
Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). As a result, factors that affect 
potential for promotion have a strong influence on choices made by military officers. The 
current DOPMA mandates might be considered major disincentives and, as noted in 
several previous studies, eliminating or modifying both up-or-out and mandatory 
retirement at 30 years of service could help the Department recruit and retain more 
skilled and experienced PMs. These changes would also enable more flexible career 
paths, allowing for fewer (but longer) assignments over the course of a career. 
As with civilians, developing better-defined career tracks for PMs could be an 
important non-financial incentive for attracting military officers. One particular alternative 
would be to establish a more self-contained professional system for recruiting military 
officers into the acquisition field, similar to that used for the medical field. This would 
more closely mirror best practices from industry.  
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A Financial Incentive Structure to Reward Program Managers 
It has been suggested that merit-based incentives (rewards) are the best 
mechanism for motivating PMs to manage their programs effectively and efficiently. As 
an example, PMs who meet certain cost and schedule targets could be offered spot 
bonuses—or even commendations and/or medals. High-performing PMs could be 
rewarded with more control over their next assignments, especially if the DOPMA up-or-
out policy and mandatory retirement do not interfere. While the Congress is seeking 
ways to reward PMs who deliver capabilities within budget and on time, recognizing the 
challenge of accurately measuring PM performance is particularly important because of 
the dangers of establishing rewards for performance that do not ultimately align with the 
organization’s mission. 
Performance-based rewards can have significant unintended consequences 
when they are applied in the wrong context. Research has shown repeatedly that poorly 
specified reward systems can create perverse incentives—incentivizing workers to focus 
on obtaining the rewards rather than on achieving organizational objectives. A reward 
system focused on cost and schedule may encourage short-term optimization at the 
expense of the long-run success of the program. For example, PMs may be incentivized 
to accept greatly increased future sustainment cost and obsolescence risk in order to 
avoid missing milestones or having to report cost growth. 
A Comparison With Incentives in Private Industry 
Although sharing the same title, PMs in government do not have the duties 
historically associated with the title of “manager” because the DoD does not develop or 
produce its weapon systems in-house. Rather, the development and production work is 
contracted through prime contractors. The principal functions of the government PM and 
staff are planning, contracting, monitoring, controlling, and evaluating the schedule, cost, 
and technical performance of contractors and the government agencies that provide 
services and support. 
Past research finds that public sector managers are often attracted to their work 
by different factors than private sector managers. Extrinsic motivation factors (e.g., 
salary, pension plans, and career advancement) have significantly greater potential for 
motivating private managers, while intrinsic rewards (e.g., challenging and interesting 
work, job responsibility, advancement/promotion in a hierarchical organization, family-
friendly policies, commitment to the public interest, a desire to serve others, self-
sacrifice, and recognition) have higher potential for motivating public managers. These 
differences suggest that different systems of rewards and incentives than those found in 
the private sector might be best suited to recruit and retain quality government PMs. 
For-profit companies have the option to motivate their PMs to achieve 
organizational objectives by rewarding them with a portion of company profits. Industry 
PMs who carefully manage successful programs and quickly shut down poor programs 
that are destined to fail can share in the higher profits their actions bring their 
companies. The industry PMs who fail may lose their jobs. In contrast, there are no 
company profits to share with DoD PMs, and acquisition personnel are not subject to the 
threat of dismissal from the Service on failure as their industry counterparts are. As a 
result, success tends to be measured in terms of cost and schedule and avoiding 
cancellation. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
We have focused our efforts in this research on the consideration of the pros and 
cons of potential incentives to recruit, retain, and reward PMs. We find, as with previous 
research, only weak evidence that financial incentives would have any impact on the 
actual tenures of PMs. Moreover, past research finds little support for the implicit 
assumption that increased PM tenure would have a significantly positive effect on 
program outcomes such as cost and schedule. 
If the real goal is to improve program outcomes, there are likely to be more 
effective mechanisms than simply increasing the tenure of PMs. For example, the DoD 
could pursue an acquisition centered around “smart buyers.” Credible “smart buyers”—
such as highly experienced senior program executive officers (PEOs) and PMs—could 
provide the counterweight that helps to overcome the institutional and political pressures 
to overpromise at the outset of programs. They further could help to enforce realism in 
executing programs in the face of contractor optimism. A career progression model, with 
strong rewards for successful careers, could create the “smart buyer” culture needed to 
properly develop and incentivize PMs and PEOs to serve as counterweights to political 
and institutional pressures. Because of their experience, and the career incentive 
structure, senior acquisition personnel would be positioned to make proper decisions 
based upon real experience. 
Industry experience has shown that another important best practice for 
maintaining a healthy portfolio is to identify and quickly terminate programs that are 
unlikely to succeed. Creating policies and a culture that supports failing quickly would be 
a substantial challenge, but the payoff to the overall outcomes of the entire MDAP 
portfolio would be considerable.  
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Abstract 
For several years, attrition in the defense acquisition workforce has been a serious 
and persistent concern among stakeholders inside and outside of government, especially 
attrition related to baby boomer retirement. The primary concern relates to the risk of losing 
critical skills and experience required to maintain and improve enterprise effectiveness. The 
Army Director of Acquisition Career Management (DACM) defines retirement “brain drain” 
as generational retirement with the potential to create a talent vacuum. 
While change is inevitable and institutional transitions usually involve turbulence and 
friction, to date the Army Acquisition Workforce (AAW) has maintained its base of 
experienced workforce members and made steady progress improving workforce balance 
despite the rising retirement wave. 
This paper presents highlights of recently completed comprehensive data analysis 
that provides a view of recent trends within the AAW's 14 career fields. We also 
demonstrate the importance of proper problem-framing in developing an accurate 
understanding of the current state of the AAW and what dynamics led to it. 
Introduction 
For more than a decade, stakeholders inside and outside of government raised 
concerns about potential severe negative effects related to generational retirement of baby 
boomers (Defense Acquisition University, 2007; Gates, et al., 2008; Hogan, Lockley, & 
Thompson, 2012; Professional Services Council, 2016; Gates et al., 2018). A primary 
concern relates to the loss of the critical skills and experience required to maintain and 
improve enterprise as a high volume of seasoned employees exit the workforce. To the 
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extent this occurs, the Army Director of Acquisition Career Management (DACM) defines 
retirement “brain drain” as generational retirement with the potential to create a talent 
vacuum (Techopedia.com, n.d.). 
Baby boomers, born between 1946 and 1964, are now between ages 54 and 74. 
With federal retirement eligibility beginning at age 55 (depending on a person’s federal years 
of service [YoS]), today nearly 100% of baby-boomer federal employees are within the 
retirement eligibility window. 
Effectively managing the current retirement situation for the AAW’s demographically 
diverse civilian and military workforce is a critical function of Army DACM Office efforts 
under its Human Capital Strategic Plan (HCSP; U.S. Army, n.d.). This requires a 
comprehensive understanding of recent accession and separation patterns that led to the 
current state of the AAW and implications these suggest for the path ahead. 
U.S. Population Distribution 
As Figure 1 shows, since the last baby boomers were born in 1964, the 
demographics of the United States changed considerably. The left side of the figure shows 
the U.S. birthrate for the two decades before 1964 grew the base of the U.S. population 
pyramid,1 resulting in the characteristic shape of an expanding population. In contrast, the 
2018 population pyramid (middle chart) has nearly vertical edges tapering to a slightly 
narrower base. This is characteristic of a decreasing birth rate, which in a closed society 
would indicate a shrinking population. But, in fact the U.S. population is increasing due to 
immigration. Finally, the right side of Figure 1 shows the U.S. Census Bureau projection for 
the U.S. population to continue growing through the next 10 years, maintaining its 
population pyramid shape consistent with low birthrates, long life expectancies, and 
continued immigration (Colby & Ortman, 2014; Colby & Ortman, 2015). 
                                               
 
 
1 A population pyramid is the combination of vertically oriented, back-to-back male and 
female histograms of the population counted according to age. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 69 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
 
 Population Pyramids for United States of America 
(Population Pyramid, n.d.)2 
Importantly, the diagrams in Figure 1 show no significant age distribution imbalance 
in the current or projected U.S. population, which is the primary context for AAW recruiting 
and retention. So while personal choices related to accepting employment and worker 
mobility are complex phenomena involving factors such as overall job satisfaction, perceived 
opportunities, personal skills, employer demand, geography, and timing, U.S. population 
age distributions cannot be blamed for AAW age imbalances that may currently exist or 
develop in the foreseeable future. 
Army DACM’s Human Capital Strategic Plan (HCSP) 
The 2002 President’s Management Agenda recognized the potential for a significant 
institutional brain drain as the result of baby-boomer retirement. The agenda also 
recognized the need for better recruiting, retention, and reward programs for federal 
workers. Toward this end, the Department of Defense (DoD) generated a department-wide 
strategic human capital plan followed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L])3 strategic human capital plan for the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce (Gates, et al., 2008). The current DoD Acquisition Workforce Strategic 
Plan—FY 2016–FY 2021 (AWSP) is the latest in the series of updates since 2002. 
The DoD’s AWSP reports that overall, Acquisition Workforce (AWF) gains exceeded 
losses from FY 2008 through FY 2015 with significant improvement in the pending 
                                               
 
 
2 Age is on the vertical axis. 
3 On February 1, 2018, the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act eliminated the 
USD(AT&L) position to re-establish the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering (USD[R&E]) and create the new position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Sustainment (USD[A&S]). 
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retirements “bathtub,”4 better posturing the workforce for the high level of retirements the 
plan expects. Further, the AWSP expresses concern about the potential for losing critical 
AWF experience and capacity as the current workforce ages and retires (DoD, 2016). 
The AWSP also sets forth four strategic goals, with Goal 2 being to “shape and 
develop the AWF to meet current and future mission area demands” (DoD, 2016). Within 
this effort, the Army DACM developed a Human Capital Strategic Plan (HCSP) which 
establishes five of its own goals to institutionalize the human capital planning process and 
develop the next generation of Army acquisition leaders. The first of these is to “shape the 
Army acquisition workforce to achieve current and future acquisition requirements” which fits 
squarely under the AWSP’s Goal 2. 
Goal 1 of the Army DACM’s HCSP encompasses five broad categories: 
• Labor supply 
• Labor demand 
• Recruiting the workforce 
• Managing workforce separation 
• Steering labor supply to fit labor demand 
Thus, this goal is intentionally forward-looking with the intent of setting the conditions 
for mission success with proactive policies and planning. This requires reliable projections of 
future workforce demographics and dynamics, based on well understood cause-and-effect 
relationships. To develop these, the DACM Office works to gain accurate understandings of 
past workforce dynamics and current trends across the AAW as a foundation for its ongoing 
predictive modeling effort. 
Data and Definitions 
The Army DACM’s Career Acquisition Personnel and Position Management 
Information System5 (CAPPMIS) maintains the data used in this study. CAPPMIS includes 
direct feeds from the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS) and provides, 
among other information, every employee’s age, duration of federal employment, duration of 
acquisition experience, acquisition certification status, command assignment, and 
geographic location. 
For this analysis, we compared annual individual civilian personnel records on 
September 30 each year from 2012 through 20186. From these we categorize each 
employee as a “join,” “stay,” or “loss” according to the annual snapshots in which they 
appear. If an employee appears in two consecutive records, we define them as “stayed” in 
the AAW for the fiscal year (FY) spanned by the two data snapshots. If an employee record 
appears in a prior year snapshot, but not in a later one, we counted them as a “loss.” 
Likewise, if an employee appears in a later snapshot, but not in the previous one, we 
                                               
 
 
4 “Bathtub” is a term used in the acquisition community to describe imbalances in workforce 
experience, i.e., a severe shortage of procurement professionals with between 5 and 15 years of 
experience (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007). 
5 CAPPMIS provides quarterly feeds to Defense Manpower Data System (DMDC). 
6 All data are according to CAPPMIS on March 31, 2019. 
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counted them as a “join.” This methodology means migrations within the AAW (changes of 
employment command or location) are not considered.7 
From these data, five primary measures are calculated as of the beginning of each 
FY:8 
• Age: Calculated using the Date of Birth field in DCPDS  
• YoS: Years of service are determined according to the Service Computation Date 
in DCPDS 
• YRE: Years until retirement eligible are calculated according to FERS retirement 
eligibility criteria based on the minimum retirement age, and years of service 
(YoS) for individuals with 100% earned benefit9 (Office of Personnel 
Management, 2019). For year-over-year comparison we round to an integer 
value, so YRE = 0 means an individual became retirement eligible (RE) within the 
FY spanned by applicable data snapshots. If YRE < 0, then an individual is RE 
for the entire FY. While YRE > 0 means an individual is not RE at any time in the 
applicable FY. 
• YAE: Years of acquisition experience counts the total number of years of work 
experience an individual has within the AAW in any Acquisition Career Field 
(ACF). Individuals self-report their acquisition experience in other agencies, 
military, or contractor roles. 
• RE: We categorize joins, stays, and losses as retirement eligible if they become 
retirement eligible at any time during a given FY. Therefore, it is important to note 
the number of RE reported in this analysis is an annual total and values are 
higher than those commonly reported in single point-in-time (snapshot) counts. 
We emphasize this difference throughout this paper with the use of the word 
“annual” to describe the findings (e.g., we discuss annual losses and annual RE 
gains). 
One challenge of AAW trend analysis is the constantly changing size of the 
workforce Figure 2 shows the scale of these changes which vary by Acquisition Career 
Field. Year-over-year variations result from the changes in service acquisition and program 
requirements, employee choices, and career field recoding. Recoding occurs when positions 
are either created or eliminated according to mission and command priorities. The most 
significant AAW recoding since FY13 is the large increase of Facility Engineers between 
FY17 and 18 which occurred due to U.S. Army functional leader policy decisions (shown in 
Shown in Figure 2). 
                                               
 
 
7 Stay = Continuation, Loss = Attrition, and Gain = Accession. 
8 In order to use the most recent value recorded, all data are standardized to the beginning of 
the applicable FY as follows: Joins and Stays data are read from the later year data snapshot and 
data field entries are converted the beginning of the FY (e.g., Age(FY14) = Age(FY15)-1). Losses are 
recorded in the previous year snapshot only, so their values are read from the prior FY snapshot 
without adjustment. 
9 While retirement eligibility depends on each individual’s retirement plan, more than 96% of 
the AAW is currently under FERS. 
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 Count of AAW Civilian Personnel in Each Army ACF  
(at Beginning of FY) 
The Bathtub Effect 
The term bathtub effect describes the phenomenon of simultaneously having an 
excessive number of senior acquisition professionals, many in and near retirement eligibility, 
and an underrepresentation of mid-level employees to succeed them when they retire 
(Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007; Hogan et al., 2012). 
For more than 20 years, an ongoing concern of senior leadership is the bathtub 
effect phenomenon among the civilian AW. In 2000, the USDs for AT&L and Personnel and 
Readiness (P&R) stated that “after 11 consecutive years of downsizing, we face serious 
imbalances in the skills and experience of our highly talented and specialized civilian 
workforce. Further, 50 percent will be eligible to retire by 2005. In some occupations, half of 
the current employees will be gone by 2006” (USD[AT&L]; USD[P&R], 2000). Because this 
condition has persisted, it has been repeatedly highlighted since.  
For example, in 2005 the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) found that 76% of 
the AT&L workforce were baby boomers or older (Defense Acquisition University, 2007). 
Again in 2007, the Acquisition Advisory Panel reported to the U.S. Congress that  
During the 1990s, the federal AW was significantly reduced and 
hiring virtually ceased, creating what has been termed the Bathtub effect, 
a severe shortage of procurement professionals with between 5 and 15 
years of experience. The impact of this shortage is likely to be felt more 
acutely soon, as half of the current workforce is eligible to retire in the next 
four years. (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007) 
A 2009 RAND study concluded that the number of DoN retirement-eligible AW 
personnel would increase by 2012 and remain above average for at least seven years 
(Gates, 2009). 
Thus, senior defense acquisition leaders maintained focus on filling the bathtub as a 
persistent theme by codifying it into strategy documents and addressing it in policy 
decisions. 
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Figure 3 shows the civilian AAW age and RE distributions at the beginning of both 
FY13 (dashed line) and FY18 (solid line). Comparing these distributions immediately 
highlights the importance of how we frame the RE situation. On the left-hand side is the 
“Age-frame” and on the right side is the “YRE-frame.” Each entails a very different 
perception of the state of the AAW. The age distribution is distinctly bimodal in both FY13 
and FY18, with the FY18 mode near 55 years of age, i.e., the beginning of federal 
retirement eligibility. This peak indicates a significant “bow wave” as 29% of the “stay” 
population was at least 55 years of age in FY18. This view from the age-frame makes the 
potential for an AAW brain drain appear acute and critical. 
 
 
 AAW Civilian Employee Age and Retirement Eligibility Distribution 
Comparisons  
(September 30, 2012, and September 30, 2018) 
The right-hand side of Figure 3 shows the YRE distribution. Like the age distribution, 
the YRE distribution is distinctly bimodal, but the leading peak height is nearly equal to the 
trailing peak. And the bathtub (5 ≤ YRE ≤ 15) is not nearly as deep. When comparing FY13 
to FY18, we see that there has been a leveling of the employee distribution while the 
“bathtub” has been filling. Thus, unlike what we see in the age-frame, this view shows 
workforce balance has improved over the six-year period. 
Figure 4 shows the development of these changes over time as a series of six YRE 
distributions for AAW joins and losses. This reveals an important dynamic. First, in FY13 
and FY14 the red lines (losses) exceeded the green lines (joins), across most of the YRE 
distribution. From FY16 through FY18 this pattern inverted with joins exceeding losses 
across the whole not-RE population (i.e., YRE < 0). This difference increased each year 
after FY15, providing positive feedback to intentional DACM workforce shaping efforts 
ranging from improved employee engagement to targeted hiring and retention efforts, as 
well as position recoding. Further, these charts show results are both wide-spread and 
sustained. 
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 Historical Joins and Losses by YRE, FY13 Through FY18 
Figure 5 aggregates the data displayed in Figure 4. This representation reveals 
several other important outcomes of the recent AAW join and loss patterns. First, total 
annual AAW losses (the solid red line) were lower in FY18 than in FY13, even after 
increasing from FY17 to FY18. As shown, declining losses among employees who were not-
RE drove down the decrease in total annual losses. These were the majority of losses in all 
years (66% in FY13 and 59% in FY18). This is a decrease in annual not-RE losses of 665 
(from 2660 in FY13 to 1995 in FY18) against a generally consistent number of annual RE 
losses which increased by 50 (or 3.7%) from FY13 to FY18 (1356 and 1406 annual losses 
respectively). 
 
 AAW Join and Loss Rates 
Figure 5 also shows annual losses increased from FY17 to FY18 in both RE and not-
RE categories (see the two dashed lines). It is too early to know whether this change 
indicates normal variation or a trend reversal, so we will continue to collect data and assess 
this. The latter case appears likely for reasons we will discuss in the next section. Finally, 
the dramatic change in number of joins (green line in Figure 5) is clearly evident as annual 
joins increased from 2115 in FY13 (about 50% less than total annual losses) to 5104 in 
FY18 (about 50% more than total annual losses). 
These figures illustrate the importance of not focusing solely on the retiring 
workforce, as the majority of attrition occurs among those not in the RE window. 
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Consequently, successful recruiting and retention in the early career population are proving 
effective workforce shaping and preservation drivers for combating the bathtub effect and 
more than compensating for FY17 and FY18 retirement flows. 
AAW Retirement Rate 
The green bars in Figure 6 show how the annual number of RE employees remained 
essentially unchanged FY13–FY15, but then began increasing from 6521 during FY15 to 
7910 during FY18. As a percentage, those RE increased at about 1% per year from 16.1% 
of the AAW during FY13 to 21.3% during FY18 (this is shown by the green line). Meanwhile, 
the red bars show that annual losses from this group (RE losses) remained consistent 
during the same period. In fact, despite the increasing RE population during FY16 and 
FY17, RE losses continued decreasing until FY17, when the trend reversed, bringing FY18 
RE losses back to about the FY13 level. Further, as a percentage of the RE population (red 
line), these losses decreased from 23.1% in FY13 to 18.8% in FY18. 
 
 AAW Retirement Eligible Population Trends 
The combined effect of these two trends suggests that retirement “pressure” is 
building in the civilian AAW population as the number retirement eligible has been 
increasing, while the number in this group actually leaving the workforce has not. This is 
why we expect the reversal from decreasing to increasing RE-losses between FY17 and 
FY18 is not likely attributable to normal variation, but will continue through FY19 and for as 
long as the RE population remains elevated. 
These RE employee counts simply tell us who is eligible to retire according to the 
federal criteria, but they don’t tell us anything about who is retiring and what intellectual 
capital and expertise is leaving with them. While sheer numbers always matter, it is 
important to examine who is retiring, because job skills and relevant expertise are critical 
considerations for assessing potential retirement brain drain impacts. 
AAW Retirement Brain Drain 
Acquisition expertise is not something we can easily measure from the available 
data. But, all else being equal, increased job experience generally correlates with increased 
job expertise. Under this assumption, we use YAE as a proxy measure of expertise and 
intellectual capital as a gauge of brain drain. While this is a coarse measure, we find it 
helpful in evaluating the gross effects of workforce gains and losses on the overall AAW 
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experience base. Additionally, since YAE is specific measure to the Army’s acquisition 
enterprise, it is a proxy for the question at hand. We acknowledge that counting total years 
invested in the enterprise has the inherent weakness of only capturing acquisition 
experience broadly, without any specificity of expertise in any particular skillset, ACF, or 
acquisition program. But, just as comparing the age-frame to the YRE-frame provides 
important insights into the flow of retirees, we find comparing the YoS-frame to the YAE-
frame helps us better understand likely impacts related to overall workforce expertise and 
brain drain. 
The left-hand side of Figure 7 shows the stratified AAW distribution according to 
employee’s federal YoS, with a breakout of those RE and near-RE10 underneath. 
Juxtaposed, on the right-hand side, are charts showing the AAW distribution according to 
employee YAE, stratified by the same RE categories. According to YoS distribution on the 
left side, there is a clear retirement “bow wave” between 30 and 40 YoS (shown in in red 
and yellow). But, the YAE-frame on the right side reveals that the experience distribution of 
the pending AAW retirements is much more uniformly distributed (compare the second 
charts down on each side). Thus, the retirement wave is significantly less sharp when 
accounting for acquisition-specific experience leaving the AAW. 
 
 Workforce Retirement Eligibility Distributions 
This comparison emphasizes the intuitive understanding that age does equal 
experience and federal workforce experience does not equal acquisition expertise. This is to 
say, not all workforce losses have equal impact on AAW intellectual capital. Each individual 
retirement, even with the same age and YoS, entails a unique skillset and experience for 
which the workforce must compensate when it is gone. Thus, since the Army hires many 
AAW employees in later career stages without previous acquisition experience, the total 
YAE they accrue are less than their age and YoS might suggest. When we measure this 
                                               
 
 
10 Near-RE are those within five years of RE. 
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directly, we see the total annual AAW expertise-loss is significantly smoother than the Age 
and YoS perspective implies. 
Total AAW Acquisition Experience 
We can measure experience gained and experience lost in the AAW by summing the 
total YAE. As such, each person who joins or leaves the AAW carries with them some 
number of YAE. Also, every member that remains in the AAW gains one YAE for every year 
they remain. From this we can make a simple calculation. For example, if the AAW has 
39,000 civilian members that remain, then total AAW YAEs increase by 39,000 during that 
year. Then, so long as the sum of these 39,000 YAE and the YAEs of those joining is 
greater than the YAE of those leaving the workforce, the workforce does not suffer any loss 
of acquisition experience, that is, brain drain. 
In FY13, the AAW had 40,100 civilian employees and 443,800 total YAE. In FY18, 
there were fewer civilian employees, 37,100, but more total YAE, 471,600 years. The red 
and green bars in Figure 8 show the YAE for AAW joins and losses during these years, 
while the black line shows mean YAEs, which increased from 11.1 in FY13 to 12.7 in FY18. 
It is also important to note that the green bars in Figure 8 show that employees joining the 
AAW were not beginning with zero YAE. Rather, those joining had significant acquisition 
experience. During FY18, 30% of those joining the AAW had previous YAEs, averaging 7.1 
years. 
 
 Cumulative AAW Years of Acquisition Experience 
As an additional brain drain measure, we suggest 10 YAE is an important benchmark 
for the attainment of full job proficiency or acquisition expertise. Recent workforce survey 
results and academic research support this assumption. In 2017, MITRE reported workforce 
survey results from 250 DoD support personnel where 92% of respondents stated 10 or 
more years of work experience are required to become fully proficient in acquisition11 
(Murphy & Bouffard, 2017). This result is consistent with many human psychology findings 
that assert “experts are made, not born” and that skill mastery requires thousands of hours 
of specific, sustained practice and skill development (Ericsson, Krampe, & Clemens, 1993; 
Ericsson, Charness, & Felto, 2006; Ericsson, Prietula, & Cokely, 2007). 
                                               
 
 
11 68% of respondents believed it takes 10 years, 18% believed it takes 15 years, 10% 
believed 20+ years. 
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Figure 9 displays the percentages of the annual join, stay, and loss populations with 
more 10 YAE. According to this measure, the percentage of “experts” staying in the AAW 
increased sharply between FY13 and FY18, from 41% to 52% respectively. Additionally, 
while the percentage of annual RE expert losses increased, the level remained consistently 
below the percentage staying. Further, this relationship remains across 11 of the AAWs 14 
ACFs (which comprise 85% of the AAW).12 These findings provide positive indication that 
the AAW is not suffering a damaging level of brain drain, even though considerable 
expertise is leaving every year. 
 
 Percent of AAW With More Than 10 YAE by Employee Category 
This outcome is expected in light of the increasing join rate relative to the loss rate 
shown in Figure 9 as these trends translate into increased employee tenure. It is also 
consistent with 2018 survey results where leaders across the federal acquisition enterprise 
reported generally increasing workforce skills (Professional Services Council, 2018). 
Career Field Patterns and Trends 
Because no career field or command is average, policy makers realize limited value 
from aggregated statistics that may miss important features within individual sub-
populations. For example, Figure 10 is a side-by-side display of the primary measures 
presented in this paper to allow comparison of the Engineering and Contracting ACFs. 
Several important features are evident when assessing the brain drain potential of each. 
 
                                               
 
 
12 Facility Engineering (≈5000 members with ≈1700 newly recoded position during FY 18), 
S&T Manager (≈500 members), and Purchasing (≈300 members) are the exceptions. 
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 AAW Engineering–Contracting Career Field Comparison 
We note the following indications of high brain drain potential in the Engineering ACF 
(left side of Figure 10): 
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1. Expected higher than average near-term retirement rate because: 
a. 34% of AAW engineers are RE or near-RE (pie chart) 
b. The RE Engineering population increased rapidly since FY13 (from 
12.7% in FY13 to 21.9% in FY18, green line in bottom chart) 
c. The RE loss rate increased in FY17 and FY18 (from 11.1% in FY16 to 
14.6% in FY18, red line in bottom chart) 
2. Expected higher than average near-term RE experience loss because: 
a. The RE and near-RE population is heavily concentrated at YAE>25 
(second chart from top) 
b. Underrepresentation of personnel with 5 and 20–25 YAE (second chart 
from top) 
3. Engineering is the largest AAW career field (>9000 members) and 97% hold 
STEM degrees 
For these and other reasons outside the scope of this paper, we assess Engineering 
as having the highest retirement brain drain potential of the AAW’s 14 ACFs. The factors 
leading to Engineering’s current condition developed over many years, but mainly occurred 
because of its historically low early and mid-career attrition. Accordingly, sustained lower 
than typical attrition, especially during early career phases, means retiring engineers 
currently have higher than average tenure than those retiring from other ACFs. 
We note the following in the Contracting ACF (right side of Figure 10): 
1. Expected moderate near-term retirement rate because: 
a. Favorable, unimodal YRE distribution with mode at 20 YRE (top chart) 
b. 29% of AAW contractors are RE or near-RE (pie chart) 
c. RE population has been stable since FY13 (changing from 17.7% in FY13 
and FY14 to 18.8% in FY18, green line in bottom chart) 
d. The declining RE loss rate reversed in FY18, but remains down (from 
25.8% in FY13 to 21.1% in FY18, red line in bottom chart) 
2. Expected moderate near-term RE experience loss because the RE and near-RE 
population is spread across YAE (second chart from top) 
3. Contracting is the second largest AAW career field (≈7000 members) 
We assess Contracting as having a low retirement brain drain potential. The 
dynamics in this ACF are very different from those among engineers as they typically exhibit 
high early and mid-career attrition so that they have far fewer high tenure employees in the 
RE population. 
Figure 11 displays a summary of our retirement brain drain assessment for all 14 
AAW ACFs. The retirement brain drain potential is highest in the Engineering, Test & 
Evaluation, and Life Cycle Logistics career fields. Together, these career fields have about 
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18,000 employees who hold 60% of the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) degrees13 in the AAW. 
 
 Retirement Brain Drain Potential Assessment Summary14 
Conclusion 
This paper’s primary focus is understanding the character of the retiring population in 
order to understand implications related to brain drain from ongoing baby boomer 
retirement. This is only one of many important workforce management issues for policy 
makers to consider in crafting comprehensive strategies and policies. With nearly all AAW 
baby boomers now retirement-eligible, the often-threatened retirement wave is upon us. 
Even so, our assessment of the AAW is consistent with other results documenting the 
successful growing and balancing of the DoD AW (DAW) over the past decade (Gates et al., 
2018). 
We have shown that problem framing is critical to proper understanding of the 
retirement brain drain dynamic. Specifically, the YRE-frame and the YAE-frames provide 
more meaningful understanding of the brain drain potential across the workforce than the 
Age-frame and YoS-frame. Together these better capture the quantity and distribution of 
acquisition specific experience entering and leaving the workforce. Therefore, despite 
expected ongoing baby boomer retirements and increased near-term retirement rates, the 
AAW has been able to maintain its end strength, improve its workforce balance, and grow its 
                                               
 
 
13 STEM degrees are defined according to National Center for Education Statistics 
categories. 
14 Industrial/Contract Property Management and Acquisition Attorney career fields are too 
small to be assessed in aggregate. 
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experience base to enable critical Army DACM initiatives related to acquisition program 
success and leader succession. 
Future Work 
As the Army DACM continues executing the HCSP to shape the future rather than 
react to it, accurate readings of workforce dynamics are needed to enable continuous fine 
tuning. This will require increased measurement detail in areas such as acquisition 
expertise. In turn, efforts to improve acquisition expertise raise additional research 
questions. For example, DAW training certification rates have increased significantly in the 
last decade (USD[AT&L], 2016). The DACM is interested in better understanding the impact 
of this trend on mission effectiveness. Hence, we seek to assess research questions such 
as the following: How much does training translate into improved job performance? What 
training is most effective for increasing needed expertise? Answering cause-and-effect 
questions like these are critical to optimizing training resource allocation and driving 
improved mission effectiveness.  
Other cause-and-effect relationships important to the Army DACM within the HCSP 
include measuring the effectiveness of communication channels on workforce engagement, 
measuring workforce engagement effects on worker retention, and measuring effects of 
workforce culture on leadership development. 
Finally, we are pursuing increased specificity—for example, identifying and 
measuring precise recruiting and retention drivers of the best performing and highest 
potential employees, rather than the aggregated employee pool. 
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Appendix: Career Field Summary Charts 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 85 - 





Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 86 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
Enhancing Professional and Technical Excellence: 
Analysis of Navy Contract Management Competency 
Models 
Rene G. Rendon—is an Associate Professor and Acquisition Management Area Chair in the 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSBPP) at the Naval Postgraduate School. A retired 
Air Force contracting officer, Dr. Rendon served as a warranted contracting officer for major weapons 
system programs such as the Peacekeeper ICBM, F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter, Space-Based 
Infrared Satellite program, and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. He also served as 
a contracting squadron commander for an Air Force pilot training base. He was presented with the Air 
Force Outstanding Officer in Contracting Award. He has received the NPS Hamming Teaching 
Excellence Award and the GSBPP Research Excellence Award. Dr. Rendon’s research has been 
published in the Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Journal of Defense Analytics and 
Logistics, Journal of Public Procurement, and the Journal of Contract Management. 
[rgrendon@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
The DoD’s contracting function continues to be challenged by deficiencies in pre-
award, award, and post-award contract management processes. The DoD Inspector 
General (DoD IG) has identified acquisition and contract management as one of the top 10 
DoD Management Challenges for FY2019. Additionally, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) continues to identify DoD contract management as a “high risk” due to the 
department’s challenge in improving the capability of its contract management workforce, 
specifically ensuring the “workforce has the requisite skills, tools, and training to perform key 
tasks.” Both the DoD IG and the GAO identify the need for increased competency in the 
DoD contracting workforce.  
The DoD’s response to these contracting deficiencies and workforce capability 
challenges continues to be an emphasis on contract management training and workforce 
competency development. However, recent legislative initiatives reflect Congress’s concerns 
about the adequacy of the DoD’s acquisition workforce training and competency 
development. The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 809 required 
the Secretary of Defense to establish an independent advisory panel on streamlining 
acquisition regulations.  
The 809 Panel reported that if the DoD is to achieve its acquisition workforce goals, it 
will need to prepare and develop its workforce differently. The FY2018 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition 
and Sustainment (A&S) to assess the training of the acquisition workforce, specifically, the 
gaps in business acumen, knowledge of industry operations, and knowledge of industry 
motivation within the defense acquisition workforce.  
Given this background, one must ask: Does the training provided by the DoD truly 
reflect what is needed by the DoD contracting workforce? The purpose of this research is to 
conduct an analysis of the DoD contracting competency framework and compare this 
framework with those of other federal agencies. Additionally, this research will compare the 
DoD contracting competency model with competency models established by procurement 
and contracting professional associations. This research builds upon past studies comparing 
federal government and industry contract management competency frameworks. Based on 
the analysis and comparisons of the reviewed competency frameworks, recommendations 
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will be made to improve the DoD contracting competency framework to help improve the 
professional and technical excellence of the DoD contracting workforce.  
Background 
The DoD is the federal government’s largest contracting agency and obligates 
approximately $300 billion in contracts every year (GAO, 2019). The DoD contract 
management workforce is responsible for managing these millions of contract actions for the 
procurement of mission-critical supplies and services. Yet given the high dollar contract 
obligations and the importance of these supplies and services to the nation’s defense, the 
DoD’s contracting function continues to be challenged by deficiencies in pre-award, award, 
and post-award contract management processes (DoD, 2009, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 
2015, 2017). The DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) has identified acquisition and contract 
management as one of the top 10 DoD Management Challenges for FY2019 (DoD, 2018). 
Additionally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) continues to identify DoD contract 
management as a “high risk” due to the department’s challenge in improving the capability 
of its contract management workforce, specifically ensuring the “workforce has the requisite 
skills, tools, and training to perform key tasks” (GAO, 2019, p. 228). Thus, both the DoD IG 
and the GAO identify the need for increased competency in the DoD contracting workforce. 
In response to these deficiencies in contract management processes, and challenges in 
improving contract management workforce capability, the DoD continues to emphasize 
contract management training and workforce competency development.  
Recent legislative initiatives reflect Congress’s concerns about the adequacy of 
DoD’s acquisition workforce training and competency. For example, the FY2016 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 809 required the Secretary of Defense to 
establish an independent advisory panel on streamlining acquisition regulations. The goals 
of the Section 809 Panel include: streamlining and improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the defense acquisition process and maintaining defense technology 
advantage, establishing and administering appropriate buyer and seller relationships in the 
procurement system, improving the functioning of the acquisition system, and ensuring the 
continuing financial and ethical integrity of defense procurement programs. In an interim 
report to Congress, the Section 809 Panel stated that the DoD acquisition workforce was a 
pivotal factor in the success of acquisition reform and that it should address the acquisition 
workforce in its analysis and recommendations. The Section 809 Panel also stated that 
career development needed to be a focus of the Panel’s recommendation. Finally, the Panel 
stated that if the DoD is to achieve its acquisition workforce goals, it will need to prepare and 
develop its workforce differently (Scott & Thompson, 2019).  
Additionally, the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the 
Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) to assess the 
training of the acquisition workforce. Specifically, the FY2018 NDAA Section 843(c) requires 
the USD (A&S) to assess gaps in business acumen, knowledge of industry operations, and 
knowledge of industry motivation within the defense acquisition workforce. NDAA Section 
843(c) also required the USD (A&S) to determine the effectiveness of training and 
development resources offered by providers outside of the DoD that are available to the 
defense acquisition workforce (NDAA, 2017).  
Given this background, one must ask: Does the training provided by the DoD truly 
reflect what is needed by the DoD contracting workforce? The purpose of this research is to 
conduct an analysis of the DoD contracting competency framework and compare this 
framework with those of other federal agencies. Additionally, this research will also compare 
the DoD contracting competency model with competency models established by 
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procurement and contracting professional associations such as the National Institute for 
Government Procurement (NIGP) and the National Contract Management Association 
(NCMA). This research builds upon past studies comparing federal government and industry 
contract management competency frameworks (Albano, 2013; Rendon & Winn, 2017). This 
current research will answer the following questions: 
• How consistent are the contract management competencies established across 
the federal government agencies? 
• How do the federal government’s contracting competencies compare to the 
contracting competencies established by procurement and contract management 
professional associations? 
Based on the analysis and comparisons of the reviewed competency frameworks, 
recommendations will be made to improve the DoD contracting competency framework to 
help improve professional and technical excellence of the DoD contracting workforce. This 
paper is organized in six sections. The first section provided the background and research 
purpose of this paper. The following section provides a theoretical framework for the study 
of the DoD’s contracting workforce competency management. After that is a brief discussion 
of the various contracting competency models across federal agencies and professional 
associations. Next is a comparison of the federal government contracting competencies with 
those of professional associations involved in procurement and contract management. In the 
following section, a summary of comparison findings is provided. The final section concludes 
with the implications of the research findings and recommendations for the DoD for 
improving its contracting workforce competency management. 
Theoretical Framework 
Auditability theory is concerned with those aspects of governance needed by 
organizations to ensure successful achievement of mission goals and objectives. As 
organizations focus on proper governance and due diligence in processes and practices, the 
results include an increased emphasis on auditability in operations. In this sense, auditability 
is more about “making things auditable” than it is about conducting an audit or an inspection 
(Power, 1996, p. 289). In making things auditable, organizations establish and actively 
manage an institutionally acceptable knowledge management system supporting their 
governance of processes and practices (Power, 1996, 2007). Although auditability is 
traditionally concerned with an organization’s financial operations, auditability theory can 
also be applied to an organization’s contract management operations (Rendon & Rendon, 
2015). As organizations increase the contracting out of required supplies and services, the 
organization’s corporate governance structure and the structure’s impact on contract 
success, especially contracts in support of major acquisition projects, have been emerging 
research topics in the project management literature. Frame (1999) stressed the importance 
of competent personnel for ensuring the success of an organization’s projects and contracts. 
Rollins and Lanza (2005) discussed the need for a solid corporate governance structure as 
well as a renewed emphasis on strong internal controls as a response to the increase in 
project fraud incidents. Crawford and Helm (2009) also discussed governance in public 
sector organizations and the role projects play in ensuring accountability, transparency, 
control, compliance, risk management, consistency in delivery, value for money, and 
stakeholder engagement. Past research has also identified the importance of process 
capability and process maturity in an organization’s ability to achieve its goals and 
objectives. Rendon (2015) explored the importance of assessing contract management 
process maturity in U.S. Navy contracting organizations. Frame (1999) and Kerzner (2001) 
stressed the importance of capable organizational processes for ensuring the success of an 
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organization’s projects. The main components of auditability theory, competent personnel, 
capable processes, and effective internal controls form the basis for auditability theory 
(Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 712). Thus, organizations need a competent workforce, 
capable processes, and effective internal controls to ensure mission success. Individual 
competence will lead to greater success in performing contract management tasks and 
activities just as organizational process maturity will ensure consistent and improved results 
for the organization (Frame, 1999; Kerzner, 2013; Wysocki, 2004).  
The next section provides a brief discussion of the various contracting competency 
models across federal agencies and professional associations.  
Contracting Competency Models 
Our research will focus on the two predominant federal government contracting 
competency models (DoD and FAI) and the two predominant professional association 
competency models, the National Contract Management Association (NCMA) and the 
National Institute for Government Procurement (NIGP). 
DoD Contracting Competency Model 
The DoD implemented the DoDI 5000.66 competency model framework for the 
contracting career field by establishing its contracting competency model. This model is 
used to assess the DoD contract management workforce competencies, determine 
competency gaps, and identify opportunities for training and development to close those 
competency gaps (OUSD AT&L, 2014). The DoD contracting competency model (hereafter 
referred to as the DoD model) consists of 11 units of competence (10 technical units and 1 
professional unit). The units of competencies are broken down into 28 technical 
competencies and 10 professional competencies, which are further broken down into 52 
technical elements and 10 professional elements (DoD, 2007). The DoD competency model 
is shown in Appendix A. 
Federal Acquisition Institute Contracting Competency Model 
The FAI was established in 1976 under the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act 
and has been charged with fostering and promoting the development of the civilian agency 
federal acquisition workforce. The Federal Acquisition Institute Improvement Act of 2011 
strengthened the FAI’s role to satisfy 12 statutory responsibilities in three broad areas: 
professional certification training, human capital planning, and acquisition research.  
Specifically for the contracting workforce, the FAI developed the Federal Acquisition 
Certification in Contracting (FAC-C) program. The FAC-C program is for civilian agency 
federal contracting professionals performing contracting and procurement activities and 
functions. The purpose of the FAC-C program is to establish general education, training, 
and experience requirements for those contracting professionals. The FAC-C program is 
built on competencies that refer to the knowledge, skills, and abilities contracting 
professionals must have in order to perform their contracting duties. The FAC-C program 
was revised to better align it with the DoD’s Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) program. The contracting competencies that are the foundation of the FAC-C 
certification training are the ones developed by the DoD, thus the FAI and DoD share the 
identical contracting competency framework (FAI, n.d.). 
NCMA Contract Management Competency Model 
The NCMA contract management competency model is established in the Contract 
Management Body of Knowledge (CMBOK). The CMBOK was first published in 2002 and 
has evolved extensively to its current version, published in 2017. The CMBOK is based on 
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the Contract Management Standard (CMS), which was developed through a “voluntary 
consensus process which included a survey of contract managers, expert drafting, peer 
review, and formal public comment validation” (NCMA, 2017, p. 20). The purpose of the 
CMBOK is to “provide a common understanding of the terminology, practices, polices, and 
processes used in contract management” by both buyers (e.g., government agencies) and 
sellers (e.g., government contractors; NCMA, 2017, p. 18). The CMBOK competency 
framework is structured at a sufficient level to apply to all types of government organizations 
(e.g., federal, state, municipal), as well as industry organizations from all sectors 
(government, defense, medical, information technology, etc.). The CMBOK accomplishes 
this purpose through a competency system which consists of seven primary competencies 
(Leadership, Management, Guiding Principles, Pre-Award, Award, Post-Award, and Learn) 
and thirty process competencies. The CMS is embedded in the CMBOK and expands on the 
Pre-Award, Award, and Post-Award competencies by including job tasks for both buyers 
and sellers. The CMS competencies were developed in alignment with the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Thus, the CMBOK complements the FAR and can be used by 
government contract managers and government agencies for development of individual 
competence as well as organizational capability (Rendon & Winn, 2017). The NCMA 
competency model (CMBOK) is reflected in Appendix B and the CMS is reflected in 
Appendix C. The CMS-FAR Matrix is shown in Appendix D.  
NIGP Competency Model  
The National Institute for Government Procurement (NIGP) has adopted the 
competence model established by the Universal Public Procurement Certification Council 
(UPPCC). The UPPCC is an independent entity formed to govern and administer the 
universal procurement certification programs, specifically the Certified Public Procurement 
Officer (CPPO) and Certified Professional Public Buyer (CPPB) certifications (UPPCC, 
2019). The CPPO and CPPB programs have been adopted by various public procurement 
professional associations such as NIGP The Institute for Public Procurement, National 
Association of State Procurement Officers (NASPO), California Association of Public 
Procurement Officials (CAPPO), and the Florida Association of Public Procurement Officials 
(FAPPO). The UPPCC has established a body of knowledge (BOK) that governs the skills 
and competencies needed for the public procurement profession. The BOK was the result of 
a job task analysis conducted to ensure that the certification exams maintain alignment with 
the critical skills and knowledge needed for the public procurement profession. The job task 
analysis process provides assurance that individuals designated by a UPPCC certification 
possess an essential common body of public procurement knowledge that is objectively 
assessed and validated by the profession (UPPCC, 2019).  
The current UPPCC Body of Knowledge consists of 87 total knowledge statements 
common to both CPPO and CPPB certifications. The CPPO and CPPB competencies are 
similar, but differ in how the knowledge is used in both the performance of tasks and the skill 
level needed. Therefore, the UPPCC developed a BOK for each certification. Both BOKs 
consist of the following six domain areas: Procurement Administration, Sourcing, 
Negotiation Process, Contract Administration, Supply Management, and Strategic 
Procurement Planning. The domain areas consist of 87 common knowledge statements and 
associated job tasks/responsibilities. The CPPO BOK contains 68 related job 
tasks/responsibilities and the CPPB BOK contains 61 related job tasks/responsibilities. 
Appendix E reflects the UPPCC competence model for the CPPO certification (UPPCC, 
2019). 
Now that we have discussed the DoD competency model (which is identical to the 
FAI competency model), the NCMA CMBOK, and the UPPCC body of knowledge, we 
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present a comparative analysis of these competency models to identify any similarities and 
differences among the models. Because the DoD and FAI use the same competency model, 
the analysis will specifically focus on the DoD, NCMA, and the UPPCC competency models.  
4. Comparative Analysis of Contracting Competency Models 
The comparative analysis of the contracting competency models will focus on three 
major areas: structure of competency model, scope of competencies, and supporting 
documentation. 
Structure of Competency Model 
The three competency models differ in terms of how they are structured. In this 
analysis, structure refers to how the competencies are constructed, aligned, and related to 
each other.  
The DoD/FAI competency model’s structure (see Appendix A) reflects a mix of 
contract life cycle phases (Pre-Award and Award, Develop and/or Negotiate Positions, 
Contract Administration, and Contract Termination), specific procurement areas (Small 
Business-Socioeconomic Programs, Contracting in a Contingent and/or Combat 
Environment), and a collection of general competency areas (Other Competencies, 
Professional Competency). Each unit of competence (11 total) is broken down into individual 
competencies (38 total), which are then broken down into elements (62 total). Other than 
this hierarchical relationship between units, competencies, and elements, there is no logical 
relationship among the competence units. For example, the DoD/FAI model combines both 
pre-award and award contract life cycle phases into one competency and divides the post-
award life cycle phase into two separate competency units of contract administration and 
contract terminations. As reflected in Appendix A, the units of competence are not structured 
in any logical arrangement other than just a listing of units of competence. 
The NCMA CMBOK (see Appendix B and C) reflects both an extensive hierarchical 
structure as well as a process flow structure. Hierarchically, each primary competency is 
broken down into process competencies, which are then broken down into job tasks and 
sub-tasks. The Guiding Principles competencies are overarching the contract life cycle 
phases of pre-award, award, and post award phases. Additionally, each contract life cycle 
phase has its own competency structure. For example, Pre-Award is broken down into 
Develop Solicitation, which is then broken down into Acquisition Planning and Request 
Offers. Acquisition Planning can be broken down to five job tasks (Shape Internal Customer 
Requirements, Conduct Market Research, Perform Risk Analysis, Formulate Contract 
Strategy, and Finalize Acquisition Plan. These job tasks can also be broken down into sub-
tasks. In addition to the Guiding Principles competency, there are supporting competencies 
such as Leadership and Management. The Management competencies are broken down 
into the contract management supporting disciplines, which include business management, 
financial management, project management, risk management, and supply chain 
management.  
The UPPCC model (see Appendix E) is similar in structure to the DoD/FAI model. 
The UPPCC model reflects a general grouping of procurement functions and activities 
(Procurement Administration, Supply Management, Strategic Procurement Planning), with 
some semblance of contract life cycle phases (Sourcing, Negotiation Process, Contract 
Administration). Each of the six domains consists of a list of knowledge statements and a list 
of associated tasks/responsibilities. Other than this hierarchical relationship between 
domains, knowledge statements, and tasks/responsibilities, there is no logical relationship 
among the domains. As reflected in Appendix D, the domains are not structured in any 
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logical arrangement other than just a listing of categories with knowledge statements and 
tasks/responsibilities. 
Scope of Competency Models 
The three competency frameworks differ in terms of the scope of the frameworks. In 
this analysis, scope refers to the topical coverage of the competencies in the competency 
model.  
The DoD/FAI competency model’s scope is focused predominantly on Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) governed contracting tasks and activities. Additionally, the 
DoD/FAI model consists of FAR-based contracting competencies specific to the buying 
organization’s tasks and activities. Furthermore, the DoD/FAI model includes other 
competencies such as using e-business and automated tools and activity program 
coordinator for the government purchase card. Finally, the model does include a 
Professional Competency unit that includes generic competencies such as problem solving, 
customer service, oral communication, written communication, and other professional skills.  
The NCMA CMBOK model is much broader and expanded than the DoD/FAI or the 
UPPCC competency models. For example, the NCMA CMBOK has a much more 
broadened focus than just contract management competencies. The CMBOK includes 
supporting competencies, such as business management, financial management, project 
management, risk management, and supply chain management, as well as a leadership 
competency. Additionally, the CMBOK’s Learn competency focuses on both individual 
learning (individual competencies) as well as organizational learning (organizational 
capability). Finally, and most importantly, the NCMA CMBOK framework expands the 
contracting life cycle to include both the buyer and seller’s competencies, processes, and 
job tasks. Each contract life cycle phase includes domains for both the buyer and seller. For 
example, the Pre-Award phase includes the buyer primary competency of Develop 
Solicitation, which consists of process competencies of Acquisition Planning and Request 
Offers. The Pre-Award phase also includes the seller primary competency of Develop Offer, 
which consists of process competencies of Business Development and Develop Win 
Strategy. Both buyer and seller process competencies are further broken down to buyer job 
tasks, seller job tasks, and joint job tasks. Thus, the CMBOK framework includes both buyer 
and seller domains for each phase of the contract life cycle.  
The UPPCC body of knowledge model is similar in scope to the DoD/FAI model in 
that it is focused primarily on government procurement and contracting, specifically from the 
buyer perspective. Furthermore, the UPPCC includes a domain on Supply Management, 
with knowledge pertaining to inventory management, asset management, and supply chain 
management and related tasks and responsibilities. Finally, the UPPCC includes a Strategic 
Procurement Planning domain, knowledge pertaining to analytical, research, and forecasting 
techniques, as well as strategic planning and cost/benefit analysis, and related tasks and 
responsibilities.  
Supporting Documentation 
The three competency models differ in terms of the amount and type of supporting 
documentation. In this analysis, supporting documentation refers to the availability of 
supplemental information and guidance that supports the contracting competency models. 
The DoD/FAI competency model is presented in spreadsheet format that consists of 
separate columns for Units of Competence, Competencies, and Elements. Supplemental 
information or other supporting documentation related to the DoD/FAI model and its 
competencies could not be found on DoD or FAI websites.  
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The NCMA CMBOK model is much more supported by documentation compared to 
the DoD/FAI and UPPCC frameworks. The NCMA Contract Management Standard (CMS), 
which is the foundation of the CMBOK, provides the primary competencies for the guiding 
principles and the life cycle phases, as well as the process competencies and job tasks for 
both buyer and seller domains of each contract life cycle phase. In addition, the CMBOK 
document itself provides supporting documentation for the remaining primary and process 
competencies of Leadership, Management, and Learn, as well as a section on 
abbreviations, acronyms, and lexicon.  
The UPPCC body of knowledge is presented as a four-page document, which 
provide an introduction and background to the documents, and then lists the domain, 
knowledge statements, and associate tasks and responsibilities. Supplemental information 
or other supporting documentation related to the UPPCC bodies of knowledge model and its 
domains could not be found on the UPPCC website.  
Summary of Comparison Findings 
From a summary perspective, the DoD/FAI and UPPCC competency models are 
similar in terms of structure, scope, and supporting documentation. Both models focus only 
on government procurement and contract management at the exclusion of any supporting 
related disciplines. Additionally, both models consist only of contracting competencies from 
the buyer’s perspective. Furthermore, the arrangement of competencies do not include the 
complete contract life cycle phases in sequence and with sufficient visibility and granularity 
for each life cycle phase. The DoD/FAI model combines both pre-award and award contract 
life cycle phases into one competency and divides the post-award life cycle phase into two 
separate competency units of contract administration and contract terminations. The 
UPPCC model reflects a general grouping of procurement functions and activities with some 
semblance of contract life cycle phases. Finally, both the DoD/FAI and UPPCC competency 
frameworks have minimal supporting documentation.  
The NCMA CMBOK competency model is different from the other models in some 
significant ways. In terms of structure, the CMBOK uses more of a concise life cycle 
approach with separate competencies for each major contracting life cycle phase, thus 
providing much more granularity and visibility on pre-award, award, and post-award job 
tasks and activities. Furthermore, while all reviewed models break down the competencies 
into lower-level competencies, the CMBOK provides greater granularity and visibility by 
breaking down each of these life cycle phases into more detailed domains such as 
acquisition planning and requesting offers (pre-award), conduct negotiations and source 
selection (award) and administer contracts and contract close out (post-award). Additionally, 
we conclude that the most significant difference between the reviewed models is that the 
CMBOK includes competencies related to both buyer and seller perspectives of contract 
management. Since contract management is about the pre-award, award, and post-award 
activities performed by both the buyer and seller, it is only appropriate that the CMBOK 
address the competencies, domains, and job tasks performed by both the buyer and seller. 
Furthermore, the CMBOK is more broadly structured and includes competencies for 
supporting disciplines such as business management, project management, financial 
management, risk management, and supply chain management.  
Finally, the CMBOK also includes a Learn competency that focuses on continuous 
learning at the individual level (competence) and at the organizational level (capability). Our 
top-level review of the other models does not identify competencies related to organizational 
capability process capability.  
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Figure 1 summarizes the results of the comparative analysis showing the major 
differences between the DoD/FAI, NCMA, and the UPPCC models. These differences may 
have important implications on contract management workforce professional development, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
 
 Summary of Comparison Findings 
Implications and Recommendations 
The DoD IG continues to identify deficiencies in DoD contract management with past 
audit reports identifying material internal control weaknesses in contract management 
processes and procedures. Additionally, the GAO continues to list DoD Contract 
Management as a high-risk area due to the department’s challenges in increasing its 
contract management workforce capacity to negotiate, manage, and oversee contracts, and 
to ensure that the workforce has the requisite skills and tools to perform their contract 
management tasks. Furthermore, past research on the DoD’s contract management 
organizational process capability has identified that post-award contract management 
processes (e.g., contract administration and contract closeout) are less capable and less 
mature than the pre-award and award processes (Rendon, 2015). The results of the 
comparative analysis showing the major differences between the DoD/FAI, NCMA, and 
UPPCC competency models may provide some insight on how to address these reported 
contract management deficiencies.  
Compared to reviewed competency models, the NCMA CMBOK competency 
framework may provide a better approach for developing the DoD contracting workforce. 
Using a more concise and detailed contract life cycle and providing greater emphasis and 
granularity in each of the contract management phases and tasks (pre-award, award, and 
post-award) may help develop and fortify the DoD’s contract management policies, 
processes, and practices. Providing greater emphasis on each of the contract life cycle 
phases and organizing competencies using a hierarchical structure that aligns each 
competency with processes, job tasks, and sub-tasks would support the development of a 
professional contracting career path that aligns contracting technical competencies and key 
work experiences. The recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2016, 
Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations (Section 809 Panel), 
recommended that the DoD create career paths for the contracting functional area that 
would include such technical competencies and key work experiences.  
Characteristic DoD/FAI Model NCMA CMBOK Model UPPCC BOK Model
Combines pre-award and award contract life cycle phases Separate competencies for each contract life cycle phase Some semblance of contract life cycle phases
Divides post-award phase Includes competencies for guiding principles, leadership, ma   Includes specific procurement areas
Includes specific procurement areas and a collection of 
professional competency areas
Extensive hierarchical relationship (primary competency, 
domain, process competency, job tasks, sub-tasks)
Minimal hierarchical relationship (domain, knowledge 
statement, task/responsibilities)
Minimal hierarchical relationship (competence, 
competencies, elements)
Federal/DoD contracting tasks and activities Govt/Industry contracting tasks and activities Federal/State/Local contracting tasks and activities
Specific to buyer's contracting process, tasks, activities Bother buyer and seller contracting process, tasks, activities Specific to buyer's contracting process, tasks, activities
Includes other contracting competencies (e-procurement, 
purchase card, professional skills) and professional skills
Includes supporting competencies in business, finance, 
risk, project, and supply chain management
Includes other contracting competencies (procurement 
admin, supply mgt, strategic procurement planning)
Supporting Documentation                                      
(Availability of Supplemental 
Information)
Three page documents in spreadsheet format with separate 
columns for competence, competencies, and elements.
        
Management Standard.  The CMBOK includes a 
discussion of the CM framework and a discussion of each 
competency.  The CMBOK also contains a glossary and 
supporting appendices.
Four page document providing an introduction and 
background and a list of domains, knowledge statements, 
and associated tasks and responsibilities.
Structure                                             
(Construction, Alignment, Relationship)
Scope                                                        
(Topical Coverage)
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Expanding the DoD contracting workforce’s knowledge to include industry’s side of 
contract management (e.g., industry operations and processes) as reflected in the NCMA 
CMBOK will help in developing technical and professional skills that can transfer across 
government and industry, as well as improve communication and collaboration between 
government and industry. Including the industry side of contracting would also result in 
strengthening systems thinking within the contract management workforce. Systems thinking 
“examines the relationship between essential parts of an organization or a problem, and 
determines how to manage those relationships to get better outcomes” (Carlson, 2017, 
n.p.). The DoD contracting competency model may be resulting in linear thinking among the 
contract management workforce, with contract managers believing that contracting problems 
have “direct causes and that you can optimize the whole by optimizing each of the parts” 
(Carlson, 2017, n.p.). Contract managers using systems thinking will know that contract 
management “problems can have hidden, indirect causes” and it is the “relationships among 
the parts that matter the most” (Carlson, 2017, n.p.). Adopting the NCMA CMBOK for the 
DoD may provide the DoD contract management workforce with a stronger foundational 
understanding of not only the complete contract life cycle (pre-award, award, post-award), 
but also with an understanding of the different perspectives in contractual relationships (e.g., 
buyer, seller, subcontractors, suppliers, etc.). Using systems thinking, contract managers will 
be able to “see the gaps where complications or opportunities can arise” within the 
acquisition process and understand how their contract management strategy decisions may 
impact contractors and subcontractors (Carlson, 2017, n.p.). Including the seller 
competencies for the DoD contract management workforce may also strengthen 
“communication, collaboration, problem-solving, and adaptability” skills (Carlson, 2017, n.p.). 
The Section 809 Panel recommended that the DoD revise its contracting professional 
development programs (e.g., professional certifications) to emphasize skills that are 
transferable across government and industry and focused on a defined set of qualifications 
connected to contracting positions.   
Additionally, there may be value in broadening the DoD’s contracting competency 
model to include other contract management-related disciplines such as business 
management, financial management, project management, risk management, and supply 
chain management, as reflected in the NCMA CMBOK. The inclusion of other contract 
management-related disciplines may enhance the DoD’s contracting workforce critical 
thinking, problem-solving, and analytical skills, bringing increased efficiency to its contract 
management processes. The Section 809 Panel recommended that the DoD revise its 
contracting professional development programs (e.g., professional certifications) to 
emphasize sufficient domain knowledge, emphasize professional skills, and provide a broad 
perspective to interact effectively with industry. A greater understanding of contract 
management–related disciplines as well as understanding both government and industry 
sides of the contract management relationship will help develop “T-shaped” acquisition 
professionals who have both “depth of knowledge in a particular expertise as well as have 
the ability to work and communicate across disciplines” (Carlson, 2017, n.p.). T-shaped 
acquisition professionals will be capable of introducing innovation and process change into 
the DoD’s contract management processes. If the DoD would adopt the NCMA CMBOK, it 
would achieve a desired recommendation from the 809 Panel that both the DoD and 
industry would adopt a common body of knowledge, which would also enhance 
communication and collaboration between government and industry.  
Finally, if the DoD emphasized a continuous learning competency at both the 
individual competence level and also at the organizational capability level, as reflected in the 
NCMA CMBOK, the DoD may increase its contract management process capability and 
strengthen its internal controls in contract management processes and procedures. Thus, 
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increasing individual competence, process capability, and internal controls will help in 
improving auditability in DoD acquisition.  
Conclusion 
The DoD IG and the GAO continue to identify the need for increased competency in 
the DoD contracting workforce. The recent Section 809 Panel emphasized the importance of 
contracting workforce professional development and stated that if the DoD is to achieve its 
acquisition workforce goals, it will need to prepare and develop its workforce differently. The 
recent FY2018 NDAA emphasized the need for business acumen, knowledge of industry 
operations, and knowledge of industry motivation within the defense acquisition workforce. 
The CMBOK was developed to integrate and standardize common contract management 
job tasks across the government and industry (NCMA, 2017). When both buyers and sellers 
understand and interpret contract management terminology, practices, policies, and 
processes consistently, contract management workforce competence and organizational 
capability increases, and successful contract management is more likely to be achieved 
(NCMA, 2017; Rendon & Winn, 2017). Perhaps the DoD should leverage the CMBOK 
competency model as it continues to emphasize contract management training and 
continues to develop workforce competencies.  
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Appendix B. NCMA CMBOK Competency Model 
(NCMA, 2017)  
 
Note. Used by permission. 
  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 101 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
Appendix C. NCMA Contract Management Standard (CMS) 
(NCMA, 2016) 
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Appendix D. NCMA Contract Management Standard—FAR Matrix 
(Rendon & Winn, 2017) 
 
Note. Used by permission. 
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Appendix E. UPPCC Body of Knowledge 
(UPPCC, 2019) 
 
Note. Used by permission. 
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Acquisition Cybersecurity Management Framework 
Dr. Randy William Maule—has been with the Naval Postgraduate School since 2000, serving as 
naval and joint forces enterprise developer, knowledge manager, and technical analyst in Sea Trial 
and coalition exercises where he conducted systems test and measurement. His enterprise tool suite 
and cyber test and measurement architecture operated on ships, in maritime and network operations 
centers, and in forward-deployed commands for nearly 15 years. Prior to this, he spent 10 years in 
Silicon Valley high technology industries researching intelligent networks and service architecture, 
and prior to this developing enterprise knowledge systems and artificial intelligence (AI) at a federal 
supercomputer center. [rwmaule@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
Current organizational structures have proven insufficient for cyber and information 
assurance. The acquisition role may be resourced and expanded to support information 
assurance and systems compliance. A supply chain audit and assessment process within 
acquisition departments will better support emerging cybersecurity requirements. This 
project advances technical and workflow models, an assessment framework, and 
implementation methods to support expansion of the acquisition department role to include 
cybersecurity and information assurance across the systems lifecycle—from supply chain, 
through test and measurement, to maintenance and obsolescence. Analysis methodology 
and model-based system engineering techniques successfully employed in naval and joint 
forces field research for technology and cybersecurity evaluation for nearly two decades, 
along with best practices from Silicon Valley high technology industries, were applied in the 
acquisition cybersecurity management framework. A shift of cybersecurity assessment from 
distributed units into centralized acquisition departments should significantly lessen the 
inter- and intra-organizational boundaries which have traditionally hindered cybersecurity. 
Research Objective: Establish methodology and models to support the cybersecurity and 
information assurance needs of naval forces and provide decision makers with an 
evaluation framework and workflow to inform acquisition decisions and better ensure 
systems security. 
Research Questions: Will the centralization of cybersecurity and information assurance 
away from individual units into acquisition departments lessen inter- and intra-organizational 
boundaries that have historically limited cyber effectiveness? Will the workflow and audit 
models suffice for acquisition departments to implement security controls across the 
systems lifecycle—from initial acquisition to maintenance and obsolescence? 
Introduction 
Current organizational structures have proven insufficient for cyber and information 
assurance. Acquisition departments may be expanded to help ensure cybersecurity. This 
research advances the acquisition role to support information assurance throughout the 
supply chain and across the lifecycle of the equipment. This is proposed as an 
enhancement to current acquisition processes. Model-based system engineering techniques 
are applied for systems test and measurement and integrated into audit processes within 
the acquisition workflow. Techniques, procedures, roles and responsibilities are based on 
lessons learned in naval and joint forces exercises and best practices in Silicon Valley high 
technology industries. The proposed supply chain audit and assessment process extends 
from initial equipment purchase order, through acquisition, to maintenance and lifecycle 
compliance assessment, to obsolescence and destruction. 
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Research Background 
Business, industry, and government collectively struggle with cybersecurity 
compliance, information assurance, and data security. Resources and processes to support 
audits, assessment and reporting are insufficient. While the terminology and architecture are 
slightly different from industry to government, the problems are similar and can often be 
traced to the supply chain—from counterfeit and compromised components, to 
improper/malevolent code, to unsecured systems and maintenance processes. The 
acquisition role may be best suited to remedy current shortcomings. This will require 
significant expansion of that role and its resources to support supply chain information 
assurance.  
Cybersecurity compliance assessment as a component of supply chain management 
will shift audit responsibilities from vendors, program offices and departments into 
centralized acquisition departments. This will significantly lessen the inter- and intra-
organizational boundaries which have traditionally hindered cybersecurity and information 
assurance. The shift of systems verification from vendors and their contractors or sponsors 
to independent government auditors will remove bias while increasing the 
comprehensiveness of the process as auditors are able to look across department 
boundaries to examine the integration interfaces where systems are most vulnerable. 
Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) and supporting analysis methodology 
successfully employed in naval and joint forces field research for technology and 
cybersecurity evaluation for nearly two decades provide the foundation for the acquisition 
modeling framework and analysis workflow.  
The process begins with technical models and expert systems for best practices, 
then procedures and workflows for technical assessment, followed by systems integration 
audits. Next are methods and procedures for in-service audits for cybersecurity and 
information assurance, systems verification and data validation. Technical models are 
integrated with audit workflows for comprehensive lifecycle systems assessment to include 
maintenance and the declaration of software/hardware obsolescence and destruction. 
Literature Review 
Supply chain modeling and analysis is advanced within the context of complexity 
science, which assumes both technical and human phenomena that interface to determine 
system readiness and operational effectiveness. The following is evidence of complexity in 
naval systems: 
1. Multi-layered communication architecture 
2. Multiple organizational structures to produce a capability 
3. Organizational boundaries which impact engineering and analysis 
4. Adversary capabilities for advanced electronic and multi-layered cyberattack. 
The methodology herein advances multi-disciplinary research techniques to include 
evaluation of all variables that we have found to impact the validity of naval systems and 
data, including cross-organizational technology integration, variance in the RF spectrum, 
and human influence (Maule, 2017). There is a research history that provides perspective 
for supply chain cyber analytics. 
Network science studies complex networks (Tiropanis et al., 2015) at a level of detail 
sufficient to generate predictive models. For example, tools that we use in naval technical 
analysis map data flows between systems over network connections to monitor routing, 
processes and data. Supporting each variable are algorithms to assess defined metrics and 
data validity based on components in the routing, integration and transformation path. 
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Network-centric warfare and information dominance are considered within the vocabulary of 
network science (National Research Council, 2005). When cybersecurity is layered into the 
analysis, the number of metrics for measurement expands exponentially. 
Complexity science spans computer science, mathematics, and operations research 
and includes the study of distributed, interactive computing (Du & Ko, 2014). Complexity 
theory investigates how subcomponents of a system integrate to produce a collective 
behavior of that system (Ladyman, Lambert, & Wiesner, 2013). Pertinent to naval systems 
analysis is that complexity can be characterized within the context of equilibrium—as 
required for high-performance communications in challenged environments. Absent system 
synchronization, we do not achieve equilibrium, so data relied upon for decisions may be 
latent, corrupt or compromised. A sub-discipline of complexity science, adaptive systems, 
uses probabilistic measures to quantify complex variables—such as systems readiness and 
human effectiveness. 
Adaptive systems are characterized by the capability to change and learn from 
experience. Machine learning can be applied to help understand the complexity. We 
observe adaptive behaviors in naval exercises as we instrument networks to monitor 
complex data flows across geographic regions. The components of systems interact, with 
the result of those interactions dependent on dynamic contextual variables. An example is 
changes made as sailors and systems adapt to rapidly changing tactical scenarios. 
Evaluation addresses the dynamic interplay of adaptive, complex variables over time. 
Failure to address this complexity results in an inability to monitor systems to recognize a 
performance variance or cyber intrusion, or to adapt the analysis to changes in systems 
operational context—leading to incorrect data.  
Test and measurement of naval systems in live operations have established that the 
relationship between systems, components, and other systems is nonlinear (Maule, Jensen, 
& Gallup, 2014). It is not possible to precisely define the inputs such that there is a direct 
relationship to the outputs. Cause–effect relationships can be determined only within 
technical, operational and environmental context. Systems performance tends to exhibit 
divergent patterns under stress—such as challenged communications, jamming or electronic 
attack, and of course cyber manipulation.  
This leads to the final construct of adaptive complexity—namely, that while it is 
possible to establish linear relationships in a static architecture, these relationships may no 
longer be relevant when integrated into dynamic scenarios. Researchers have noted the 
need for probabilistic algorithms for multiple dimensions of analysis when contexts are 
dynamic and expanding (McMullen, 2015). Assessment is over time, within the full range of 
technical, operational and environmental contexts in which the system will operate (Maule, 
2016). 
Probabilistic algorithms also fit nicely with artificial intelligence (AI) tools for decision 
support. In warfare, the large number of dynamic variables, together with the large number 
of possible technical, operational and environmental contexts to be assessed in an 
engagement, necessitate statistical analysis. There is never a single answer; the result is 
always within context. Probabilistic approaches, together with machine learning and neural 
networks, can address this complexity to provide a solution for tactical supply chain cyber 
analysis.  
The need is acute. Problems with unsecured open architecture and open source 
products persist (Dorofee et al., 2013; Cooper, 2009; Lindqvist & Jonsson, 1998). There are 
problems when vendors publish system specifications to the Internet and problems with 
deployment practices that do not carefully control firmware updates (Kern, 2014; Camp et 
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al., 2006). There is little protection if purchasing computer chips which have already been 
compromised (Center for Public Integrity, 2014; Rossi, 2012; Johnson, 2011; Adee, 2008; 
Grow et al., 2008; Dean & Li, 2002). 
Another rationale for a direct connection between the audit process and the 
acquisition role is so that compromised systems can be immediately destroyed and 
replaced. Historically, after we identify a breach, we can only file a report. These reports are 
not typically well-received, and systems may continue to operate. In the proposed supply 
chain cybersecurity workflow, the auditors have a more direct means for remediation. 
As needed, events can be reconstructed for detailed cyber analysis. We use live 
cyberattacks on components in offline laboratories to validate findings. The analytics 
produce quantitative system readiness coefficients and confidence levels for those 
coefficients (Maule, 2017). 
Method 
Adaptive complexity for supply chain cyber analysis is applied as an extension of the 
Cybersecurity Figure of Merit (CFOM). CFOM is a mathematical framework of weighted 
qualitative and quantitative metrics that provide an expression of the relative effectiveness of 
an information technology in terms of the completeness and sufficiency of its cyber security 
properties throughout its lifecycle (Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
[SPAWAR], 2015). 
The NPS Service Evaluation Architecture (SEA) CFOM implementation is based on 
assessments conducted in live naval, joint forces and coalition exercises where the focus 
was on systems readiness and resiliency in electronic engagements against adversaries 
that had imposed D-DIL or A2AD conditions on blue forces (Maule & Lewis, 2011). 
Models, metrics, and analytics are derived from cumulative naval system test results, 
beginning with Fleet Battle Experiments in 2000 and then FORCEnet and Joint Forces 
Command (JFCOM) Sea Trials from 2003–2015, which included Trident Warrior, RIMPAC, 
Valiant Shield, and numerous limited objective experiments with NATO and coalition forces.  
Supply Chain Standards 
Next is to address foundations for the supply chain cybersecurity framework to help 
structure the analysis. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a global 
network of national standards bodies which develop and publish International Standards. 
Members are the foremost standards organizations in their countries. The ISO collaborates 
closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the Institute for 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Some of the standards are specific to supply 
chain management, including cybersecurity, quality management, and audits (ISO, n.d.). 
Standards pertinent to the acquisition cybersecurity management framework include the 
following: 
• SO 9000: Quality management systems 
• ISO/TS 10303-1307: Industrial automation systems and integration 
• ISO 16678: Guidelines to deter counterfeiting and illicit trade  
• ISO/TR 17370: Data carriers for supply chain management 
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• ISO/IEC 20243: Mitigating maliciously tainted and counterfeit products1 
• ISO/TS 22375: Security and resilience guidelines for complexity assessment 
• ISO/IEC 27036: Information security for supplier relationships 
• ISO 28000: Supply chain security management systems—Specifications 
• ISO 28001: Supply chain security management systems—Assessments 
• ISO 28002: Supply chain security management systems—Resilience 
• ISO 28003: Supply chain security management systems—Audit and certification 
• ISO/IEC/IEEE 41062: Software engineering 
Supply Chain Acquisition Framework 
The acquisition cybersecurity management framework and supply chain cyber 
analytics process apply the previously mentioned standards through an extension to the 
traditional acquisition workflow. The extension provides cybersecurity management from 
initial equipment request through vendor selection, then across the systems lifecycle to 
include maintenance and obsolescence. The intent is to provide a comprehensive security 
structure for naval systems from acquisition to destruction (Figure 1). This includes the 
system support structure and command management, staffing, contracting and outsourcing. 




 Variables for Supply Chain Cyber Assessment 
Evaluation techniques are based in statistical analysis with AI and machine learning 
to provide decision support. Probabilities are based on defined metrics and measurements 
from independent government auditors. The methodology can be applied to help acquisition 
decision makers better evaluate technologies for possible cybersecurity impact and tactical 
forces to better understand the implications of their purchase requests, the degree to which 
their systems may have been compromised, and the validity of the data in their systems.  
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The assumption herein is that when naval architecture is suspected of compromise 
and the cyber adversary may have enacted automated routines to alter data to impact 
systems performance or invalidate information in command decision systems, mechanisms 
will be required to determine the impact on warfighter readiness. The proposed 
enhancement to the systems acquisition process will help remedy this situation through real-
time audit monitors and controls. 
Figure 2 denotes the basic acquisition process and the current financial and vendor 
selection process. Along the left axis is equipment selection and the purchase request. The 
green arrows indicate legacy operations. Below the basic acquisition process is the 
proposed cybersecurity enhanced acquisition process. Red arrows denote the additional 
workflows and data streams. 
 
 Supply Chain Basic and Cybersecurity Enhanced Acquisition 
Framework 
Within the enhanced process are databases for quality assurance and cybersecurity, 
along with expert systems to interface with engineers during design and development—
preliminary to product request and submission to the purchasing agents. The green arrows 
indicate the current workflows, and the red arrows are the interfaces to the new specialized 
systems.  
The dashed red box designated as Section “A” is preliminary to the acquisition when 
the system proponent begins the purchase order. Here the purchaser interacts with expert 
systems as machine learning agents assess the technology through comparative analysis 
and provide recommendations. A record stream for acquisition decision makers and 
financial personnel is generated. Functions in this area are discussed in the solution section 
later in this report. 
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The dashed red box designated as Section “B” is the post-purchase process and 
consists of a series of independent government monitors and audits. Most can be 
automated and have been successfully tested in naval operations. These monitors and 
audits recognize that the purchase is not the end of the acquisition process, but rather a 
step in the systems lifecycle. Before the purchase, the cybersecurity concerns are with the 
computer chips and embedded components, drivers and software. After the purchase, the 
cybersecurity concerns are with the integration, maintenance and evolution of the software 
and components within the system, impact on other systems, and the validity of the 
processed data. Functions in this area are advanced in more detail in the next section and 
are discussed again in the solution set later in this report. 
The unbound area in the middle of the figure addresses the physical components—
from the vendor, to the suppliers to the vendor, to the involved personnel. This is a 
comprehensive area for assessment that is beyond the scope of this project and is reserved 
for future research. Techniques advanced in Sections “A” and “B” can be applied, albeit with 
an exponential expansion of detail and complexity. 
Supply Chain Audit Framework 
The audit framework begins with test and measurement models that show 
components, systems, spectrum, interfaces, sensors and software. All are assessed within 
the technical, operational and environmental context in which they operate to provide a 
more accurate analysis for acquisition decision makers. Collected data includes packets, 
system logs, sensor data, human interface and interaction results, and fusion/integration 
artifacts (Figure 3).  
 
 
 High Level Supply Chain Cyber Audit Workflow 
Analysis of cyber effects begins with stressing systems through network and process 
load to determine points of failure and countermeasures to achieve resilience. Cyber effects 
are layered to assess system capabilities to recover from and/or counter cyber stress. 
Assessment involves a continuous, comprehensive monitoring of systems, networks and 
applications. CyberSim is for offline tests with live malware against the components to 
provide a more accurate cybersecurity assessment for systems verification and data validity. 
This data feeds the AI routines for algorithmic prediction of systems operational readiness. 
In more detail, the supply chain cyber audit framework (Figure 4) supports in-service 
test and measurement for continuous systems cybersecurity assessment–using many of the 
same techniques successfully implemented on forward-deployed ships and in network and 
maritime operations centers in Sea Trials and coalition exercises. Our audits include not 
only new innovations but also updates to program of record systems.  
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 Supply Chain Technical Analysis Framework and Workflow 
Cyber analytics is conceptualized as a continuing flow of tests across the operational 
lifecycle of a system. Each operational context, test scenario, vignette, and attack advance 
the machine learning algorithms and predictive capability of the audit models. In the 
previous example, the analysis is focused on ships in A2AD and communication-challenged 
environments. Systems are under electronic attack—our typical live event scenario 
throughout the Sea Trials.  
The audit workflow starts with Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
(DoDAF) models of the system, for which at-rest baselines are established. Systems are 
then evaluated against these models in at-sea tests with active jamming and 
cyber/electronic attack. Communications between components/sensors require evaluation of 
satellite communications, tactical radios, and airborne over-the-horizon capabilities.  
Cyberattacks are analyzed for their results on the acquisition component, including 
system failures, data corruption or manipulation, and degradation of situational awareness 
of supported command decision systems. Cyber performance and operational measures 
update or verify models and validate the quality of the data. The process iterates.  
Solution 
This section applies the previously discussed acquisition framework and analytics 
process as an extension of a traditional systems lifecycle to provide structure for naval 
systems supply chain cyber analysis.  
Integration DEFinition (IDEF) models are common in the DoD to represent 
operations (IDEF, n.d.). Like DoDAF, the IDEF models range from high-level functional 
models to low-level object-oriented design and simulation. For a supply chain analytics 
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workflow, the IDEF modeling approach provides useful operational representations in 
addition to precise data/information metrics for decision support.  
The solution set integrates the previously discussed supply chain framework and 
workflow (pre- and post-acquisition) with implementation constructs for systems verification 
and data validation through the addition of  
a. Experts and expert systems to the pre-acquisition engineering processes 
b. Independent audits for information assurance and systems verification 
c. Machine learning for AI support to supply chain decision makers 
Core processes (Figure 5) include IDEF0 inputs, outputs, controls and mechanisms 
plus additional audit and AI layers. Core inputs are the purchase order and budget; outputs 
are the purchase and supporting maintenance agreements. Controls address guidelines and 
approvals required for submitters and purchasing agents. Mechanisms include the system, 
software or component requirements and specifications. 
 
  
 IDEF A0 High-Level Solution Framework 
Core Workflow 
Figure 6 presents IDEF steps A1–A5 as the high-level components of the supply 
chain cybersecurity workflow. Assessment begins with user requirements and controls to 
determine whether specifications have adequately addressed technical, operational and 
environmental variables that impact the integrity of the equipment in its intended operations. 
 
 Core Workflow for Supply Chain Cybersecurity Integrity Analysis 
Next are technical specifications with systems integration controls. This becomes a 
primary data set for the machine learning algorithms to address process conflict or 
constrained environments and will be one of the more extensive programming efforts due to 
the number of variables in a complex and dynamic naval architecture.  
In operation, the purchasing agent receives the recommendation from the machine 
learning output and is simultaneously presented with the option to review the specific criteria 
upon which the recommendation is based. Controls include restrictions specific to the unit. 
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Upon receipt of the system (hardware, software, service, etc.) the responsibility for 
verification and validation shifts to the auditor. Upon auditor approval, the system is 
transferred to the end user.  
Finally, the maintenance phase monitors equipment throughout its lifecycle, including 
patches and updates, until the declaration of obsolescence and verification of destruction. 
Important is the means to verify that the system or software has been destroyed due to the 
cyber risk from unsupported components. 
The next two sections examine A1 and A2 in more detail (A3–A5 are reserved for 
future research). In Figure 2, both are represented in the initial block “A” which occurs prior 
to the purchase. In future research, the approach followed for the technical specifications 
will also be applied in the operations audit (A4) and maintenance (A5) phases—albeit with 
the addition of metrics for technical, operational and environmental context to address the 
added complexity of live operations.  
Requirement Audit 
Audits are key to integrity validation across the supply chain. Auditors need to be 
properly trained and equipped, and with the capability to act independently without fear of 
reprisal. Nor should they have a vested interest in the success or failure of the system. All 
are common problems we encounter in analysis.  
In Section “A” (Figure 2), with enough audits and a supporting database of audit 
results, the requirements review can be automated such that the purchaser interacts with an 
expert system and AI agents provide feedback and recommendations.  
Figure 7 models the process and breaks out the Quality of Service (QoS) variables, 
metrics for those variables, and ratings key. Variables include (1) alignment with the 
strategic vision, (2) alignment with the mission statement, and (3) alignment with the 
operating environment. These variables can be programmed into an expert system. 
 
 User Requirement Initial Audit Phase With Metrics and Ratings 
More difficult are the metrics and ratings which require in-depth understanding of the 
components of the system and the complexities of the operating environment and software. 
A typical approach is to begin analysis with the user’s requirements for communications to 
assess alignment with the vision and mission, then the specifics of the operating context, 
including the organizational, technical and environmental conditions in which the equipment 
will operate.  
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The system interface metric examines innovation integration with components of the 
strategic plan, and then the specific mission area(s) in which it will operate. The context 
addresses interfaces to technical, operational and environmental conditions but at a deeper 
level. Technical context addresses the specifics of the physical interface—an area for further 
refinement and additional audit layers in future research. The environmental context 
categorizes the innovation through physical presence—for example, mobile device versus 
server, ship versus shore deployment, calm seas versus challenged communications. The 
operational baseline establishes whether the test is static or dynamic within the specifics of 
the test scenario. This area will also require much deeper analysis in future research. 
Software design is more straightforward and looks at the innovation in the context of 
currently active capabilities. For example, is this a redundant capability? Is the system rated 
by one of the major laboratories? Is this to be purchased? Developed in-house? 
Outsourced?  
In a similar vein, data integration addresses the alignment of the innovation with the 
vision, mission, and end state: Will data be merged? Will this capability build on the output 
of another device? Create new insight? QoS variables are addressed from a command 
decision perspective.  
Finally, the cybersecurity. Too often this is an after-thought, but this placement in the 
initial audit helps ensure that cybersecurity is at the forefront of the supply chain assessment 
workflow and aligned with the vision, mission and operating context. A2, below, adds more 
detail and addresses the actual engineering technical measurement process. 
Specification Audit 
The A2 technical audit identifies specifics within the systems environment, looking at 
system/service/process integration and interfaces (Figure 8). The first QoS variable 
assesses alignment of the technical specifications with the designated systems environment 
in which the equipment will operate to establish baselines. Until baselines are established, it 
may be difficult to discern a performance anomaly or cyber intrusion. 
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 Technical Specification and Architecture Audit Phase, Metrics and 
Ratings 
Performance, interoperability, and integration metrics are assessed for (a) the 
technology, (b) the technology within the operating environment, (c) interaction of the 
technology with the other systems in that environment, and (d) the technology under full 
operational load from all systems in the environment in a cyber/electronic warfare 
engagement. Process and data flows are assessed, as is the cybersecurity of the system for 
each process and data flow. 
Systems integration functions are similarly evaluated for performance, 
interoperability, and integration. This step examines the impact of other systems on the 
equipment and the impact of the new equipment on the existing configuration. Data and 
process flows are examined at the interface level.  
The auditors assign weights/ratings to the tests, and these data populate training 
databases for machine learning. AI helps the decision makers understand the findings while 
reducing the complexity of the audit metrics. 
Conclusion 
Supply chain integrity analysis requires assessment of a complex mix of dynamic 
and adaptive variables. Systems lifecycle evaluation includes not only the equipment being 
tested, but also the impact of the collective enterprise, interplay of hosting networks and 
intervening systems, and remote data processes. Measurements are against metrics 
derived from models and their variables—prior to acquisition for alignment and post-
acquisition for in-service analysis. The method advanced in this report provides a technique 
to evaluate supply chains to address variables that impact systems integrity and a workflow 
for in-service auditing and assessment. 
Initial levels of analysis were presented, with examples for high-level audit variables, 
their metrics, and measurement methods. The research addresses the problem of 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 126 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
engineering practices which do not adequately address cybersecurity, information 
assurance, and data validity over the lifecycle of a system. The method, framework and 
techniques were active for 15 years on ships, in network operations and fusion centers, and 
in deployed shore facilities to assess naval and joint forces technologies. This included field 
tests of over 500 complex systems-of-systems innovations in live operations. Through this 
research, the supply chain problems became readily apparent. Techniques advanced herein 
were proven to verify systems and validate data.  
The approach layers independent audits with information assurance and 
cybersecurity as facets of quality management and associated performance controls. Audit 
layers were presented as enhancements to the basic acquisition process. Separation of 
assessment into an independent unit reporting to acquisition departments will help avoid 
entanglements that impact auditors in naval systems analysis. 
To evaluate the framework and workflow, a proof-of-concept will be developed. AI 
and multi-database capabilities will be presented in the final report. In future research, AI 
may be further applied to help with supply chain decisions and ensure systems integrity. 
Preliminary tests with weights for the machine learning algorithms seem promising and 
worthy of development. For acquisition personnel, the AI prediction capabilities for 
equipment viability based on specifications and previous test results seem promising. 
Development of machine learning processes into repeatable formal methods is an additional 
area for future research.  
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Cybersecurity: Converting Shock Into Action (Part 2) 
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Abstract 
Last year, the authors presented Part 1, which focused on a discussion on 
policy/directives and then explored the efficacy of the DoD’s cybersecurity strategy and 
associated actions taken to date—all intended to safeguard the efficacy of DoD systems. 
The goal of the research in Part 2 is centered on the design and implementation of the 
cybersecurity training intended to achieve the key cybersecurity behaviors to meet that end. 
The Kirkpatrick Learning Level framework is used to help translate learning objectives into 
security and resilience critical behaviors for organizational oversight. The process of 
translating Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes (KSAs) into learning objectives and workplace 
behaviors is also discussed. However, what the workforce actually applies in the workplace 
is the most important part of the equation, especially its correlation to expected outcomes. 
Part 2 addresses just that. The DoD will be hard-pressed to achieve any mission assurance 
objectives for security and resilience without recognizing that (1) cybersecurity critical 
learning behaviors require commitment at all levels—individual, team, and organizational; 
and (2) cybersecurity must be viewed as more of a dilemma where emerging threats will 
surface continuously and must be assessed with regular frequency to ensure the viability of 
the DoD’s weapon systems’ lethality. 
Introduction 
In March 2019, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) released an extensive 
Cybersecurity Readiness Review. His uncomplimentary readiness review reinforced the 
findings of numerous other reports (e.g., reports by the Director National Intelligence [DNI]; 
Office of Management and Budget [OMB]; Government Accountability Office [GAO]; DoD 
Inspector General [IG]; Defense Science Board [DSB]; Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation [DOT&E]; and other government agencies, think tanks, etc.) that concluded a 
cyberattack by an advanced cyber threat could easily inflict significant mission impact to the 
DoD. Simply stated, the DoD (and perhaps other federal agencies) is (are) not achieving 
their required mission assurance outcomes for cybersecurity and cyber resiliency. The 
response to the quintessential question for DoD cyber risk management (i.e., can the DoD 
as a collective handle a co-evolving, intelligent cyber threat?) is not good. Almost every 
assessment of the DoD and its supporting infrastructure has reaffirmed that it is woefully 
unprepared for attacks from a cyber peer. Even worse, the DoD continues to fall further 
behind year after year, and that might come as a shock to those who would depend on the 
DoD to prevent a catastrophic event by a cyber peer. 
The DoD already has significant cybersecurity issues (i.e., Significant Mission 
Impact) and faces a learning culture with little understood obstacles, including the following: 
 
• Cybersecurity is a complex, dynamic, and ambiguous domain and is becoming a 
dilemma. 
• Cybersecurity Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes (KSAs) exist (e.g., Newhouse et 
al., 2017) but are only sporadically translated into critical learning behaviors. 
• The forgetting curve is no stranger to cybersecurity. Cybersecurity requires an 
ongoing commitment to a workplace learning environment for competencies to 
flourish. 
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• Formal (and tailored) training is only a learning antecedent. What the workforce 
actually applies (and practices) in the workplace with regular frequency is vitally 
important. 
• Reinforcement of the critical behaviors is dependent on leadership’s persistence 
to establish and maintain a strong learning culture. 
Given its complexity, domain ambiguity, and dynamic nature, cybersecurity cannot 
depend on incidental learning. While a lot of good work has been done with cybersecurity 
core knowledge and tasks (e.g., Newhouse et al., 2017), it has yet to be translated into the 
critical behaviors required to fully embody cybersecurity learning gains. Newhouse et al. 
(2017) has numerous applicable KSAs for most cybersecurity workers, and the KSAs can be 
easily translated into Bloom’s Taxonomy action verbs. However, using any learning 
application framework (e.g., Kirkpatrick or Brinkerhoff) to translate learning objectives into 
critical behaviors for organization oversight of security and resilience as far as their 
realization goes has not yet been implemented. The process of translating KSAs into 
learning objectives and behaviors is discussed with various representative groups. National 
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) KSAs (Newhouse et al., 2017) have only 
connected learning objectives and behaviors described as follows: 
• K0106—Knowledge of what constitutes a network attack and a network attack’s 
relationship to both threats and vulnerabilities 
• K0110—Knowledge of adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures 
• K0112—Knowledge of defense-in-depth principles and network security 
architecture 
• S003—Skill in evaluating the adequacy of security designs 
• S0027—Skill in determining how a security system should work (including its 
resilience and dependability capabilities) and how changes in conditions, 
operations, or the environment will affect these outcomes 
• S0054—Skill in using incident handling methodologies 
What the workforce applies in the workplace is the most important aspect for 
cybersecurity learning. It is the reason for this research pursuit—and the more strategic 
challenge for the entire cybersecurity learning discipline, ahead. 
Problem Statement: This research continues previous work that started with the 
DoD’s cybersecurity strategy and policy. After conducting over 70 cybersecurity workshops 
with various DoD customers, cybersecurity assistance has transitioned to assisting program 
offices with their more chronic cybersecurity risk management challenges instead of a 
program’s acute cybersecurity shortcomings. 
Research Goals:  
• Assist program offices with their commitment to harbor critical learning behaviors 
that support security management and security engineering that may lead to 
essential cybersecurity risk management practices for an evolving cyber threat. 
• Demonstrate that implementing a robust, effective, and sustainable cybersecurity 
program requires a long-term and ongoing commitment and a transition from 
solving a problem to managing a dilemma.  
The researchers posit that the DoD will be hard-pressed to achieve the desired 
mission assurance objectives for security and resilience without recognizing cybersecurity 
risk management, and that the achievement of security engineering critical behaviors must 
predominate at the individual, team, and organizational levels. Implementing a robust, 
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effective, and sustainable cybersecurity risk management program will always be a 
foreboding challenge for program offices. Unlike decades ago, they now have to build 
systems that anticipate and survive a constant evolving cyber threat attack the minute 
systems are fielded, without the luxury of a crystal ball. Over a three and half year period, in 
executing over 70 cybersecurity workshops, DAU has refocused on how to best manage this 
dilemma versus how to solve a problem. The ability to understand this change means that 
learning KSAs need to be viewed and embodied as critical behaviors. In DAU’s 
cybersecurity workshops, learners have the opportunity to practice these behaviors in 
rigorous case studies. Application of these behaviors beyond the classroom and back in 
their workplace is where the transformation begins, or where it can easily end before it 
begins. Without reinforcement, or time to practice, these vitally critical cybersecurity 
behaviors will likely succumb to the forgetting curve and place the systems they support at 
risk.  
Background 
Last year, the authors presented Part 1 and focused on a discussion on 
policy/directives and then explored the efficacy of the DoD’s cybersecurity strategy and 
associated actions taken to date—all intended to safeguard the efficacy of DoD systems. 
The researchers intended to develop a cybersecurity approach customized for DoD 
acquisition organizations that characterized what it takes to implement a robust, effective, 
and sustainable cybersecurity program. This year, Part 2 focuses on the achievement of key 
cybersecurity behaviors to meet that end, including the following: 
• Determining the effectiveness of security controls in support of risk management 
• Evaluating the performance of security controls in support of organizational 
mission assurance objective 
• Justifying security control development and implementation in support of 
organization mission assurance objectives 
• Evaluating security controls at system interfaces and that span system of 
systems  
• Appraising protection of information assets in context of a threat level for 
protected information assets 
In addressing the above behaviors, it has become quite evident that cybersecurity for 
program offices is more of a dilemma than a problem. Program offices have a continual 
need to adapt their security posture over time to a co-evolving intelligent threat. Problems 
usually have solutions that can be applied to correct a risk that materialized (AKA the issue) 
at some point. When a car is broken, a diagnostic tool in the hands of a skilled technician 
can quickly determine the cause and the remedy required to return the car to working order. 
On the other hand, finding peace in the Middle East is a dilemma, and dilemmas cannot be 
solved anywhere near as easily. Instead, they require ongoing vigilance that balances a 
huge and complicated array of competing needs. Given its complexity, cybersecurity is a 
challenge where organizations need to continually test the outer edges of their learning 
envelopes with the understanding that there is no silver bullet. 
To continue to guide this research pursuit, the authors used the same four questions 
to better isolate the learning implementation hurdles currently found in the DoD’s 
Cybersecurity Strategy. The answers continue to be both informative and instructive: 
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1. Have the DoD’s actions (e.g., policy directives, tools, methods, etc.) met the stated 
and implied expectations for cybersecurity protection and resilience? (Updated in 
Part 2) 
The answer is still no. The DoD is vulnerable to crippling cyberattacks by cyber peers 
that could impose significant loss of life, equipment, and ability to execute mission.  
DOT&E’s assessment in their FY2018 annual report to Congress (Behler, 2019) can 
be summarized with the following comments: 
DOD missions and systems remain at risk from adversarial cyber 
operations. Operational tests continued to discover mission-critical 
vulnerabilities [emphasis added] in acquisition programs. (p. 229)  
 
Test and assessments in FY18 again found that low-capability attack 
techniques too often posed a risk for disrupting operational missions 
[emphasis added]. (p. 232) 
The tone of the current DOT&E summary is very similar to previous warnings from 
their annual reports of FY15, FY16, and FY17 (Behler, 2018; Gilmore, 2017; Hall, 2017). 
An uncomplimentary review provided in the March 2019 SECNAV Cybersecurity 
Readiness Review summarizes,  
To restate, the DON culture, processes, structure, and resources are ill-
suited for this new era. The culture is characterized by a lack of 
understanding and appreciation of the threats, and inability to anticipate 
them, and a responsive checklist behavior that values compliance over 
outcomes, antiquated processes and governance structures that are late 
to respond to dynamic threats, and an enterprise whose resources are 
required for warfighting and defense in this environment. The net-net is that 
the DON is preparing to fight tomorrow’s kinetic war, which may or may not 
come, while losing the global cyber enabled information war. (p. 7) 
These results are reinforced by numerous other open source reports from the DNI, 
the OMB, the GAO, the DoDIG, the DSB, the DOT&E, other agency inspector generals, 
RAND Corporation, and numerous others—a cyberattack by an advanced cyber nation 
states could inflict significant mission impact to the DoD and its supporting infrastructure. 
This conclusion can be drawn from at least 100 different reports of cybersecurity 
assessments over the last eight years—a sophisticated cyberattack could inflict significant 
impact to DoD missions, with possibly substantial losses of life, equipment, and supporting 
infrastructure (Coates, 2019). Current risk mitigation strategies are not tightly connected to 
mission assurance imperatives in the face of a growing hostile cyber environment. In 2017, 
a RAND study found that “cybersecurity risk management does not adequately capture the 
impact to operational missions nor is it designed in” (Snyder et al., 2017, p. ix). Snyder et al. 
(2017) went on to say that the policies governing cybersecurity are better suited for simple, 
stable, and predictable environments leading to significant gaps in cybersecurity risk 
management. Without more critical thinking about ongoing risk management of an evolving 
cyber threat, future studies are likely to announce the same conclusion—the DoD is 
vulnerable to crippling cyberattacks by cyber peers that could impose significant loss of life, 
equipment, and ability to execute missions.  
2. What are the metrics and have they been effective?  
The answer is still no. Extensive DoD cyber activities are not achieving measurable 
outcomes of secure and resilient systems. Most DoD metrics measure activity instead of 
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outcomes of systems of system security and resilience. While there are numerous metrics 
that could be cited, the authors believe the following three metrics best sum up DoD 
cybersecurity effectiveness: (1) comments on cyber survivability from DOT&E open source 
annual reports to Congress; (2) the SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review of 
cybersecurity risk with who has the largest Dark Web footprint of stolen sensitive data; and, 
(3) the number of open cybersecurity recommendations for remediation as reported by the 
DoD Inspector General (IG). 
DOT&E Comments From Cyber Tests on Effectiveness 
DOT&E has conducted over a hundred operationally realistic cyber-threat tests over 
the last eight years. Only a few programs during that time achieved cybersecurity 
survivability objectives. In the last two DOT&E open source annual reports to Congress, 
successful ratings included: one instance of “demonstrated a robust cyber network defense 
to protect against an operationally realistic cyber threat opposing force” (Behler, 2018, p. 
130), two instances of “survivable in a cyber-contested environment” (Behler, 2019, pp. 49, 
53), and one instance of “secure against a cyber threat having limited to moderate 
capabilities” (Behler, 2019, p. 15). In this and previous DOT&E open source annual reports 
to Congress, the more frequent ratings are 
• “not survivable in a cyber-contested environment” (Behler, 2019, p. 21),  
• “vulnerabilities identified during earlier testing periods still had not been 
remedied” (Behler, 2019, p. 23),  
• “the system remains vulnerable to cyber-attack” (Behler, 2019, p. 94),  
• “has cybersecurity vulnerabilities that can be exploited” (Behler, 2019, pp. 103, 
105), and/or  
• “cybersecurity testing identified deficiencies” (Behler, 2019, p. 144).  
Please note the above instances with page references are for different systems 
traceable through page references. The issue is less about cybersecurity execution by a 
specific program and more about an ongoing trend of DoD system effectiveness against 
realistic cyber threats.  
DoD Protection of Sensitive Information  
The lack of achieving outcomes is best demonstrated by the loss of classified and 
controlled unclassified information (Nakashima & Sonne, 2018). A recent Wall Street 
Journal article described the armed forces under constant cyber siege by relentless foreign 
actors (Lubold, & Volz, 2019). The loss of sensitive information has a significant effect on 
the Department of Defense (DoD) for lethality and technological superiority (Mattis, 2018). 
Estimates on the value of losses of intellectual property from the United States are up to 
$600 billion (Mattis, 2018). According to the White House, “The United States cannot afford 
to have sensitive government information or systems inadequately secured by contractors. 
Federal contractors provide important services to the United States Government and must 
properly secure the systems through which they provide those services” (Trump, 2018, p. 7). 
The DoD implemented DFARS 252.204-7012 to require contractors to protect unclassified 
sensitive DoD information, defined as Covered Defense Information (CDI), on their 
networks. SECNAV (2019) concluded that “competitors and potential adversaries have 
exploited DON information systems, penetrated its defenses, and stolen massive amounts 
of national security IP. This has lessened our capabilities and lethality, while strengthening 
their offensive and defensive capabilities” (p. 4). The emerging DoD vision sees a shared 
responsibility developing between the DoD and its contractors on the protection of sensitive 
information regardless of its location (DoD, 2018a, 2018b).  
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DFARS 252.204-7012 is now applied to all new contracts and requires contractors to 
protect CDI on their networks. Concerning effectiveness of these activities, the metric that 
the SECNAV used in his Cybersecurity Readiness Assessment is applicable.  
While there are many ways to measure cybersecurity risk, one indicator of 
vulnerability is how much data about an organization is available on the 
Dark Web. When compared to Fortune 500 companies, the US government 
has the largest collective Dark Web footprint. Of the 59 government 
agencies, the DON led the government with the largest Dark Web footprint. 
(SECNAV, 2019, p. 8) 
Of particular concern should be the ability for entities to detect if they are breeched. 
Nine of the 129 security requirements in the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) concern the ability to perform audit of unusual activity on the network. In the redacted 
DoJ, Office of Inspector General report, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber 
Victim Notification Process, dated March 2019, “the FBI had 721 Special Agents dedicated 
to cyber investigations, including cyber victim notifications” (p. 1). Over the period from 
November 2014 to December 2017, “Cyber Guardian had 16,409 cyber incidents and 
20,803 victim notifications” (DoJ, 2019, p. 12). Of special note was another revealing 
comment: “According to FBI personnel, victims of cyber intrusions are typically identified by 
the FBI or its partner agencies in the course of their investigative activities. As a result, many 
cyber victims, most of which are companies or organizations, are unaware that they are 
victims of an intrusion until the FBI notifies them” (DoJ, 2019, p. 1).  
Open DoD Cybersecurity Recommendations for Remediation  
The DoD tends to be a leader in the federal government and not to be forced to 
remediate open cybersecurity recommendations. A DoD Inspector General (IG) redacted 
report (DoDIG, 2019) states that “recently issued cybersecurity reports indicate that the DoD 
still faces challenges in managing cybersecurity risk to its network. Additionally, as of 
September 30, 2018, there were 266 open cybersecurity-related recommendations, dating 
as far back as 2008” (p. 6). As noted in our previous paper, “FISMA requires that each 
Federal agency conduct an annual independent evaluation to determine the effectiveness of 
the agency’s information security program and practices” (DoD IG, 2019, p. 1). Prior 
independent assessment of DoD cybersecurity maturity, using the Cybersecurity Framework 
categories of identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover, tended to rank the DoD at the 
lowest levels of maturity of any federal agency (OMB, 2017). The DoD IG (2019) found that  
the DoD needs to continue focusing on managing cybersecurity activities 
in four of the five NIST Cybersecurity Framework functions—Identify, 
Protect, Detect, and Respond, primarily in the Framework categories of 
governance, asset management, information protection processes and 
procedures, identity management and access control, security continuous 
monitoring, detection processes, and communications. (p. 6) 
3. Is the DoD headed in the right direction?  
The answer is still partly. The DoD has shown a willingness to create policy and 
strategy. Senior leadership has been willing to examine itself in very critical ways. Several 
senior leaders have shown extraordinary vigilance by instituting major initiatives in 
cybersecurity reform including the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition; and Director, Defense Contracting Management Agency. 
Numerous operational commands are taking positive steps as well with self-reporting and 
taking corrective action. 
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DOT&E performed an assessment of a major command which identified 
several vulnerabilities that could impact mission assurance. Senior 
leadership at the command self-reported to senior DoD leadership that the 
command’s mission assurance posture was potentially degraded, and 
made mitigation of these vulnerabilities a top priority. [emphasis added] 
(Behler, 2019, p. 231) 
Additionally, there have been isolated pockets of excellence within the DoD. The 
Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2 Program Office did an 
exceptional job of becoming a cybersecurity leader and innovator of cybersecurity 
acquisition and operations best practices. The Army’s WIN-T Increment 2 Program Office 
set a high bar. The DoD’s ability to assure senior leadership of mission assurance, in spite 
of a cyber peer threat, can be much higher once acquisition programs “demonstrate they 
have a robust cyber network defense to protect against an operationally realistic cyber 
threat opposing force” (Behler, 2018, p. 130). 
A group with potential to do more for cybersecurity is the DoD Acquisition Workforce. 
However, SECNAV (2019) aptly noted that  
Cybersecurity is largely viewed as an IT issue and is not integrated across 
all operations and activities of the organization. The current approach is 
characterized by vertical stovepipes of responsibility which ignore the 
reality that information and cybersecurity require a horizontal, systems 
approach across all aspects of the organization’s activities and operations. 
This horizontal approach is extremely important for without it, the DoN 
cannot achieve cybersecurity. (p. 7) 
The DoD acquisition workforce would be well-served if it approached cybersecurity 
as a dilemma instead of a problem. To make matters worse, many in the acquisition 
community have either deflected or not fully embraced their role in cybersecurity and the 
need to adapt to the persistent threat. It’s vitally important to elevate the acquisition 
community’s knowledge of cybersecurity risk management through better implementation of 
systems security engineering, the ability to adapt to advancing threats, and integration with 
cyber operations. The acquisition workforce needs to transition from a “compliance 
construct” for cybersecurity to one of cybersecurity for operational “mission assurance.” 
More systems might achieve in operational test adversarial assessments and fulfill 
operational commanders’ mission assurance needs if there was a transition of approach, 
culture, and workforce attitudes.  
The cyber threat is evolving and changing as Snyder et al. (2017) indicated: 
Capabilities of potential adversaries are growing, and the changing 
technologies introduce new vulnerabilities over time. This evolution means 
that static solutions for cybersecurity management are unlikely to be 
effective; cybersecurity solutions need to be adaptive. Creating defensive 
barriers in the form of security overlays that respond to discovered 
vulnerabilities is by nature insufficient to protect against future, unknown 
threat vectors [emphasis added]. (p. 7) 
Actors with the ability to exploit the DoD’s systems are growing at a staggering rate:  
 Recent advances in cyber technologies indicate that automation—and 
even artificial intelligence—are beginning to make profound changes to the 
cyber domain. Warfighters and network defenders must prepare for the 
onslaught of multi-pronged cyberattacks [emphasis added] across both 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 135 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
critical mission systems and the multitude of supporting systems and 
networks that enable these missions. (Behler, 2019, p. 229)  
To keep pace with the threat, the DoD acquisition workforce needs to step up their game. 
4.  What industry best practices should the DoD adopt and why?  
There are numerous. Industry best practices have concentrated their efforts on 
resilience, trustworthiness and continual testing. Intel, Google, Microsoft, Netflix, major 
financial institutions, and other cybersecurity leaders have taken an enterprise approach to 
cybersecurity. Their approaches include active engagement of cybersecurity by senior 
leadership and robust workforce cybersecurity involvement. As stated by SECNAV (2019),  
The enterprise approach is not just about the systems and management; it 
also includes robust involvement by the workforce. Many companies simply 
fire personnel, from the C-Suite to the line level, who fail to follow 
established cybersecurity policy and processes. They also have very active 
CEO and CIO/CISO-led Cybersecurity committees and working groups 
that meet on a regular basis which include business unit, technology, risk 
management, and executive leadership. (p. 34) 
Best in class cybersecurity companies have transitioned their security posture 
traditional security activities to emerging security concepts. Their best practices include 
rapid adoption of transformational emerging security technologies (such as for access 
management); extensive monitoring of network and system health, especially for 
configuration management and access management; and extensive and continual testing 
(extensive developmental testing, internal adversarial testing, bug bounties, etc.). 
An example of an industry best practice is the “zero-trust model.” This model was a 
core element of the Army’s WIN-T Increment 2 security posture. SECNAV (2019) described 
the zero-trust architecture as follows: 
With a Zero-Trust model, successful companies have addressed both 
careless behaviors and malicious intent by granting trust only to those who 
have securely proven their identity. Having done so, their subsequent 
access to resources is limited to the least amount of access required. 
Successful Zero-Trust designs include processes that ensure all resources 
are accessed securely, adopt a least-privileged strategy strictly enforcing 
access control, and continuously monitor the enterprise ecosystem. 
Everyone and everything is constantly validated, with zero exemptions. (p. 
36) 
The more mature cybersecurity companies have a wider focus than just system 
protection to that of dynamic performance evaluation. The September 2016 DoD Defense 
Science Board report on cyber defense management recommended 
examining the attack data to determine what is working well, what is not, 
where changes need to be made, and where investment is required to 
better defend against troublesome or emerging threats to move beyond a 
compliance approach towards a more dynamic performance evaluation. (p. 
11)  
These companies have adopted a security posture of adaptability and innovative 
thinking in response to impending cyber threats.  
Will this type of thinking eventually become pervasive in the DoD? There are isolated 
pockets of excellence in the DoD exhibiting the required change of approach, culture, and 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 136 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
workforce attitudes to execute these best practices. Such a transition just needs to occur 
across a much wider swath of the acquisition workforce and their DoD contractors in order to 
respond to impending cyber threats. 
Assumptions 
As with any research study, assumptions generally help characterize the research 
constraints as well as the prevailing environmental domain. While strikingly provocative, the 
following (and persistent) assumptions reinforce today’s cybersecurity operating envelope: 
• Cybersecurity is a decaying function—static cybersecurity assures a declining 
security posture.  
• No system is without malware—every system has an inherent vulnerability just 
waiting to be exploited. 
• Organizations rely too much on technology for security and don’t sufficiently 
consider the people and process components. 
• The seemingly most secure system often fails to acknowledge that it can be 
affected by a higher level threat (i.e., any system can be misconfigured). 
• Cybersecurity policy stands at the outcome level; acquisition guidance and 
implementation below the outcome level is subjective (i.e., outcome level is 
typically characterized as “design for the fight”) 
• Most programs undershoot “adequate security”—many operate under a false 
sense of security until they discover they did not sufficiently manage realistic and 
likely operational risks. 
• The DoD may not be proactive enough to exploit its own systems to withstand 
advanced threats.  
• Politics can trump engineering. Systems security engineering is constrained in 
pursuing a preferred solution set due to required integration with legacy 
components and systems, lack of control over interfacing systems, and a 
preference for functionality over security.  
• If user behavior is monitored and proper user behaviors can be enforced, the 
chance to reduce a significant attack surface is increased. Significant benefits for 
good user disciple: cost of implementing an effective security posture is reduced, 
and probability of successful detection and recovery increased. Money is a poor 
substitute for discipline (especially enforced user security behaviors).  
Research Methodology 
The researchers treated the cybersecurity skills captured in the NICE KSAs as the 
basis of the required critical learning behaviors. The researchers wondered what if they 
were treated as static, and not part of continuous process of learning and reinforcement 
(e.g., Monitor, Encourage, Reinforce, and Reward [MERR]). What if the acquisition 
workforce did not learn or retain the critical behaviors? These questions set the stage for 
what could be seen as more deterministic outcomes since 
• Without a strong bridge in the form of metrics between what students learned in 
class (Level II) and what they applied in the workplace (Level III), it is more difficult 
to connect the two, and  
• Without the evidence, organizations would be hard-pressed to confirm the 
resources they allocated to Level II learning gains actual paid off in the workplace.  
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The directorate’s intact teams who attended the workshop also previously committed 
to connecting Level II learning objectives with the Level III critical behaviors. Just as 
importantly, their leadership committed to what Kirkpatrick calls its required drivers (i.e., 
MERR) to assure their Level III achievements (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016, p. 56). 
Without them, a key feedback mechanism would be missing, and accountability 
opportunities would be lost. However, the more important aspect surrounds the abilities and 
attitudes of the learners to apply what they learned in the workshop back on-the-job (i.e., 
Level III that doesn’t atrophy), and what results their learning afforded. Furthermore, what 
will happen and what needs to happen to strengthen the bridge between Learning Level II 
and Learning Level III? The achievement of these Learning Level III critical behaviors 
represents the litmus test. Through a suitable dose of feedback (i.e., MERR), Learning Level 
III critical behaviors and Level IV results are more achievable later. 
The Forgetting Curve  
Closely tied to any learning is the unforgettable “forgetting curve,” originated by 
Herman Ebbinhaus (Murre, 2015). He characterized it in a simple formula: 
R = e^(-t/s), where R = Recall; e = Euler’s constant (2.71); t = time passed; and s = strength 
of memory.  
He proved that about 80% of what we learn we forget in 30 days if there is no reinforcement 
(i.e., “forgetting curve”), and it still holds true today. Why is that important for cybersecurity? 
Aside from remembering and applying the nine framing assumptions originally described in 
this study, and in the context of an ever-evolving functional discipline that is more a dilemma 
than a problem, dismissing it would be a dangerous proposition. MERR is no antidote, but it 
certainly keeps the affected individuals’ consciousness on high alert, and rightfully so. 
Cybersecurity Workshop Structure  
To build greater cybersecurity knowledge and raise awareness for acquisition 
professionals, DAU conducted various workshops for diverse audiences. Figure 1 depicts 





 Customer Composition in Workshops 
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The critical questions for these workshops have been: Will DAU’s cybersecurity 
workshop enable the individual to develop a competence (either a tactic, technique, 
protocol, or procedure) or behavior that will enable an organizational outcome? Will the 
organization make a commitment in monitoring, encouraging, reinforcing, and rewarding to 
achieve learning gains in the workplace? Possibly the most successful of our cybersecurity 
workshops has been a series of three workshops over multiple days. Figure 2 covers the 
essence of the three workshops—NIST Systems Security Engineering, Threat-Based 
Engineering, and Active Cyber Defense. These workshops were designed to help the 
participants understand security principles, cyber threat and their tactics, and integration of 
acquisition with cyber operations. The compilation of these workshops addresses the 
horizontal issues brought up by SECNAV (2019). The SECNAV (2019) well understood that 
cybersecurity requires “a horizontal, systems approach across all aspects of the 




 Types of Cybersecurity Workshops 
The NIST Systems Security Engineering (SSE) uses the NIST 800-160 (Vol. 1 & 2) 
to cover the standards and constructs of system trustworthiness and system resilience. The 
NIST SSE workshop was designed to give the participants time to apply best practices 
outlined in NIST publications 800-160 (Vol. 1 & 2; Ross, McEvilley, & Oren, 2017; Ross et 
al., 2018). Three core behaviors are taught and practiced in the NIST SSE workshop: 
• Construct a comprehensive and holistic system view while addressing 
stakeholder security and risk concerns; 
• Apply input to analyses of alternatives and to requirements, engineering, and risk 
trade-off analyses to achieve a cost-effective security architectural design for 
protections that enable mission/business success; and  
• Evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of the security elements of the system 
as an enabler to mission/business success. 
NIST has done an exceptional job of understanding standards and techniques and 
developing a core process in each of the various volumes. For example, Ross et al. (2017) 
state,  
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The ultimate objective is to address security issues from a stakeholder 
requirements and protection needs perspective and to use established 
engineering processes to ensure that such requirements and needs are 
addressed with the appropriate fidelity and rigor across the entire life cycle 
of the system. (p. viii) 
For system security engineering trustworthiness, our desired outcome is to develop 
and demonstrate the evidence necessary to support assurance claims and to substantiate 
the determination that the system is sufficiently trustworthy. Ross et al. (2018) note that “the 
ultimate objective is to obtain trustworthy secure systems that are fully capable of supporting 
critical missions and business operations while protecting stakeholder assets, and to do so 
with a level of assurance that is consistent with the risk tolerance of those stakeholders” (p. 
ix). For system security resiliency, the desired outcome is focused on designing security risk 
management activities, producing related security risk management information, and 
advising the engineering team and key stakeholders on the security-relevant impact of 
threats and vulnerabilities to the mission/business supported by the system. 
This is the pre-course email sent to the workshop participants: 
You will do a capstone case study as part of a team for either system 
trustworthiness or system resiliency. While we have case studies for you 
to work on—if you should desire to nominate a project that you are working 
on as either a trustworthiness or resiliency exercise—we will accommodate 
it. The only caveat is that the training is being executed in Unclassified 
spaces. We have done other DoD systems as exercises (either 
trustworthiness or resiliency) in previous SSE workshop sessions in 
unclassified spaces. Please talk to me on day 1 with your proposal. I 
suspect there is a high probability that we can figure out how to make it 
work. 
The participants nominate a problem they have in their environment. The goal is to 
help participants understand how to implement the standards and techniques to achieve an 
outcome through a series of exercises and case studies. The capstone exercise validates 
whether their system is trustworthy and resilient.  
In the NIST SSE workshops, participants raised the following issues that they felt 
have limited their ability to execute a particular security standard and/or resilience 
technique: 
• Can I change the design/architecture? 
• Can I change configuration? 
• Ability to manage interfaces? 
• Can I contain/isolate/segment trust relations? 
• Can I implement new processes? 
• Can I automate a process? 
• How will I monitor & enforce user behavior? 
• Can I trade off/restrict functionality? 
• What capability will a newer technology provide (will my users be able to 
implement the technology)? 
The fact that these types of questions are occurring in the workshop case studies is 
very encouraging. The next step is to follow up with the workshop participants to ensure the 
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behaviors of construct, apply, and evaluate are underway at their workplaces. There’s no 
guarantee that the learners will have enough opportunities to apply everything they learned 
in the workshop. What needs to happen in the workplace to combat the likely consequences 
of forgetting curve? Without a coach or mentor, how do they get to the point where they 
sustain the cognitive connection to the original learning behavior—and how do we measure 
it? The workplace has to establish surrogate scenarios that refresh and reinforce the critical 
learning behaviors—and what tools are the most appropriate. 
Results and Findings 
Individuals enter the workshops with a wide variance of cybersecurity experience 
and knowledge levels—novice to experienced practitioner. There seems to be several 
revelations that occur during a workshop that would likely increase the chance that a student 
will apply appropriate risk management and security engineering constructs and behaviors 
to their situation after the conclusion of a workshop. Students progress through the following 
stages: understanding cybersecurity is a severe security threat; acknowledging the cyber 
threat is not static, but evolving; accepting that their system/program needs to do something 
about evolving cyber threats; adapting their cybersecurity security posture if the cyber threat 
changes; committing to cybersecurity risk management as a continual, ongoing effort; and 
becoming an effective agent of change to achieve meaningful outcomes. Depending on the 
maturity of the student and their organization, individual progression can stop at any point in 
the cycle of progression. During these workshops, the following common themes surface: 
• Workshop participants usually start the workshops looking for prescriptive 
answers. They hope to find a fix to their cybersecurity problem. 
• The initial focus is frequently satisfying some external entity. The most common 
DoD focus is to satisfy an Authorizing Official (AO). More advanced programs will 
set a goal of succeeding against a capable adversarial assessment sponsored by 
a DoD Operational Test Agency (OTA). While both are worthy objectives, their 
real focus should be one of mission assurance.  
• Often, they are not creating a solution set that can adapt if the threat should 
change. Most want to stop after finding a single possible solution, instead of 
creating a solution set. 
• They want to make the threat static and then optimize to a static threat. 
Accepting an evolving threat is a significant strain on people and resources. 
• They need to achieve a construct of self-assessment and continual testing—such 
that achievement of either an ATO/ATC or passing an OTA assessment—are 
just part of an ongoing process for cyber risk management to achieve mission 
assurance.  
The core question simply stated became “What initial successes will likely occur as 
you consistently apply what you learned?” In the researchers’ Part 1 of this study, we 
examined the Western Naval Audit Service in learning and applying critical cybersecurity 
behaviors from our workshops. This particular group was highly motivated and had 
committed leadership. Kirkpatrick calls it having required drivers (i.e., monitor, encourage, 
reinforce, and rewards) to assure their Level III achievements (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 
2016, p. 56). Since their initial series of cybersecurity workshops, this group offered to the 
SECNAV’s office to bid for a cybersecurity audit. The SECNAV assigned Western Naval 
Audit Service a critical audit issue concerning fleet cybersecurity readiness. This audit is 
underway and should be back to the SECNAV’s office for review before the end of 2019. To 
go from no cybersecurity audit experience to conducting a major fleet readiness 
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cybersecurity audit review was a major commitment by this group and the start of objective 
measurable outcomes in the form of secure and resilient systems.  
Across multiple workshops, we have seen statistically significant changes in attitudes 
towards the behaviors. The following qualitative comments across various workshops 
summarize the trend seen across the workshops.  
• Participant 1—Right now, as a novice, I would say my biggest challenges are 
ensuring I have a full and complete understanding of all the components, and 
having a clear vision of putting all this into play …  
• Participant 2—The biggest challenge is simply a matter of scope vs. resources. 
We all face this of course, so finding time to keep momentum requires focus that 
is sometimes difficult.  
• Participant 3—I was impressed that the training was compressed into two days. 
So much material was covered! … I think that improvement will come from 
continuing the activity so it is not a one and done … 
• Participant 4—This workshop helped me better understand the requirements and 
how to convey that importance to our customers …  
• Participant 5—When looking at the security posture of an asset, I will now ask 
the questions to determine what the priority result is for this asset and then look 
at the systems needed to attain that goal/result. …  
• Participant 6—I’m standing up a lab for a new C2P effort. … It is aimed at 
replacing the legacy C2P over the next decade. I expect to apply the techniques 
learned in this workshop during our IPTs … 
• Participant 7—This course has made me more important as a resource to others 
around me. … Already, leaving the class, was able to connect to a resource in 
the Cloud Broker to the O(ffice)365 Broker … 
From the above comments, the described student progression can be seen. These 
participants are starting to understand cybersecurity is a severe security threat, 
acknowledging the cyber threat is evolving, accepting their responsibility to do something, 
adapting their cybersecurity security posture, and committing to ongoing cybersecurity risk 
management. If these participants receive reinforcement from their organization, there is a 
significant probability for meaningful outcomes to occur. If we can start to have more of the 
acquisition workforce to exhibit the same types of attitudes – our operational forces might 
have a chance against when facing a cyber peer.  
Conclusion 
The number of cyber threat actors who have the ability to exploit the DoD’s systems 
is growing at a staggering rate while too many people involved in the acquisition community 
may not have fully embraced (or even understand) their role in cybersecurity. It’s vitally 
important to elevate the acquisition community’s knowledge of all cybersecurity risks in order 
to more carefully plan, decide, and act for inescapable and impending cybersecurity threats. 
Admittedly, the danger signs are very telling, and they’re not good.  
In Part 2 of this research project, the authors reinforced how behaviors learned in 
workshops could be instituted in a participant’s work environment. The researchers posit 
that the DoD will be hard-pressed to achieve the desired mission assurance objectives for 
security and resilience without recognizing that (1) cybersecurity risk management and 
security engineering critical learning behaviors require commitment at all levels—individual, 
team, and organizational; and (2) cybersecurity is a domain that must be viewed as a 
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dilemma where there is no one-size-fits-all solution, nor can it be treated as a static problem. 
Cybersecurity threats will never wane in frequency or severity. Its asymmetric nature is too 
great. Without constant vigilance, the United States will lose the cybersecurity war.  
Thankfully, the commitment from numerous senior DoD leaders is growing. Outside 
the DoD, there has been a willingness from numerous organizational leaders (e.g., the 
intelligence community, DOT&E, IG, audit service, chartered boards, think tanks, etc.) to 
take similar action. And programs like the WIN-T Increment 2 Program Office have 
demonstrated what it takes to achieve cybersecurity excellence at a given juncture. If the 
remaining acquisition workforce steps up to the cybersecurity learning challenge, the 
negative trends discussed at the beginning of the paper might just start to reverse course, 
resulting in a much more favorable heading. 
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China’s Efforts in Civil-Military Integration, Its Impact on 
the Development of China’s Acquisition System, and 
Implications for the United States 
Tai Ming Cheung—School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California, San Diego 
Eric Hagt—School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University 
Abstract 
China, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, is significantly stepping up its efforts to 
pursue civil-military integration—or what he calls military-civil fusion (MCF)—as an integral 
component of its grand development strategy of building a technologically advanced and 
militarily powerful state within the next one to two decades. This paper examines the 
making, nature, and implementation of Xi’s grand MCF undertaking. This paper offers an 
analytical framework that seeks to provide a coherent and holistic view of the many moving 
parts and disparate elements of MCF through an innovation systems perspective. This 
framework identifies seven categories of factors that are important in shaping the structure 
and process of the MCF system: catalytic, input, institutional, organizational, networks, 
contextual, and output factors. Key dynamics that are examined in detail in the paper 
include the high-level leadership engagement, the influence of the external threat and 
technology environments, the application of new financial mechanisms such as hybrid state-
private sector investment funds, the role of key state and military agencies, and the 
evolution of the Chinese defense acquisition system to embrace MCF. 
Introduction 
The defense and civilian economies in China co-exist side-by-side, but their 
relationship has been far from harmonious or close. They are separated by deep-seated 
structural, normative, and operational dynamics that have limited their mutual interactions 
and linkages. This division was originally by design as the Communist state’s founding 
fathers wanted to maintain tight secrecy over defense activities and prioritize the forging of 
the defense industrial base over civilian economic development during the height of the Cold 
War between the 1950s and 1970s. This rigid civil-military compartmentalization became so 
deeply entrenched that succeeding regimes in the post-Mao reform era have struggled 
mightily to bridge this yawning gap—with mixed results.  
From Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s to Xi Jinping today, Chinese leaders have pursued 
an assortment of strategies to straddle the civil-military divide for different reasons. Deng 
sought to divert large segments of the defense industrial base from military to civilian 
production to support broader economic development. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao pursued 
an incremental approach of reducing barriers between the civilian and defense economies 
to promote an expanding overlap of economic activities, such as allowing civilian firms to 
compete for military orders and permitting defense firms to tap into the capital markets.  
Xi Jinping has made civil-military integration (Junmin Yitihua), or what he calls 
military-civil fusion (MCF -Junmin Ronghe), a key element of his grand development 
strategy of establishing a technologically advanced and militarily powerful Chinese state. He 
has replaced the gradualist approach of his immediate predecessors in favor of a far more 
ambitious, high-powered, and expansive strategy that aims to establish a tightly integrated 
dual-use economy during his reign in power. To ensure that his goals and vision are carried 
out, Xi put himself in direct charge of this fusion initiative.  
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To address the title question of whether Xi can build a truly effective and integrated 
civil-military economy, this paper examines the making, nature, and implementation of his 
grand MCF effort. This paper offers an analytical framework that seeks to provide a coherent 
and holistic view of the many moving parts and disparate elements of MCF through an 
innovation systems perspective. This framework identifies seven categories of factors that 
are important in shaping the structure and process of the MCF system. These factors will be 
examined in detail in the rest of the paper. This paper begins though by providing a brief 
overview of the development of MCF policy in China since the beginning of the 21st century 
through to its embrace by Xi Jinping during the first term of his rule in the mid-2010s.  
Defining Chinese Approaches to MCF 
The study of MCF in China is greatly complicated by the lack of clear definition. The 
integration of the military and civilian economies in its broadest definition is an effort to 
remove the longstanding institutional and regulatory barriers between the two systems and 
fuse them into a single entity able to produce for both civilian and military needs. In reality, 
however, the two separate spheres interact in highly disparate ways depending on the local 
political economy conditions in which they are embedded.  
The way MCF is discussed in China can be summarized by grading its related 
activity on a scale of integration, a MCF value chain if you will, which reflects both the 
efficiency and innovation gains in the system through collaboration. At the bottom is a 
complete division between the defense and civilian economies, a condition that has no 
integration in the system, is inefficient and produces little collaborative innovation. Although 
simplified, this was largely the state of affairs in China during the 1960s and 1970s.  
The next level is defense conversion (junzhuanmin), which dominated civil-military 
interaction from the beginning of the reform era (1978) to the late 1990s. With some 
exceptions, this period was marked by a diversion of excess capacity in the defense 
industrial base, precipitated by decreased defense budgets while maintaining the sector’s 
productive force. Integration with the civilian sector was low as this was in the main a one-
way conversion process. While it helped spare the defense industrial base, efficiency and 
technological collaboration were low as the sector competed with the civilian sector in low-
tech, consumable goods.  
Since the defense industry reforms of the late 1990s, a number of additional forms of 
MCF have come to characterize the Chinese economy, including spin off (or military to 
civilian transfer, junzhuanmin) and spin on (civilian to military transfer, minzhuanjun). Spin 
off is the commercial application of a product or technology originally conceived for military 
purposes, while spin on is the reverse: technologies developed entirely within the 
commercial sector and adapted for defense. Both are common in the Chinese economy, 
which can lead to efficiency gains (particularly with relevant commercial-off-the-shelf [COTS] 
products). However, while some interaction is inherent in such spillover economic activity, 
collaboration greatly varies and is often minimal in the Chinese system.  
Dual-use activity (junmin liangyong), on the other hand, particularly the Chinese 
context, implies a closer relationship between the defense and civilian sectors. While some 
degree of dual-use potential is intrinsic to many technologies, this refers to science and 
technology (S&T) programs that intentionally serve both defense and non-defense 
outcomes. This type of program began in earnest with China’s 863 Program in the late 
1980s, but has since been a central component of many national innovation projects 
(Cheung et al., 2016). While the level of civil-military cooperation required for such programs 
is substantial, these dual-use programs are frequently focused on particular technologies 
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and limited in their effect in breaking the barriers of separation between defense and civilian 
participants within these programs, much less the broader economy.  
The next level that has become a leading mantra of defense innovation scholars is 
the so-called mincanjun, or the participation of civilian or commercial entities in defense 
projects. As this domain increases its investment in research and development (R&D) and 
its capacity to lead the defense industry in many emerging technologies, the military is 
looking to encourage their participation in defense projects. Mincanjun clearly has the 
potential to produce a higher form of civil-military interaction and incorporate a much larger 
swath of economic and technological activity for defense purposes.  
And under a final phase, there is a complete fusing of defense and civilian productive 
forces (yitihua, or junmin ronghe), where there are not two separate sectors, but a single 
industrial and technological ecology able to produce for both military and the national 
economy as needed. Such full integration would enable China to achieve maximum 
efficiency and technological innovation gains. While this unified system is more of a long-
term aspiration than an immediate goal, Xi Jinping has emphasized that a fully integrated or 
fused “national strategic system” is his primary policy focus (Jingjing, 2016, pp. 19–20).  
Overview of Chinese Efforts to Pursue MCF in the 21st Century 
MCF has been promoted in China since the early 2000s but with little tangible 
success because of limited leadership engagement, unclear strategy, ineffective 
implementation, and weak civil-military coordination. Despite the weak progress, Chinese 
civilian and military authorities have viewed MCF as essential in the drive for original 
innovation and defense modernization. 
Hu Jintao attempted to broaden MCF’s scope and pushed for deeper implementation 
during his tenure from 2002 to 2012, although with limited success. Ultimately, Hu’s aim to 
implement “overall coordination” stalled due to persistent obstacles such as poor 
coordination among top level decision-making bodies, insufficient regulatory structures to 
allow transfer of technology between civilian and military entities, poor intellectual property 
rights (IPR) protection, especially for defense industry-originated IPR, and lack of universal 
industry and technology standards across civilian and military sectors. While Hu’s attempt at 
top-down leadership support should have been enough to catalyze MCF implementation, it 
proved insufficient to mobilize all the needed actors and agencies. 
Two modest successes of Hu’s push were (1) broadening the thinking on MCF away 
from its former limited understanding of “combining the military and civilian sectors” [Junmin 
Jiehe] to an understanding more reflective of the deep implementation required through 
“integration” or “fusion” of civilian and defense sectors; and (2) broadening the scope of 
MCF to include all available economic resources in the promotion of the defense industry, 
including capital, technology, human capital, facilities, and information (Alderman, Crawford, 
Lafferty, & Shraberg, 2014). 
When Xi became China’s supreme leader at the 18th Party Congress in November 
2012, MCF was included in major leadership speeches and policy documents to show that 
the incoming regime would continue to pay attention to this issue. There was though little 
indication of a new direction in MCF policy. The 18th Communist Party Congress work report 
issued in November 2012 detailing Xi Jinping’s policy agenda for his first term pointed out 
that the country would  
continue to follow a Chinese-style path that integrates the development of 
the military and civilian sectors, combine efforts to make the country 
prosperous and the armed forces strong, and strengthen strategic 
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planning, system building as well as related laws and regulations to boost 
the development of military and civilian sectors in an integrated way. 
(Jintao, 2012) 
A year later at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013 that 
laid out an ambitious roadmap of economic reforms, Xi and his lieutenants offered intriguing 
but vague hints that they were looking to inject new thinking and initiatives on MCF as part 
of the broader goal of undertaking comprehensive reforms of the economy and military 
establishment. The Third Plenum decision noted the importance of  
promoting the extensive development of military civilian fusion. Establish 
mechanisms for unified leadership, coordination between the military and 
localities, linking needs and demands and resource sharing at the national 
level so as to promote the joint development of the army and the people … 
and guiding superior private enterprises to enter into areas of military 
material research, development, production and maintenance. (“Decision 
of the CPC Central Committee,” 2013) 
What stood out were the references to the promotion of “extensive” MCF 
development, creating “mechanisms for unified leadership,” and “guiding superior private 
enterprises” into military activities.  
Xi’s commitment to MCF became evident by 2015, when it was designated as a 
national priority and was consciously incorporated into the innovation driven development 
strategy (IDDS), the country’s new national development strategy, which aimed to develop a 
strategic system and capabilities that will allow China to “implement key science and 
technology projects and race to occupy the strategic high ground for science and technology 
innovation” (“Xi Calls for Deepened Military, 2018). Key elements of this national strategic 
system are detailed in some of the MCF implementation plans that have been formulated 
since the adoption of the MCF development strategy. This includes the 13th 5-Year Special 
Plan for Science and Technology MCF Development issued jointly in 2017 by the Central 
Military Commission Science and Technology Commission (CSTC) and the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MoST) that detailed the establishment of an integrated system to 
conduct basic cutting-edge R&D in artificial intelligence, bio-technology, advanced 
electronics, quantum, advanced energy, advanced manufacturing, future networks, and new 
materials “to capture commanding heights of international competition” (CMC Science and 
Technology Commission and Ministry of Science and Technology, 2017). This plan also 
noted the pursuit of MCF special projects in areas such as remote sensing, marine-related 
technology, advanced manufacturing, biology, and transportation. 
Analytical Framework: The MCF Innovation System 
As a starting point, it is crucial to understand that MCF is arguably one of the most 
ambitious industrial policy programs China has ever embarked on. MCF not only 
incorporates numerous traditional industry sectors (from shipping to aviation), but the 
industry chain of each sector including upstream R&D to downstream manufacturing. In so 
doing, it requires the coordination of an enormous range of bureaucratic stakeholders 
governing the economy. Additionally, there is the divide between the private and state-
owned firms in the economy that must be managed in order for MCF to be effective. As 
much of China’s economy is operated at the local level, a center-local dynamic also plays an 
important role given the national level goals and actors that MCF embodies. This 
decentralized system accentuates the diversity of China’s economy geographically, a 
phenomenon that profoundly impacts a coherent national MCF strategy. If all of this was not 
sufficiently challenging, underlying all of the above is the separation between the military 
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and civilian systems within China that first and foremost must be tackled in order for MCF to 
be conceivable. 
One analytical approach to address this complexity and confusion is to view MCF as 
a hybrid eco-system comprised of institutional arrangements, organizations, networks, 
inputs, outputs, and various other factors. This paper applies the notion of an innovation 
system derived from the systems of innovation and public policy process literature to 
examine the Chinese approach to MCF. Innovation systems are complex, constantly 
evolving eco-systems that include “all important economic, social, political, organizational, 
institutional and other factors that influence the development, diffusion and use of 
innovations” (Edquist & Johnson, 2005). Innovation is of central importance to MCF because 
its mantra is about finding new or improved ways of meeting defense and dual-use needs 
faster, better, and cheaper.  
A diverse array of factors are involved in the MCF innovation process, and the 
framework distinguishes seven categories: 
• Catalytic Factors: Catalysts are the principal motivators of this colossal 
undertaking and are the sparks that ignite innovation of a more disruptive nature. 
These powerful factors are normally external to the MCF innovation system and 
their intervention occurs at the highest and most influential levels of the eco-
system and can produce the conditions for enabling considerable change and 
disruption.  
• Input Factors: These are material, financial, technological, human and other 
forms of contributions that flow into the MCF innovation system. Most of these 
inputs are externally sourced but can also come internally.  
• Institutional Factors: Institutions are rules, norms, routines, established 
practices, laws, and strategies that regulate the relations and interactions 
between actors (individuals and groups) within and outside of the MCF 
innovation system (Edquist & Johnson, 2005, p. 46; Ostrom, 2007, p. 26). Rules 
can be formal (laws, regulations, and standards) or informal (routines, 
established practices, and common habits). Norms are shared prescriptions 
guiding conduct between participants within the system.  
• Organizations and Other Actors: The principal actors within the MCF 
innovation system and main units of analysis of the framework are organizations, 
which are formal structures with an explicit purpose and they are consciously 
created. They include firms, state agencies, universities, research institutes, and 
a diverse array of organized units.  
• Networks and Subsystems: Social, professional, and other types of 
personalistic networks are invaluable means for connecting actors within and 
beyond the MCF innovation system. Networks provide invaluable means of 
sharing information, often more quickly and effectively than traditional channels 
and they help to overcome barriers to innovation such as rigid 
compartmentalization that is a prominent feature of innovation systems (Taylor, 
2016, pp. 157–168). Subsystems are issue or process-specific networks that link 
organizations and other actors with each other to produce outputs and outcomes 
(Weible et al., 2012; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018). Numerous subsystems exist 
within the overall MCF innovation system and they can overlap or be nested with 
each other. The procurement and research and development subsystems are 
two of the most prominent subsystems. 
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• Contextual Factors: This category covers the diverse set of factors that 
influence and shape the overall MCF innovation environment. Contextual 
determinants that exert strong influence include historical legacy, domestic 
political environment, development levels, geographical diversity and a country’s 
size and its markets.  
• Output Factors are responsible for determining the nature of the products and 
processes that come out of the innovation system. They include the production 
process, commercialization, the role of market forces such as marketing and 
sales considerations, and the influence of end-user demand.  
1. Catalytic Factors: High-Level Leadership Engagement and the RMA 
Although MCF has attracted attention and support from Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
between the early 2000s and early 2010s, much of this interest and engagement was 
sporadic and superficial and lacked sufficient political clout and credible commitment to 
overcome the difficult structural obstacles that blocked the path of meaningful progress in 
integrating the civil and defense economies. Xi Jinping’s active and sustained 
interventionalist engagement in MCF affairs since 2015 is having a profound impact in 
reshaping the dynamics and momentum of MCF policy making and implementation.  
Xi’s decisive involvement in MCF can be highlighted by two events. The first was his 
announcement in March 2015 to elevate MCF into a national-level development strategy. 
Prior to this move, MCF was a sector-level industrial policy being managed by mid-level 
government and military officials. Xi’s intervention quickly catalyzed high-level political and 
bureaucratic engagement. In March 2016, the Politburo approved a document titled 
“Opinions on Integrated Development of Economic and National Defense Building” and 
approved MCF as a national strategy (“Consideration of ‘Opinions,’” 2016). These opinions 
formed the basis of the 13th 5-Year Special Plan for Science and Technology Military Civil 
Fusion Development that was issued in 2017 by the CSTC and MOST.  
Another imprimatur of Xi’s high-powered MCF involvement was his willingness to 
become the head of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian 
Development (CCIMCD) that was created in January 2017 to oversee MCF matters. 
Establishment of the CCIMCD was an unprecedented breakthrough with powerful Party, 
state, and military leaders as members.  
A second important catalytic factor in promoting major development in the MCF 
innovation system is the global threat environment, especially technological threats and 
opportunities. Xi and the Chinese leadership perceive that the world is currently in the midst 
of a profound science and technology revolution in both the military and civilian realms and 
that China needs to be at the forefront of riding this change.  
A focal point of this technological transformation lies in the intersection between 
civilian and military affairs, especially in the information and autonomy domains. These 
technological revolutions occur infrequently and in order to take full advantage of this 
opportunity and leapfrog to the global frontier, the Chinese authorities see the need to have 
a carefully coordinated undertaking between the civilian and military communities in areas 
such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, high-performance computing, advanced 
manufacturing, and robotics. This is being carried out in large-scale industrial and innovation 
initiatives such as the Made in China 2025 Plan and the Science, Technology, and 
Innovation 2030 Major Projects Plan.  
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2. Input Factors: Financial Integration 
Input factors are the basic building blocks in the defense and civilian economies 
needed to advance the goals of MCF. They are tangible “hard innovation capabilities” and 
include advanced research and development facilities, firm-level capabilities in R&D and 
manufacturing, a cadre of experienced scientists and engineers and supporting programs to 
cultivate human talent, technology transfers, sourced domestically or through international 
knowledge markets, as well as the availability of funding and investment sources from state 
and non-state sources (Cheung, 2011). In the case of MCF, it also includes infrastructure 
projects and markets that create civil-military hybrid industrial and technological clusters. 
China has made large investments into building up these tangible inputs and infrastructure 
factors since the turn of the 21st century and this subject has received much analytical 
attention. 
One of the most significant initiatives of the past few years has been the vast new 
sources of funding for the defense industry and MCF projects both through the capital 
markets and government venture funds. Over the past decade or more, the political and 
military leadership has come to grips with financial demands of achieving the goals of its 
expansive military modernization drive (Chaofeng, 2014). In addition, traditional forms of 
state funding—whether from the defense budget, subsidies and loans, or the sector’s own 
profits—perpetuate a high degree of insulation from market forces. Greater opening to the 
capital markets offers the potential both for a large, new source of financing while stimulate 
greater accountability and competitiveness into a closed defense enterprise system. This 
section will focus on this subject area. 
A cursory glance at the state of China’s defense technological and industrial base 
(DTIB) serves as a useful reference point from which to assess the role of financial MCF. 
Measured by revenue and asset-base ($367 billion and $640 billion), the defense industry in 
China in gross terms is a thriving sector.1 Importantly, however, is the rate at which the DTIB 
has grown in the recent past. In the past 10 years, while employee numbers have edged up 
only modestly, its revenue and asset base have ballooned, in several cases well over 150%, 
much more than its western counterparts, and an amount that could more than double again 
in the next five years (“The Frequent Claim,” 2016).  
The size and growth of the Chinese DTIB is in marked contrast to its meager 
performance as measured by profit growth and return on assets. Over the past five years, 
while all major defense enterprises have shown profits, they have been modest (averaging 
RMB 68 billion in the past five years), with some exceptions. More importantly, their average 
year-on-year growth in profits and return on investment (ROA) have been flat (<1% per 
annum since 2015), again with a few exceptions in the aerospace and ordnance sectors, 
while the overall average ROA is a mere 1.7%.2 All in all, the Chinese defense industry, 
while pronounced in size and output, continues to underperform financially and contributes 
                                               
 
 
1 Data for defense industry was collected from various sources (including 
http://www.csindex.com.cn; http://www.fortunechina.com, http://stock.jrj.com.cn) as well as defense 
industry year end reports and websites. 
2 Boeing’s and Airbus’ average rate of profit increase for this timeframe is 19% and 47%, 
respectively, while their average ROAs over the same period have been 5.5% and 2.1%, respectively. 
See http://www.fortunechina.com/fortune500/node_65.htm and Boeing and Airbus websites.  
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modest profits to its own operations, raising the question of how its large and rapid 
expansion is being funded. 
Naturally, the defense budget, and in particular the procurement budget, is a 
substantial source of income for the defense sector (“China’s Defence Industry,” 2018). 
However, the growth in the defense budget is slowing, reflecting a slowing in the broader 
economy. Financial transfers, subsidies tax breaks and especially low-interest loans have 
been the other sources of support and are certainly significant for state-owned enterprises—
including the defense industry3 (Haley & Haley, 2013, p. 2). While these conventional 
sources of funding are substantial, they do not account for the doubling in size of the 
defense industry during the last 10 years.4 
Instead, the Chinese government has increasingly turned to new forms of financing 
to recapitalize the defense industry. These are closely linked to MCF efforts, because these 
defense monies are being tapped in the commercial and private capital markets. This trend 
was slow to develop until the passage of the mixed ownership reform initiative (MOR) in 
2015 (“Opinions on Promoting Development,” 2015). MOR encouraged the joint equity 
stakes by government and private shareholders in state enterprises, with the dual goal of 
expanding the defense industry’s capital access and exposing the defense enterprises to 
greater market forces and thereby accelerating their reform. Moreover, the latest initiatives 
in defense sector reform have been the restructuring of research institutes, where some of 
the most productive assets lie. In early 2017, a pilot plan to reform 41 research institutes 
was confirmed (“Reform to Classification,” 2017).  
Mixed ownership has manifested in the markets in several important ways. First, 
defense securitization includes over 100 listed companies on China’s primary stock market, 
most of which are majority controlled by the defense industry groups or other state-owned 
entities (“Structure and Design,” 2018). These companies raised an estimated US$63 billion 
between 2010 and 2016 through various market operations (Cheung, 2016). Another form of 
defense industry participation in the market has been the rise in asset-backed securities, 
whereby state-owned non-liquid assets are converted into investment vehicles that can then 
be sold to intermediary financial institutions to be indirectly traded in primary and secondary 
capital markets (Yuwa, 2007).  
The overall asset securitization rate of China’s defense industry currently stands at 
an average of 33%. With a current total defense industry asset base of RMB 4.15 trillion 
($638 billion), there is the potential to tap an additional several trillion RMB in the market as 
the defense industry opens up (“At a Rate of Only 30%,” 2017). If the higher predictions of 
20% annual growth in the defense industry overall for the next 5–10 years is realized, these 
astronomical figures may not be unwarranted, though many barriers remain to its 
implementation.  
Another financial phenomenon that will profoundly impact the future of MCF 
implementation in China is the tidal wave of government guidance funds (GGFs) that has 
emerged on the scene in the last three to four years (Liang, 2018). GGFs are part of a 
                                               
 
 
3 One estimate put the amount of subsidies to SOEs at US$310 billion (~2 trillion RMB) from 
1985–2005 (nominal terms). 
4 Between 2009 and 2018, asset value has gone from roughly RMB2 trillion to over RMB4 
trillion, and revenue has gone from RMB1.4 trillion to RMB2.4 trillion.  
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broader state-directed industrial policy to channel national resources into its goals under its 
2016 “Innovation-Driven Development Strategy” (Ministry of Science and Technology, 
2016). These efforts consciously link defense and civilian production and R&D capabilities to 
achieve its goals. Moreover, among the now thousands of GGFs that exist, explicit MCF 
projects have risen as an important portfolio of many local government sponsored GGFs. 
To summarize the financial landscape of MCF, these new channels of funding in the 
form of securitization and government guidance funds are significant both in their scale, and 
in their nature. They represent in aggregate the opportunity for massive financial 
recapitalization of China’s DTIB, but they are being tapped with limited effect on the 
restructuring and opening up of the defense enterprises to the civilian participation. In fact, 
the evidence suggests their monopoly position and political status have risen in the past few 
years. The nature of a state-led investment approach poses inherent contradictions for an 
MCF economic model that seeks a genuine participation of the civilian private and 
commercial sectors with the defense sector. 
3. Institutional Factors: Formal and Informal  
The role of institutions is of central importance to innovation systems. Broadly 
defined, institutions are the norms, routines, habits, established practices, and other rules of 
the game that exist to guide the workings of the system and the interactions between 
organizations (North, 1990, pp. 4–5). These come in formal (such as development 
strategies, laws, and standards) and informal (conventional routines, market incentives, 
governance norms) variants. The notion of institutions is particularly salient for China’s MCF 
program because of the interplay of so many actors across industrial sectors, state and 
market entities, central and local governments, and civilian and military agencies. 
Understanding the nature of interactions amongst this panoply of organizations is critical 
because creating an effective institutional arrangement to achieve this has been one of the 
most intractable challenges for the Chinese leadership in its pursuit of MCF goal of fostering 
an innovative and collaborative ecosystem.  
Under the Hu administration, efforts to promote MCF focused primarily on reforms to 
defense corporations and on establishing a body of regulations, policies, standards, and 
other mechanisms by which to encourage the flow of private-sector technology, talent, and 
investment into defense projects. The work done in building up these institutions is 
voluminous (Wenxian et al., 2015).5 In essence, this pre-Xi period laid the formal institutional 
foundations for MCF. What this phase failed to accomplish however, as pointed out earlier, 
was to fundamentally alter established social, organizational, and cultural patterns of 
interaction and norms of behavior (Xie & Lu, 2014). In other words, the informal institutions 
relevant to MCF have proven far more difficult to change. A lack of leadership engagement 
and an overarching strategy led to ad hoc, structurally misaligned initiatives (Lafferty, 2019). 
From an institutional perspective, Xi altered the MCF landscape in several important 
ways. First of all, a raft of new high-level strategies, plans and other administrative 
arrangements have been developed following 2015 Xi’s decision to elevate MCF to a 
                                               
 
 
5 One compendium of these efforts details over 300 major regulations, standards, and 
planning documents, covering a wide range of procurement, intellectual property rights protection, 
and other provisions issued by a host of agencies including GAD, the CMC, the State Council, the 
NDRC, SASTIND.  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 155 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
national strategy that collectively represent a committed effort to reform the defense S&T 
industrial base and shift behavioral norms and practices. They build on previous ideas but 
are much more specific in the sectors and actors involved, and call for closer collaboration 
between civilian and defense sectors working in these fields (“Xi Jinping Presided,” 2017). 
Unlike previous institutionalization of MCF, these documents are issued by a superior 
authority (“Bluebook on Prospects,” 2019).  
A second way in which Xi is altering the institutional environment is by integrating 
MCF initiatives with the larger innovation-driven development strategy and many of the 
major national S&T programs associated with it. By linking strategic plans and initiatives 
together, and funding resources along with it, the interaction between organizations involved 
in these pockets of innovation is moving toward a freer, more fluid collaboration and 
exchange of ideas. This is most apparent in cutting-edge technology fields with strong 
government support, but it is occurring spontaneously in technology centers around the 
country, indicating a shift in normative behavior or informal institution building (Hagt, 2019). 
Similarly, through his high-tempo and wide-ranging production of laws and opinions, 
Xi Jinping is not just ramping up a set of formal institutions but he is also sending a strong 
political signal of commitment to a MCF agenda. This catalytic factor in China’s MCF 
ecosystem is impacting the relationship of other factors, as the innovation literature predicts 
(Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). Xi’s support for MCF is coordinated with resource allocations, 
which is altering the interaction of organizations and changing mindsets and conventional 
practices.6 The gradual rise in enthusiasm for experimenting with MCF projects at the local 
level is an example of this phenomenon. Also, the publication of product catalogues and 
technology patents also show changes in conventional practices.  
4. Organizational Factors 
Organizations and other actors in the civilian and defense economies are central 
factors in the MCF innovation system. They are the vehicles for technological change in that 
they carry through and facilitate innovations (Edquist & Johnson, 2005). Collectively, 
organizations refer to entities that are directly or indirectly involved in supporting a MCF 
economy, ranging from private and defense corporations, to government agencies, military 
entities, and the research and development system, but can also be key individuals in the 
policy decision-making process. Creating a MCF ecosystem, which calls for an additional set 
of actors and institutions, has been difficult given the complexity of managing a much 
broader group of players and interests in China’s political economy (Cheung, Mahnken, & 
Ross, 2018).7 This section will focus on one of the critical elements catalyzing China’s 
current MCF innovation eco-system: the CCIMCD.  
The creation of the CCIMCD in 2017 under Xi’s leadership was an unprecedented 
move and is the highest such organization in Chinese history to oversee MCF related work 
(General Staff Department Compilation Group, 1991, p. 567). This Party institution was 
necessary not only to bring together the various civilian stakeholders within the economy, 
but also to bridge the two major parts of the Chinese system: the State Council, China’s 
                                               
 
 
6 For instance, officers from CEDD, AMS, and NDU emphasize that past MCF-related efforts 
were frequently resisted by local if not aligned with its interests, but sustained political attention 
mitigates that over time. Interviews in Beijing, 2017. 
7 These authors distinguish between defense and military innovation. 
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supreme executive body overseeing the civilian national economy, and the Central Military 
Commission, China’s leading military institution. Policy practitioners of the civil-military 
economy in China have long bemoaned the lack of such a supra-organization (Chuanxin, 
2014). Without it, coordination of these two systems of equal rank in China’s body politic in 
the pursuit of a complex undertaking like MCF is doomed to bureaucratic inertia, as previous 
efforts had demonstrated.8  
The CCIMCD is populated with around two dozen senior Party, state, and military 
leaders. Its importance is best represented by the fact that the body has already convened 
four meetings, issuing important policy guidance on MCF initiatives with increasingly more 
specific measures to implement MCF across the country (Guangrong, n.d.). The CCIMCD is 
also distinctive in that the military has substantial representation in this body with five 
members (members and vice-chairman of the CMC)9 (“Han Zheng Chairs National 
Symposium,” 2018). This is a significant point given that MCF is an initiative that involves 
the civilian economy, a domain traditionally (and constitutionally) off limits to the military.10  
Civilian Actors 
The State Council, a supra-agency with chief administrative authority in China, holds 
a number of departments and ministries responsible for MCF. Two agencies are most 
relevant in this respect: the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and 
State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense 
(SASTIND). The NDRC is a core department of the State Council with wide-ranging powers 
over major national development projects and their funding. Within this commission is the 
Department of Economic and Defense Coordination, which is the body most focused on 
macro-level economic planning involving the defense and non-defense sectors, with 
particular purview over national economic mobilization. With the NDRC’s prominent role 
over economic planning, it also takes a lead role in MCF activity and is a principal in 
convening meetings.  
SASTIND is a relatively lower ranked body, but it is the only agency charged with 
directly regulating the defense enterprises.11 It is an agency under the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology (MIIT), the large bureaucracy with a purview over industrial 
planning and regulation. On the surface, this makes for a rational organizational framework, 
bringing defense and non-defense sectors under one administrative roof.  
A number of other bureaucracies have a degree of input with respect to MCF 
implementation, including MoST, which plays a central role in the country’s vast national 
S&T program—including the planning of S&T parks—much of which has dual-use 
applications. The State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
and its local branches manage and own state enterprises, including the defense sector. In 
                                               
 
 
8 In general, previous MCF efforts were ad hoc, structurally misaligned, of low policy priority. 
See Chao (2016).  
9 Previously Zhang Gaoli and currently Han Zheng.  
10 This point was made by NDRC officials. Interview BJ27-8. 
11 SASTIND has control over a substantial pot of money (estimated at RMB 100 billion over 
10 year period, granted sometime in the mid-2000s), but interviewed sources generally admit that 
SASTIND is relatively weak and without this funding, would have little influence over the defense 
enterprises. Interviews in Beijing, 2015. 
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general, their responsibility is to ensure returns on investment of SOEs, but they also have 
some input in performance evaluation of state-owned sector leaders. The Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) is also involved with evaluating and funding development projects and 
supporting industry parks across the country. The State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) is 
in charge of patents, intellectual property, and technology transfer in China and works with 
the CMC to declassify defense patents.12  
Military Actors 
The structure of leadership over MCF activity on the military side also involves a 
number of high-level bodies. The agency formally charged with leading this effort is the 
CMC Office of Strategic Planning (COSP). Originally a third-level organization subordinate 
to the General Staff Department, the COSP was elevated to one of the 15 departments 
directly under the CMC under the 2015 reforms, and is responsible for the overall 
configuration of defense resources and the PLA’s modernization goals, particularly in 
science and technological innovation. An important task under this bailiwick is civil-military 
integration, and the department houses the MCF Bureau to manage the military’s efforts and 
is the principal contact with State Council departments working on MCF.  
Two other sources of expertise with regard to MCF reside in the PLA. One of these is 
the CMC Equipment Development Department (CEDD), responsible for procurement, 
acquisition, and defense R&D. CEDD was formerly a powerful general department, housing 
substantial expertise in managing defense projects, and had the closest relationship with the 
defense industry sector (Hagt, 2014). It has traditionally been the principal advocate for 
MCF in the military and supports the MCF Bureau. Another important player in MCF on the 
military side is the CSTC, a body also promoted in status under the 2015 reforms, reflecting 
the importance placed on S&T for military innovation. This institution also holds substantial 
expertise through its traditional relationship with military research institutes in the defense 
industrial base. The CSTC works with MoST to identify dual-use and MCF collaboration in 
key national S&T projects, the product of which was a recently published S&T MCF 
development plan (Tao, 2017).  
Other departments involved more peripherally in MCF include the CMC Joint Staff 
Department (CJSD), which is in charge of operations and overall command and control of 
the armed forces (“The Battlefield Environmental,” 2016; “The First Geology MCF,” 2016). 
Also the Strategic Support Force, responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare, has 
built ties outside the military, signing cooperation agreements with research universities and 
software development companies (Laskai, 2018). The National Defense Mobilization 
Department—another body carved out of the former GSD and placed directly under the 
CMC—is significant in that defense mobilization planning dovetails with MCF efforts in a 
number of ways, such as the collaboration of transportation and communication 
infrastructure development projects to meet both civilian and military needs. In this respect, 
this organization works with its State Council counterpart to coordinate defense mobilization 
requirements. But it is also significant for its charge over the Provincial Military Commands 
(PMC) (“16 Provincial-Level,” 2018). In short, this branch is the PLA’s most direct interface 
with local (provincial governor) leaders on matters relevant to MCF (Li, 2014). The most 
                                               
 
 
12 SIPO works with the CMC National Defense Intellectual Property Office, and in early 2017, 
over 3,000 declassified defense patents were released at www.weain.mil.cn. Also, see Nouwens and 
Legarda (2018). 
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recent organizational addition to MCF relevant efforts under the CMC is the founding of the 
Military Science Research Steering Committee (MSRSC), an agency launched in early 2017 
that is modeled on U.S. DARPA (Ni, 2017). Its specific mission is as yet unclear but will 
likely be to identify priority areas for investing R&D resources in both defense and civilian 
sectors and thereby help guide national security development plans.  
There are several distinctive features of China’s organizational approach to guiding 
its MCF strategy that point up both strengths and weaknesses in its design. With this new 
institution, the Party leadership has finally resolved a longstanding barrier to joint planning of 
the defense and civilian components of national economy and S&T innovation system. 
Second, the formation of a permanent commission, rather than an ad hoc leading group, 
sends a strong political signal about the top leadership’s vision to pursue a long-term 
strategy of MCF.  
It has led to a proliferation of institutions and planning initiatives at many levels of 
government.13 The administrative and functional lines, and their status and authority in 
decision-making are unclear. In the State Council, for instance, the relationship between 
SASTIND and the MCF Promotion Bureau—both formally under MIIT—is ambiguous. The 
effectiveness of the NDRC and its subordinate National Mobilization office to coordinate with 
other offices is also problematic. On the military side, the MCF Bureau has little specific 
expertise and must rely on assistance from the CEDD and the CSTC, where relevant 
competence traditionally was housed. The addition of yet another body to guide R&D efforts 
in the military sphere, the MSRSC raises questions about its distinctive role in MCF, in 
relation to the MCF Bureau or the CSTC, both of which also have responsibilities over 
military R&D efforts (Grevatt, 2017). In short, the uptick in political commitment to MCF and 
the rise in organizations dedicated to this effort will help empower its implementation, but it 
will also increase bureaucratic bargaining, as China’s system has frequently proven in the 
past (Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; Mertha, 2008; Dougan, 2002).  
A second feature evident in the organizational architecture is the limited role of the 
MCF strategy’s foremost proponent, the military. While the PLA is substantially represented 
in the CCIMCD, it has virtually no footprint at the local level. This was not always the case. 
The PMC (sheng jun qu), through its role in national defense mobilization and procurement 
responsibilities for military region forces, had the potential to serve in some capacity as a 
useful local platform for certain types of MCF activity (“Following Reform,” 2016; Li, 2014). 
However, the PMC’s purview over local mobilization and army building was curtailed under 
the 2015 reforms, effectively constraining the potential of this regional civil-military entity as 
a platform for MCF. At local level, the military essentially has no direct formal representation 
to interact with government departments in charge of economic and industrial affairs and 
therefore has little authority or means to promote a MCF agenda with local development 
planning.  
A third distinguishing feature here is the central role of the state-owned enterprises in 
China’s defense industrial system. The 11 major defense firms control and operate the 
majority of China’s defense sector research, development, and production. Despite ongoing 
reforms to transform their historically closed-off nature—through MOR reforms—the defense 
                                               
 
 
13 This discussion of continued bureaucratic chaos comes mainly from interviews with officials 
in 2017 and 2018 (Hagt, 2019). 
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industries have so far remained resistant to fundamental change (“90% of Defense 
Enterprises,” 2018). Moreover, their dominant position in the defense political economy 
arena of China’s system means that they will be instrumental in the outcome of an 
integrated national development plan that the MCF strategy envisions (Lafferty et al., 2013). 
However, there is effectively no direct authority or control over defense industry enterprise 
operations, and real power over them lies within the Communist Party. Since the CCIMCD 
has not yet been replicated at lower levels of the political system, there is a large power 
differential between the defense enterprises and the much lower ranking local governments 
in which they reside, making comprehensive planning needed for MCF difficult to achieve. 
5. Networks and Subsystems  
Traditional and formal organizations and institutions, many of which are described in 
this paper, heavily dominate China’s MCF infrastructure. In fact, the formation of 
government bodies and the crafting of laws, regulations and planning guidelines are a 
particular strength of China’s state-centric model of industrial policy making. However, as 
the literature makes clear, networks and subsystems are the “interstitial connectors” that link 
actors and processes in the innovation ecosystem and are crucial to mitigating 
compartmentalization and enhancing information sharing and technology diffusion (Taylor, 
2016, pp. 157–168). Until recently, there has been an absence of such platforms in China’s 
MCF system, a product of its statist approach, and exacerbated by issues such as secrecy, 
historical legacy, and unclear IPRs and the monopolistic behavior of its defense firms. 
However, that is changing, and an exciting new development in China’s MCF efforts is the 
emergence of a range of novel mechanisms that are enabling these crucial linkages in the 
system. 
Subsystem: CMI Acquisition System 
One of the most prominent of these is the formation of what amounts to a new CMI-
specific acquisition regime that is in part a reform of, but is also separate from, the existing 
monopoly-oriented system. The PLA and the State Council have instituted many 
components to this new acquisition platform that allow for private sector firms to be vetted 
and approved for defense work, that facilitate a more open bidding process and generally 
enhance transparency of the acquisition governance regime.  
Some of the elements of this new system include web-based portals that are 
appearing both at the national and local levels. The much-heralded PLA’s Weapons 
Acquisition Information Network (WEAIN), launched in 2015, provides information on the 
country’s weapons and armament needs, relevant policies, procurement notices. Moreover, 
the PLA has vetted 13 intermediary tendering agencies to screen applicants and manage 
the bidding process (“The Military’s Weapons,” 2018). As of early 2018, it had attracted over 
16,000 registered entities and listed more than 4,500 technology procurement notices 
(Yang, 2018). Moreover, the site also holds over 3,000 defense patents that were 
declassified in 2017 as part of an effort to increase transparency and encourage the private 
sector to engage defense research and production (Nouwens & Legarda, 2018). Many local 
governments and S&T parks have founded similar online platforms.  
As of October 2017, the PLA, in conjunction with SASTIND, officially announced the 
streamlining of the arcane defense contractor approval process, making it substantially 
easier for smaller commercial firms to obtain the necessary licenses and approvals 
(“Mincanjun,” 2017). Extensive catalogues of products, technologies, and firms for 
researching, developing, and manufacturing military weapons and equipment were released 
by SASTIND. 
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Within the last year, a number of reforms to the tax system, the pricing of military 
products and technologies and standards have made substantive progress, all of which are 
paving the way for greater private participation in the defense acquisition system. 
Commercial enterprises can now enjoy many of the tax incentives previously restricted to 
defense firms (lower VAT and “return first policy”).14 The fixed pricing system (cost-plus) that 
dominated earlier eras has given way to more flexibility and includes a range of negotiable 
pricing schemes for a much larger portion of defense products and technologies (Xi & 
Bingwei, 2018).  
The PLA has also increased its efforts to sidestep the traditional acquisition system, 
particularly with regard to accessing the private and commercial domains for high-end and 
emerging technologies. The newly empowered CSTC now has greater control over the early 
phases of the R&D process—for example, experimental and exploratory research—whereas 
this was overseen by the General Armaments Department prior to 2015 reforms. The 
previously mentioned Military Science Research Steering Committee also serves to better 
identify emerging technologies for military application in the private domain. The creation of 
the National Defense S&T Innovation Rapid Response Team under the CSTC, located in 
Shenzhen, is the most recent move. This is very similar to the DIUx offices in the United 
States and forms another part of this new system to enhance technology acquisition in the 
commercial sphere. 
Networks: Non-Traditional Platforms 
There are also novel ways in which China is generating cross-linkages in the system. 
First, exhibitions where civilian and military enterprises gather to show off technologies and 
exchange information have proliferated. The Zhuhai Airshow is the most visible of these, but 
virtually every major S&T center convenes these events to demonstrate new dual-use 
projects and burgeoning MCF areas as well as facilitate a two-way channel of 
communication between private and defense enterprises. SASTIND has been the leading 
agency in holding exhibitions, but the PLA has also shown increasing interest in directly 
participating (“Private Enterprise,” 2014).  
The designation of national MCF demonstration bases has also been a prominent 
strategy to foster interaction between defense and civilian activities. As of mid-2018, there 
were 36 such bases in 22 provinces and cities around the country (Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, 2018). These are important because underlying this strategy is the 
notion that spatial proximity is key to technology diffusion. Industry clustering fosters a 
higher degree of interconnectedness that encourages spillover in technology and 
knowledge—between defense and commercial firms—thus stimulating productivity and 
innovation (Jolly & Zhu, 2012).  
One of the most novel developments in China’s MCF economy is the intermediary 
entities that are on the rise in many local governments. These range from government to 
quasi- and even non-government institutions, which provide an array of liaison, research, 
and consulting services to facilitate information exchange and interactions between civilian 
and defense actors in the local economy. Such organizations are especially active in thriving 
economic centers where industrial and technological complementarity with the resident 
                                               
 
 
14 Interviews in Chongqing, May 2016. For discussion on tax reform, see 
http://pg.jrj.com.cn/acc/Res/CN_RES/INDUS/2019/3/6/4e258c51-a0d9-4eff-9517-7455fc98a073.pdf  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 161 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
defense industry is higher. These intermediaries are unique in that they either have experts 
in-house that have defense industry backgrounds, or their staff includes retired military 
officers familiar with defense procurement and acquisition practices.15  
In sum, these various platforms that are making their debut in the past few years 
largely fall outside the conventional actors and institutions of the MCF system. Yet, they 
constitute a vital enabler for MCF implementation in local economies where the threshold for 
the majority of commercial and private enterprises is too high to engage in defense work 
(Huixian, 2017). They provide the connections between the notoriously separate defense 
and civilian parts of the economy. These emerging entities are helping generate the bottom 
up collaboration that will be essential if MCF is to succeed.  
6. Contextual Factors: MCF Implementation 
This category comprises a set of conditions that shape the environment in which 
MCF happens. In this sense, they are usually broader in scope than other factors (such as 
inputs and formal organizations) and cover political, institutional, and even ideational 
aspects of an innovation system (Abramovitz, 1986). Using the framework of contextual 
factors is especially useful when examining China’s MCF efforts at local levels, where much 
of the implementation occurs. The complexity of China in terms of geographical diversity, 
levels of development, governance structures and historical legacies dictate that MCF will 
be carried out with a high degree of variance in form and substance. And the aggregate of 
these contextual factors help understand the specific operating environment of MCF and the 
different outcomes that it leads to.  
The set of conditions that impact MCF implementation can be summarized under 
several overarching variables, which, while not comprehensive, aid in deriving general 
models and are important indicators of their relative success (Hagt, 2019). The first is what 
may be called complementarity between the local economic and political context and the 
resident defense entity. In order for collaboration between the defense and commercial 
sectors to occur, a local economy must be sufficiently competent (in either industrial or 
technological aspects) in providing what the defense sector requires; or vice versa, for the 
defense sector to integrate with the local economy, it must be able to produce goods and 
technologies the commercial sector demands.  
A second variable that is unique to China’s system is the role of center-local 
relations. The objectives of a national MCF strategy are not always aligned with local 
development priorities and properly structuring incentives for civil-military collaboration is 
almost without exception a difficult center-local exercise. The center-local dynamic is also 
manifested in other ways. China’s political system is sensitive to rank and status within the 
party and government structures. This hierarchy of power and position comes to be an 
important factor for MCF implementation because the defense industrial enterprises, as 
central, monopolistic institutions with immense influence at the political Center, are difficult 
to manage by local officials who are much lower in status.  
A final variable affecting MCF implementation is the notion of governance. In general 
terms, this is the local government’s ability to mobilize and effectively utilize its natural, 
financial, economic and political resources to pursue a policy agenda—in this case, MCF. In 
other words, how well a local government can parlay its particular economic and industrial 
                                               
 
 
15 Interviews in Shenzhen and Beijing, 2016–2017. 
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strengths into effective implementation of MCF has an important governance dimension. 
These variables interact dynamically across the national landscape and shape the 
implementation of MCF in myriad ways. This complexity at the national level does not lend 
itself easily to gross assessments; however, there are three relatively coherent models of a 
MCF economy that can be identified.  
7. Output Factors: Measuring Implementation 
Output in the context of defense innovation and the systems innovation literature is 
broken down into a number of archetypes, ranging from simple copying at the one end to 
sophisticated disruptive innovation at the other (Cheung et al., 2018). The notion of output 
for a MCF economy must differ to an extent because one is not just looking at technological 
innovations, but the level of collaboration and integration between the civilian and defense 
sectors that generated the output. In other words, the relational dimension of the civil-
military axis is decisive.   
There are many forms of civil-military activity conducted around the country that fall 
under the larger rubric of MCF. If conceptualized along a continuum, higher value types of 
MCF reflect closer collaboration and lead to greater efficiency and innovation gains in the 
system but they also become more challenging politically as an increasing array of 
organizations and institutions become involved. These extend from simple defense 
conversion with little or no integration on the one extreme to organic fusion of defense and 
civilian economies on the other. The current state of MCF is the widening participation of the 
commercial and private sector in the defense economy (mincanjun), though primarily lower 
(3rd and 4th tier) component supply in addition to discrete, or stand-alone technologies.16 
Quantifying MCF along this value chain is a direct way to measure output of a MCF 
innovation system.  
The problem in measuring MCF output based on this formulation is a paucity of data. 
A second difficulty is the lack of specificity in documenting the nature of MCF conducted. 
This is partly for a lack of commonly held standards when reporting MCF s, but many local 
governments and agencies that benefit from “MCF output” are also incentivized to 
exaggerate results. Many cities and provinces use crude methods of calculating “MCF 
degree,” which are devoid of significance in both qualitative and quantitative terms (“Speech 
by Luo Qiang, Mianyang Party Secretary and Cao Zhiheng,” 2014).  
That is not to say that all data published by the government are meaningless. Many 
government and military agencies provide some quantification, but these are usually top-line 
figures. For instance, one report states that two-thirds of enterprises approved to do defense 
work are civilian and a third of those are private firms. The PLA reported recently that by the 
end of 2017, almost 10,000 firms and over 700 high-tech firms had “entered the ranks of 
national defense and military construction” (Maorong, 2019). These headline numbers are 
impressive on the one hand, but they represent a miniscule percentage of their respective 
totals. These figures quantify civilian participation in the defense sector (mincanjun) in the 
most macro sense, but there is no discussion of quality, such as information that would help 
                                               
 
 
16 To date, expos around the country have typically showcased discrete technologies—
though increasingly impressive—to sell as stand-alone systems, such as robots, 3D printing, energy 
storage systems, electronics, navigation equipment and software, cyber security system, high-
performance materials, and drones (UAVs). See Guoli (2018). 
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one gauge an enterprise’s engagement with the defense sector—R&D, production, design, 
subsystems, or component off the shelf sales.  
Other, indirect quantitative methods of measuring output are also possible (Jaffe et 
al., 1993). One proxy for civil-military integration is technology diffusion. Joint patent activity 
and joint science and technology paper publications between these actors are frequently 
utilized to study collaboration in Beijing’s innovation economy. Other ways of examining 
knowledge flow and technology diffusion include the use of patent citation analysis. 
Although much of the registered patented technology falls into the dual-use realm, all of 
these methods are imperfect yardsticks, as much of the data is not specifically defense 
oriented, or subject to selection bias (Nouwens & Legarda, 2018).  
A more fruitful approach to measuring MCF progress and impact is qualitative in 
nature and borrows from the U.S. defense industry concept of the lead system integrator 
(LSI) (Gansler et al., 2009). Viewing MCF’s success through this lens highlights the 
importance of many of the factors discussed in the systems innovation framework. A 
Chinese LSI from the private, corporate sector would represent a disruptive innovation at the 
institutional, political, bureaucratic, and economic level. Given the powerful position of the 
defense conglomerates, discussed earlier, the presence of an outside system integrator 
would clearly indicate a high level of political support by the leadership. Moreover, LSI would 
demonstrate genuine change in the monopolistic position of the defense enterprises and a 
more effective institutional and governance regime to implement collaboration.  
A range of fields in high-tech, disruptive technologies where China is seeking to 
become globally competitive is receiving increasing analytical attention (Ray et al., 2016; 
Kania, 2017; Katwala, 2018; Fisher, 2010; Sinko, 2017; Krekel, Adams, & Bakos, 2012). 
These range from robotics, to artificial intelligence, quantum computing, aerospace, 
nanotechnology, new materials, drones, high performance computing, and others. In many 
of these, the private corporate sector is beginning to engage seriously in MCF through 
technology contribution, co-licensing, and partnerships in R&D (“Baidu Establishes,” 2017). 
It is clear the military and defense sectors are able to leverage significant amount of 
technology and know-how from these projects. What is less understood is the degree to 
which firms are actively participating in these MCF projects or acting as system integrators. 
Government R&D institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and defense 
enterprises, such as China Electronics Technology Group, continue to play central roles. 
Beyond these specialized technology programs, with their high-level government attention 
and funding, private enterprises’ role in defense programs is limited to lower tier component 
supply. Measuring the level of participation would require deeper corporate profiling. 
Implications for the United States  
A central goal of China’s MCF strategy is to develop and acquire weapons “better, 
cheaper, faster.” The trajectory of that effort will have far-reaching consequences for the 
United States’ ability to manage the military balance with China. The defense industrial 
complex itself has since the turn of the century greatly improved in its own ability to produce 
more advanced weaponry. Moreover, state-directed and funded institutions, especially 
Academies of Science and Engineering, national labs, and defense universities, and to a 
lesser extent civilian universities, represent an important civilian body of capabilities that 
have certainly helped transform China’s research, development, and acquisition system. But 
all the available evidence strongly suggests this has come at a high cost. In aggregate, this 
state-led defense and civilian sectors capture enormous amounts of national resources, but 
these are highly inefficient (Liu, Simon, Sun, & Cao, 2011; “Interpret ‘Made in China 2025,’” 
2015). In short, the system has become better and faster, but not necessarily cheaper. The 
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fact that MCF has been elevated to a national strategy with a sense of urgency precisely at 
a period when China is making huge strides in its military modernization suggests the 
leadership views a fix to the inefficiency of the system as essential to sustain this trajectory. 
However, the goal to fix this—facilitate the participation of China’s robust private or 
commercial economy in defense building—has only begun to achieve results, and its 
prospects for successful implementation remain highly uncertain despite its high level 
attention at the Center. Private and commercial sector engagement in defense acquisition 
and procurement programs remains limited largely to 3rd and 4th tier component production. 
The emergence of a genuinely private or commercial entity that acts as lead system 
integrator for a major defense program would demonstrate deeper reform of the system. 
That has not yet happened, as the defense enterprises remain largely resistant to 
fundamental change.  
Another important goal of MCF is financial integration. Asset securitization and the 
ability to tap financial markets represent an important turning point for the defense industrial 
base. Access to the market is allowing for a massive recapitalization of the defense industry. 
A much larger windfall of capital in the years ahead could well materialize as SOE reform 
moves forward. The expansion of the defense sector in the last decade attests to this 
increased capture of national resources through the market. This financial aspect of MCF is 
significant because it falls outside conventional understanding of the resources devoted to 
China’s defense industrial base. It is not a well-understood phenomenon, in large part due to 
the opaque nature of China’s statist market and the complexity of SOE reform. But it is 
certain to be an important factor in China’s military modernization drive. Military procurement 
budgets, preferential tax treatment, subsidies and loans—all of which are slowing in 
growth—may not be the biggest determinants of the defense industry. Assessments of 
China’s military modernization trajectory based principally on budgetary and extra-budgetary 
state largesse misses this new source of funding that will grow in size and importance over 
time.  
Ironically, this aspect of financial integration stands in contrast to the previously 
discussed MCF goal of increasing innovation and efficiency of defense work through private 
and commercial sector participation. Ideally, SOE reform and asset securitization is meant to 
diversify ownership in order to infuse better corporate management and governance, not 
just increase resources. However, despite the substantial securitization of defense assets, 
the group corporations remain completely state-controlled, and even its listed subsidiaries 
are in the main still government owned. In other words, the financial markets are being 
leveraged to recapitalize the defense sector with little impact on their political or monopoly 
position in the economy—and in fact may be helping to further consolidate it (Milhaupt & 
Zheng, 2016). The implications here are that military modernization may continue apace 
despite the lack of progress in MCF in terms of commercial participation. The rise of 
government industry guidance funds, an equal and possibly larger source of capital, may 
only accentuate this trend.  
While the narrower definition of MCF has direct implications for the state of China’s 
defense industrial base, there is also a broader conceptual goal for the national MCF plan 
that has profound implications for U.S. national security and its economic relations with 
China. IDDS explicitly formulates an agenda that closely links defense building with nation 
building, blurring the lines between defense and civilian domains (Levesque & Stokes, 
2016). Strategic industries and dual-use technologies are targeted for development with the 
aim of transforming China into a world-class power in economic, technological, and military 
terms. This mobilization of national resources to achieve economic-hard power makes China 
a techno-security state. This has obvious and direct implications for America’s own defense 
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industrial base, but even more troubling are the indirect, less discernible risks to U.S. 
defense and economic superiority. 
The broader challenge for the United States regarding China’s MCF strategy is two-
fold. The first is the nature of many emerging technologies and industries from a dual-use 
standpoint, some of which have direct and clear defense applications—such as robotics and 
semiconductors—but many others that have potential for or are foundational to defense 
purposes that are frequently more remote from or are embedded in a long component 
defense industrial supply chain—specialized machine tools, artificial intelligence, and 
biotech are examples here. Moreover, most of these technologies have vast commercial 
potential, which means they are available to anyone and their development is widespread, 
making their monitoring for national security purposes a highly complex undertaking. The 
second and interrelated challenge stems from China’s own well-defined industrial strategy 
linking defense and civilian economic goals, and which directly influences both outbound 
and inbound FDI. This intrinsically dual-use development plan entails the targeting of 
technologies and industries much farther upstream and downstream in the supply chain—
both defense and commercial—than would normally be the case (Humphries, 2015, pp. 4–6; 
Bureau of Industry and Security, 2016, p. 3; Interagency Task Force, 2018). Similarly, the 
risks to technologies and components in the defense industrial supply chain become more 
widely spread and so much harder to map (Brown & Singh, 2018). Taken together with the 
variety of financing vehicles (acquisitions, mergers, but also minority stake ownership) that 
are employed by Chinese investors, monitoring is extremely difficult.  
To date, the tools used by the U.S. government and Department of Defense are 
limited, though they have improved recently with the increased attention to Chinese 
investment behavior in the United States. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. 
(CFIUS) is one of the few mechanisms in place today with real power to govern inbound 
investments with potential national security threat (Jackson, 2018). While originally a blunt 
tool that only reviewed relevant transactions that resulted in a foreign controlling interest, 
CFIUS’ jurisdiction has recently been expanded under the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act (FIRRMA) to cover non-controlling foreign interests in critical 
infrastructure, critical technologies, or sensitive personal data, including via indirect 
investment and if a foreign government is involved.17 Importantly, however, a radical move 
to include U.S. outbound investments to China with potential national security implications 
was removed from the final FIRRMA reforms (Donnan, 2018).  
Perhaps the most important lesson for the challenge that China’s MCF strategy 
poses for the United States has to do with political will. China’s strong, centralized, state-led 
system allows for a substantial degree of engineering of industrial and economic goals. 
Such a state-centric design in industrial policy is unfamiliar to the U.S. free-market system. 
Even control over broad technology in the United States is highly controversial within the 
commercial technology community, where the largest markets for many foundational and 
emerging technologies are non-defense in nature. Despite the reforms to CFIUS or other 
tech transfer measures, several major recent studies argue that the United States remains 
                                               
 
 
17 FIRRMA takes the “direct” out of foreign investment review. Therefore other investment 
types (assets purchased from bankruptcies, or the presence of Limited Partners in a VC fund) can 
now trigger CFIUS action. Also, filings involving foreign governments are mandatory. See Croley et 
al. (2018) and Oleynik et al. (2018). 
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vulnerable to loss of critical technologies. It is unclear how the U.S. polity could muster the 
political will to take a whole of government approach and institute a comprehensive policy 
tool set necessary to protect against the depth and breadth of the challenge: from supply 
chain vulnerabilities, to targeted investments for tech transfer and industrial espionage. Yet, 
bold action may be the only means to meet the challenge of protecting U.S. military 
technological advantage.  
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Department of Defense Emerging Technology Strategy: A 
Venture Capital Perspective 
James Cross—The Atlantic Council 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the DoD’s efforts to access new sources of 
innovation through engagement with venture-backed emerging technology companies by 
analyzing dual use venture funding flows. The intended audience is threefold: DoD 
innovation policy makers, members of innovation units deployed to emerging tech 
ecosystems, and their overseers and financial backers in Congress.  
The first section analyzes five years of dual use venture funding activity. The 
encouraging conclusion is that, at least on the surface, DoD efforts have been successful: 
Venture funding to dual use companies the last five years has tripled from around $5 billion 
to nearly $15 billion. However, a deeper look shows that the DoD overly focuses on the 
Early Stage segment of the market. The corresponding geographic analysis of venture flows 
in 2018 also shows an incomprehensible lack of engagement in Silicon Valley.  
The second section lays out a multi-stage throughput model for dual use venture 
activity. A better familiarization by innovation leaders will effectively calibrate policy, capital, 
and personnel to the venture market, driving stronger outcomes for the warfighter. The third 
section offers a set of metrics detailed at each VC funding stage to assess the effectiveness 
of DoD innovation engagement. 
Preface 
It is generally accepted that the United States has entered a new geopolitical phase 
that equates to a Digital Arms race, primarily with China. Silicon Valley conceptually stands 
at the front lines. Whoever harnesses the newest technology for geoeconomic purposes 
wins. So, it would seem natural then that the DoD would send “soldiers to the front” to 
secure these new technologies for the warfighter.  
To that end, a four-star COCOMM commander met with a group of 20 dual use VCs 
early in 2019 to explore commercial space options for his new multi-decade modernization 
program. Thirty minutes into the meeting, it became apparent, however, that no one in the 
room had seen his Broad Area Announcement calling for emerging tech ideas—no one, that 
is, except the VC rep from a prime contractor.  
Four-star generals aren’t the best choice for foot soldiers in this new digital conflict. 
The DoD needs a better strategy. 
Introduction 
The DoD has officially shifted focus from counter-terrorism (CT) to Great Power 
Competition (GPC), as described most prominently in the Trump Administration’s 2018 
National Defense Strategy: “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the 
primary concern in U.S. national security” (DoD, 2018). Observers such as the media, 
industry analysts, and academics have begun talking about the new “Digital Arms Race” 
with China, or the new “Cold War II” with Russia and China. “U.S. Scrambles to Outrun 
China in New Arms Race,” proclaimed the New York Times newspaper headline on January 
27, 2019 (Sanger et al., 2019). Defense leaders speak of the digitization of warfare. The 
three traditional domains, Air, Sea, and Land, have now been expanded to the realms of 
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Space, Cyber, and Information. The Russians refer to the latter as “hybrid warfare,” a term 
trumpeted by General Gerasimov, Russia’s chief of the General Staff (Baig, 2019).  
Recent DoD strategy documents decry a “digital gap” that has emerged between the 
United States and its adversaries in these new domains. A variety of efforts have begun to 
work towards closing that digital gap. Much of these efforts center around improving defense 
innovation and strengthening the National Security Innovation Base. Policy statements, new 
budget authorizations, and the development of novel DoD innovation outreach units are all 
aimed at accelerating the closure of this perceived gap.  
The implied goal of these efforts is to better facilitate the United States in its 
competition with its Near Peer competitors by developing new sources of emerging 
technology. Secretary Mattis described this goal succinctly at the 2018 Reagan Defense 
forum: “Our will to win is not more important than our will to prepare to win. This includes 
warfighting excellence from our military, steady predictable funding from Congress, and 
engaged support from our most innovative industry leaders, including Silicon Valley” (Mattis, 
2018).  
Mattis’ statement begs the question, then, what exactly is “Emerging Tech;” with a 
$60 billion R&D budget, why does the DoD need it; and how does the DoD get more of it 
from Silicon Valley?  
 
 DoD No Longer Drives the Nation’s Innovation Ecosystem 
The two most likely new sources, then, would be tech developed by the new “Tech 
Titans,” such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook and/or early stage emerging technology 
companies backed by venture capitalists. These two sources could reasonably be lumped 
into the DoD’s rhetorical innovation category of “Silicon Valley” given either their geographic 
HQ locations and/or their sources of funding originating from Sand Hill Road (the geographic 
center of the vast preponderance of tech venture capital). 
So, the DoD is deploying resources, in terms of “boots on the ground” and dollars, to 
access these sources of emerging tech that their current/traditional sources of technology 
don’t offer through the establishment of new innovation units such as the DIU, AFWERX, 
and Army Futures Command (AFC). From the standpoint of a defense technology venture 
investor based in Silicon Valley, these units’ strategy and mission are obvious. Defense 
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innovation policy makers are less sure of these units’ mission and strategy. This is obvious 
considering, for example, that the DIU has had three executive directors in two years (four if 
you count the acting executive prior to Mike Brown [Elias, 2018]) and seen its funding cut 
multiple times by the appropriation committees (Williams, 2018). 
From a Silicon Valley investor standpoint, the DoD should drive forward on three 
lines of effort to effectively engage venture-backed emerging technology companies: 
1. Startups: To inspire potential founders to quit their day jobs and start that 
company they always dreamed of. Also, to develop an initial business model that 
includes selling to the government (dual use).  
2. VC Funding: To help attract venture capital towards these dual (or single) use 
start-ups across all stages, sectors, and geographies.  
3. Policy: To drive policy changes that enable the services to be more effective 
consumers of these new technologies at each start-up lifecycle stage with the 
ultimate goal of getting Late Stage emerging tech companies on Programs of 
Record (or the R&D/O&M equivalents).  
2014–2018 Dual Use Venture Fund Flows 
The effectiveness of DoD innovation engagement is difficult to measure qualitatively. 
The various outreach units act in an uncoordinated (and often conflicting) manner; no unit 
has a clear national leadership role, funding levels for the various units are inconsistent, and 
the uniformed services have yet to fully get involved. Quantitative measurements are much 
easier. A survey of publicly available venture funding in dual use categories shows that 
despite the DoD’s miscalibrations, it is succeeding in attracting private capital. Figure 2 
shows the excellent growth in dual use funding over the last five years.1 
 
 
 ABCD Round Funding in DoD Tech Priorities 
                                               
 
 
1 Unless noted, all venture funding data is sourced from Pitchbook with full documentation in 
the reference list. 
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Also encouraging is that the DoD has roughly held its share of VC funding steady at 
around 20% (see Figure 3).  
 
 
 Percentage Share of DoD to Total U.S. VC 
 
Looking at the 2018 dual use venture funding by round reveals insights that will 
better shape innovation strategy. As Figure 4 shows, whether by intent or not, A and B 
Round funding is rather robust. However, the levels drop in the Late Stage, illustrating the 
need to shift focus.  
 
 
 2018 DoD Tech Priority VC Investment by Series 
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 2018 DoD Deal Count 
2018 Dual Use Venture Activity by Region 
Table 1 shows 2018 dual use venture activity by region and funding stage. Table 2 
compares DoD innovation unit budgets to venture activity by region.  
One immediate conclusion jumps off the page: Silicon Valley completely dwarfs all 
other regions. Similarly, from the second chart, DoD innovation is significantly over-indexed 
to the National Capital Region (NCR) and extremely under-indexed to Silicon Valley. SV had 
57.5% of 2018 dual use venture flows. However, the DoD only allocates 3.7% of its VC-
backed innovation engagement budget there, with just a single unit deployed there. The DIU 
needs a massive resource increase as the only unit based in Silicon Valley. The NCR gets 
91% of DoD budgets with a mere 2.6% of venture funding. Lastly, the AFC’s selection of 
Austin for its HQ implies other priorities for the unit than engagement with venture backed 
companies. Texas only saw 2.7% of venture funding in dual use categories last year. 
Table 1. 2018 Dual Use Venture Activity 
 
  
2018 Dual Use Venture Activity by Region
Region Dollars (MM) % of Total $ Deal Count % of Total # A B C D
NCR 374 2.6% 24 3.9% 13 9 1 1
Midwest 392 2.7% 24 3.9% 15 5 2 2
New England 1316 9.0% 76 12.4% 42 23 7 4
New York 1825 12.5% 62 10.1% 28 24 7 3
Northwest 53 0.4% 7 1.1% 4 3 0 0
Rocky Mountains 175 1.2% 13 2.1% 6 4 3 0
Silicon Valley 8414 57.5% 290 47.4% 152 76 41 21
Southeast 308 2.1% 18 2.9% 8 8 0 2
Southern California 1102 7.5% 58 9.5% 26 24 6 2
Southwest 287 2.0% 14 2.3% 10 3 1 0
Texas 389 2.7% 26 4.2% 13 8 1 4
Totals 14635 612 317 187 69 39
Funding Round
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Table 2. DoD Innovation Unit Budget 
 
 
All the data relating to venture funding in this paper, unless otherwise noted, is 
targeted at DDRE Griffin’s 10 tech priorities for the DoD (Acquisition in the Digital Age 
[AiDA]—MITRE, n.d.). 
Case Study: AI/ML 
Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) stands as a compelling case study 
candidate for a variety of reasons. Highest among those is the fact that the White House 
(Trump, 2019) and the DoD (2019) just released strategy papers, the Joint Artificial 
Intelligence Center was recently launched under General Shanahan (Cullum, 2018), and the 
category represents a huge amount of dual use venture funding (65.6% in 2018). This case 
study illustrates how the analysis of venture funding by stage and source better informs DoD 
innovation strategy.  
AI/ML funding is showing immense growth and taking a steadily increasing share of 
venture funding (see Figure 6), all good news for the DoD’s AI ambitions. Venture investors 
have poured billions into AI/ML deals. The total from 2014 to 2018 according to Pitchbook 
stands at $22.6 billion. This number alone clearly shows the DoD should focus on partnering 
with existing dual use AI start-ups rather than creating new ones.  
 
 
 AI/ML ABCD Round Funding 
2018 DOD Innovation Unit Budget by Geography vs VC Funding Flow
VC Dollars DOD Dollars
Region Dollars (MM) % of Total $ Dollars (MM) % of Total #
NCR 374 2.6% 1755 91.0%
Midwest 392 2.7% 0 0.0%
New England 1316 9.0% 0 0.0%
New York 1825 12.5% 0 0.0%
Northwest 53 0.4% 0 0.0%
Rocky Mountains 175 1.2% 2 0.1%
Silicon Valley 8414 57.5% 71 3.7%
Southeast 308 2.1% 0 0.0%
Southern California 1102 7.5% 0 0.0%
Southwest 287 2.0% 0 0.0%






SOFWERX (no public budget data avail)
Innovation Units (HQ)
SCO, MD5, JAIC, NavalX
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 Percentage Share of AI/ML to Total U.S. VC 
 
However, a closer look at 2018 funding data shows a more nuanced story. While A 
and B Round funding remains healthy, Late Stage funding drops dramatically (see Figure 8). 
AI technology has yet to find revenue-rich markets, making Late Stage funding difficult. This 
represents an opportunity for the DoD to aggressively compete for the attention of A and B 
Round companies with large procurements without onerous compliance and accounting 




 AI/ML VC Investment by Round 
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 Percentage Share AI/ML vs. Total U.S. VC 
 
Those efforts to woo capital and start-ups in AI should center around the West 
Coast. According to CB Insight’s 4Q18 venture reports (PitchBook, 2019), the top five states 
for AI deals in the quarter were 
• CA: 53 deals, $1.9 billion invested  
• MA: 13 deals, $247 million invested  
• NY: 10 deals, $110 million invested 
• TX: 3 deals, $10 million invested 
• WA: 3 deals, $9 million invested  
Again, this illuminates Army Future Command’s decision to HQ in Austin. Naturally, 
proximity to testing ranges and resources at Fort Hood supports that move, but the lack of 
AI/ML start-ups does not. The recent spate of NYC-based DoD AI/ML hackathons also don’t 
make sense from a geographic analysis. 
A Venture Capital Map of the National Security Innovation Base 
Better policy and innovation partnerships would flow easier if the DoD side better 
understood the structure and process of the people (venture being relationship-driven) they 
are trying to partner with, especially considering that the DoD needs Silicon Valley more 
than Silicon Valley needs the DoD. The goal of this section, then, is to increase the 
effectiveness of DoD innovation efforts by decreasing the awkwardness of its efforts to 
attract innovation. Metaphorically, stop stepping on your dance partner’s shoes by actually 
learning the dance. 
Following is a highly simplistic model that captures the life stages of a venture 
backed dual use start-up as it progresses through the innovation ecosystem, describes the 
relevant issues for DoD support of that process at each stage, and recommends policies for 
improvement thereof. In the next section, the paper will then offer a basic framework for 
measuring the effectiveness of the DoD’s efforts in stimulating greater output of dual use 
companies from this ecosystem. 
Many of the terms and acronyms will be defined in the following section. However, a 
few definitions up front are necessary: 
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• Start-Up Stage—the general timeframe and lifecycle in which the start-up is 
currently operating. Innovation policy needs to fit each stage; one size does not 
fit all.  
• VC Funding Round—the specific funding round that the start-up either most 
recently completed or is working to fund. These rounds somewhat fit the start-up 
stages, but not perfectly. The key is that as the start-ups move through their life 
stages, their funding round sources and milestones shift. Policy should fit 
appropriately.  
• Sand Hill Road—the geographic location west of Stanford University in Palo Alto, 
CA, where the vast majority of the leading venture capital firms are located, 
especially those capable of writing large, late stage checks. The term “Sand Hill 
Road” is also often used as a metaphor for traditional venture funding.  
• MVP—Minimum Viable Product, the goal of an early stage start-up, which is to 
go through multiple customer engagements as it defines its MVP, then build a 
business model. Many policy makers mistakenly confuse the order: MVP first, 
then detailed business model.  
• DoD Innovation Units—DIU: Defense Innovation Unit; AFC: Army Futures 
Command; AFWERX: Air Force innovation outreach unit; SOFWERX: Special 
Operations Forces innovation, outreach unit; MD5: National Security Technology 
Accelerator; H4D: Hacking for Defense. This purposely excludes traditional DoD 
innovators such as DARPA, AFRL, NRO, etc.  
DoD Innovation Outreach Ultimate Goal 
In the interest of starting with the end in mind, the ultimate goal of DoD innovation 
efforts should first be defined. As referenced in the introduction, the obvious answer to that 
question is threefold from the perspective of a Silicon Valley venture investor: to motivate 
more founders to launch dual use start-ups, attract an increasing amount of private capital to 
fuel those start-ups’ growth, and develop better policy to enable the services to deploy the 
technology from these companies. Or more simply put, the goal of DoD Innovation is to 
increase the number of “Dual Use Unicorns”2 like Palantir, SpaceX, Cloudflare, Tanium, 
C3IOT, etc., by an order of magnitude.  
While the DoD may not care about helping start-ups make unicorn status, only the 
larger Late Stage companies can handle the onerous requirements of full Federal 
Acquisition Requirements. In addition, the venture funders will require large exits at the Late 
Stage to continue finding dual use companies in the long term. Successful exits renew the 
innovation ecosystem. They are the key to driving the self-funding nature of the venture 
market. The proceeds of the exit go to the VCs who often re-invest them in earlier stage 
deals. As the number of successful exits grows, the amount of capital available in that 
ecosystem grows over time as well. For example, according to Crunchbase, a leading 
source of start-up financing data, the average successful startup raises $41 million in capital 
and exits for an average of $242.9 million (Lapowsky, n.d.). So, the DoD stands to benefit 
from a growing, self-funded source of new technology.  
                                               
 
 
2 A “unicorn” is Silicon Valley vernacular for a private (pre-IPO) venture backed company 
whose last financing round was conducting at a valuation exceeding $1 billion.  
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Creating Late Stage winners is easier said than done. In 2018, VCs funded 317 A 
Rounds but only 39 D Rounds. However, the DoD can boost the number of D Rounds if it 
properly aligns its current outreach units and budgets more effectively by stage, sector, and 
geography.  
To do that, leadership needs to first understand the unique issues involved in 
supporting a start-up through its journey from Day 1 to Exit. It’s generally understood in the 
Valley that the average time from start-up Day 1 to Exit is around seven years (Abdullah, 
2018). Exact data on that number is difficult to measure with perfect accuracy because 
much of the data in the early stages is inconsistently self-reported. As discussed later, the 
data becomes much more reliable around the A Round.  
Defining Foundational Venture Stage Concepts  
Start-Up Lifecycle Stages: The lifecycle of a start-up proceeds in stages. These are 
generally referred to as Early, Mid, and Late Stage. Venture Capital firms often define their 
investment strategies by these stages. For example, Bessemer is known as a Mid Stage 
firm with emphasis on B Rounds, whereas Technology Crossover Ventures is very Late 
Stage focused, writing checks into five+ year old start-ups near their exits. The stage focus 
dictates what size of fund these VCs raise.  
The average check size of an Early Stage Seed fund in 2018, according to 
Pitchbook, was $1.8 million. A venture fund normally targets 10–15 deals in its 7–10-year 
life. Thus, a Seed fund would need to raise around $20–50 million for the handful of partners 
to effectively deploy the fund in a timely manner.  
Short Funding Stages Enforce Speed: Each stage usually holds one to three 
financing rounds. To move through these rounds, the start-up needs to achieve certain 
milestones. Funding rounds are usually spaced 12–18 months apart. Investors fund just 
enough cash in each round for the company to work towards its milestone, enabling the 
solicitation of the next funding round at a higher valuation. This structure drives the 
impressive speed in technology development which attracts the DoD—the start-up team 
either hits its milestone or goes “cash out.”  
Founders’ Equity Incentivizes Speed: The other driver of start-up speed is the 
incentive of the equity ownership. The founders stand to make a tremendous amount of 
money through their equity holdings if they get to a successful exit. Thus, they are willing to 
take extremely low cash compensation and run a very lean operation. This second feature 
of start-ups is also attractive to DoD innovation goals. Traditional DoD R&D development 
programs are often very slow and end up wasting billions, as was the case with the Army’s 
Future Combat System program. 
Key Funding Milestones: For a start-up to obtain its next funding round, it must first 
achieve the key milestone enabled by its current funding round. DoD innovation policy 
makers should a have rudimentary understanding to better align resources by stage.  
The key milestone in each stage evolves as the company grows. In the Early Stage, 
according to the work of leading start-up theorist and Stanford professor Steve Blank, the 
company is searching for its Minimum Viable Product (MVP; Blank, 2013) while building out 
the team beyond the first founders (usually one to three, with more than five being relatively 
rare). In the Mid Stage, the company raises more money to build the MVP into a full featured 
product ready for general availability with a full-fledged business plan and revenue model. In 
the Late Stage, the company raises even more money, often upwards of $100 million or 
more, to scale business towards an exit by hiring a large sales force and launching a 
comprehensive marketing campaign with the goal of ensuring a profitable exit.  
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The DoD needs to meet start-ups at each of their life stages with the right 
combination of customer engagement and financial support that helps the companies move 
more effectively towards their next funding round, yet this assistance must also be 
supportive of the ultimate exit.  
For instance, the start-up’s board of directors will often reject early stage Non-
Recurring Engineering (NRE) money from a DoD source if they don’t see a pathway from 
that activity towards a full Program of Record opportunity. The NRE may seem nice in a 
vacuum, but investors at the next funding round will not “count” that revenue in their 
valuation if it's not indicative of a much larger market opportunity later (usually referred to as 
TAM or Total Addressable Market).  
 
 
 Venture Backed Emerging Tech Ecosystem 
 
Early Stage—Funding Stages and Sources  
The Angel and Seed rounds constitute what is called the Early Stage. Note that Early 
Stage funding data is less reliable than later stage data due to the self-reporting issue. 
Therefore, this paper is only analyzing A Rounds and later. The Mid and Late Stage 
sections will start with a review of 2014–2018 dual use funding trends.  
Angel Round—On Day 1, when a start-up is first formed through the signing of 
Articles of Incorporation, it finds financing in one of three ways: either by “bootstrapping” 
with the help of friends and family, or by securing launch funding from an Angel Investor. 
Bootstrapping is when the founders use their own money to finance operations. An Angel 
Investor is a professional venture investor who specializes in investing in a start-up's first 
round by using outside capital. Angels are almost exclusively high-net-worth individuals, 
though they often group together in networks. The function of the Angel is to partner with the 
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first full VC funding round from a traditional Venture Capital Limited Partnership (or the 
equivalent thereof, like a corporate entity making an early stage minority investment—the 
nuances are not relevant to the purposes of this paper). Both sources of funding described 
in this paragraph are usually lumped together under the name Angel Round for 
convenience.  
Seed Round—While usually still pre-revenue, here the start-up usually accepts its 
first capital investment from a professional venture firm. The importance is that the company 
has somewhat graduated from the “hobbyist” start-up phase to being serious enough to 
attract investor attention.  
Most major cities have an adequate number of Angel and Seed investors that a 
founder can get all their financing done locally, as shown by the CB Insights chart in Figure 
11. Thus, the DoD does not need a national level function working to organize and attract 
early stage funding for dual use start-ups. The local innovation units can address that issue 
organically in their own local venture networks.  
 
 
  Q4’18 Funding by Region 
 
Early Stage—DoD Innovation Units 
The DoD is heavily resourced in its efforts at the Early Stage. A couple of units stand 
out as notable: 
• Hacking4Defense (H4D): According to the H4D website, “Hacking for Defense™ 
is a university-sponsored class that allows students to develop a deep 
understanding of the problems and needs of government sponsors in the DOD 
and IC.” The DoD funds H4D, with classes conducted at approximately 20 
schools in the fall of 2018 (Johnston, 2018). H4D is an extremely well thought out 
program (if one endorses the Lean Start Up methodology) for launching dual use 
founders on Day 1 through Day 90 when the three-month course ends. The 
formal timeline begs the question of what happens next when a start-up 
graduates … enter MD5 … 
• MD5: Otherwise known as the National Security Technology Accelerator (and 
rumored around Silicon Valley to be up for a new name and reporting structure 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 184 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
change), the mission of MD5 is to “create new communities of innovators that 
solve national security problems.” MD5 is well positioned to provide the “Sherpa” 
function described previously, especially for H4D graduates who need support in 
their early stage dual use mission from Day 91 through their Seed Round. MD5 is 
well positioned for three reasons:  
1. DoD-Wide: MD5 represents the entire DoD, whereas other early stage 
outreach units like AFWERX are beholden to a specific service. 
2. National Geographic Focus: provides the comprehensive nation-wide 
network necessary to harness every single state (i.e., and more 
importantly, every Congressional district) 
3. University Focused: a natural hub from which the surrounding innovation 
ecosystem can be effectively organized, whereas other early stage units 
lack a consistent geographic home in each geography which leads to 
inconsistent deployments of resources across regions 
• AFC: The Army Futures Command is a vitally important evolution of the DoD 
innovation outreach strategy. As referenced in the introduction, none of this 
emerging technology partnering rhetoric matters if it doesn’t end up deployed 
across the services in the hands of the warfighter. Additionally, the AFC has the 
largest budget of any services innovation unit at $100 million, a four-star 
commander, and responsibility for the Army’s entire $30+ billion modernization 
budget (Freedberg, 2018). However, at least for now, its geographic choice of 
Austin positions it as an Early Stage player. The southern region, including 
Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana, only account for 6.6% of all venture 
deals and a meager 2.4% of all venture funding in the United States in 2018, 
according to the National Venture Capital Association (PitchBook & National 
Venture Capital Association, 2018).  
Early Stage—DoD Goals 
In the simple three phase DoD innovation outreach framework described earlier, 
here is where DoD innovation outreach efforts should be focused on motivating founders to 
start a company, and/or direct their start-up towards dual use applications. The earlier a 
start-up embraces the DoD as a customer or security as a market, the more likely it is to 
develop technologies of interest. This could be thought of as the “battle for hearts and minds 
in the garages and dorm rooms,” and thus, the Early Stage DoD outreach efforts should be 
calibrated to this goal.  
Mapping the Local Start-Up Ecosystem: In addition to founder-oriented outreach, 
these Early Stage DoD units need to map out their local/regional innovation. They need to 
identify all the resources in their assigned region that could support their cause and 
potentially benefit dual use start-up founders in their company’s first years. Of utmost 
importance are the Angel Investors described previously and the Angel Networks. All the 
existing university-based incubators, entrepreneurs clubs, innovation leadership, etc., would 
also need to be mapped out along with supportive military influence groups such as San 
Diego’s Military Advisory Council. These are relationship-based networks such that a 
traditional military rotational assignment model won’t do—another reason that MD5 should 
serve as the permanent civilian “connective tissue” of the Early Stage. 
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There a few key efforts here that must be effectively conducted, and somewhat in 
order: 
1. Founding of the dual use start-up—essentially getting from “cocktail napkin” to 
Articles of Incorporation (Day 1) with Founder’s Equity divvied up among the small 
number of founders. 
2. Incubation (Day 2 through Seed Funding)—Many innovation locales have existing 
incubators. The DoD should partner there as much as possible. If adequate and 
effective local incubators don’t exist to serve dual use startups, DoD innovation 
outreach units may need to start their own. Incubation is where the start-up founders 
hire employee #1 while beginning the search for their MVP. 
3. Customer Intros—The early stage start-up needs as many customer introductions as 
possible to get input on their MVP. Here the DoD outreach folks can help by 
providing these introductions to the local DoD units and related agencies. This is 
probably the single most important function of the DoD outreach units at the early 
level—to break down barriers between civilian start-ups and local defense entities. 
Merely getting on base to engage with local military leaders is nearly impossible for 
civilian founders.  
4. Modest Funding—Early Stage start-ups can benefit from small amounts of DoD non-
dilutive capital in the form of grants and non-recurring engineering funding. These 
amounts should probably mirror the practice of commercially-oriented incubators, 
who often give $50,000–150,000 in funding in exchange for small pieces of equity. 
The funding helps the start-up get through its first 90–365 days. The DoD money 
should come with no strings attached and even perhaps no deliverables. The funding 
is to help the start-up engage with potential DoD customers as the founders search 
for their MVP. Prototyping comes later and marks the beginning of a multi-year 
journey from OTA style “no-strings” attached defense contracts towards full rate 
production Program of Record contracts with full FAR12/15 accounting requirements.  
Mid Stage—Funding Trends 
As Figures 12–13 show, funding in the Mid Stages appears healthy and growing. 
The rough total of $9 billion in Mid Stage funding ($4.1 billion A and $4.95 billion B) is 
encouraging considering how little the DoD has invested in stimulating this funding. As 
shown later, FY2019 budgets for innovation units focused explicitly on venture backed 
companies totals less than $2 billion and is arguably closer to a few hundred million 
depending on how one views the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO). 
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 B Round Funding in DoD Tech Priorities 
Mid Stage—Funding Stages and Sources 
Start-ups crossing the line from the Seed to the A Funding Round also cross the 
“magical” line from Early Stage to Mid Stage. They are taken much more seriously by 
professional venture investors. What’s important for DoD innovation policy makers is that the 
sources of funding for Mid Stage dual use begin to narrow and are concentrated more 
geographically. 
A and B Round checks are much larger, averaging $7 million and $15 million in 2018 
according to PitchBook. Funding sources capable of writing checks to fit these round sizes 
are not as readily found in all 50 states. Potential funding partners move from being 
available locally to mostly being found regionally in the largest cities with the more robust 
innovation ecosystems. Silicon Valley and the West Coast become more important partners 
for the DoD and dual use starts ups in the Mid and Late Stages. According to PitchBook’s 
4Q18 Venture Monitor, the West Coast region funded 61.7% of all VC funding in 2018 
(PitchBook, 2019).  
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This is good news in one sense for the DoD, as it can start focusing its resources 
geographically towards these funding centers, as the founders will naturally begin building 
relationships into the networks that can support their next funding rounds.  
Mid Stage—DoD Units 
There aren’t any.  
That is a bit of an overstatement, as almost all the DoD innovation outreach units 
conduct activities that touch the Mid Stage. However, none of them are specifically aimed at 
this stage with the correct regional focus. The non-defense equivalent here would be an 
organization like Galvanize with a network of co-location Accelerators deployed in key 
innovation regional hubs like Denver and San Francisco.  
A later section in this paper will survey the majority of the well-known DoD innovation 
units, where this gap will be more readily addressed. Also, the role of the DIU comes up 
here. It is based primarily in Silicon Valley with tiny satellite offices in Austin and Boston. So, 
it would seem natural that it targets the A/B Rounds; which it does. However, as this paper 
will argue later, the DIU is uniquely positioned to support the DoD in the Late Stage where 
the checks, stakes, and potential warfighter impact are much greater.  
Mid Stage—DoD Goals 
The role of DoD innovation units changes as they move into the Mid Stage. Happy 
hours, free T-shirts, and Sherpa services are no longer as useful to dual use start-ups here. 
Their Key Funding Milestones require more substantial help if they are going to continue 
with a defense focus. Beyond customer introductions, they need revenue from early 
customers not so much to fund their business models, but rather to validate their Minimum 
Viable Product.  
DoD innovation interactions at the Mid Stage, then, should focus on finding DoD 
customers with priority problems and an agile contracting capability (Other Transaction 
Authorities being top of that list), and matching them with the most promising dual use start-
ups. This is easier said than done. The Federal Acquisition Regulation makes this sort of 
“customer interfacing” activity extremely difficult for the outreach unit attempting to act as the 
intermediary. However, the laws of venture funding are as firm as gravity, and they don’t 
care about the need to first issue a Broad Area Announcement and then wait 90 days before 
undertaking vendor meetings. Those 90 days put the start-up one quarter closer to death 
(otherwise known as “cash out”).  
To address the issue raised in the preceding paragraph, the DoD has deployed all 
sorts of innovation funding experiments, dedicated funds, and related activities. However, no 
central directory thereof exists. The DoD innovation outreach units need to help solve this 
discovery problem in their regions. Just as they mapped out the Angel Networks in the Early 
Stages to better make funding introductions for their incubating dual use start-ups, they 
must also map out the DoD agile funding ecosystem.  
They similarly need to map out the A and B Round funding sources. This should 
include determining which VCs have accepted Chinese LPs and discouraging dual use 
founders from taking their money.  
Finally, Mid Stage companies are mature enough to take the “on ramp” to a five-year 
journey from OTA prototyping contracts with minimal paperwork towards PEO full rate/full 
paperwork prime contracts. The DoD should work to more officially define this “on ramp” 
approach so that the paperwork requirements match the life stage of the start-up. For 
instance, an A Round company may be able to support some very modest form of cost 
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reporting but not a full-blown Defense Contracting Acquisition Agency audit. To that point, 
professional venture investors rarely ask for fully audited financial statements until the 
company is nearing its exit, usually with $100+ million in revenue. They would rather the 
management team focus on growth rather than perfect accounting. The primary financial 
focus until the exit is on revenue growth, cash burn rate, and cash balance. 
Late Stage—Funding Trends 
Funding for C Round companies shows nice growth progress, though the level in 
2018 is down roughly $1 billion from the $4+ billion in the A and B Rounds (see Figure 14). 
D Round funding shows a more volatile pattern with strength in the last two years (see 
Figure 15).  
 
 
 C Round Funding in DoD Tech Priorities 
 
 
 D Round Funding in DoD Tech Priorities 
Late Stage—Funding Stages and Sources 
Late Stage funding sources become very concentrated. With a few rare exceptions 
(large family offices, corporates, and sovereign wealth funds), most of the late round equity 
financing either comes from Sand Hill Road or Wall Street. According to the PitchBook data, 
16 of the top 20 most active Late Stage investors in 2018 were based in Silicon Valley.  
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The average check sizes (total) for C and D Rounds were $26 million and $44 million 
in 2018. The days of the founder asking his or her parents for some funding are long behind. 
As pointed out earlier, the West Coast (mostly Silicon Valley) provided 61.7% of 2018 
venture financing. However, the region only financed 39.5% of all deals, which speaks to the 
much larger check sizes.  
Late Stage—DoD Units 
There should only be one unit focused on the late stage. The DIU is uniquely 
positioned by geography to manage the Late Stage VC relationships on behalf of the DoD. 
Venture investing is a relationship-based business. If the DoD wants to attract large checks 
for its dual use start-up partners, it needs to establish good relationships with those check 
writers, and those large check writers, like TCV, Andreesen Horowitz, New Enterprise 
Associates, etc. have more money than time. They and their peers are not interested in 
meeting every single DoD innovation outreach unit under the sun—AFWERX, 
CYBERWERX, SOFWERX, DIU, MD5, NavalX, AFC, SCO, REF, and especially those that 
use a traditional uniformed rotational assignment process.  
Second, the PEOs need one authoritative emerging technology partner upon which 
they can base their long-term acquisition planning. As the PEOs can’t integrate dual use 
start-ups until the Late Stage due to the overhead requirement, that authoritative partner 
probably should be the same one coordinating the Late Stage VC relationships.  
Late Stage—DoD Goals  
The Late Stage is where the DoD can finally achieve its ultimate goal of rapidly 
deploying new emerging technology in the hands of the warfighter at scale. That sounds an 
awful lot like an official Program of Record.  
The early PEO partnerships discussed previously are critical so that by the time the 
start-ups have scaled enough to afford DoD overhead, the PEOs had their requisite five 
years lead time to plan to incorporate the start-ups’ new technology in their acquisition 
plans.  
Without the PEOs and their Programs of Record, the start-ups lack a big enough 
customer representing a sufficiently large Total Addressable Market to support an exit and 
justify their choice of the DoD as a target customer. Thus, the need for an exit drives start-up 
strategy at every stage. No exit; no VC funding. 
Of course, the start-ups can always partner with Traditional Defense Contractors 
(Primes) and System Integrators (SIs), which they often do and should. However, these 
partnerships also take extensive time to materialize (and monetize), just as a DoD prime 
contract would, and the enhanced overhead requirements are still material, even in a sub-
contracting role.  
Conclusion 
The early returns as measured in the dual use funding data described in this paper 
merit the strong support of National Security Leadership. With all due respect, the opposition 
to modest funding levels for organizations such as the DIU must stop. The primes and 
system integrators should instruct their government relations teams to stop opposing these 
seedling efforts and instead partner with them. Large defense contractors would be better 
served to fear Amazon’s move into their market rather than the DIU. The latter wants to help 
them; the former wants to dominate them in the digital arms race.  
Again, to make the point, China raised more money in one financing round from 
western investors for its leading AI company than Congress is willing to commit to the 
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entirety of the DoD innovation units aimed at VC backed companies. Therefore, the early 
successes described in this paper should not cloud the fact that there is much work still to 
be done in winning the Digital Arms Race.  
To complete the work of supporting the NSIB:  
• Congress should fully fund from the appropriations side all the innovation efforts 
supported from the authorizer side. 
• The DoD should deconflict and better coordinate all its innovation units at the 
OSD level. 
• The Services should compel their PEOs to collaborate with the innovation units. 
• The Primes should all launch their own venture funds, partner with dual use 
funds, and make strategically meaningful minority investments into Late Stage 
dual use companies. They should also increase commercial technology 
leadership on their boards of directors.  
• The System Integrators should facilitate the introduction of emerging technology 
companies to their customers in partnership rather than continuing to propose 
building their own (often antiquated upon delivery) custom technology solutions, 
particularly in software.  
True success, finally, will be achieved when venture backed dual use start-up IPOs 
are commonplace. Only then will the dual-use ecosystem become self-sustaining and the 
full power of U.S. free markets be brought to bear on this new age of the Great Power 
Competition.  
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Major General Kirk Vollmecke, USA—Major General Vollmecke became the Program 
Executive Officer for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 
in April 2016. In this position he is responsible for the development, acquisition, fielding, and life cycle 
support of the Army’s portfolio of intelligence, electronic warfare, cyber, biometrics and target 
acquisition programs. These capabilities provide the Soldier with the ability to detect, recognize, and 
identify targets, as well as to collect, tag and mine intelligence which can be integrated into the 
tactical network to support force protection, maneuver, persistent surveillance, and provide a more 
detailed understanding of the battlefield.  
MG Vollmecke was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in May 1984 through ROTC as a 
distinguished military graduate of the Centre College of Kentucky, where he earned a Bachelor of 
Arts Degree in Economics and Management. He also graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School 
in 1992 where he earned a Master of Science Degree in Management with a concentration in 
Acquisition and Procurement Management. He is a 1999 graduate of the U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College in 2004. MG Vollmecke is Acquisition 
Level III certified in Program and Contract Management.  
Prior to his current position, MG Vollmecke served as the Deputy Program Executive Officer 
for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. He has also 
served as the Deputy Commanding General for the Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) overseeing the security assistance program for the Afghan National Defense 
Security Forces in support of OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM and FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. 
His acquisition assignments include the Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistic and Technology), Washington DC, in which 
he provided program management oversight of Army acquisition programs. Prior to that assignment, 
MG Vollmecke was the Commanding General of the Mission and Installation Contracting Command 
(MICC), Fort Sam Houston, Texas which provided Army commands, installations and activities 
contracting solutions and oversight across CONUS. Before that, he served as the Deputy to the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement to ASA(ALT). He also served on the Joint 
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Staff as the J-8 Chief, Capabilities and Acquisition Division, and before his tour on the Joint Staff in 
2007; he was the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency Iraq/Afghanistan supporting 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.  
Other acquisition assignments include Headquarters Department of the Army Systems 
Coordinator for the Future Combat Systems (Brigade Combat Team) program, Executive Officer to 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army(AL&T); Commander, DCMA Boeing Philadelphia; Program 
Analyst for the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Programs, Program Analysis and Evaluation 
(PA&E) Directorate; Assistant Product Manager M2/M3 for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems 
project office; Contingency Contracting Officer assigned to the U.S. Army Forces Central Command-
Saudi Arabia under OPERATION DESERT FALCON; and as a Weapon System Contracting Officer 
assigned to the Army Materiel Command’s Communications-Electronics Command(CECOM), which  
included a deployment to Honduras, Joint Task Force Bravo. Prior to joining the Army’s Acquisition 
Corps in 1991, he served in a variety of mechanized and light infantry battalion staff and company 
command positions.  
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Smart Contracts in the Federal Government—Leveraging 
Blockchain Technology to Revolutionize Acquisition 
Michael Arendt—PhD, is a subject matter expert in innovative acquisition and contracting 
strategies across the Federal Government. Over the past 12 years, he has authored and co-authored 
numerous studies and reports including The MITRE Innovative Contracting Implementation 
Framework, The MITRE Challenge-Based Acquisition Handbook, From Incentive Prize and 
Challenge Competitions to Procurement, and Pushing the Acquisition Innovation Envelope at the 
Office of Naval Research. Arendt was a public-sector strategy and innovation consultant with IBM and 
a member of the research faculty at the University of Maryland’s Center for Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise. He holds a PhD in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland, College Park. 
Dave Bryson—is a lead engineer for the MITRE corporation with more than 20 years of 
experience designing and building software. In his current role as MITRE’s blockchain technology 
lead, he performs research in applying the technology to the enterprise space and contributes to 
several leading open-source blockchain projects. 
Kenyon Doyle—has more than 15 years of program management experience by serving in 
the United States Air Force, Federal Civilian workforce, and currently works in industry for The MITRE 
Corporation. Doyle has managed and supported defense acquisition programs covering aspects of 
the acquisition process, including research and development, integrating engineering, developmental 
and operational test, deployment, configuration management, production, manufacturing, and 
logistics support. Doyle has a BS in business administration from The Citadel and an MSA in general 
administration from Central Michigan University. 
Patrick Staresina, COL, USA (Ret.)—is a retired member of the Army National Guard with more 
than 20 years of contracting officer experience, with the pinnacle of his Federal career serving as the 
Director of Contracting at the National Guard Bureau. Staresina continues to provide acquisition 
support the Federal Government through his service as an Acquisition Principal for multiple federally 
funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) managed by the MITRE Corporation.  
Abstract 
Across the government, the process of creating and enforcing contracts has not 
changed much in the past several decades. To this day, most government contracts require 
paperwork that must be routed across multiple parties, with physical signatures attested to 
by key personnel, and further rely on third parties such as private contractors or other 
government organizations for enforcement and storage. This results in a slow, opaque 
process that lacks transparency, efficiency, and auditability. Despite this reality, major 
advancements in blockchain technology in recent years have opened a new door to greatly 
improving the traditional government contracting process via the use of blockchain enabled, 
smart contracts.  
Smart contracts have the potential to simplify many types of agreements (such as 
Government-Wide Acquisition Contracts and General Services Administration Schedules, 
among others) without the need for tedious paperwork and third parties. They can objectify 
contracts and policies while also storing the provenance of the information on a globally 
decentralized database. This research paper discusses how blockchain technology, coupled 
with smart contracts, can provide a next generation approach to automate and radically 
reduce acquisition lead time, improve contract performance, and sustainably decrease 
transaction costs. 
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Introduction 
When most people think of blockchain, they immediately think of cryptocurrency and 
Bitcoin. For some, hearing these terms stimulates a cynical eyeroll as one recalls the last 
great, overhyped technological innovation whose promise far outweighed its practical, real-
world benefits. While there are certainly some corners of the blockchain and cryptocurrency 
universe that will inevitably fail, there are many others that will meet and widely exceed 
promised expectations. Blockchain-based smart contracts are one of these innovations that 
has the potential to revolutionize the world as we know it.  
This research paper provides a window into how blockchain-based smart contract 
technology can be leveraged across the federal, state, and local government to improve 
acquisition and procurement. Acquisition and procurement can be simply defined as the 
purchasing of goods and services. Both public and private sector entities acquire and 
procure a wide variety of things ranging from construction services to office furniture, from 
software licenses to printer paper, from IT consulting services to cloud-based technologies 
which serve as the backbone for day-to-day operations.  
In the case of the government, whether it be federal, state or local, the process to 
acquire these goods and services tends to be complex. Irrespective of the level of 
government and department or agency doing the buying, a process exists for the express 
purpose of executing these transactions. Many involve a slew of requirements paperwork, 
reviews and approvals, bids and proposals, contract awards, administration, oversight of 
contract terms and conditions, inspection and acceptance criteria for delivery, and finally at 
some point taxpayer funds can be disbursed for payment. The resulting process can seem 
archaic for those in the government who practice it and twilight-zone-like for those in 
industry who are used to getting things done nearly on-demand. This is not to say that 
advancements have not been made in streamlining contracting processes, reducing 
acquisition lead-time, and making payment disbursements to vendors more efficient. But 
considerable opportunities for improvement remain to bridge the gap between government 
operations and commercial benchmarks for operating efficiency. Moreover, when examined 
today within the context of what is truly possible while employing a revolutionary technology 
like blockchain-enabled smart contracts, the promise for improvement may in fact be 
exponential. Numerous opportunities exist across a wide range of acquisition and 
procurement types to turn months into days or weeks to complete the very same 
transactions that currently drain the hope out of those caught in the middle of the process. 
This research paper introduces blockchain technology; provides an overview of the 
status quo which may be colloquially referred to as “dumb contracts”; offers an introduction 
to blockchain-based smart contracts along with their benefits as well as drawbacks; 
describes a prototype including how we smart contracts may be leveraged to improve the 
agreement, tracking, and payment part of the procurement process; and, to illustrate how 
smart contracts might work when applied in the real world of government procurement, we 
will offer a notional use-case where smart contracts could be beneficial as part of a Federal 
Supply Schedule process.  
Blockchain Technology Overview 
Blockchain … Isn’t That Just Bitcoin Hype? 
What is a blockchain? Believe it or not, a blockchain is pretty much exactly what it 
sounds like.  
A blockchain is a series of blocks (or batch of transactions) cryptographically linked 
to one another to form a digital ledger. Each block may contain one or more transactions 
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such as the amount of currency to exchange. A blockchain provides an immutable, 
transparent, irrefutable, record that is permanently stored on multiple machines or nodes. 
Trust between parties that may not otherwise trust one another is established through a 
blockchain without requiring assistance from an administrator or traditional centralized 
services.  
To summarize, the key components of a blockchain include the following: 
• P2P Protocol: the protocol that manages the peer nodes of the network that 
support blockchain 
• Performs communication between node, flow control, node discovery, framing 
• Smart Contracts (optional added feature): business rules or logic that can extend 
the functionality of a blockchain (Bryson et al., 2017) 
• Cryptography: hash functions that link blocks together providing integrity of the 
chain and digital signatures providing integrity for the transactions 
• Consensus Algorithm: the process by which parties to a blockchain decide on the 
ordering and presence of transactions on the ledger 
• Distributed Ledger: a distributed, replicated, representation of all transactions 
 
A blockchain is distributed over multiple nodes using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. 
Each node within a blockchain is independent of one another and every transaction is 
redundantly verified and processed by every node for verification. Therefore, a single node 
failing on a blockchain network will not bring the whole system down as the other operating 
nodes can continue to run the blockchain. To compromise a blockchain, a hacker would 
need to have control over a large majority of the network.  
A blockchain is often compared to a bank ledger containing transactions. A bank 
ledger records a series of transactions by collecting and reporting information. Every time a 
debit card is swiped at a grocery store, the bank ledger records the transaction and you’ll 
find it next time you log into your banks app or website to review your account information. 
This type of ledger is traditionally done using a centralized database that is managed and 
stored by your bank. A database administrator oversees bank transactions which are then 
managed internally and reported back out for customers and other businesses to see such 
as the merchants bank. These transactions need to be reconciled every night. 
These transactions may be changed by the bank without you having visibility into the 
changes themselves in real-time. For example, have you ever had a deposit hold on your 
debit card fall off? One day the transaction is pending, and your balance reflects this 
change, the next day the transaction falls off your ledger and disappears from your recent 
transaction list in your banks app never to be seen again. The result is that your balance is 
updated accordingly, but the history of the hold against the account one day and being 
removed the next day essentially disappears. This happens all the time with gasoline 
purchases, hotel stays, car rentals, and many other transactions of these types.  
The blockchain solves this problem (and several others that we will discuss in more 
detail below) quite easily because every transaction that is written to the ledger in the 
blockchain is permanent so they cannot be changed or deleted. In the example of the 
deposit hold against the bank account, the blockchain records each transaction individually 
so the hold would be recorded on one day and a new block would record when the hold is 
removed on the next day allowing for complete transparency into the account ledger 
information at any point in time.  
Each transaction is bundled into blocks and these blocks are linked to form the 
ledger, which is called a blockchain. At its core, a blockchain enables a network of peer 
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computers (or nodes) to validate, settle, and agree on a record of transactions. It establishes 
a form of trust between parties that may not otherwise trust each other, and does so without 
relying on traditional centralized services, or trusted third parties (Bryson et al, 2017).  
Centralized Databases vs. a Blockchain 
Although a blockchain is a database in the form of digital ledger, a database is not a 
blockchain. A database is a ledger that is controlled and maintained by an administrator. 
The administrator can create, modify, and delete data stored in the database at any given 
time. The administrator can also delegate and provide rights to read or write data to other 
users. 
A database is centralized as there is a single point of control of the data. Because of 
this centralized single point of control, a database is more inclined to be hacked or 
misused—recent revelations regarding Facebook’s use of user data offers a contemporary 
example of what might happen when there is single point of control for your data (Lomas, 
2018). According to blockchain expert Vince Tabora, “A company that has control of 
information can monetize it for third party use, but sometimes it is not in the best interest of 
users” (Tabora, 2018). Other differences (and drawbacks) of a centralized database are that 
since there’s a single point of control of the database, a failed server will affect the entire 
system. Likewise, the data will not be recoverable if the information was not backed up and 
stored. 
Traditional databases are optimized for transaction throughput. Transactions may be 
processed on a database in a matter of seconds while it may take several minutes for new 
blocks to be created on a blockchain as these new blocks work their way through each node 
of the blockchain. 
Digital Ledger Technology (DLT) vs. Blockchain 
Blockchain and DLT share common themes in that they are both decentralized and 
digitalized ledgers. Many people use blockchain and distributed ledger technology 
interchangeably, but they are vastly different. 
Blockchain is a type of DLT where a series of blocks are interconnected. Each block 
contains data that is verified and validated before being attached to the chain of transaction 
records. Blockchain data is permanently stored and cannot be manipulated. There are 
several different types of DLT and blockchain is just one example. All blockchains are DLTs 
but not all DLTs are blockchains. 
DLT is the “umbrella” term used to describe a database that is shared across various 
locations or multiple participants in a trusted environment. DLTs do not have a centralized 
administrator or centralized database. Like blockchain, DLT data has a timestamp that 
contains unalterable history of all transaction records in the network. Any of the participants 
on the DLT can view all the data. The data on a DLT is secure and stored using 
cryptography that can be retrieved with keys and cryptographic signatures (Buntinx, 2017). 
Comparing blockchain to DLT would be like using the analogy that a Lexus is a type of 
automobile (Kashyap, 2018). 
Dumb Contracts vs. Smart Contracts: How the Status Quo Can Change 
Dumb Contracts 
Current methods for writing contracts could be described as “dumb.” Often, 
requirements stakeholders, contracting officers, their specialists and representatives perform 
slow, manual, labor-intensive activities based in some form of a word document, 
spreadsheet, database file, or arcane contract writing system. In cases where requirements 
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are truly unique, and customization is required, this type of approach can make some sense. 
However, for a vast number of the acquisitions and procurements for commercial goods and 
services, the process is repetitive.  
Processes for contracting and acquisitions may or may not be documented within an 
organization leading to differences even between groups within the same office. As a result, 
the process may not always be 100% repeatable across an organization when buying the 
exact same good or service. In some cases, processes may appear to be completely 
digitized and have some sense of automation on the front end because of the use of a web-
based interface, when in fact the backend is simply generating a slew of emails and forms 
that must be manually reviewed and approved to continue along in the process.  
Change orders, for example, when something in the existing contract must be 
modified, may become tripwires that generate additional downstream churn and are often 
overlooked at contract initiation. These safeguards are in place to ensure taxpayer funds are 
spent appropriately.  
Smart Contracts 
Blockchain-based smart contracts enable automation of dumb contracts as noted 
above. Smart contracts achieve this by taking the ledger-based blockchain innovations 
previously discussed and overlaying some business logic on top of them enabling automatic 
execution when certain pre-defined terms and conditions are met. A common basic example 
of a smart contract is that of the vending machine whereby you insert a coin into the 
machine and in return the machine gives something to you. The machine is programmed to 
give you X when Y dollars/cents have been received. This is the business logic that has 
been pre-programmed into the machine. As compared with a dumb contract, in the vending 
machine example, the transaction occurs without the presence of a middleman. By 
comparison, when you go into a gas station convenience store and must walk up to the 
counter and hand the clerk the soda and your money in order to check out, the clerk is the 
middleman who must be present for you to complete the transaction. Moreover, if you 
happen to use a debit/credit card to purchase the soda in the store, the merchant’s credit 
card processing company and your bank or credit card issuer act as additional middlemen 
who must all be present for the transaction to be processed. By comparison to the “smart 
contract” vending machine example, if paying in cash, the transaction is solely between you 
and the machine itself because the machine has been preprogramed to dispense a soda 
once the correct amount of money has been deposited—no middleman required. 
Smart contracts may be useful for purchasing basic goods and services and may 
also be beneficial for things like insurance policies, breach contracts, property and real 
estate transactions, issuing and managing credit, financial services, legal processes and 
crowdfunding agreements among others where typically the services of a middleman have 
been previously required (Blockgeeks, n.d.). 
Benefits of Smart Contracts 
Smart contracts offer numerous benefits that can be realized across the government 
acquisition and procurement process which are discussed in more detail below: 
• Autonomy—Smart contracts allow the creation of a direct agreement between 
two parties without use of an intermediary. Moreover, because there isn’t an 
intermediary the transaction may not be manipulated by a third-party. 
• Trust—Smart contracts permit trust to be built into the process because all 
information and associated documents/data are encrypted on a shared ledger, so 
they cannot be lost. 
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• Backup—Because the blockchain stores information related to an agreement on 
the shared ledger across a distributed network, there will be multiple copies of 
stored information.  
• Safety—The blockchain is secured through cryptography; blockchain relies on 
two cryptographic primitives to help secure the chain—digital signatures and 
cryptographic hash functions. Both are used to verify and ensure the integrity of 
data. 
• Speed—Smart contracts can automate tasks if business logic is pre-defined and 
built into the blockchain, as a result, previous tasks related to contracting that 
were done manually (such as quality reviews or multiple approvals) could be 
executed automatically. 
• Savings—Smart contracts have the potential to save considerable amounts of 
money as intermediaries are no longer necessary. Moreover, business process 
improvement may be possible after the introduction of smart contracts in parts of 
the process where redundancy to include multiple human approvals was built in 
to explicitly improve trust, safety, and accuracy.  
• Accuracy—Automated contracts avoid the errors that come from manually filling 
out endless amounts of paperwork like spreadsheets and word documents. If the 
appropriate business logic is built into the smart contract, only those 
spreadsheets or documents that meet the pre-defined accuracy criteria would be 
accepted (Blockgeeks, n.d.). 
Drawbacks of Smart Contracts 
The term smart contract is a bit misleading, as they are not inherently “smart” nor a 
“contract” in the legal sense. Smart contracts are essentially the business logic of the 
blockchain that run during blockchain transactions and are only as good as the logic 
programmed in to them. Smart contract functionality varies by platform as each may offer 
differ capabilities. However, in all cases the blockchain cannot prevent programmer error. So 
due diligence is needed to prevent introducing security problems via a smart contract. 
Additionally, it’s very important that smart contract logic executes in a deterministic fashion, 
whereby outcomes are precisely determined through known relationships among states and 
events as this plays a key role in the network reaching consensus on a given set of 
transactions.  
Blockchain Smart Contracts Prototype: Agreement, Tracking and Payment in 
Action 
MITRE’s research in applying Blockchain technology is focusing on three high-level 
areas that apply to acquisition and procurements: Agreement, Tracking, and Payment. 
We’re exploring how blockchain technology coupled with smart contracts may help to 
improve the efficiency and integrity of the process across these areas. Nearly all business 
processes rely on these areas to conduct day to day activities. We are building small 
prototypes in an incremental fashion. Our goal is not to build a production level system., but 
rather to demonstrate and evaluate the potential capabilities of blockchain and smart 
contracts as applied to the areas of agreement, tracking, and payment within acquisition as 
defined below. 
• Agreement: Can we automate the process of establishing an agreement among 
parties without relying on centralized control or services? Why is this important? 
Agreements are used to establish trust among parties as well to enforce policy 
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and procedures. In our use-case, this involves several documents related to 
approvals, terms and conditions when the government is procuring a good or 
service. Integrity and efficiency can be improved by eliminating the need for 
centralized control to enforce and process these agreements, along with 
automating the rules and verification via cryptography. 
• Tracking: Every organization involved maintains their own system of record, yet 
parties to the contracting process, often need to have a shared view into the 
overall state of a given agreement or transaction. Sharing this information across 
organization boundaries via traditional technology has been a pain point for 
decades. Blockchain technology is very good at providing a tamper-resistant, 
audit logic that can be safely shared among all parties internal and external to the 
government. 
• Payment: Moving money around and across governmental organizations and 
outside of government to pay vendors requires many checks and balances. If we 
could employ digital currency in the Enterprise, it may be able to streamline 
processes by eliminating spreadsheets and reconciliation services. 
Current Blockchain Smart Contracts Prototype Achievements 
Since the beginning of FY19 through date of this research, the prototype has 
demonstrated the following:  
a. An agreement is created and processed. We use a blockchain and smart 
contracts to capture, track, and enforce the rules of an agreement. We use 
decentralized file storage to store the traditional documents associated with an 
agreement. The decentralized file storage also maintains a unique fingerprint of 
each document to ensure parties are collaborating on the correct version of an 
agreement—no more emailing documents around while trying to track the right 
version via the filename. 
b. A cryptographic “wallet” was created for every user who intends to interact with 
the system. Any transaction sent to the system to digitally sign an agreement, 
assign a funding authority, etc., requires a cryptographically signed transaction 
from that user. The signature is checked several times by every permissioned 
validator node to verify the user before the transaction is accepted. This 
increases the integrity of the transaction and the transaction is permanently 
stored in the blockchain for auditability. 
c. A decentralized notary service was established to verify, and process digital 
signatures required by the documents associated with the process. The notary 
service is implemented as a smart contract ensuring the integrity and authenticity 
of signatures simplifying the document approval process. 
d. A rules-based flow was established to enforce the agreement through the 
process: 
i. User creates a request for purchase along with required signers.  
ii. When all signers have signed a funding authority is assigned by their 
cryptographic wallet address. Once the associated funding doc(s) are 
signed, the funding transfers the funding amount (in digital currency) to 
the selected contracting office. 
iii. The contracting office develops an RFQ and opens the process for 
bidding. Once the bidding process ends. The “best” bid is selected, and 
the winning bidder is recorded in the smart contract agreement. 
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iv. The contracting office then “pays” the winner bidder for the service via 
digital currency over the blockchain 
v. When the purchase is received, creator of the agreement “closes” the 
agreement. 
Using the approach, the entire process agreement generation, document signatures, 
money transfers, and so forth, are recorded on the blockchain in an immutable, auditable 
ledger and available for all parties to the process to examine. 
Applied Use Case: How Smart Contracts Prototype Could be Implemented in 
the Government 
The intent of this use is to examine how our prototype could be applied to a simple 
acquisition of standard Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) software licenses using a Federal 
Supply Schedule. 
This use case is organized in the following manner: a general introduction to the 
Federal procurement process, an example requirements generation process that describes 
the status quo, how smart contracts could be used, and potential benefits; an example 
contracting process that describes the status quo, how smart contracts could be used, and 
potential benefits; applicability of this use case; barriers to a smart contracts prototype 
implementation; keys to success for a smart contracts prototype implementation; and, a 
short conclusion.  
Understanding the Federal Procurement Process 
When an individual or an organization has an immediate need to procure a COTS 
item, such as geographic information system (GIS) mapping software, the process is simple 
enough. The individual consumer or corporate purchasing agent simply logs into the 
software sales point of entry, clicks on the subscription or product that best meets their 
needs, inputs their registration and payment information, and downloads the software. The 
process generally takes less than an hour. Conversely, when a government information 
technology (IT) specialist needs a similar piece of software, the process to fulfill that need 
could not be more different. Instead of going through an automated online purchase 
transaction, the IT specialist is directed to a much more subjective acquisition process, 
which could take up to 90 days to complete. This leads us to the following question: How 
might we introduce blockchain-based smart contracts to improve the procurement of COTS 
software?1 
While the detailed nuances for procuring COTS software differs from agency to 
agency, the overall federal procurement process is relatively fixed. Below is a representative 
example of the wickets that an agency would have to navigate in order to acquire software 
licenses. For clarity’s sake, this process is broken down into two major groups: Actions of 
the Requiring Activity/Customer and Actions of the Contracting Team (see Table 1). 
  
                                               
 
 
1 While this process could be customized for federal COTS procurements at any dollar level, 
this particular case study process is focused on those software purchases between the ranges of the 
FAR Micropurchase Threshold and the Simplified Acquisition Threshold. 
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Table 1. Actions of the Requiring Activity/Customer and Actions of the Contracting Team 
Actions of the Requiring Activity/Customer 
Step 1. Determination of Requirements 
Step 2. Seek Requirements Validation 
Step 3. Secure, Commit, and Transmit Funds 
Step 4. Transmit Requirement Package to Contracting Officer (CO) 
 
Actions of the Contracting Team 
Step 1. Review Package for Sufficiency 
Step 2. Prepare the Request for Quotation (RFQ) 
Step 3. CO Seeks RFQ Approvals (Legal, Policy, Manager, Peer Review) 
Step 4a. Post RFQ on eBuy 
Step 4b. Transmit RFQ to Specific Vendors 
Step 5. Receive Quotes 
Step 6. Evaluation of Quotes 
Step 7. Award Decision 
Step 8. Award Notification 
Step 9. Tracking Contract Performance 
Step 10. Contract Payment 
Step 11. Contract Closeout 
This standard process for procuring simple commercial items or services follows 
many of the same steps as the procurement of more complex solutions or services. While 
this process may be scaled down somewhat for more “simplified acquisitions,” this approach 
is far from efficient. Upon quick review, the process is inefficient; requires unnecessary 
reviews and/or approval from members with little or no equity in the acquisition; and adds 
unnecessary schedule delays.  
By automating those functions that can be processed using machine logic, the 
government should be able to realize the following second and third order effects: 
• Reduction in the number of “touch points” needed to process a simple COTS 
acquisition,  
• Greater standardization and simplification of requirements inputs to include 
requirements definition, cost estimating, market research, and evaluation of 
quotes,  
• Reduced number of resources (i.e., employee hours) needed to execute the 
transaction through the reduction of said “touch points” listed above, 
• Improved procurement acquisition lead-times, 
• Faster delivery of software products and support services,  
• Quicker processing of payment, and 
• Automated enforcement of the process flow including redundant verifications. 
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So, how could we apply a blockchain-based smart contracts approach to this use 
case? The critical piece of this analysis starts with a detailed examination of the current 
procurement steps and analyzing each to see which, if any, steps can be automated—
comfortably replacing human decisions with machine logic. 
Requiring Activity Steps 
Let’s start by examining the first four steps executed by the Requiring Activity or 
Customer. 
Step 1. Determination of a Requirement 
One of the most difficult challenges in the area of procurement is the task of defining 
contract requirements. Traditional processes require the requiring activity to draft a 
Statement of Work (SOW) document identifying required salient characteristics that allow for 
multiple vendors to respond with formal quotes. Requirements definition is one of the 
primary points of contention between a contracting office and its customers, often resulting 
in numerous significant back-and-forth iterations of work statement reviews. 
We recommend establishing an agency pre-approved menu of software license 
solutions available for the IT professional to select. The process of developing a work 
statement would essentially be replaced by completing an eForm requisition, which would 
include: a description and quantities of the license(s) requested; overall estimated cost; a list 
of sources and other simple market research data points; a short narrative or justification 
explaining why the software license is required; and a narrative/list of the equipment on 
which it would be installed. 
By consolidating all these data points onto one eForm, we essentially eliminate the 
requirement to draft a Statement of Work (SOW), Independent Government Cost Estimate 
(IGCE), Market Research Report, and an agency needs justification document. This eForm 
would be certified by the preparer and would initiate the procurement process in the 
blockchain. 
Step 2. Seek Requirements Validation/Approval from Agency (Processes Vary 
by Agency) 
Once a purchase request is initiated, there is often an internal agency review 
process. This requirements validation process is established with the intent of ensuring that 
the need is valid, the requirement is an appropriate use of agency funds, and that the 
request agrees with the policies of that agency. It is not uncommon for this requirements 
validation process to be top-heavy and lengthy. In many cases, the process involves 
multiple layers of unnecessary approvals with final approval levels being established at the 
highest executive levels (who often have very limited schedule availability). The higher the 
approval authority that is established, the greater the number of people that review the 
requirement prior to final approval. Further, some organizations only perform this 
requirements validation process on a semi-annual or quarterly basis, adding even more time 
to the process. While this level of scrutiny may be appropriate for multi-million-dollar 
requirements, it would not be appropriate for simple low-dollar COTS software purchases.  
To address this, we recommend establishing a blockchain-based smart contract with 
pre-defined business logic that automates the approval process for all requisitions to a Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) representative within the organization for approval if the requisition 
is (1) for a COTS software solution; and (2) under a pre-determined price threshold that the 
organization can accept as low-risk. Replacing a multi-layered requirements validation 
process with an automated step that is executed by the pre-programed smart contract, could 
reduce the procurement lead time by weeks and even months by eliminating the number of 
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non-value-added reviews as often the degree of human checking is not proportionate with 
the dollar amount or complexity of the transaction.  
Step 3. Secure, Commit, and Transfer Funding to Contracting Office and Step 
4. Transmit Approved Requirements Package to the Contracting Officer 
After a requirement is validated and approved, the next step is normally to secure, 
certify and transmit funding to the contracting office. In the traditional procurement process, 
this requires the customer to prepare a “purchase request” for funds, which would then 
circulate through a series of reviewing/approving steps before a representative with 
“commitment” authority certifies that funds are “available” for this procurement and provides 
a unique accounting code for the purchase. Once the funds are “certified,” the procurement 
package is routed to the contracting office manually or electronically through email or 
another pre-approved agency system. 
Again, this is a task that can be automated into a smart contract process. In this 
case, once the requirement is validated, the task would move to the next step, which would 
require the system ensure the correct funding account was being selected and would 
perform a comparison of the anticipated requirement cost vs the available budget and/or 
some other pre-determined approval dollar threshold. If the cost is less than both and the 
correct account was selected, the process could move forward to funds certification. In other 
words, the agency could set pre-established conditions (built in to the blockchain-based 
smart contract as business logic) under which the process could proceed without human 
interaction, until it reaches the final stage of “funds certification.” 
Because of the low-dollar amount of the requirement, the number of reviews could 
be reduced by introducing machine review gates into the smart contract business logic, 
which would validate funds being applied were of the appropriate time, purpose and amount 
required. The funds would then be forwarded to the funds certifying official in the blockchain 
for review/approval. Approval of these funds would then trigger the next automated step—
Transmittal to the Contracting Office.2 
Contracting Team Steps 
Step 1. Review Requirement Package for Sufficiency 
Once the customer submits the requirements package, the contacting office 
becomes the lead for further processing and facilitates the steps provided below. 
Acceptance of a requirements package is often a hot spot in the procurement 
process. A primary reason for this friction is that the “clock” for Procurement Acquisition 
Lead Time (PALT) officially starts once the requirements package is accepted by the 
contracting office. This creates an environment where there is a reluctance to accept weak 
or incomplete requirements packages. Contracting offices will often reject the package and 
require the customer resubmit with corrections or improvements. 
This need not be the case in a procurement as simple as the purchase of a COTS 
license. Assuming the IT specialist complied with the initial guidance, completed the 
                                               
 
 
2 Note: Federal agencies utilize numerous different processes and/or systems to track and 
certify funding. In order to integrate blockchain and smart contracts into this process, they would have 
to interface with those systems. Alternatively, the funds certification process could be performed 
outside of blockchain, and then integrated back into the process once funds are approve. 
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eForms/requisitions correctly, received adequate requirements validation, and secured 
enough certified funding, the acceptance of a procurement package should be easy to 
validate through pre-defined smart contract business logic that captures the specific 
requirements necessary for a complete requirements package to be permitted to move 
forward.  
By standardizing and automating the required inputs of the requirements package, 
the acceptance process is made significantly easier. The contracting officer task of 
performing a complete procurement requirements package review (which includes the SOW, 
purchase request (PR), IGCE, Market Research Report, requirements validation, and funds 
certification) is instead reduced to a more simplified review of the completed requisition 
eForm, the simplified requirements validation, and the certification of funds. 
Step 2. Prepare the RFQ 
By standardizing and automating the required inputs of the requirements package, 
the acceptance process is made significantly easier. The contracting officer task of 
performing a complete procurement requirements package review (which includes the SOW, 
PR, IGCE, Market Research Report, requirements validation, and funds certification) is 
instead reduced to a more simplified review of the completed requisition eForm, the 
simplified requirements validation, and the certification of funds. 
Once the contracting officer has accepted the requirements package, the contracting 
team prepares a Request for Quotation (RFQ) for distribution to the potential offerors. 
Depending on the details of the requirement, this RFQ can be prepared using a government 
form (i.e., SF 1449 or DD 1155), a formal letter, an email, or even an oral request over the 
phone. 
As mentioned previously, this use case capitalizes on the use of Federal Supply 
Schedules to procure the said software licenses. One of the greatest benefits of utilizing 
Federal Supply Schedules is that all the terms and conditions are pre-negotiated and 
automatically wrapped into the price of the software. This allows the government to focus 
almost exclusively on price for the individual order. Because we are using these schedules, 
the RFQ can be dramatically simplified using a standard fillable letter or email. This process 
could be easily automated by the smart contract pre-populating a standard RFQ form letter 
with the information provided in the original requisition eForm and a few additional inputs. 
Unlike other more complex solicitations, all the clauses, provisions and other terms for the 
RFQ are already pre-defined under the governing schedule.3 Using this approach, the 
system could easily generate an RFQ by populating a form simple letter utilizing 
standardized automated inputs.  
Step 3. Seek RFQ Approval From Contracts Chain (Legal, Policy, Manager, 
Peer Review) 
Many contracting offices require multiple layers of review before a solicitation is 
released to potential bidders. Normally, the RFQ is prepared by a contract specialist and 
reviewed by the contracting officer. However, some organizations require additional 
                                               
 
 
3 Note, some organizations such as the DoD have mandatory specialized clauses in addition 
to the pre-negotiated GSA terms and conditions. In such cases, these additional terms can be added 
to the RFQ eForm. 
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solicitation reviews from independent peers, branch supervisors, policy teams, and legal 
counsel. These reviews could add weeks to the procurement process. 
We recommend that the review requirements be minimized as much as possible, 
especially in cases such as this where the acquisition is simple, low-dollar, and utilizes pre-
established Government-Wide Acquisition Contracts (GWACs). However, if additional RFQ 
reviews are required, this process could be greatly simplified and expedited by establishing 
a “Smart Contracts Analyst” who would be specially trained to perform compliance reviews 
with a focus on issues related to COTS acquisitions using a blockchain-based smart 
contract with pre-defined business logic. These reviews, adjudications, and approvals would 
be recorded transactions on the blockchain with the supporting data being stored in 
decentralized file storage. Once all compliance approval is received and all concerns are 
adjudicated, the contracting officer/contract specialist can proceed to the next step—
transmitting the RFQ to vendors. 
Step 4a. Post RFQ on eBuy IAW FAR 8.405-1(d)(3) 
Step 4b. (Alternate to 4a above) Transmit RFQ to Specific Vendors 
Step 5. Receive Quotes 
The rules for procuring solutions under the Federal Supply Schedules is 
uncharacteristically explicit. The Federal Acquisition Regulation specifically outlines the 
contracting officer’s processes and requirements under subpart 8.405-1, Ordering 
Procedures for Supplies and Services Not Requiring a Statement of Work, and further 
explains the required procedures under subparagraph (c), Orders exceeding the micro-
purchase threshold but not exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold. Under this 
section, the FAR states that the agency shall survey at least three schedule contractors 
through the GSA Advantage! online shopping service by:  
• Reviewing the catalogs or pricelists of at least three schedule contractors. An 
automated process can be established to collect pricelists from GSA Advantage 
to assist determining which vendors offer the most competitive pricing. Machine 
logic can then be applied to compare prices to each other. 
• Requesting quotations from at least three schedule contractors. If the contracting 
officer elects to solicit multiple quotes, the transmittal of an RFQ to one or 
multiple GSA vendors can be achieved through automated systems using 
blockchain to record the transmittal. Not only would blockchain record the 
transmittal of the RFQ, but it would also provide a tamper-proof method to certify 
(i.e., date stamp) when that transmittal occurred by building such business logic 
into the smart contract.  
• Posting the RFQ on GSA’s competition web platform and seek responsive 
quotes through that eBuy portal (FAR 8.405-1(d)(3)(i)). If the contracting officer 
elects to solicit quotes from all GSA schedule holders through the use of the GSA 
eBuy system, the RFQ that is transmitted could include explicit instructions for 
offerors to submit their quotes to the government through a method or system 
that is also recorded on the blockchain. 
Once vendors have the opportunity to review the RFQ and prepare their quotes, 
those vendors would then transmit their offers to the contracting office utilizing the 
prescribed blockchain-based system, which would leverage the pre-defined smart contract 
business logic to record the transaction and assign a date/time stamp as proof of 
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submission.4 For ease of processing and evaluation, the government could require that the 
quote be provided through automatically populating a pre-established eForm again based 
on pre-determined smart contract business logic.  
Step 6. Evaluation of Quotes 
Step 7. Award Decision 
A traditional federal procurement process normally goes through a manual 
evaluation and decision-making process. This process involves multiple components: 
• A review to determine if the offer is “responsive” (i.e., meets requirements of the 
RFQ); 
• A technical review of the offer to ensure proposed solution meets the technical 
requirements of the RFQ; and 
• A review of price. 
If the quotes are prepared in accordance with the standards set forth in the RFQ and 
the required eForms, Step 6, Evaluation of Quotes, and Step 7, Award Decision, should be 
relatively straight forward and easy to complete. The quotes would be provided in a manner 
that allows the smart contract business logic to compile the information, to filter out non-
compliant quotes, and to compare “apples to apples.” Lastly, evaluations and awards could 
be further simplified by building in the template the smart contract business logic that can 
provide the contracting officer with quotes that are pre-organized for ease of analysis and 
automatic export into an award decision document that has also been built into the pre-
determined smart contract business logic. 
By automating the requirements package inputs, the RFQ, and the mandatory 
structure of the quotes, the information can be screened, consolidated, and organized in a 
manner that allows the contracting officer to simply validate the information and certify the 
award decision result.5 This result would also be recorded on the blockchain and the 
associated files would be archived in distributed storage. This step would also include the 
contracting officer’s task of preparing the award document. Normally the award document 
would be prepared using government forms SF 1449 or DD 1155, which are generated 
utilizing federal contracting systems, outside of the smart contract construct. Once the award 
is executed in the government contracting system, the award document could be extracted 
and fed back into the blockchain. It may also be possible to integrate directly into the 
government contracting system depending on the nature of the interfaces and technical 
architecture.  
Step 8. Award Notification 
Once the contracting officer receives internal approval and signs the contract, he/she 
would traditionally transmit that contract to the awardee via email. Similarly, all unsuccessful 
offerors would receive a letter via email notifying informing them that they were not selected 
                                               
 
 
4 Note: this is a particularly useful feature when there are questions regarding the timeliness 
and acceptability of the offeror’s quote. 
5 This assumes the contracting officer adopts a “lowest-price technically acceptable” selection 
approach, which is highly compatible with the procurement of COTS. 
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for award and providing them with pertinent information (i.e., name of awardee, amount of 
award, etc.). 
The process of Award Notification involves nothing more than the transmittal of 
information—a process that a blockchain-based smart contract can be easily designed to 
support with the corresponding business logic built-in. Once an award decision is made by 
the contracting officer, that information could be quickly processed using smart contract 
business logic in the form of a template/letter notifying all interested parties of the selected 
awardee and relevant award information. The information would be transmitted, and delivery 
would be recorded on the blockchain providing the government an error free proof of receipt. 
This approach saves the government time in preparing award notification, and instead 
allows the contracting officer to focus on his or her review responsibilities, rather than 
getting bogged down in administrative tasks that can be executed as part of the smart 
contract’s automated business logic. 
Step 9. Tracking Contract Performance 
Step 10. Contract Payment 
Since this use case involves the procurement of a software solution, the government 
function of tracking performance is greatly simplified. The actual software license generally 
is treated as a supply purchase, and performance is met when the software is delivered. 
The ongoing software support services (i.e., patches, help desk, troubleshooting support) is 
normally treated as a subscription. As with delivery of software, the support subscription is 
typically considered complete and payment is made when the subscription services are 
initiated. No long-term contractor performance surveillance is required for the follow-on 
upgrades, patches, and help desk support. Agencies utilize multiple methods for certifying 
delivery. Most agencies use electronic systems such as the DoD’s Wide Area Workflow 
(WAWF) System to certify when delivery occurs, which triggers an authorization to make 
payment. 
As stated above, the oversight and payment processes are already highly 
automated. As such, a blockchain-based smart contracts approach would have to be fully 
integrated into these existing systems in order to record those activities. Alternatively, a new 
system could be implemented which could automatically track delivery of software and 
support services with the vendor notifying the government when both were provided (like the 
smartphone app used by Amazon). The government could utilize this same system to 
confirm receipt and authorize payment utilizing a Government Purchase Card rather than 
electronic funds transfer. All transactions would be recorded on the blockchain and executed 
based upon the pre-defined business logic built into the smart contract for the software. This 
approach would require special authorizations and would likely have to meet or exceed the 
requirements of the Prompt Payment Act of 1982 (FAR 12.301(b)(3) and FAR 52.212-4). 
By utilizing a smart contracts approach and the use of the Government Purchase 
Card, payment could be made automatically within hours of receipt of the software and 
subscription services, rather than some 30 days later. This would be much more in-line with 
commercial best practices and would encourage the vendor to offer more competitive 
pricing to the government as well as reduce risk of incurring interest penalties. Moreover, 
this would reduce the burden to smaller or other non-traditional government vendors who 
simply can’t wait a month to get paid for a good or service that has been delivered and 
accepted by a customer.  
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Step 11. Contract Closeout 
Finally, after the transaction is fully completed, all goods are provided and services 
are received, the contracting office is normally required to “closeout” the contract for 
archiving and eventual destruction. In many offices, this is performed utilizing a manual 
process. Specifically, a government employee or contractor will review the contract and 
determine if there are any outstanding disbursement balances. If all payments have been 
made, the employee will prepare a close-out document for contracting officer approval and 
add it to the contract file. If outstanding unpaid balances exist, the file is set aside for further 
resolution. 
Many organizations already have an automated closeout process for simple, low-
dollar acquisitions. This type of transaction could easily be applied by building the closeout 
process into the smart contract business logic. The simple smart contract agreement could 
consider easily programable syntax questions whereby the answers have already been 
recorded as previous transactions on the blockchain such as the following:  
• Final payment made (Y/N)? 
• Outstanding/undispersed funds(Y/N)? 
• Any outstanding performance issues(Y/N)? 
• Is it now 30 days or greater beyond performance end-date (Y/N)? 
By applying this process, the government would no longer have to manually review 
each file. Instead, they could focus on only those files that need special adjudication, saving 
both considerable time and resources. 
Applicability of This Use Case 
As shown above, the employment of blockchain-based smart contracts could greatly 
improve the trust, autonomy, and security within a simple procurement of software licenses 
under Federal Supply Schedules. Once greater trust, autonomy, and security are introduced 
into the procurement system, it permits business processes to be re-engineered 
purposefully to reduce the redundancy and inefficiency. As described, such inefficiency is 
often built-in as a result of the numerous errors that occur in a manually driven, centrally 
managed environment. Speed, accuracy, and efficiency all become second order benefits 
realized upon the blockchain paradigm shift once embraced by the organization.  
Can this approach be used to procure software outside of Federal Supply 
Schedules? The simple answer is yes. Use of the above discussed blockchain-based smart 
contracts process can be leveraged in procuring COTS when utilizing other software GWAC 
vehicles. 
One of the first examples for additional consideration to implement blockchain-based 
smart contracts is the DoD’s family of Enterprise Software Agreements (ESAs) which 
provide a full complement of pre-negotiated COTS blanket purchase agreements (BPAs) to 
provide Remedy, Adobe, Redhat, SAP, and numerous other software and support solutions.  
Another primary source of COTS for civilian federal agencies is NASA’s Solutions for 
Enterprise-Wide Procurement (SEWP) V GWAC, providing a full complement of IT 
commercial software products through multiple-award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity 
(IDIQ) contracts. In both cases, a similar approach can be used to build, validate and fund 
the requirements package, as well as execute many of the same contracting process steps 
outlined in this case using machine-logic. 
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Barriers to Implementation of the Smart Contracts Prototype  
As with any proposed innovative solution, there are often obstacles that need to be 
overcome for successful implementation. The following is a discussion of three potential 
barriers to employing this technology in a federal acquisition environment. 
• Contracting Officer Discretion. It must be acknowledged that by its very nature 
contracting absolutely must involve the business judgement of a warranted 
contracting officer. If the government were to develop a blockchain-based smart 
contract system to procure simple goods and services, it cannot (at least in the 
short term) replace automated business logic built into smart contracts with 
individual contracting officer judgement in a few key areas: Determination of 
Acquisition Strategy; Determination of the Best Value of the Government; and 
Final Selection of the contract awardee. All these determinations are inherently 
governmental, reside exclusively with the contracting officer, and must be 
completed before he/she will make a contract award obligation on behalf of the 
government. Accordingly, any established blockchain-based smart contracts 
process must make room for contracting officer discretion in the award process 
for procurement of software. 
• Brand Name and Related Competition Concerns. The FAR spends 
considerable time laying out special rules and processes for acquiring “brand 
name” solutions (See FAR 6.302-1(c), 8.405-1(e), and 8.405-6(b)), which 
requires requiring activities to explicitly identify and justify those “salient 
characteristics” associated with the “brand name” product in order to foster a 
more fair and just competitive environment. This issue is especially pronounced 
when multiple firms produce a COTS product that is of a similar type. For 
instance, there are multiple COTS solutions that provide security protections for 
laptops (i.e., Symantec, McAfee, Kaspersky, Bitdefender). The FAR normally 
prohibits the customer from arbitrarily selecting their preferred product. Instead, 
the FAR requires the government to define the salient characteristics needed for 
that software (in this case security software) and allows the entire segment of 
industry to compete in the RFQ. Unless Congress is willing to relax the 
requirements of the brand name restriction, this will remain an impediment to 
simplifying Step 1, Determination of a Requirement. The smart contract business 
logic could be programmed to leverage previous software contract performance 
characteristics as part of the process to generate a new agreement.  
• Scale. The point of employing blockchain-based smart contracts into acquisition 
of software process is to realize organizational efficiencies and savings that 
come with improving trust, autonomy, and security in the process. It must also be 
recognized that building a blockchain-based smart contract solution also requires 
government resources. The agency exploring the use of this solution should 
perform a cost/benefit analysis to determine if the return (benefits achieved in 
software acquisition) are worth the investment (resources needed to build the 
system). While the return on investment (ROI) results will vary for each agency, 
one common premise exists—the scale of the software requirement(s) is 
determinative. In other words, the greater the scale for COTS software need 
across a department, agency or government-wide, the more benefit that a 
blockchain-based smart contracts solution provides. 
• Legal Concept of Remedy. If something goes wrong in paper based legal 
system, the “remedy” is very malleable. In a blockchain-enabled world, the 
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“remedy” is a set of additional blockchain transactions. This requires an updated 
mindset, and a blockchain-enabled capability that can distinguish between the 
original transactions, recognition of an issue, and the remedy transactions. 
Conclusions and Recommendations for Successful Implementation of the 
Smart Contracts 
It is unlikely that the government will ever be able to make the software acquisition 
process completely mirror industry best practices. However, tremendous progress can be 
made in working towards achievement of that goal by improving trust, autonomy, and 
security in the process that can ultimately result in improved efficiency and cost savings for 
the government.  
In order to make the successful implementation of blockchain-based smart contracts, 
there are several special considerations related to software acquisition that need to be in 
place. First, the agency needs to have access and authority to utilize enterprise-sized 
software acquisition vehicles to achieve savings through economies of scale such as the 
GSA’s IT 70 or the DoD’s ESAs. It’s not enough to make the existing in-house process 
simpler as a result of the introduction of blockchain technology that adds trust, autonomy 
and accuracy to business operations which will ultimately yield greater efficiencies and cost 
savings. 
Second, the efficacy of using a blockchain-based smart contract solution would be 
increased significantly if, in the requirements development step, the customers are able to 
select COTS solutions that are pre-approved by the agency for use and are not be required 
to develop a list of “salient characteristics” needed for software procurement. In other words, 
the agency needs to establish pre-competed COTS solutions for agency use within software 
segments of competing vendors (i.e., Symantec vs. McAffe, ArcGIS vs. Geosoft, Tableau vs. 
Lumira). By establishing agency-wide pre-selected/pre-competed solutions, the government 
enables more standardized contracting requirements, as well as terms and conditions that 
can be built into the smart contract business logic.  
Third, establish pre-set requirements needed to receive software validation approval 
which can be built into the smart contract business logic. Organizations may be compelled 
to procure software for an entire group of people, even though only a small subset of users 
require it. Normally, this rationing or scrutiny is applied during the validation step. In order to 
make this step go much smoother, it would help if the agency CIO publish pre-established 
screening criteria or other thresholds that must be met in order to receive requirement 
validation approval. Without clear, definitive guidance on what “will or won’t fly” with the CIO, 
customers may unwittingly be wasting their time seeking validation of their software request. 
With clear guidance from the CIO representative, this ambiguity is reduced or eliminated. 
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Abstract 
This paper is intended to disseminate initial outcomes of the NPS Research 
Acquisition Program “Automatic Generation of Contractual Requirements from MBSE 
Artifacts” project. The research addresses the automatic generation of contractual 
requirements in textual form from models in a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) 
environment, enabling the transition from document-centric systems engineering to MBSE in 
acquisition programs. Textual requirements form the backbone of contracting in acquisition 
programs. Requirements define the problem boundaries within which contractors try to find 
acceptable solutions (design systems). At the same time, requirements are the criteria by 
which a customer measures the extent to which their contract has been fulfilled by the 
contractor. However, latent problems exist in acquisition programs stemming from poor 
practices in requirements engineering. Research suggests that transitioning to model-based 
requirements can be effective in coping with such challenges. We presented in prior work a 
framework to construct true model-based requirements within the context of the Systems 
Modeling Language (SysML). This research addresses the main question of whether 
contractual requirements in textual form can be automatically generated from those 
requirement models without loss of information or intent. We present in this paper an initial 
template of requirements and a process to support this goal. 
Introduction 
Textual requirements form the backbone of contracting in acquisition programs. 
Requirements define the problem boundaries within which contractors try to find acceptable 
solutions (design systems; Salado et al., 2017). At the same time, requirements are the 
criteria by which a customer measures the extent to which its contract has been fulfilled by 
the contractor (e.g., INCOSE, 2015). Hence, it is not surprising that some authors consider 
requirements “the cornerstone of … systems engineering” (Buede, 2009). However, 
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literature shows latent problems in acquisition programs stemming from poor practices in 
requirements engineering (e.g., Yeo, 2002; Dada, 2006; McConnell, 2001; El Eman & Birk, 
2000). 
In order to cope with such a challenge, academia and industry envision extending 
the application of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) beyond conceptual design, 
particularly addressing problem formulation. Two main paths to integrate requirements 
within a complete MBSE environment are currently pursued. In the first path, major modeling 
languages, such as Systems Modeling Language (SysML), incorporate elements called 
requirement models (Friedenthal, Moore, & Steiner, 2015), which are intended to model the 
requirements the system is expected to fulfil. Some authors have attempted to demonstrate 
how those so-called requirement models can be used to move acquisition practice from 
document-centric (textual) requirements to model-based requirements (e.g., Holt et al., 
2011; Holt et al., 2015). However, this approach is based on defining specific model 
elements, called “requirements,” which contain a text property that takes the textual 
requirement. The requirement element is then linked to a specific component in the system 
architecture. Hence, the only modeling value of this approach is to achieve traceability 
between requirements and architectural elements. Although this is valuable on its own merit, 
requirements remain textual; thus, model-based requirements are not achieved.  
In the second path, researchers propose to use behavioral models of the system of 
interest as problem definition elements (requirements; e.g., Miotto, 2014). Such work has 
been confined, though, to the technical challenges of modeling expected system behavior. 
Therefore, the proposition remains positional, since such work has not addressed how 
contracting in acquisition programs is affected, or needs to be adjusted, to incorporate 
behavioral models as a contractual mechanism instead of textual requirements. Hence, the 
near-term, practical feasibility of the approach is questionable. 
In a third path, less extended, mathematical or formal structures are used to capture 
requirements (e.g., Micouin, 2008). In these approaches, shall statements or similar natural 
language statements are not used in the formulation of the requirement. In the context of the 
research presented in this paper, these representations may be considered examples of 
true model-based requirements. Their usage in the context of SysML is, however, not 
evident. 
The overarching research in which this paper is framed is aimed at overcoming those 
obstacles by providing a translation mechanism that enables the engineering of true 
requirement models, while automatically generating corresponding textual requirements. 
Prior work by the authors has addressed the construction of such true model-based 
requirements in SysML (Salado & Wach, 2019). This paper presents a template and 
showcases a requirement translation process that enables the automatic generation of 
contractual requirements in natural language (i.e., textual requirements) from model-based 
requirements.  
Background: Model-Based Requirements in SysML 
The construct for model-based requirements in SysML described in Salado and 
Wach (2019) is used in this paper. A summary of the construction specification for such 
model-based requirements is provided in this section. 
Justification 
The key underlying construct of a model-based requirement lays upon “the central 
proposition … that every requirement can be modeled as an input/output transformation” 
executed through one or more physical interfaces (Salado & Wach, 2019). This proposition 
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is founded on two main premises. First, every system can be modeled as a transformation of 
input trajectories into output trajectories (Wymore, 1993). Second, a set of requirements 
yields a solution space (Salado, Nilchiani, & Verma, 2017). Therefore, “it follows that a 
solution space can be modeled as a set of transformations of input trajectories into output 
trajectories” (Salado & Wach, 2019).  
The suitability of this construct was explored by re-interpreting requirement 
categories of a taxonomy that fulfills the partition criterion as input/output transformations 
(Salado & Wach, 2019). Four requirement types, which are considered to be collectively 
exhaustive to capture requirements, were considered: functional requirements (i.e., what the 
system must do), performance requirements (i.e., how well the system must do it), resource 
requirements (i.e., what the system may consume to do those things that well), and 
environmental requirements (i.e., in which settings or contexts the system must do those 
things, that well, with those resources; Salado & Nilchiani, 2014, 2017). The explanation of 
how these types of requirements may be described as sets of input/output transformations 
provided in Salado and Wach (2019) is reproduced verbatim here: 
 
Functional requirements inherently describe input/output 
transformations. Mathematically, a function is necessarily defined as a 
mapping between a domain and codomain. From a General Systems 
Theory perspective, engineered systems are necessarily open (von 
Bertalanffy, 1969).  
 
Performance requirements are, as defined, necessary 
characteristics, properties, or attributes associated with the inputs and 
outputs of the transformations that the system shall perform. In fact, this 
condition is necessary because any attribute transparent to the interaction 
between the system and external systems should not be considered a 
requirement due to unnecessarily constraining the solution space (Salado 
et al., 2017, INCOSE, 2012). 
 
Resource requirements define limits on resources that the system 
may consume. It is obvious that a resource must therefore be inputted to 
the system and that it is consumed for producing something. Hence, any 
limitation imposed on resource consumption is in fact part of a functional 
exchange and can be modeled in such a way. 
 
An environment for the system is an abstraction of boundaries 
between the system and external systems. The environment provides 
certain conditions under which the system must operate and imposes 
certain limitations on how the system may affect the environment. In other 
words, the environment provides certain inputs under which the system 
must operate and imposes certain limitations on the outputs the system 
may yield to the environment. 
 
In terms of typology of inputs and outputs, the construct is consistent with Kossiakoff 
et al.’s (2011) taxonomy for external interfaces and considers that systems operate in three 
types of media (information, material, and energy) that become inputs to and/or outputs from 
the system (Salado & Wach, 2019). 
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Construction Rules 
A complete description of the construction rules for the model-based requirements is 
given in Salado & Wach (2019). A summary is provided here.  
In line with the theoretical construct described in the previous section, the model-
based requirements are built according to the meta-model depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 Meta-Model of the Model-Based Requirements 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
Three main SysML constructs are used to capture requirements as models (Salado 
& Wach, 2019): 
1. A sequence diagram, which captures the required input/output exchanges. Each 
input or output is modeled by signal elements, which capture the required 
properties of each input and output. An example is provided in Figure 2. 
2. An internal block diagram, which captures the physical interfaces that are 
required to convey the required system inputs and outputs. Each interface is 
modeled by ports, which capture the required properties of each interface and 
the signals it conveys. An example is provided in Figure 3. 
3. Mode requirements, which describe the sets of requirements that apply 
simultaneously, modeled by state machine diagrams. Each state represents a 
mode, which represents a collection of requirements that need to be fulfilled 
simultaneously. An example is provided in Figure 4. 
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 Example of Input/Output Transformation As a Model-Based 
Requirement 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
 
 
 Example of a Required Physical Interface Through Which the Required 
Input/Output Transformation Occurs as a Model-Based Requirement 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
 
 
 Example of Requirement Sets as a Model-Based Requirement 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
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It should be noted that although existing SysML constructs are used to model 
requirements, there are semantic differences with respect to their regular use to model 
system solutions (Salado & Wach, 2019). Describing those differences is outside the scope 
of this paper because they are addressed in the original source. It suffices to state that the 
diagrams shown in this section extend (or modify in some cases) their traditional use in 
SysML. In essence, they should not be interpreted as models of the behavior or physical 
structure of the system, but as models of the input/output transformations the system is 
required to execute. 
An Approach to Transform Model-Based Requirements to Contractual Requirements 
in Natural Language 
Process 
The process to transform the model-based requirements presented in the previous 
section (Background: Model-Based Requirements in SysML) to contractual requirements in 
natural language consists of four steps: 
 
Step 1. For each port, generate corresponding textual requirements. This step 
generates a list of physical interfaces that are characterized by a set of required 
properties, which will be pointed at by the requirements resulting from the 
sequence diagrams.  
Step 2. For each mode, generate a simultaneity modifier. This step assigns tags to 
each sequence diagram associated with a particular mode. These tags are used 
later to associate a modifier with the textual requirements resulting from such 
sequence diagrams that indicates the need to fulfill such requirements in the 
context of all other requirements with the same modifier. 
Step 3. For each sequence diagram, generate corresponding textual 
requirements. This step generates a list that contains requirements associated 
with the need to accept inputs and provide outputs, the characteristics of those 
inputs and outputs, and the logical or temporal conditions for the acceptance of 
those inputs and provision of those outputs. In addition, for each requirement 
referring to the required inputs and outputs, a modifier referring to the physical 
interface through which such input or output is conveyed is added. Furthermore, 
the simultaneity modifiers in Step 2 are used to identify the subset of 
requirements that need to be fulfilled simultaneously. 
Step 4. Remove repetitions, if any. Because inputs and outputs may be used in 
several sequence diagrams, this step will consolidate the list of requirements to 
avoid repetitions. It should be noted that this step can be executed after all 
textual requirements have been generated or as they are being generated, for 
efficiency purposes. 
The basic concept for generating textual requirements leverages a predefined 
template of natural language requirements that maps to the different elements in the meta-
model depicted in Figure 1. A simplified view of this concept is shown in Figure 5. A 
computerized algorithm is not used in this paper but is being developed as part of the 
research program. It will be disseminated in future publications. The focus of this paper lays 
on the template that will be employed to generate the textual requirements. Specific 
template rules are defined, as will be described in the next section, to cope with the different 
types of requirements captured by the model-based requirements. 
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The system shall <action> 
<object> <modifier 1> 
<modifier 2> <modifier 3> … 
<modifier n>.
Algorithm (notional)
for each element in Diagram 1
   createreq(element)
end
createreq(Item1):
   if item1.type=e & syst.direction(item1)=in
      <req1.action>=”operate”
      <req1.object>=”in” & item1.subtype & “range” & item1.range
      <req1.modifier1>=”when fulfilling requirements”
      <req1.modifier2>=reqs(Diagram1)
      <req1.modifier 3>=”Note: Interface defined in” & item1.Def
   if item1.type=f & syst.direction(item1)=in
      <req1.action>=”accept”
      <req1.object>=item1.Id
      <req1.modifier>=”according to IF defined in” & item1.Def
   if item1.type=f & syst.direction(item1)=out
      <req1.action>=”provide”
      ...
   Resulting textual requirements (notional)
   The system shall operate in temperature range [20, 50] deg C. Note: Interface defined in IF-2.
   The system shall accept On commands according to IF-3.
   The system shall provide On feedback according to IF-4.
   The system shall provide On feedback in less than 2 s after receiving on command.














 A Representation of the Concept to Generate Textual Requirements Out 
of Model-Based Requirements 
Template 
The basic template for a requirement takes the form of The system shall <action> 
through <interface>. This form is refined to capture the richness of requirements offered by 
the model-based requirements described earlier in the paper. The resulting forms are shown 
next. 
Consider the basic model provided by the sequence diagram in Figure 2 and the 
internal block diagram in Figure 3. Table 1 shows the template for the requirement in natural 
language and describes how each element of those model-based requirements is mapped 
to an element of such template. 
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<Input> is defined in 
<Source 1>. 
Note 2: 
<Interface> is defined 
in <Source 2>. 
<object>: Block in diagrams referred to as System. 
<accept>: Captured as an input directional port on the system in 
the Sequence Diagram (incoming arrow in the sequence diagram). 
<Input>: Name of the Signal connected to the input directional 
port in the Sequence Diagram. 
<Interface>: Connection between System block and external 
block in the Internal Block Diagram, to which Signal is allocated. This is 
described as a physical port in the System block. 
<Source 1>: Properties of the Signal, directly described in the 
properties of the element. 
<Source 2>: Properties of the physical interface, directly 
described in the properties of the Port element. 
The <object> 
shall <provide> 
<Output> according to 
<Interface>. 
Note 1: 
<Output> is defined in 
<Source 1>. 
Note 2: 
<Interface> is defined 
in <Source 2>. 
<object>: Block in diagrams referred to as System. 
<provide>: Captured as an output directional port on the system 
in the Sequence Diagram (outgoing arrow in the sequence diagram). 
<Output>: Name of the Signal connected to the output 
directional port in the Sequence Diagram. 
<Interface>: Connection between System block and external 
block in the Internal Block Diagram, to which Signal is allocated. This is 
described as a physical port in the System block. 
<Source 1>: Properties of the Signal, directly described in the 
properties of the element. 
<Source 2>: Properties of the physical interface, directly 
described in the properties of the Port element. 
Consider now the model-based requirements in Figure 6, which capture required 
dependencies between the inputs and outputs. It should be noted that the three examples 
are not exhaustive, but other types of dependencies may be captured (Salado & Wach, 
2019). Table 2 shows the templates for the requirement in natural language and describes 
how each element of model-based requirements is mapped to an element of such 
templates. 
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 Examples of Model-Based Requirements Capturing Various 
Dependencies Between Inputs and Outputs 
Note. Left: alternative required exchange based on conditions; Center: exchanges that need to be executed in 
parallel; Right: continuous exchange until a condition is met. 









<object>: Block in diagrams referred to as System. 
<action>: It takes the value of accept or provide depending on whether the Signal 
element inside one of the branches of the conditional element is an input or an 
output, respectively to the block System. 
<when>: This value is used when the diagram element is alt. 
<condition>: As described in the condition property of the alt element. 
The <object> 
shall <action 1> 
<while> <action 
2>. 
<object>: Block in diagrams referred to as System. 
<action 1>: It takes the value of accept or provide depending on whether the 
Signal element inside one of the branches of the conditional element is an input or 
an output, respectively to the block System. 
<while>: This value is used when the diagram element is par. 
<action 2>: It takes the value of accept or provide depending on whether the 
Signal element inside another branch of the conditional element is an input or an 





<object>: Block in diagrams referred to as System. 
<action>: It takes the value of accept or provide depending on whether the Signal 
element inside the conditional element is an input or an output, respectively to the 
block System. 
<while/for>: This value is used when the diagram element is loop. 
<condition>: As described in the condition property of the alt element. 
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It should be noted that defining required time dependencies or restrictions between 
inputs and outputs may also be necessary (Salado & Wach, 2019). Figure 7 shows an 
example. In this case, Table 3 shows the template for the requirement in natural language 
and describes how each element of model-based requirements is mapped to an element of 
such template. 
 
 Example of a Model-Based Requirement Capturing Time Restrictions 
Table 3. Mapping of Timing Dependencies Model Elements to Textual Template 
Template of textual 
requirement 
Model element 
The <object> shall 
<action 1> in <time 
dependency> <after> 
<action 2>. 
<object>: Block in diagrams referred to as System. 
<action 1>: It takes the value of accept or provide depending on whether 
the Signal element is an input or an output, respectively to the block 
System. 
<time dependency>: This is formally defined as a range of [Min, Max], 
which refer to dependencies such as: less than, more than, within. 
<after>: This is implied by the temporal dependency given by the 
duration constraint. 
<action 2>: It takes the value of receiving or providing depending on 
whether the Signal element is an input or an output, respectively to the 
block System. 
Two options are offered for the template for capturing simultaneity of requirement 
applicability in natural language (as modeled for example in Figure 4). The first one is shown 
in Table 4, together with a description of how each element of model-based requirements is 
mapped to an element of such template. The second one consists in simply creating 
separate sections of the requirement document for each mode requirement, with a 
statement that reads, All requirements in this section shall be fulfilled simultaneously. 
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Table 4. Mapping of Applicability Simultaneity Model Elements to Textual Template 
Template of textual 
requirement 
Model element 
<Req X>. The system shall… 
Note: This requirement must be 
fulfilled simultaneously with 
[<Req Y>]. 
<Req X> is a requirement originating from a Sequence Diagram 
linked to a state element. 
[<Req Y>] is a list of all requirements originating from all 
Sequence Diagrams linked to the state element to which 
Sequence Diagram from which <Req X> originates is also 
connected. 
No template is prescribed for capturing the characteristics of inputs, outputs, and 
interfaces in textual form. In general, they may be listed as columns containing the property 
and the required values for each property. For physical interfaces, properties may be 
organized, for example, following a layered approach, such as identifying a transport layer 
and a physical layer. 
Application Example 
Case Design 
The proposed template to transform the model-based requirements developed in this 
research project into natural language requirements that can be used to support contractual 
activities is applied to the case developed in Salado and Wach (2019). In such work, a 
notional set of requirements in textual form (not necessarily following any template) was 
transformed into a set of model-based requirements. In this paper, the resulting model-
based requirements in such work are transformed back into textual requirements, but using 
the template presented in this paper. The resulting textual requirements are compared 
against those used as source requirements in the original work. 
It should be noted that a formal comparison of the efficiency, coverage, and accuracy 
of the resulting requirements after applying the template presented in this paper is outside of 
the scope of this paper. The focus of the paper is to illustrate how the proposed template 
can be used to transform model-based requirements to textual requirements, without 
assessing its performance. 
Problem Statement: Model-Based Requirements 
The model-based requirements used in this case are depicted in Figures 8 through 
15 and directly taken from Salado and Wach (2019). They represent the requirements for an 
optical space instrument with the purpose to take images of the Earth and send them to the 
satellite platform under command by the platform. In parallel, the instrument is required to 
provide health status data continuously to the satellite platform for monitoring purposes. The 
requirement set, which has been adapted from Salado and Nilchiani (2014) and includes 
new requirements that were added for coherence and partial completeness, provide 
nevertheless a limited set of requirements with respect to a real-life project. However, the  
acceptability and suitability of the sample requirements [were] 
validated by deriving and contrasting them against requirements of actual 
operational and scientific optical space systems developed by different 
manufacturers for different customers and with a similar level of complexity, 
which is represented by an instrument mass of around 1 ton. (Salado & 
Nilchiani, 2014) 
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 Mode Requirements 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
 
 Conditions for Applicability of Each Subset of Requirements  
(Mode Transition in Figure 8) 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
 
 
 Exchange Related to the Mechanical Load Requirement 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
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Note. There is an error in the figure: Command A is an input to the Instrument, and Image data is an output of 
the Instrument. 
 Required Exchanges in Nominal Operations 
(Salado & Wach, 2019)  
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 Required Characteristics of the Required Inputs and Outputs 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
 
 
 Requirements on the Allocation of Logical Inputs and Outputs to 
Physical Interfaces Through Which They Must Be Conveyed 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
 
 
 Required Characteristics of the Physical Interfaces Through Which 
Inputs and Outputs Must Be Conveyed 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
 
 
 Modeling of Transport Layer Aspects as Proxy Ports for Leveraging 
Model Complexity 
(Salado & Wach, 2019) 
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Resulting Contractual Requirements in Natural Language 
Application of Step 1. Each interface block in Figure 14 is converted to a table form with 
two columns, one listing the property and one listing the corresponding value. It should be 
noted that, as part of those properties, the information in Figure 15 is nested for some of the 
interfaces in Figure 14. The resulting tables are not shown in this paper because of length 
limitations. For referencing purposes in other requirements, they will be referred to as Tables 
E1 through E4, which correspond to IF-1 through IF-4, respectively. 
Application of Step 2. For simplicity, the approach to divide the requirement set in sections 
is used. Two sections are therefore created. Section 1 corresponds to Launch requirements, 
and Section 2 corresponds to Nominal Operations requirements.  
Application of Step 3. First, all signals in Figure 12 are converted to a table form with two 
columns, one listing the property and one listing the corresponding value (ref. Table 5). A 
template in Table 1 is applied to Figures 10 and 13, yielding a single requirement for the 
Launch requirements subset. All templates are then used on Figures 11 and 13 to generate 
the requirements for the Nominal Operations subset. The resulting requirements are given in 
Table 6. Requirements R2 through R7 are generated using template in Table 1. 
Requirement R8 is generated using templates in Table 3. Requirements R9 and R10 are 
generated using templates in Table 2. Note that R9 and R10 have been simplified because 
of paper length limitations. Essentially, the requirements should be extended to every action 
that is paralleled and every action that is part of the lifetime loop, respectively.  
 
Table 5. Required Characteristics of Inputs and Outputs 
Property Value 
S1 
Flow type Continuous 
Min 5g in all directions 
S2 
Spectral radiance *Plot 
Flow type Continuous 
Area >= 2 deg 
Distance [600 km, 650 km] 
S3 
Message [current image, last image] 
Flow type Trigger 
S4 
Flow type Continuous 
Temperature [-10 deg C, 45 deg C] 
S5 
Max 600 W 
Flow type Continuous 
S6 
Flow type Trigger 
Field of 
View 
>= 2 deg 
Resolution < 1 unit 
S7 
Flow type 1 Hz 
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Table 6. Resulting Textual Requirements 
ID Requirement 
Launch 
Note: All requirements in this section must be fulfilled simultaneously. 
R1 The system shall accept Acceleration according to IF-4. 
Note 1: Acceleration is defined in Table S1. 
Note 2: IF-4 is defined in Table E4. 
Nominal Operations 
Note: All requirements in this section must be fulfilled simultaneously. 
R2 The system shall accept Earth spectral features according to IF-1. 
Note 1: Earth spectral features are defined in Table S2. 
Note 2: IF-1 is defined in Table E1. 
R3 The system shall accept Command A according to IF-2. 
Note 1: Earth spectral features are defined in Table S3. 
Note 2: IF-2 is defined in Table E2. 
R4 The system shall accept Electrical power according to IF-3. 
Note 1: Earth spectral features are defined in Table S4. 
Note 2: IF-3 is defined in Table E3. 
R5 The system shall accept Heat according to IF-4. 
Note 1: Earth spectral features are defined in Table S5. 
Note 2: IF-4 is defined in Table E4. 
R6 The system shall provide Image data according to IF-2. 
Note 1: Earth spectral features are defined in Table S6. 
Note 2: IF-2 is defined in Table E2. 
R7 The system shall accept Telemetry according to IF-2. 
Note 1: Earth spectral features are defined in Table S7. 
Note 2: IF-2 is defined in Table E2. 
R8 The system shall provide Image data in less than 0.2 s after having received 
Command A. 
R9 The system shall accept Earth spectral features while accepting [Command A, 
Electrical Power, Heat] and providing [Image data, Telemetry]. 
R10 The system shall <all actions> for 7 years. 
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Step 4 has not been applied in this example. 
Comparison and Discussion 
The resulting textual requirements for the required properties of the physical 
interfaces captured in Figures 14 and 15 are identical to those in the benchmark given in 
Salado and Wach (2019), although they have not been explicitly shown in this paper. 
However, a comparison of the description of the resulting requirements in table form with 
those tables in the source paper yield this conclusion. 
With respect to requirements in Tables 5 and 6, it is necessary to look at the 
benchmark textual requirements, which are listed in Table 7 directly from the original source 
in Salado and Wach (2019). The requirement sets look different at first sight and, in fact, 
present also some differences with respect to the solution space. They are discussed next.  
 
Table 7. Benchmark Textual Requirements 
(Adapted from Salado & Wach, 2019) 
Req ID Description 
BR1 The instrument shall image a target at 600 km–650 km according to IF-1. 
BR2 The instrument shall image a target with spectral radiance of ABC (*plot) according to IF-1. 
BR3 The instrument shall accept Command A according to IF-2. 
BR4 The instrument shall transmit image data according to IF-2 in less than 0.2 s after receiving Command A.  
BR5 The instrument shall have a resolution better than 1 unit. 
BR6 The instrument shall have a FOV greater than 2°. 
BR7 The instrument shall provide telemetry data every 1 s according to IF-2. 
BR8 The instrument shall accept power according to IF-3. 
BR9 The instrument shall consume less than 600 W of electrical power. 
BR10 The instrument shall withstand a mechanical load of 5 g in any direction on IF-4. 
BR11 The instrument shall fulfill its performance when subjected to a temperature between -10 deg C and +45 deg C at IF-4. 
BR12 The instrument shall have a lifetime of at least 7 years. 
Note 1 R10 only applies during launch. All other requirements only apply once the instrument is powered on through IF-3. 
 
In terms of visual differences, a different approach is taken for describing the 
different modes. However, this is purely a stylistic matter and of no real concern for the 
definition of the solution space. In addition, the benchmark employed a single requirement 
for each required property of the required system inputs and outputs, whereas the resulting 
set in this paper employs a table form for the properties linked to a single requirement for 
each input and output. We believe that both options have pros and cons with respect to 
requirement management. For example, the benchmark option may be easier to manage in 
terms of traceability in requirements management tools. However, it does not present any 
structure to facilitate consistency during requirement elicitation. Certainly, there may be 
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ways to overcome both problems with both approaches. Hence, these differences remain 
aesthetic and with no impact on the definition of the solution space. Therefore, they can be 
considered equivalent. 
Wording employed in the textual statements is also different. The free form employed 
in the benchmark yields the use of verbs that provide a description of the intent or purpose 
expected to be fulfilled by the system, whereas the proposed template uses only 
accepting/providing statements. We argue that the proposed approach is actually more 
effective. We base this assertion on two aspects. First, the purpose of deriving stakeholder 
needs into system requirements is to devoid the requirements of context, so that only what 
the system has to do is defined, not what an external actor will do with the actions of the 
system. In this sense, and using systems theory, a system can be fully characterized by the 
inputs it accepts from the environment and external systems and the output it provides to 
them. Second, natural language lends itself towards diversity of interpretation. This 
difference can cause a difference in the content of the solution space, as different engineers 
work towards finding an acceptable solution. Therefore, limiting the types of actions that the 
system can take, as proposed in this paper, may be beneficial to cope with such limitation of 
natural language. 
In terms of effects on the solution space beyond wording interpretation, the only 
apparent difference is that the benchmark did not explicitly refer to the need to execute 
certain actions in parallel, while the models did. We believe that this difference is just an 
artifact of the limitations of the case study but felt it was necessary to mention for 
completeness. Therefore, we consider both sets of requirements to be equivalent from this 
perspective. 
Finally, it should be noted that the transition requirements captured in Figure 9 have 
not been transformed to textual requirements. The reason is that the model-based 
requirements were incomplete and did not capture the external conditions for the different 
mode requirements as external inputs (particularly, pressure conditions), but just as 
operational conditions of the transitions. Because of this lack of completeness, the 
templates cannot be applied in this case. 
Conclusions 
Prior work in the frame of this research project demonstrated an approach to capture 
requirements directly in model-based form without using requirements in natural language, 
such as the traditional shall requirement statements. This paper has shown a template to 
generate contractual requirements in natural language directly out of those model-based 
requirements. These templates can enable a technical team to transition to model-based 
requirements while guaranteeing fulfillment of the expectation of contractual departments 
and acquisition programs. The former can work directly in developing models, while the 
latter can still provide shall statements to vendors and suppliers. 
It should be noted that the effort is ongoing and is planned to be completed within 
the timeframe of the NPS Research Acquisition Program's “Automatic Generation of 
Contractual Requirements from MBSE Artifacts” project. 
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Abstract 
In typical eProcurement processes, sensitive data such as prices, intellectual 
property, and customer information often flow across enterprise boundaries. Such data 
sharing amplifies the risk of a data breach due to exposure to the potential security flaws of 
prospective and current eProcurement partners. Threats of information leakage inhibit 
enterprises from sharing sensitive data; thus, enterprises cannot take full advantage of the 
eProcurement process. Existing cryptography-based data sharing protocols impose a high 
computational burden for maintaining data confidentiality, making them unsuitable for real-
time applications such as eProcurement. With this motivation, we address the following 
research question: How can procurers and suppliers securely conduct their business 
transactions without revealing their confidential information? 
The proposed approach enables procurers and suppliers to perform computations 
while preserving their confidential data. In this paper, we show how Computing-Without-
Revealing (CWR)–based data sharing protocols can be used as building blocks to execute 
procurement auctions for standard products. A web-based platform is developed to measure 
the performance of the CWR protocols against competing techniques. Experimental results 
corroborate the efficiency of the CWR-based protocols, making them suitable for real-time 
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applications. The application of the protocols is demonstrated for different eProcurement 
scenarios, including first- and second-price auctions for standard products.  
Introduction 
The design and manufacturing of products, regardless of complexity, involve 
partnerships with third-party vendors, manufacturers, suppliers, contractors, and other 
entities outside the organization. The design of a Boeing 777 airplane, for example, involved 
more than 10,000 people external to Boeing. Similarly, Ford Motor Company works with 
more than 1,000 suppliers across the globe. Such partnerships allow organizations to focus 
on their core expertise, thereby increasing their effectiveness. However, there are also risks 
associated with sharing confidential information with business partners. In the 2016 
acquisition research symposium, it was highlighted that business partners pose a significant 
malicious threat because they are a part of the information flow (see Figure 1). Therefore, 
there is a growing need for research and development on technologies that enable business 
transactions without revealing confidential information of the participants. 
 
 Incidents of Data Breaches Among Business Partners 
(Kaestner, Arndt, & Dillon-Merrill, 2016) 
Traditionally, business transactions between a procurer and suppliers involve a 
trusted third party (TTP), such as a cloud service provider. The procurer and suppliers send 
their confidential information to a TTP, who performs the required computation. Although 
this is easy to implement, the main risk is that rogue employees of the TTP (e.g., the people 
who maintain and update cloud servers) can learn the confidential information. Additionally, 
information may be compromised through a break-in by hackers, through a malware or 
spyware infestation, or even in a completely non-malicious (i.e., accidental) manner. There 
is also a potential risk that the cloud service provider may, as an organization, decide to 
betray the users by revealing or secretly using their confidential inputs. A recent report 
(Ponemon, 2018) highlighted the impact of internal attacks by insiders/contractors on 
organizations (see Figure 2). Therefore, it is important to preserve the confidentiality of an 
organization’s data while engaging with current and especially potential suppliers. 
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 Influence of Different Security Threats Faced by Organizations 
(Ponemon, 2018) 
In a typical eProcurement process, sensitive information related to prices, intellectual 
property, and customer data often flow across enterprise boundaries. While this data flow 
between eProcurement partners is important for performing business operations, there exist 
data security concerns, especially when the data involves intellectual property, trade 
secrets, etc. Sharing such confidential data amplifies the risk of data breach due to potential 
security flaws of the partners in the eProcurement process. Such threats discourage 
enterprises from sharing sensitive data, and thus prevents them from taking full advantage 
of the eProcurement process. 
In this paper, we present an approach for addressing this fundamental challenge. 
The approach enables secure eProcurement of standard products. We present the use of 
cryptographic protocols to execute auction mechanisms within an eProcurement process, 
where the procurer only learns confidential information related to winning bidders. No 
confidential information about the losing bidders is revealed to anyone, including the 
procurer, thereby resulting in truthful revelation and increasing value for all participants 
involved. This proposed eProcurement process promises economic advantages for a wide 
variety of private-sector organizations ranging from large electronics manufacturers and 
automakers to small and medium-sized enterprises specializing in specific technologies.  
Overview of the Approach 
Current procurement processes are characterized by incomplete and disaggregated 
information about (i) the capabilities and cost structure of individual suppliers and (ii) the 
requirements of the procurers. In a typical eProcurement process, such as a sealed-bid 
reverse auction, as shown in Figure 3, procurement happens in three stages. In Stage 1, the 
procurer reveals his/her requirements to the suppliers. In Stage 2, suppliers submit their 
consolidated bids. In Stage 3, the procurer analyzes the submissions and determines the 
winner by choosing the supplier with the best technology at the lowest bidding price. 
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 Existing Approach for Sealed-Bid Auctions 
In such a setting, suppliers would ideally like the procurer to learn their confidential 
cost information and the details of the proprietary technology only if they win the contract. 
However, procurers need to determine the quality and suitability of the technology to choose 
the winner. In addition, procurers may not want to reveal their requirements, especially if the 
requirements reveal their competitive advantage. This reluctance to reveal sensitive 
information may drive the procurer to settle for inferior solutions, thereby reducing the overall 
effectiveness of the procurement mechanism. This brings us to the research question 
addressed in this study: How can procurers and suppliers securely conduct their business 
transactions without revealing their confidential information? 
Our central hypothesis for this project is that the fundamental protocols discussed in 
the Details of the Technical Approach section can be used as building blocks to perform the 
computations involved in an eProcurement process. Computational results derived using 
Computing-Without-Revealing (CWR) protocols help in reducing information asymmetry 
while also protecting the sensitive information held by procurers and suppliers. Such an 
approach enables procurers and suppliers to estimate the challenges and uncertainties 
involved and thereby help both sides of the eProcurement process in making informed 
decisions.  
Procurement processes based on the proposed CWR approach enjoy the following 
benefits: 
• No cryptographic key management: No data is lost if the secret key used for 
determining the splits is inadvertently lost. 
• Computation time: The proposed protocols are computationally lightweight, 
unlike homomorphic encryption and circuit evaluation. Hence, it is possible to 
perform huge computations with weaker and battery-powered portable devices 
such as smart phones. 
• No data abuse: The data is handled by cloud servers, procurers, and suppliers. 
No user learns the actual inputs of their counterparts. Hence, there is no 
possibility of misusing the data. Even if there is a breach in one of the cloud 
servers, the data that a hacker can access would only be a share of the actual 
data.  
• No specialized infrastructure required: Since their confidential information is 
protected, procurers and suppliers can use commercial cloud services for 
procurement processes. This has cost advantages in terms of capital expenditure 
and IT expenses. 
• Overcomes supplier vulnerabilities: The procurer need not worry about a data 
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be only a share of the actual data. Therefore, no meaningful data would be 
leaked.  
A sub-field within cryptography, called “secure multi-party computations” (SMC), 
focuses on enabling multiple parties to jointly process their individual confidential data into 
useful information while preserving the confidentiality of the data belonging to each party. 
Existing cryptographic practices to perform computations securely can be classified into two 
broad categories: 
1. No Need of a Third Party: Cryptographic techniques such as fully homomorphic 
encryption (Bogetoft et al., 2009), secure circuit evaluation [Ben-David, Nisan, & 
Pinkas, 2008), and partial homomorphic encryption (PHE; Paillier, 1999) use 
encryption-based techniques to hide confidential data. Encrypted data is 
exchanged between parties and computations are performed on the exchanged 
encrypted data. Such computations impose a very high computational burden 
and the times reported using these techniques are much longer than in the case 
of the traditional TTP approach, which makes them ill-suited for use in practical 
scenarios. 
2. No Need to Reveal to the Third Party: On the other hand, using secret sharing 
techniques is a way to distribute a secret (or confidential data) among a group of 
parties, where every party is allocated a share of the secret. This secret can be 
reconstructed only when a sufficient number of shares are combined. Individual 
shares do not infer anything about the whole secret.  
Secret sharing approaches are comparatively faster than encryption-based 
approaches. The approach proposed in this study reduces the computational burden, which 
makes it easier to adapt. Moreover, as the proposed approach is based on general 
arithmetic primitives, it is well suited for quickly building secure collaborative computing 
platforms for new procurement scenarios or for variants of the current state of practice, such 
as volume-based pricing, which is not handled in previous work.  
Details of the Technical Approach 
EProcurement involves standard processes such as request for proposals (RFPs), 
auctions, payments, etc. Usually, these processes require inputs from both procurers and 
suppliers. We present a secure multi-party computation (SMC) technique that allows 
procurers and suppliers to perform the computations involved in these standard processes 
without needing to reveal their confidential inputs to anyone. We term our approach of the 
SMC technique as Computing-Without-Revealing (CWR). It builds on the protocols 
developed by the PIs, which are presented in Wang et al. (2017). The approach is based on 
two key principles (Wang et al., 2013): 
• Adding/multiplying an input with a random number hides the value of the input. If 
the random number is much larger than the input, it also hides the order of 
magnitude.  
• Adding/multiplying with a large number is orders of magnitude faster than the use 
of expensive cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption and 
secure circuit evaluation. 
Consider a scenario where the confidential value is 11. We additively split the value 
into random-looking shares and a participating cloud server sees only one of the random-
looking shares. For example, the additive splits of 11 could be 1819 and –1808 (see Figure 
4); it could just as well have been 103 and –92 or –19 and 30. These additively split values 
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of 11 are stored in two different cloud servers. We developed protocols for basic arithmetic 
operations on such additive splits (see Wang et al., 2017, for details).  
 
 Additive Splits 
The CWR approach utilizes these splits to perform the desired computation without 
revealing the input data to anyone. In the next section, we review the structure of the CWR 
protocols.  
Foundational Computing-Without-Revealing (CWR) Protocols 
CWR protocols enable a procurer (referred to as Alice) and suppliers (referred to as 
Bob) to use a single external server (referred to as Helper) to perform the computations that 
are mutually agreed upon between Alice and Bob. The following is the generalized structure 
of the CWR protocols: 
• Stage 1—Pre-processing of inputs. The pre-processing of inputs involves two 
steps:  
(a) Split the inputs additively if the inputs from Alice/Bob are not 
additive splits.  
(b) Alice/Bob agree on a morphing function and a distribution from 
which random numbers are generated. Alice/Bob morph the additive splits 
using this morphing function and random numbers from the distribution. 
These morphed additive splits prevent the Helper from learning about 
Alice/Bob when shared with the Helper.  
• Stage 2—Run the desired computations securely. Alice/Bob derive the 
application logic from their mutually agreed computation. Alice/Bob provide the 
application logic along with the morphed additive splits to the Helper. The 
application logic involves the sequence of computations that need to be 
performed on the morphed additive splits. The output derived from running the 
application logic is additively split. One of the additive splits corresponding to the 
output is shared with Alice and the other with Bob. 
• Stage 3—Post processing of outputs. Alice and Bob post-process their 
additive splits before sharing them with each other. Alice and Bob simultaneously 
exchange the processed outputs with each other. Alice and Bob independently 
add their additive splits and learn the actual output of the computation. 
Using this structure, CWR protocols for fundamental mathematical operations are 
proposed (Wang et al., 2017). In the rest of this paper, we denote CWR-MP to denote 
multiplication protocol and CWR-GT0 to denote greater than zero protocol within the CWR 
setting. These foundational protocols are used as building blocks to construct protocols for 
higher level mathematical calculations. In the next section, we discuss how these protocols 
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Extension of CWR to eProcurement 
In this paper, we present a procurement platform that enables participants of a 
procurement process to execute the computations involved using CWR technology. 
Specifically, we focused on an auction platform for standard products. However, this 
approach can be extended to different types of auctions suited for their business needs.  
In the following sections, we describe these CWR-based auction platforms in a greater 
detail.  
Extension of CWR to Auctions for Standard Products 
In this section, we assume that standard products or commercial-off-the-shelf items 
are those items where the quality of these products is established. So, the decision on the 
auction winner is based on the price of the product. 
While there are many ways to perform auctions within an eProcurement process for 
standard products, in what follows, we use reverse sealed-bid auctions to illustrate how 
CWR protocols can be used as building blocks to perform the computations involved (as 
shown in Figure 4). Note that the CWR-protocols can be constructed to perform the 
computations involved in any auction mechanism, but to simplify the discussion, we focus 
on the first price reverse sealed-bid auction. The computation involved in such auctions is 
the identification of a supplier with the minimum consolidated bid for all the items listed by 
the procurer. The procurer and suppliers mutually agree on three external servers (for 
example, cloud servers α,β, and γ). The procurer provides unique IDs to all the suppliers. 
Suppliers share the additive splits corresponding to their confidential information (i.e., 
consolidated bids) along with their IDs with cloud server α and cloud server β. Cloud server 
α (as Alice) and cloud server β (as Bob), together with cloud server γ (as Helper), deploy 
Protocol 1. After Protocol 1 ends, the cloud servers α and β share the additive splits obtained 
with the procurer. By adding these additive splits, the procurer finds the supplier with the 
minimum consolidated bid and the value of the consolidated bid.   
This extension of CWR to eProcurement enables procurers and suppliers to perform 
procurement transactions without needing to reveal their confidential information to anyone. 
This allows procurers to design auction mechanisms that can help them overcome 
inefficiencies in existing auction mechanisms. For example, an auction mechanism built 
using CWR can identify the supplier with the best price (i.e., “cherry pick” the suppliers) for 
each and every item. Such an auction mechanism has great potential to reduce 
procurement costs, as the procurer gets the best possible price for every item. This will 
appeal to suppliers as well because their individual item prices are not revealed to anyone, 
including to the procurer. In this section, we present a CWR first price reverse auction that 
enables the procurer to select the supplier who provides the greatest bang for their buck for 
each individual item and thereby overcome this inefficiency.  
CWR First Price Reverse Auction 
In a CWR first price reverse auction, a single procurer (say, the DoD) can “cherry 
pick” the best supplier among the suppliers (DoD contractors) for each and every item. 
Figure 5 illustrates a scenario of CWR first price reverse auction. The CWR first price 
reverse auction is listed in Protocol 1. 
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 CWR-First Price Reverse Auction 
The CWR first price reverse auction enables the procurer to learn only the payments 
that need to be made to each individual supplier and the items provided by each supplier. 
Throughout the protocol, the procurer cannot learn the supplier’s individual item prices. 
Similarly, the supplier cannot learn the quantity desired by the procurer before the auction. 
The novelty in this protocol is that the external servers (cloud servers α,β, and γ) on which 
the CWR protocols are run do not know the auction’s context (item names, etc.) as they 
receive morphed additive splits. Therefore, the external servers learn nothing about the 
procurer’s/supplier’s confidential information. Note that this protocol is designed to choose 
the supplier based on a single attribute of the product (price). This protocol can be extended 
to multiple attributes with the appropriate weights. 
Implementation Details 
Below are some of the details for implementing the CWR first price reverse auction: 
1. Secure Channels: It is important to understand that information exchanges that 
occur between parties within the CWR auction should use secure channels, such 
as HTTPS. 
2. Cross Accounts: The ownership of the cloud server account is one of the 
concerns while deploying CWR. Existing cloud servers, such as Amazon Web 
Services (AWS), offer features such as cross accounts through which a procurer 
and suppliers can examine what algorithms are being run on their data splits. 
Please refer the following webpage for more details: 
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/tutorial_cross-account-with-
roles.html 
3. Tie Breaks: There is a possibility that the item prices of suppliers may be the 
same. In such scenarios, the procurer can break such ties in many ways, 
including randomly picking a supplier from the suppliers with the same item price. 
How such ties are handled is made public to all participants prior to the auction. 
4. Single Item Winner: In some scenarios, a supplier may win only one item. This 
can reveal the item price to the procurer when he/she makes payments. In such 
scenarios, the corresponding supplier is informed and the supplier may choose to 
participate/quit the procurement process. 
In the next section, we compare the performance of CWR-based computing techniques with 
competing secure computing techniques.  
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Performance Analysis of CWR 
We developed a test-bench to run and compare different secure computing 
techniques such as partial homomorphic encryption and secret sharing, as discussed in the 
Overview of the Approach section. In what follows, we describe the test bed developed as 
part of this project to compare our approach (CWR) with the existing cryptographic 
approaches.  
Test Bed Setup 
We conducted experiments in two different settings. The first set of experiments was 
conducted when all the procurers and suppliers were connected to the same network (i.e., 
local area network or LAN). The second set of experiments was conducted when the 
procurers and suppliers were connected to different networks (i.e., wide area network or 
WAN). Note that the computation speed of all the approaches reduces with WAN. This is 
mainly attributed to the network latency. 
 
 Experimental Setup 
We identified computational time and bandwidth with respect to the amount of data 
that needs to be transferred between the procurer/suppliers as the key performance 
indicators (KPIs). The computational time is measured using a python module named “time” 
and the bandwidth is measured using an open source packet analyzer (Wireshark). We 
compared CWR protocols with competing secure computing techniques using these KPIs. 
CWR-VIP 
We chose the inner product as the computation to compare the performance of the 
proposed approach (CWR) against the existing approaches. This computation was chosen 
as it is commonly used to multiply the vector of quantity with the vector of item prices for the 
listed items within a procurement process.  
We found that the proposed approach (CWR) is at least 10 times faster than the best 
existing approach (refer to Table 1) using LAN. We found that our approach is about 7 times 
faster than the best existing approach (see Table 2) using WAN. We realized that the cost of 
security (computational burden to maintain the confidentiality) in procurement activities is 
high (about 6–7 times) compared to open sharing, where procurement data is revealed to 
every participant. One of the reasons for this additional burden is the requirement of 
performing every computation using CWR protocols.  
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10 14.6 4.1 0.35 
100 135.5 37.4 2.88 
1000 1738.4 378 27.5 
10000 >3600 4031 264.7 
 











10 16.5 5.58 0.68 
100 235 47.3 6.9 
1000 >3600 486.3 74.7 
10000 >3600 5567 742.6 
 
In network communication, the amount of data (bandwidth) being exchanged 
between parties is another important performance indicator. In our comparative study, we 
found that our approach requires 3 times less bandwidth (refer to Table 3). These results 
indicate that our approach can be deployed in real-time applications and can be supported 
by devices with limited battery power. 
Table 3. Comparison of Bandwidth Use (in KB) 
CWR-First Price Reverse Auction  
We developed the software embodiment of the CWR-first price reverse auction 
(described in Protocol 1) and used it as an auction mechanism in a procurement process. 
Vector length 0-server (PHE) 
3-servers 
(Previous best) [9] 
1-server 
(CWR-VIP) 
10 6.5 3.4 1.18 
100 61.8 33.8 10.6 
1000 614.2 342.7 105.9 
10000 >5000 3425.3 1053.7 
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We used the values shown in Table 4 to simulate the auction mechanism. In what follows, 
we describe the outcomes of a traditional sealed bid auction and compare these outcomes 
with those obtained using CWR-first price reverse auction. 
In a traditional sealed-bid auction, the procurer reveals the desired quantity. The 
suppliers submit their respective sealed bids ($330, $322, $316) to the procurer, who 
selects the minimum bid ($316) in first price auction and receives the items from Supplier 3. 
Throughout the auction process, suppliers hide their item prices in the form of sealed bids. 
However, from Table 4, we learn that Supplier 3 does not provide the best prices for each 
individual item.  
Table 4. Item Prices and Quantities Used for Simulation Studies 








A 12 $11 $9 $10 
B 8 $6.5 $8 $7 
C 7 $8 $6 $6.5 
D 9 $10 $12 $10.5 
Figure 7 shows a picture of the demo of this CWR-first price reverse auction, 
developed as part of this project. In this demo, one Microsoft SurfacePro computer was 
used as the procurer and three other SurfacePros were used as the suppliers to simulate a 
reverse auction. All the surface pros were connected with each other using 2 Mbps 
(upload/download speed) LAN. The procurer and suppliers mutually agree on three external 
servers (α,β, and γ) which are used to run the CWR first price reverse auction. A computer is 
used to run these three external servers and this computer is also connected to all the 
SurfacePros using the same LAN.   
 
 Demo of a CWR-First Price Reverse Auction 
Deploying the CWR-first price reverse auction enables the procurer to enter item 
names and their respective quantities. Only the item names are provided to all the suppliers. 
Suppliers enter their respective confidential item prices (as listed in Table 4). As described in 
Protocol 1, the confidential information (item quantities and prices) is split additively and 
shared with the external servers (α and β). These external servers along with the help of 
another external server (γ) execute the computations involved in the auction. By the end of 
these computations, the procurer learns that items (A, C) and (B, D) will be provided by 
Supplier 2 and Supplier 1, respectively. The procurer also learns the amounts that should be 
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paid to Supplier 1 and Supplier 2. The suppliers also receive information on the items they 
won/lost and their receivable payout amounts from the procurer. Figure 9 shows the 
screenshots of the procurer and suppliers at the end of the auction process. Note that 










 Screenshots of the Procurer’s Screen (a) and the Suppliers’ Screens 
(b)–(d) 
This CWR-first price reverse auction enables procurers to select the suppliers who 
provide the best price for each individual item. Such selection enables the procurer to 
reduce procurement costs. For instance, using the values listed in Table 4, CWR-first price 
reverse auction enables the procurer to procure all the desired items for $292 instead of 
$316 (from traditional sealed-bid auctions). We believe that this form of cherry-picking 
enables the procurer to increase competition among suppliers and thereby achieve efficient 
solutions. 
We extended the functionality of this software embodiment to handle second-price 
reverse auctions by modifying the calculation of payments in Protocol 1. We tested the 
scalability of the proposed CWR-first price reverse auction by running for different numbers 
of items procured by the procurer. The resulting computational time and bandwidth use are 
reported in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. These results indicate that CWR-first price reverse 
auction is a computationally efficient and secure technique that can be deployed in real-time 
settings.  
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4 7.8 7.2 
8 8.2 8.7 
16 9.2 9.5 
32 15.3 12.58 
64 18.95 18.41 
 







4 0.05 0.06 
8 0.11 0.13 
16 0.21 0.22 
32 0.40 0.42 
64 0.76 0.82 
 
The CWR-first price reverse auction is a step towards demonstrating that 
computations in a procurement process can be performed without needing to reveal any 
confidential information. We believe that procurers and suppliers can build on this and 
modify it to make it suitable for more sophisticated computations.  
Summary 
The proposed approach, Computing-Without-Revealing (CWR), supports research in 
information systems and risk management. Our approach also complements, but does not 
replace, research in economic mechanism design. While mechanism design is focused on 
truthful revelation through the design of incentives, our approach focuses on protecting 
confidential information in any mechanism. In this study, we developed new dedicated CWR 
protocols suited for eProcurement and demonstrated the application of these protocols for 
the procurement of standard products. We believe that these protocols could be extended to 
the procurement of innovative technologies. 
We present the CWR-first price reverse auction, which enables a procurer to “cherry 
pick” those suppliers who provide the best price for each individual item and thereby lower 
procurement costs. Such lowering of acquisition costs for procurers will increase their 
efficiency because they will be able to achieve more with the same financial resources. 
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Suppliers who participate will not see their competitive advantage erode due to the very fact 
that they participated (e.g., currently, a cost advantage for some components quickly erodes 
once it becomes known). The eProcurement platforms based on the proposed approach will 
considerably mitigate the threat of data breach originating from business partners because 
the approach makes it possible to achieve the desired collaborative goals with business 
partners without revealing to them the confidential data on which the collaboration depends.  
A test bed is developed to compare the performance of CWR-based protocols with 
the previous-best approaches. Experimental results show that the CWR protocols performed 
better than previous-best approaches. With this, we conclude that CWR based auctions are 
lightweight, scalable, and secure.   
 
Protocol 1: CWR-First Price Reverse Auction 
Input: Procurer provides the list of items (denoted by I) and their respective 
quantities (denoted by q = [q1, …, qN]). Suppliers (S1, …, SK) provide their item prices for 
the items in the list I. Supplier Sk item price list is denoted by pk = [pk1 , …, pkN]. 
Output: Procurer determines the items won (represented by wk) by each supplier Sk 
and payment (represented by ak).  
Stage 1. Pre-processing of inputs 
Step 1: The procurer and suppliers mutually identify cloud servers (α and β) 
as their surrogates to execute procurement using CWR. The procurer splits their 
sensitive information q into qα and  qβ such that q = qα +  qβ and shares them with the 
cloud servers α and β, respectively; [[.]] notation is used to represent these shares, 
[[q]] represents qα for cloud server α and qβ for cloud server β respectively. Similarly, 
the suppliers split their individual item price list and share them with the cloud 
servers α and β, respectively. 
Step 2: Cloud servers (α and β) mutually agree upon morphing functions (Mα, 
Mβ) and a seed to generate the random numbers that are used in these morphing 
functions. These agreements can be derived using session number, auction ID, etc. 
Further, the cloud servers (α and β) identify another cloud server (γ) as their helper to 
perform the desired procurement computations using CWR.  
 
Stage 2. Run desired computations securely 
Step 3: Cloud servers (α,β, and γ) execute the computations as mentioned in 
Table 7. Cloud servers (α and β) keep track of the splits corresponding to the 
information on whether a supplier Sk won/lost the items (wαk = [wα1, …, wαN], wβk) 
and the splits corresponding to the payments that are to be made to the supplier Sk 
(aαk, aβk). The vector (wk = wαk +  wβk) has 1s against the items that are won and 0s 
against all the items lost by the supplier Sk.  
Step 4: By the end of Step 3, cloud server α has (aα = [ aα1, …, aαk], Wα = [ 
wα1, …, wαK]) and cloud server β has (aβ, Wβ). Both cloud servers (α and β) share 
their splits with the procurer. The procurer adds (aα, aβ) to determine a = [a1, …, aK] 
where ak refers to the money that the procurer owes the supplier Sk. Similarly, the 
procurer adds (Wα, Wβ) to determine W = [w1, …, wK].  
Stage 3. Post-processing of outputs 
Step 5: Procurers provide the payment aK and items won (represented by wk) 
to Sk. Supplier Sk verifies the payment aK against the item prices that he/she won. 
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Correctness  
The correctness is derived from the correctness of CWR protocols.  
Security 
Procurer knows q, a, and W. With this information, the procurer cannot infer the 
suppliers’ item prices. Similarly, suppliers receive wk and the items they need to provide to 
the procurer. Additionally, the suppliers cannot infer each other’s private information such as 
item price. All the external servers (α,β, and γ) receive only one of the additive splits. 
However, these external servers learn the number of suppliers participating in the auction. 
This could be avoided by using different external servers for the computations. 

























N number of items 
K number of sellers 
[[P]] NxK matrix with additive shares corresponding to prices from sellers for 
different items  
[[Q]] additive shares corresponding to the quantity from Buyer 
Winner_price = [0] * N # winning price for each item 
W = [[0] * N] * K # winner index   
item_paycheck = [0] * N 
for j in range(N): 
    [[index]]=0 # make Seller 1 as the default winner 
    for i in range(1, K): 
        [[b]]=0 # [[b]] denotes an additive share of b 
        W [j][index], lowest_price = 1, [[P[j][index]]] 
        [[b]]CWR-GT0(lowest_price – [[P[j][i]]]) # update indices and prices 
        W[j][i], W[j][index] = [[b]], [[1-b]] 
        [[index]]=CWR-ADD(CWR-MP([[b]], [[i]]), CWR-MP([[1-b]], [[index]])) 
        [[Winner_price[j]]] = CWR-ADD(CWR-MP([[b]], [[P[j][i]]]), CWR-MP([[1-b]], 
[[lowest_price]])) 
   [[item_paycheck[j]]] = CWR-MP([[q[j]]], [[Winner_price[j]]]) 
a=[0]*K 
for j in range(K): 
    for i in range(N):  
        [[b1]] = 0 
        [[b1]]CWR-EW0(j, W[i][j]) 
        [[a[j]]] = CWR-ADD([[a[j]]], CWR-MP([[item_paycheck[i]]], [[b1]])) 
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Abstract 
For approximately 25 years, the United States was the world’s sole superpower. With 
the emergence of China as a peer competitor on both the economic and military fronts, that 
era has come to an end. The prospect for near-future, industrial-scale, non-nuclear warfare 
can no longer be dismissed. Should that occur, it would be irresponsible to assume that a 
military decision would quickly ensue, therefore industrial (and societal) mobilization would 
be necessary. When considering this type of future, it is natural to look to the most recent 
historical example for guidance, and that would be World War II, in which America’s 
supremely effective industrial mobilization created the well-known “arsenal of democracy” 
that the enemy was not able to counter.  
In this paper, we propose that while the World War II story is instructive, the run-up 
to World War I in which America’s industrial mobilization was far less effective, should not be 
ignored. This paper takes an introductory look at the failure of U.S. industrial mobilization in 
World War I, focusing on the case of shipbuilding. We review similarities and contrasts to 
today’s situation and suggest courses of action to reduce the likelihood of a similar outcome 
in the future. 
Introduction 
The total collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which took the West by surprise, 
thrust the United States into a new and unexpected role as the world’s sole superpower 
(Department of State, 2001–2009). The U.S. Navy suddenly exercised uncontested control 
of the high seas. Absent a high-end military threat, defense spending (including naval 
construction) was curtailed during the balance of the 1990s as resources were shifted to 
serve economic rather than military objectives. In that manner the American people looked 
forward to reaping a peace dividend. As the ex-Soviet fleet quickly deteriorated, the U.S. 
Navy’s principal role was re-directed toward projecting influence and power ashore. 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the prospect of a peace dividend vanished as 
the military budget grew. But military operations in the post-911 era were focused on land 
warfare, and naval ship production rates did not expand appreciably. There was little 
urgency to developing plans to mobilize the shipbuilding industry in response to aggression 
from enemy naval forces capable of inflicting severe losses at sea.  
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This frame of mind ended in the mid- to late-2010s. The current geopolitical 
environment has become characterized by “overt challenges to the free and open 
international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between 
nations” (DoD, 2018). The result is a renewed potential for non-nuclear, industrial-scale war. 
If such a war were to break out against a peer-level enemy or against an alliance of multiple 
peer-level enemies, historical precedent suggests that demands on the U.S. Navy could 
quickly ratchet up.  
The most recent major mobilization of the shipbuilding industry occurred prior to and 
during World War II. The World War II shipbuilding effort encompassed every type of naval 
and merchant ship, plus emergent types not envisioned prior to hostilities. The U.S. 
economy, directed and controlled by the State, performed brilliantly as described in an 
extensive literature that includes several recent book-length treatments (e.g., Wilson, 2016; 
Baime, 2015, & Herman, 2012) along with older classics such as Lane (1951), a standard 
text on the Emergency Shipbuilding Program of the Second World War.  
The rapid and effective mobilization and expansion of war production (including 
shipbuilding) in World War II is a popular story due in part to its success, which was 
unprecedented. But the World War II effort was not original. It was preceded by a very 
similar push to mobilize U.S. industry, with a major focus on shipbuilding, in World War I. 
Responsible preparation for a future industrial-scale, non-nuclear war involving naval 
combat and trans-ocean supply lines would require an understanding of the World War I 
experience.  
Shipping and Shipbuilding Actions Prior to U.S. Entry into the War 
Prior to World War I, the world’s dominant shipbuilder was Great Britain (see, for 
example, Stott, 2017).1 At the early stages of the war, the British believed that the key 
maritime asset needed to defeat Germany was a large battle fleet, so naval construction 
was prioritized over merchant shipbuilding. Consequently, British commercial shipping 
deliveries actually dropped; the merchant ship tonnage delivered in 1915–1916 was only 
one third of that delivered in 1913–1914. French industry was unable to respond as 
resources were fully occupied in ground fighting. U.S. shipyards, which had been depressed 
prior to the war, responded and were quickly filled with new orders (Williams, 1989, pp. 38–
41).  
From 1915 to 1916, German U-boat action took a heavy toll as Germany attempted 
to counter-blockade Great Britain. In 1916 German submarines sunk one of four ships 
bound for the U.K. and continental Europe (Hutchins, 1948, p. 52). “By the spring of 1916, 
the amount of tonnage sunk each month by German U-Boats began to overtake the amount 
of new tonnage delivered” (Williams, 1989, p. 41). The most pressing need now was for 
cargo-carrying merchant ships. The British revised their industrial priorities; however, it was 
not enough. U.S. shipbuilding was needed to plug the gap.  
The Shipping Act of 1916 established a new U.S. Shipping Board that was 
empowered and capitalized to form a subsidiary corporation for the purpose of building and 
                                               
 
 
1 Great Britain led the development of the steel shipbuilding industry, but its global 
market declined “from over 80% in the 1890s to zero by the end of the 1980s” (Stott, 2017). 
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operating merchant vessels. The Naval Act of 1916 provided for naval construction to be 
ramped up. Its general objective was to build a powerful battle fleet; motivated by battleship 
and battlecruiser action in the Battle of Jutland (May 31–June 1, 1916). Naval ships were 
constructed at the Navy yards and at the large, pre-existing private-sector shipyards, such 
as New York Shipbuilding (Camden, NJ), Newport News, Fore River, Union Iron Works, 
Bath Iron Works, William Cramp & Son, and Electric Boat.  
The Three Sectors of the Shipbuilding Industry (New Construction) 
The United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, and this spurred 
industrial mobilization to build warships and merchant ships. The ship new construction 
industrial base comprised three sectors:  
1. Navy yards 
2. Existing commercial shipyards 
3. Emergency commercial shipyards 
Each had distinct industrial characteristics and business bases. The Navy yards built 
warships, and the existing commercial shipyards built warships and a variety of merchant 
ship types. The emergency shipyards were a special case. Most, including the three largest, 
did not exist prior to the war. These emergency shipyards were “pop-up” facilities urgently 
constructed with government funding to build merchant ships quickly to overbalance the 
attrition from the German submarine campaign.  
Naval Construction 
Upon the entry of the United States into the war, naval shipbuilding underwent a 
complete change of plan in terms of both the quantity ordered and the mix of ship types. 
This is shown in Table 1, which traces U.S. naval ship production from shortly before the 
turn of the 20th century through World War I.  
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Table 1: Naval Vessels Delivered by Year, U.S., 1898–1922 
(Smith & Brown, 1948, pp. 115–117) 
 
Note. Other types include minelayers, minesweepers, ammunition ships, fuel ships, tenders, monitors, and others. 
 
Prior to World War I, the European great powers plus the United States and Japan 
had engaged in a naval arms race prominently geared towards fleet operations and 
featuring battleships and cruisers. Unexpectedly for all belligerents, World War I naval 
combat followed a different course. Table 1 shows that the U.S. Navy shipbuilding plan was 
revamped to prioritize destroyers and submarines rather than capital ships, but the re-
orientation and the ramp-up did not happen quickly enough. While the armistice was signed 
in 1918, peak output was not reached until 1919.  
The major naval fighting ships (battleships, destroyers, and submarines) were built at 
a variety of shipyards including all three types, that is, Navy yards, existing private sector 
yards, and a new emergency yard, as shown in Table 2. The emergency shipyard that was 
purpose-built for destroyer production was the Navy-owned, Bethlehem Shipbuilding 
Corporation-operated facility at Squantum, MA. That yard followed the concept of the 
merchant ship emergency yards and was designed to build a single ship-type (destroyers) in 
large numbers. The shipbuilding supplier industries required rapid expansion along with the 
shipyards. For example, in conjunction with the construction of the new Squantum shipyard, 
the Navy also built a new boiler shop in Providence, RI, and a turbine shop in Buffalo, NY. 
The Navy financed facilities expansion at other existing shipyards, including the Newport 
News shipyard and the New York Shipbuilding Corporation yard in Camden, NJ, along with 
expansions to other critical suppliers such as Erie Forge (DoN, 1921). 
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Table 2: Shipyards That Built Major Warship Types From 1913 to 1922 
(Smith & Brown, 1948, p. 132) 
 
Note. Shown are shipyards that built battleships, destroyers, and submarines, i.e., the principal fighting ships. No cruisers were 
built in this period.  
Merchant Ship Construction 
The U.S. shipbuilding industry had become very active following the 1914 outbreak 
of the war, as the British shipyards were filled to capacity with orders. On April 16, 1917, 10 
days after the declaration of war on Germany, the U.S. Shipping Board created the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation; all of the shares were held by the Shipping Board. The 
Shipping Board was essentially regulative, with the Emergency Fleet Corporation being its 
operational arm. The initial organization of the Shipping Board was badly flawed, leading to 
unresolvable technical and managerial disputes at the top level. In late July 1917, senior 
leadership was replaced with a more effective line-up and the World War I shipbuilding 
program got under way in earnest. But the political and bureaucratic paralysis cost the 
program four months that proved impossible to recover.  
On July 11, 1917, under its new and more energetic leadership, the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation took control of the U.S. shipping and shipbuilding industries. It requisitioned all 
431 steel merchant ships under construction in U.S. shipyards, totaling 3,068,431 
deadweight tons (Hutchins, 1948). This was not enough however, and what followed was 
“the greatest flood of ship orders in American history. The task was indeed the largest 
shipbuilding effort in the world’s history up to that time” (Hutchins, 1948, p. 52). It is worth 
quoting Hutchins at length here: 
In 1917, before the entry of the United States into the war, the 
shipbuilding industry had already grown to forty-two yards with 154 ways 
for steel ships. … Before 1914, about 75 per cent of the country’s shipyard 
capacity was normally engaged in naval work. By 1919, however, the 
capacity had risen to seventy-two steel shipyards with 461 ways. … The 
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yards were then engaged in the construction of more commercial than 
naval tonnage.2 (Smith & Brown, 1948) 
The need far exceeded the capacity of the existing shipbuilding industry.3 The 
construction of new emergency shipyards and the enlargement of existing ones was 
necessary. Hurley (1927) described the situation as follows:4 
Originally it was supposed that the main function of the Fleet 
Corporation would be that of developing designs and placing contracts for 
ships. But all the yards were either busy in completing for the Fleet 
Corporation the 431 hulls which we had commandeered, or were clogged 
with orders for the Navy. The shipyard owners, found that they could not 
control the supply of either material or labor. Hence the Fleet Corporation 
had to step in and manage the yards. Entirely new yards had to be built, at 
an expense so huge that it could not be defrayed by private companies. In 
the end the Fleet Corporation had to build the yards with government 
money and to act as their banker. 
The Emergency Fleet Corporation contracted for three new large shipyards to be 
built by private-sector firms. The largest was the Hog Island shipyard in Philadelphia.5 This 
facility was owned by the American International Corporation, which also owned the huge, 
modern New York Shipbuilding Corporation yard in Camden, NJ. Hog Island (and the other 
purpose-built yards) built ships to a standard design, employing newly conceived 
prefabrication methods on a massive scale. Hog Island “built 122 ships of 921,000 
deadweight tons between the laying of the first keel … on Feb. 12, 1918 and the completion 
of its last vessel on Jan. 29, 1921, averaging a keel every 5.5 days.” Of those 122 ships, 
110 were of the pre-fabricated standard Hog Island 7,600 dwt freighter. The yard had 50 
slipways but not as many shop facilities as a conventional shipyard, as many parts and 
components were manufactured elsewhere. Peak employment was 30,000. (Hutchins, 
1948, pp. 54–55; Goldberg, 1991, pp. 3–14). See Table 3 for a summary of activity at the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation shipyards.  
  
                                               
 
 
2 Table 10 lists the 70-odd shipyards.  
3 Merchant ships were so desperately needed that the Shipping Board placed orders in 
Japanese and Chinese shipyards (Goldberg, 1991, p. 3). 
4 Edward N. Hurley was appointed chairman of the U.S. Shipping Board in July 1917 as part 
of the USSB’s reorganization.  
5 The others were the Newark shipyard of the Submarine Boat Company and the Bristol, PA, 
yard of the Merchant Shipbuilding Corporation.  
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Table 3: World War I Emergency Shipyards 
(Shipbuildinghistory.com, Tim Colton, accessed Feb. 13, 2019) 
 
Note.  
1. A few of these yards completed a small number of later ships, for example, USSB cancellations that they were able to 
complete for private-sector ship owners.  
2. Dozens of cargo ships were delivered to the French government by various emergency shipyards.  
3. A few additional emergency yards built smaller ships of less than 1,000 gross tons. 
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As seen in Table 3, the Hog Island shipyard achieved a prodigious output. But its first 
ship, the Quistconck, was delivered in December 1918, too late for World War I service.6 
This must have been a colossal frustration at the time, and it is the general theme of the 
World War I merchant and naval shipbuilding effort: technically impressive, far in front of 
shipbuilding thinking elsewhere in the world, but ultimately did not contribute to victory in the 
war. The Hog Island shipyard was promptly closed down and demolished after the last 
delivery in 1921; much of the site is now the Philadelphia airport. However, the effort was a 
valuable dress rehearsal for World War II, in which the same theme of ship manufacturing in 
huge, purpose-built facilities was adopted with much more timeliness.  
The merchant shipbuilding program’s results in Table 3 paralleled those of the naval 
construction program: impressive industrial mobilization, but too late for most of the ships to 
come on line during the war (see Figure 1). This effect was exacerbated in the merchant 
vessel program, as most of the shipyards did not exist before the hostilities, and the largest 
did not exist until after U.S. entry.  
 
 
 Gross Tons of Steel Merchant Ships (over 2,000 gt) Delivered 1914–1945 
(Smith & Brown, 1948) 
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Discussion and Recommendations 
The U.S. World War I shipbuilding program was not effective because it started well 
after World War I was underway, and because of poor management in its initial 
stages. World War I began in August 1914, and by the end of that year it was clear that it 
would be a long desperate struggle, yet the United States made few preparations for naval 
construction until the Naval Act of 1916. Seven months later, in April 1917, the United States 
entered the war, and at that point the Emergency Fleet Corporation still had not been 
created.  
The contrast to the World War II experience is stark. A ramp-up in ship orders for 
that war started at the expiration of the naval arms limitation treaties in 1936, three years 
prior to European theatre hostilities. As early as 1939, efforts were initiated to expand 
industrial capacity. During America’s pre-War period (1936–1941), 182 destroyers were 
authorized and 39 were delivered.  
The World War I experience suggests some food for thought in preparation for the 
onset of future industrial-scale, non-nuclear, global war. A few samples are offered in the 
next paragraphs. 
1. Investments in options could increase industrial capacity rapidly. This would include the 
shipbuilding industrial base and the critical supplier base of facilities that take the same 
general timeframe to ramp up as a shipyard. This could include foundries, forges, 
specialty machine shops, and other types of production facilities, and capacity for 
development of software infrastructure for naval and commercial ships. 
2. Merchant marine and merchant shipbuilding policies may be due for a reexamination. In 
past global wars, merchant fleets have been instrumental tools of military strategy. They 
were required to reposition ground forces, their gear, and supplies between overseas 
theatres of war. The U.S. merchant marine has substantially atrophied since World War 
II. U.S. subsidy programs supporting the foreign trading segment of the merchant marine 
have not been funded since the early 1980s.7 Before 1914, approximately 75% of U.S. 
shipbuilding industrial capacity was engaged in Navy new construction. But at the height 
of World War I, after tremendous capacity expansion, there were more merchant ships 
being built than warships even though most of the warships being built were small. In 
World Wars I and II, at the point when the situation was grimmest for the allied powers, 
merchant shipbuilding was by far the #1 priority, not warship construction.  
3. In preparation for high-volume wartime production, creation of detailed designs of 
merchant and naval ship types could be done in advance. If the two world wars are valid 
guidance (not known), then other ship types, including long-lead-time warships, would 
out of necessity be placed at lower priority.8 The corollary would be that those are the 
ship types that would be emphasized in peacetime in the absence of war exigencies.  
                                               
 
 
7 The foreign trading segment of the merchant marine exists outside of the Jones Act 
legislative environment. Historically it was supported via mechanisms including subsidies and cargo 
preference programs (Gibson & Donovan, 2000). 
8 World War I lasted less than 4 ½ years (including prior to U.S. involvement), so even for the 
European belligerents, no ships that took longer than that to build were able to be used during the 
war.  
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4. Prototype construction of some of those ship designs to work out design issues, 
production issues, and gain feedback from the operator for design mods may be an 
effective way to smooth the path to wartime volume production. For effective designs, it 
may be advantageous to store jigs and other critical tooling.  
5. Ship design flexibility may be at a premium at the outset of a new industrial-scale 
conflict, due to the impossibility of accurately predicting the nature of future naval 
combat. In World War I, not only was the naval surface combatant production priority 
changed from capital ships to destroyers, the originally intended fleet combat role of the 
destroyers (e.g., torpedo attacks on enemy capital ships) never materialized. Instead, 
they were pressed into service convoying merchant vessels and conducting the world’s 
first antisubmarine warfare campaign (Gardiner, 1985).  
Conclusion  
The industrial mobilization experience of the United States in World War II has been 
described and discussed in an extensive literature and is well known. One reason is that it is 
an uplifting story, and in significant ways it embodied the ideals upon which the best in 
American civilization is based. It was as the “arsenal of democracy” that America made, 
arguably, its most irreplaceable contribution to allied victory. A critical lynchpin of that effort 
was shipbuilding, where the result was achieved through the voluntary, dedicated labor of 
an unprecedented cross section of American society (including women and minorities) who 
were effectively mobilized with a common goal of building merchant ships to counter the 
effects of German submarine warfare.  
In World War I, both the need and the means were almost the same, and yet the 
result was disappointing, even though the United States responded in a spectacular fashion, 
temporarily becoming the largest shipbuilding nation in the world, and the ships built during 
the World War I program “composed the great bulk of the American merchant marine until 
the construction program of World War II had effect” (Hutchins, 1948, p. 53). In this paper 
we have described the actions taken and that the results were too late to have as much 
effect as they could have had.  
For an additional cautionary conclusion, we now take a big-picture look. We observe 
that the industrial mobilization outcome in the 1941–1945 war was fully informed by the 
1917–1918 experience. For World War II, “the characteristics of that earlier period were … 
again duplicated” (Hutchins, 1948, p. 57). In terms of industrial base strategy, industrial 
organization, and manufacturing technology, World War I served almost as a dress 
rehearsal for World War II. In a potential 21st century non-nuclear World War III, could the 
United States update the successful World War II script to achieve victory? Not likely, as too 
many variables (industrial, economic, geopolitical) have undergone fundamental change 
since 1945. Which brings us back to the World War I predicament: mobilizing the industrial 
base in a new economic environment, for a new type of war.  
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Abstract 
Small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS) are increasingly important for ground 
combat operations. SUAS extend ground unit situational awareness and their ability to 
prosecute targets, and may enhance command and control. Their fast development cycles, 
commercial availability, and still-maturing operational concepts, though, do not align well 
with conventional U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) force development processes and 
timelines. This paper proposes a framework to address this misalignment by rapidly 
capturing unstructured qualitative insights on SUAS usage and converting them into 
procurement and allocation levels within the context of existing force development 
processes. The process leverages semi-structured interviews and document collection for 
data collection, followed by a mixed method approach using qualitative coding and 
mathematical matching. The result is a set of procurement and allocation levels that 
balances current operational needs with opportunities for experimentation and concept 
development. 
Introduction 
Current Marine Corps operations and future operating concepts place a heavy 
emphasis on disaggregated and distributed operations (U.S. Marine Corps, 2016). Such 
operations require high demand, low density capabilities such as aerial imagery and 
command, control, communications, computers (C4) assets to provide battlefield 
awareness. Currently, the Marine Corps centralizes many of these assets at regimental or 
higher echelons. This approach is inadequate to provide support to subordinate units 
conducting disaggregated and distributed operations. As such, the Marine Corps has seen 
an increased demand for organic means of enhancing battlespace awareness at the 
company level and below. To meet this growing demand, the Marine Corps has invested in 
emerging small unmanned aircraft system (SUAS) technology which provides small units 
with not only organic situational awareness capabilities, but also other capabilities that were 
once exclusively held at higher level units. The Marine Corps has been experimenting with 
these platforms for over 15 years and has accelerated its efforts to integrate SUAS into 
operations. 
However, the Marine Corps is still refining its requirements for this maturing 
technology. The analyses that drive requirements are incomplete. Other platforms have 
been acquired through the rapid acquisition process. The current acquisition approach has 
focused on ground combat elements, primarily infantry units, but the expectation is that 
other unit requirements will expand rapidly when other elements are considered. 
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Additionally, SUAS technology advances are being influenced by commercial factors that 
may crowd out military ones.1  
The Marine Corps has identified that a comprehensive review of the SUAS portfolio 
is required. This review will help determine what capabilities are needed across the Marine 
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and where there are current gaps. The purpose of this 
research is to document lessons learned from the Marine Corps’ recent experience and 
recommend next steps in SUAS allocation and procurement. 
Research Approach 
For this research, SUAS are defined as unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) in 
Department of Defense (DoD) UAS Groups 1 and 2; these systems weigh less than 55 
pounds, fly lower than 3,500 feet above ground level (AGL), and fly no faster than 250 
knots. Groups 1 and 2 encompass a wide span of capabilities. We further define SUAS 
using the seven emerging categories used by U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) Expeditionary Organic Tactical AISR Capability Set (EOTACS) to further refine 
DoD Groups 1 and 2.2 These seven categories are explained in Table 1. In particular, we 
use the performance characteristics of each EOTACS category to frame our procurement 
analyses and recommendations in later chapters. Note that Category 1 consists of tethered 
platforms and is not considered SUAS and thus not considered in our research.  
  
                                               
 
 
1 Facilitator interview 
2 AISR: airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance 
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Table 1. USSOCOM EOTACS Categories Considered in This Analysis  































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Payload threshold 
weight (lbs) 
0 0 1 1 2 10 





10 15 20 20 25 25 
Dash (KIAS) 10 15 20 35 35 35 
Weight 
Min (lbs) 0 0 3 0 0 20 
Max (lbs) 1 3 10 20 20 55 
Launch 
Hand? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Bungee No No No No No Yes 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deep stall? No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sliding (belly 
land)? 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Combination? No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note. VTOL: vertical takeoff and landing, FW: fixed wing, SR: short range, SE: short endurance, MR: medium range, ME: 
medium endurance, LR: long range, LE: long endurance 
Assumptions and Limitations 
Like any research, this effort was bounded by various assumptions and practical 
constraints. We identify them here at the outset of this report. 
• This research only addresses SUAS needs for CE and GCE units from the squad 
to regimental level.  
• This research is confined to examining material solutions. 
• The mathematical matching methodology errs on the side of inclusivity when it 
comes to linking SUAS platforms and categories to definable mission tasks.  
• This analysis is budget-unconstrained as it assesses CE and GCE SUAS 
employment today, along with future needs, and develops an idealized future 
state to inform decision makers considering future SUAS procurement.  
• Costs are representative of current models for each category and are current as 
of October 2018. 
• Procurement recommendations do not include platforms already in Marine Corps 
possession.  
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• We did not consider the effect that task-organized units (i.e., Marine air ground 
task forces) might have on reducing the number of platforms needed.  
• At the request of the sponsor, our quantities do not take attrition or additional 
maintenance float requirements into consideration.  
A Literature Review Identified Decision Paths and Outcomes of Actions That the 
Marine Corps Has Already Taken 
To capture the Marine Corps’ baseline SUAS usage, we reviewed a variety of after 
action reviews (AARs), reports, and open-source literature to understand the work that the 
Marine Corps has already done to develop its SUAS capability. This body of work spanned 
over 10 years and helped us understand the previous analyses, decisions, and problem 
areas that have informed the Marine Corps’ SUAS efforts. In particular, they helped us 
identify five mission profiles that encompass the different ways the Marine Corps may use 
SUAS (exemplar sources are cited): 
• Situational awareness: Increase small-unit commanders’ ability to visualize the 
battlefield to speed their decision-making process (Dalby, 2013). 
• Force protection: At the small-unit level, provide standoff detection ability to 
detect and inspect improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) to allow freedom of maneuver (Gillis, 2017). 
• Rapid target engagement: Increase small-unit commanders’ ability to identify, 
locate, and engage targets, particularly time-sensitive ones (Dalby, 2013). 
• Persistent C4: Increase small units’ abilities to communicate through voice and 
data, particularly at beyond line of sight (LOS) ranges or dense terrain that 
suppresses signals (NCOs, SNCOs, & Officers of 3d Bn 5th Marines, 2017). 
• Persistent electronic warfare (EW): Provide small units with the ability to sense 
and affect the electromagnetic spectrum for military purposes (Turnbull, 2019).  
Semi-Structured Interviews and Qualitative Coding Systematically Revealed 
Operational Insights From Current Users 
To assess how well the Marine Corps is employing its SUAS to fulfill those mission 
profiles today, we conducted and analyzed a series of semi-structured interviews. Interviews 
provided direct access to personnel intimately involved in managing and employing SUAS. 
We developed and followed semi-structured protocols that encouraged discussion about 
how SUAS are currently employed, how they might be employed in the future, the force 
development process, and sustainment. We opted for semi-structured interviews to 
encourage greater consistency across interviewees while allowing the flexibility to explore 
relevant subject areas that we did not anticipate during protocol development. Our literature 
review suggested three different interview groups, and our protocols were tailored to focus 
on areas most relevant to each:3  
• Sponsors that articulated how the SUAS serves Marine Corps purposes. This 
included HQMC(CD&I) and PMA-263. Protocols focused on future employment, 
force development, and sustainment. 
                                               
 
 
3Although we focused on certain interview areas for each group, all groups were given the 
opportunity to discuss all interview areas.  
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• Facilitators that enable SUAS employment, such as training and logistics 
support agencies (TALSAs), MCTOG, VMXs, and Defense Innovation Unit (DIU). 
Protocols were focused on force development and sustainment. 
• Operators that employ the SUAS, which mostly consisted of unit SUAS program 
managers from division to battalion level.4 Protocols were focused on current 
employment, future employment, and sustainment. 
We interviewed 69 individuals across 39 organizations between May and November 
2018. We conducted interviews in person at Marine Corps and DoD installations across the 
continental United States (CONUS) and over the phone. In addition to interviewing HQMC 
sponsor and facilitator organizations, we interviewed at least one unit of each type from the 
CE and GCE.  
Thematic Analysis  
We explored the collected literature review and interview data through qualitative 
coding and thematic analysis. To ground our analysis. we developed a code tree with 
themes we were interested in exploring. The code tree was based on initial themes that 
emerged from the literature and interviews, including the utility of various SUAS mission 
profiles, preferred SUAS design characteristics, employment, and sustainment issues. All 
interviews were coded by two team members using Dedoose thematic analysis software (De 
Vries et al., 2008).5 This activity was particularly important in enabling us to quantify the 
qualitative data captured in the interviews (e.g., priority of SUAS design characteristics) and 
understand its ordinality. In addition, coding captured tones and sentiments that helped us 
more comprehensively understand the underlying connotations interviewees associated with 
various aspects of SUAS. Emergent relationships observed in coding were used to guide 
and inform other aspects of the research approach. 
The interview results, in conjunction with the review of source documentation, 
allowed us to examine a variety of themes across and between different interviewee 
perspectives (e.g., HQMC versus operating forces, CE versus GCE, and different OccFlds 
and echelons). This analysis forms our assessment of the current state of SUAS in the 
Marine Corps, explored in the following three themes.  
Mathematical Matching Helped Identify the Best SUAS for Each OccFld and Echelon 
To systematically relate the insights from the literature review and interview themes 
into procurement and allocation recommendations, we took several steps to convert the 
qualitative data into quantitative proxies. We used a mathematical matching method to 
transform the qualitive data into ideal SUAS design characteristics for each occupational 
field (OccFld) and echelon, then allocated them to CE and GCE units. This yielded a set of 
procurement and allocation courses of action for the Marine Corps to consider. Model inputs 
can be changed, allowing the Marine Corps to conduct additional analysis using different 
assumptions or units of interest. 
                                               
 
 
4Although we interfaced with units no smaller than battalions, they provided us with access or 
perspective on lower echelons, down to the squad level.  
5To ensure consistency of coding by all coders, inter-rater reliability was tested using Cohen’s 
kappa. The two coders involved in this project achieved a 0.91 kappa score, indicating almost perfect 
agreement. 
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Complementary Data Sources Shaped the Ideal SUAS Profile for Each OccFld and 
Echelon 
To convert the qualitative data into quantitative proxies, we considered three 
additional data sets to give depth and rigor to the process: 
• The 1,242 training and readiness (T&R) tasks that define tasks for each OccFld 
and echelon of interest 
• EOTACS framework, including representative costs 
• Descriptions of the five SUAS mission profiles 
 
Each data source complements the others, forming a broad understanding of how 
SUAS may be useful for a given OccFld-echelon combination. T&R tasks define the entire 
range of tasks that a given OccFld-echelon combination is required to perform, but do not 
offer information about how SUAS might fit into a task. Interview data provided information 
on how SUAS might help an OccFld-echelon combination perform its mission generally, but 
not at the detailed level described in the T&R manual. The EOTACS framework helps us 
delineate different levels of capability between SUAS. Lastly, the SUAS mission profiles 
paint a detailed picture of how SUAS might help with Marine Corps missions generally but 
does not characterize how they might help any given OccFld-echelon combination.  
Combining the data allowed us to articulate the ideal SUAS design profile for each 
OccFld-echelon combination. Note that interview inputs were necessarily limited to ordinal 
preferences and some design characteristics were subjective.6 To accommodate this (and 
to make the ideal SUAS design profile relatable to existing classes of SUAS), we converted 
all preference data into rankings of the importance of each design characteristic for each 
T&R task for each mission profile.7  
For instance, consider the infantry battalion task of conducting a ground attack (T&R 
task INF-MAN-7001). Rankings were informed by interview inputs and the research team’s 
understanding of each T&R task definition and mission profile description. On that basis, 
SUAS situational awareness capabilities would be useful in this regard, but not force 
protection, rapid target engagement, persistent C4, or persistent EW. Within the situational 
awareness task, a SUAS’ endurance is the most important priority. Speed is the next 
priority, followed by payload carrying capacity, weight, and launch and recovery flexibility. 
This process was repeated for all 1,242 T&R tasks related to the OccFlds and echelons of 
interest for this research. If a task did not apply to a mission profile, then it was assigned a 
null value. See Figure 1 for a graphical example.  
                                               
 
 
6 For instance, it would be difficult for an interviewee to articulate a response to our question 
about design preferences with a numeric answer such as specific speed or payload carrying capacity. 
Rather, we asked for a general ranking of the design characteristic. Nevertheless, an ordinal 
preference does not indicate how close either ideal specifications or platforms might be to each other. 
In reality, platforms might be quite comparable, but ordinal rankings force a distinct prioritization, 
which could distort choices. 
7 Embedded in each individual T&R task is the OccFld and echelon that it applies to; no T&R 
task is applied to more than one OccFld echelon combination. 
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 Example of Training & Readiness SUAS Design 
Characteristic Ranking 
Note. Source: RAND analysis 
 
The result was a set of 37,260 individual ranking sets.8 To generalize this information 
down to an ideal SUAS profile, we took the average of all ranking sets for each OccFld-
echelon combination. Note that we considered all T&R tasks to be equally important to the 
overall functioning of an OccFld-echelon combination.9 However, we did consider the 
relative importance of each mission profile to each OccFld-echelon combination. In this 
case, we opted to weight the situational awareness mission 1.5 times the other mission 
profiles, as it was the one that was most consistently mentioned in interviews. The ultimate 
result is a ranking of the importance of the six SUAS design characteristics for each OccFld-
echelon combination. See Figure 2 for a graphical example.  
 
 Aggregating Preference Inputs Into Ideal SUAS Profiles 
                                               
 
 
8 From 1,242 rankings multiplied by six design characteristics, multiplied by five mission 
profiles. 
9 This can be reinvestigated by other, more knowledgeable experts if needed. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 272 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
Note. Source: RAND analysis 
Matching Ideal Profile to SUAS Design Characteristics 
The next step is to identify the EOTACS category that best meets the ideal design 
profile articulated by a given OccFld-echelon combination. To do this, we used a common 
method for ranking complex preferences, known as the analytical hierarchy process (AHP), 
with some modifications.  
We Modified an Analytical Hierarchy Process to Accommodate Ranked Preferences 
The standard AHP takes as its inputs matrices of pairwise comparisons between 
characteristics (Satty, 1986). These pairwise comparisons specify which of each pair is more 
suitable—and by how much—according to a prescribed mapping of verbal descriptions of 
relative suitability to numeric scores.  
In standard AHP, the verbal descriptions enable analysts to directly compare the 
direction and magnitude between a pairwise comparison.10 Since our interviewees were only 
able to respond with design preferences in ranked order, we modified the AHP methodology 
by expressing a unit’s numerical capability requirement profile as a single vector ranking the 
relative importance of each SUAS characteristic. Similarly, because units have not had the 
opportunity to establish specific platform-agnostic technical specifications, we converted the 
technical specifications of platform categories to rankings of each category for each 
characteristic. For example, the category with the fastest speed was ranked 1 for speed. 
See Table 2 for a graphical depiction of this arrangement. 
Table 2. Ranked SUAS Design Characteristics 
 Design 
characteristic 




















Endurance Longer is 
better 
1 5 5 4 4 3 2 
Speed Faster is 
better 
5 4 3 2 2 1 1 





2 4 4 3 3 2 1 
Launch More options 
are better 
3 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Recovery More options 
are better 
3 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Note. Source: RAND analysis 
We next applied the modified AHP algorithm to compare the ideal SUAS profiles to 
the converted EOTACS categories. Our modified algorithm was originally developed in R 
                                               
 
 
10 For example, consider an interview with a car enthusiast about engine preferences. The 
interviewee can respond with specific horsepower or liter displacement preferences. Since these 
design preferences can be articulated as quantitative values, the direction and magnitude of the 
preferences (expressed as Euclidian distances) can be evaluated directly. 
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and later adapted to VBA to facilitate wider compatibility with USMC computers. The 
following steps  illustrate each transformation in the algorithm:  
• Ranked EOTACS profile is read in and reversed such that higher values 
represent better performance in a category. This was done to facilitate modified 
pairwise comparisons. 
• Aggregated unit preference averages are read in using the VBA macro. 
• A pairwise matrix is constructed by taking the ratio of each ranked design 
characteristic to each other. For example, the weighted rank for endurance is 
compared to the weighted rank for payload carrying capacity by dividing the 
weighted rank score by the weighted endurance score. The matrix yields 36 
ratios, which are then summed by column. 
• A normalized matrix is created by dividing each cell value from the modified 
pairwise matrix by the sum of the respective column from the same matrix. The 
average of each row yields the weight of a given design characteristic for each 
OccFld-echelon combination. 
• The dot-product of the design characteristic categories for each SUAS and the 
weight vector created in the previous step yields a score value for each EOTACS 
category. The highest score indicates the optimal match.  
The process is repeated for each OccFld-echelon combination. The resulting scores 
yield a complete ranking of each EOTACS category to each OccFld-echelon combination 
from best to worst fit.  
These analytical outputs are not prescriptive. Like any process, we expect the 
modified AHP to have some shortcomings (see the next section), given how much we 
reduced and generalized the starting inputs. Rather, these outputs should be considered as 
the starting point for further evaluation of the optimal EOTACS category for a given OccFld-
echelon combination.  
Modified AHP Has Some Shortcomings 
Our modified AHP reduces match quality by compressing both the Euclidean 
distance between units with different priorities and between SUAS categories with different 
capabilities.11 In this specific application, these modifications likely did not affect match 
results because SUAS categories vary most significantly along discrete dimensions, such as 
whether a category offers vertical take-off and landing (VTOL). As the SUAS market 
matures and more specialized platforms become available, users can increase the fidelity of 
this model by  
                                               
 
 
11 For example, consider comparisons between two different pairs of platforms along the 
dimension of endurance. Suppose that for the first pair, the highest ranked platform has a maximum 
endurance of 10 hours and the second ranked platform has an endurance of 9.5 hours. Suppose that 
for the second pair, the top ranked is 10 hours and the second ranked is only five hours. The 
endurance of the first pair is so close that it might be preferable to go with the second ranked platform 
if, for example, it is significantly less expensive or superior along another performance dimension 
such as speed. In contrast, the difference between the second pair is significant, and the first platform 
is likely preferable for a unit requiring longer endurance, even at the expense of greater cost or other 
performance features. Our modified AHP cannot distinguish between these two situations in the same 
way the standard AHP with pairwise rankings can. 
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• establishing capability-based, platform-agnostic technical requirements where 
possible (i.e., the maximum acceptable decibel signature for a unit) for 
subsequent use in a quantitative matching algorithm, and  
• where requirements cannot be expressed in quantitative terms, generating full 
pair-wise comparison matrices in order to employ the standard AHP, rather than 
ranking across characteristics. 
To identify the SUAS categories best satisfying unit capability requirements, we input 
both the SUAS category capability rankings and unit capability requirements profiles into the 
AHP algorithm, which mathematically identified the best matched SUAS category for each 
unit’s capability requirements profile. 
We Developed Quantity Recommendations From Literature Review and Interview 
Inputs 
Having identified the best EOTACS category (or categories) for each OccFld and 
echelon, we estimated the total quantity of platforms needed to usefully carry out the 
missions that SUAS might be useful for. For each OccFld-echelon combination, we 
considered interview inputs, unit AARs, unit CONEMP and CONOP slides, the Marine 
Operating Concept, and current unit organization documents to identify the needed quantity 
of each EOTACS category. In some cases, some OccFlds had highly developed CONEMPs 
and CONOPs that illustrate concepts and plans for how SUAS might be employed within the 
context of an operation. These slides often included recommended quantities and types of 
SUAS needed to accomplish a given mission. In other cases, we had to infer and estimate 
the number.12 We then scaled that quantity up so as to equip all units in a given OccFld-
echelon combination. Finally, we considered a slightly reduced allocation to capitalize on the 
Marine Corps’ existing TALSA investments to manage a pooled SUAS fleet for units that are 
less mature in their SUAS employment concepts.  
Results 
Our results are divided into two sections. First, qualitative insights on the current 
state of SUAS in the Marine Corps indicate a greater need for access to platforms in order 
to fully determine what the optimum quantity and type of SUAS might be. Second, we offer a 
set of three procurement and allocation recommendations that fulfill the access need to 
varying degrees.  
Current State of SUAS in the Marine Corps 
The thematic analysis identified three key results about the current state of SUAS in 
the Marine Corps.  
Marine Corps Occupational Fields Only Partially Grasp What SUAS Mission 
Profiles Are Useful to Them 
Based on our thematic analysis, we found that Marine Corps CE and GCE units 
understand and value the utility of some SUAS mission profiles, but the utility of other 
                                               
 
 
12 We inferred quantities in such cases by reviewing doctrine, T&R standards, and emerging 
concepts (described in the Marine Operating Concept) to identify how many of each type of SUAS 
would need to be used by a given unit and how many units would have to employ SUAS 
simultaneously.  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 275 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
profiles remains unclear. Recall from the Research Approach chapter that the Marine Corps 
identified five mission profiles: (1) situational awareness, (2) force protection, (3) rapid target 
engagement, (4) persistent C4, and (5) persistent EW. Almost all units shared numerous 
and substantial observations about situational awareness and force protection mission 
profiles. When asked how their units currently employ SUAS, interviewees discussed tasks 
that corresponded to the situational awareness mission profile 97 times in 29 of 42 
interviews. Tasks related to the force protection mission profile were mentioned 51 times in 
32 interviews. One excerpt from a light armored reconnaissance (LAR) unit indicates the 
familiarity and appreciation for the ability of SUAS to enhance situational awareness: 
I think the situational awareness … the idea behind [the RQ-11B Raven] is 
for preliminary reconnaissance before the vehicles go up. See the route, 
identify manmade or natural obstacles and whether or not we should even 
try. 
Even units that did not have much experience with SUAS shared substantive 
observations about how they would employ SUAS for these mission profiles. A 
reconnaissance interviewee who had only used SUAS sporadically in the past illustrates a 
level of appreciation for it, much the same as we saw in the previous excerpt: 
[The] key benefit is providing offset from our objective[;] it avoids big 
compromise problems. It allows us to gather information without being 
close. 
Another interviewee from an artillery unit (a community that did not indicate frequent 
SUAS usage) discussed both its usage for situational awareness as it is described in this 
context and also for understanding its own force signature: 
[We use SUAS] to fly red cell. Training batteries use them to understand 
new threat dimension, to look to the sky. This is not something were used 
to thinking about. We do lots of red cell work, [as well as] assessment of 
our own signature, what we look like. 
These and other responses indicate that CE and GCE units understand how SUAS 
can enable both mission profiles and what the concepts of employment may entail. 
However, the other three mission profiles were less frequently commented on or 
understood. Rapid target engagement was mentioned 56 times, but only in 13 interviews. 
Interestingly, some units professed deep experience in using SUAS for rapid target 
engagement, but others did not. An infantry interview excerpt illustrates the almost casual 
and pedestrian nature of using SUAS for this mission:  
We call for fire with the Ravens and Pumas regularly. … We’ve done 
multiple exercises with the mortars organic to the company and artillery. 
Both have been used and we’ve adjusted fire off both of them. 
At the same time, our interactions with artillery units—units who would be an obvious 
beneficiary of SUAS-enabled rapid target engagement—suggested less consistent usage. 
When contacted, some artillery units claimed that they did not use SUAS in any capacity at 
all. Others discussed using SUAS only for situational awareness. A division SUAS program 
manager observed: 
Artillery units don’t use it as much as you’d think. I was surprised 
that they don’t use them more. For targeting, [battle damage assessment], 
from division perspective [this would be useful] especially during exercises. 
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There were even fewer mentions of persistent EW (four mentions in four interviews) 
and persistent C4 (three mentions in three interviews) by SUAS users. As a whole, 
interviewee responses indicate that experience across the five mission profiles is uneven. 
Situational awareness and force protection uses are understood, rapid target engagement 
uses are somewhat understood, while other mission profiles are far less so. 
This is not to say that all OccFlds require the same level of proficiency across all the 
SUAS mission profiles. From interview responses and the literature review, we formed a 
hypothesis that different communities have varying needs for these mission profiles. Our 
research shows that the infantry community has a clear need for all five mission profiles, but 
it is not yet clear which mission profiles are crucial for others. Figure 3 provides our current 
assessment of which mission profiles might be required for each community. 
 
 RAND-Assessed Potential Mission Demand by Unit Type 
Note. Source: RAND analysis 
 
We believe the Marine Corps should consider identifying each OccFld/unit’s true 
demand for each mission profile. This will be a crucial task that will shape requirements 
across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 
and facilities (DOTMLPF) and help the Marine Corps take the fullest advantage of SUAS at 
the least risk of making a poor investment decision.  
Access Is Key to Further Understanding of SUAS Utility 
We found that the infantry and LAR communities had the most mature understanding 
of SUAS. For the infantry, this is because it has been given priority in accessing platforms. A 
MEF SUAS program manager (PM) illustrated this:  
So what I base everything off of is the [SUAS] fielding plan, so we’re 
keeping that going as a good place to start. It’s a good baseline, but the 
problem is there are so many other units and there’s not enough inventory 
to go across the spectrum. … For example, units A and B went out the door 
with almost three times the systems because their [concept of operation] 
was briefed to Commandant [of the Marine Corps]. [We] have to balance 
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the small number of systems across the [MEF]. If you don’t have anything 
going on, I’ll probably take your systems. 
Because the infantry has such extensive exposure to the platforms, the infantry had 
the opportunity to develop and refine CONEMPs for situational awareness, force protection, 
and (to a lesser extent) rapid target engagement. We also observed that the infantry has 
started to consider the potential utility of SUAS for providing persistent C4 and EW. 
The LAR community gained its understanding of SUAS differently. Rather than 
gaining exposure through prolonged access to existing platforms alone, some of its units 
also have direct access to the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL), the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR), and through them, SUAS contractor teams. Through those organizations, 
the LAR community has been able to focus directly on experimenting with CONEMPs and 
with different platforms instead of learning through exposure alone. Because of this different 
form of access and the relatively small size of the LAR community, it has achieved a level of 
SUAS maturity that is comparable to that of the infantry. However, we do not believe the 
LAR community approach is scalable because direct relationships with the MCWL and ONR 
can only be sustained for a small number of units. 
The other communities had lower levels of experience using the platforms in training 
and during deployment. Interview responses and AAR reviews suggest that most 
communities have had some access to SUAS, but such access has not been consistent. In 
some cases, units were not aware they had access to the platforms, despite the fact that 
such platforms were on their unit tables of equipment (T/Es). We believe the way that the 
Marine Corps has prioritized SUAS access over time has suppressed demand from low-
priority units. In other words, these units have learned to stop requesting SUAS. One 
battalion commander’s observation highlights an extreme case: 
I was six months into job before I knew we had designated [RQ-20B] 
Pumas. It was just a drive by conversation. I saw sheet of paper. There is 
education gap between what [HQMC and higher echelons] produce and 
the information they disseminate to units. Some units still don’t know they 
have airframes designated for them up there. 
When units do gain access to SUAS, they often must focus on maintaining operator 
currency on the platforms—activities that contribute little to a unit’s ability to employ SUAS 
as described in the mission profiles or to support any other unit task. One SUAS PM from a 
low-priority unit observed that maintaining operator currency (discussed more later) is his 
key concern. 
The main thing with SUAS is that they need to be more available. So 
currency prevents them from being used because it’s impossible to be 
current. I would like to use them more, but it takes a [lot] of work to be 
current. 
As a result of uneven access, units across the CE and GCE have uneven experience 
employing SUAS. Units that have sufficient access to SUAS have room to experiment with 
CONEMPs, gain experience with SUAS, and determine the true demand for SUAS. Units 
that have little access are only able to sustain basic operator skills to maintain currency. We 
also observed differences in SUAS experience across different units of the same 
community. This was particularly evident in our interactions with the artillery community. 
Consistent access drives understanding of how SUAS and SUAS mission profiles contribute 
to a community. 
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Non-Material Issues Must Also Be Addressed to Increase Access 
We also found that significant impediments to greater SUAS maturity in the Marine 
Corps are not related to material solutions. Although our protocols focused mainly on 
material topics, a consistent trend in user interviews was a focus on non-material issues. 
The most cited issues were doctrinal, personnel, and training, each of which is described 
next. Although non-material aspects of SUAS employment were out of the scope of this 
research, the issues described next are relevant to the issue of SUAS access previously 
discussed. Further research should be conducted into the full range of DOTMLPF issues 
impacting the use of SUAS by CE and GCE units and how they might be addressed.  
Lack of Agreed-Upon SUAS Doctrine and Concepts Impedes Tactical-Level Usage 
The Marine Corps today lacks SUAS doctrine and concepts of employment for CE 
and GCE units. Some service-wide guidance has been articulated, but such guidance is 
insufficiently detailed. Guidance includes a reference publication on unmanned aircraft 
systems (MCRP 3-20.5, Unmanned Aircraft System Operations) and the SUAS training and 
readiness (T&R) manual (NAVMC 3500.107). MCRP 3-20.5 contains useful employment 
information and considerations but is meant primarily for Group 3 platforms employed by 
dedicated unmanned aircraft squadrons. The T&R manual provides standards for training 
Group 1 operators, but it offers nothing on employing SUAS operationally. 
The lack of generally understood doctrine, CONEMPs, and other service-wide 
direction impedes the general utility of SUAS. We observed from our interviews that many 
units can conceptualize the situational awareness and, to lesser degrees, force protection 
and rapid target engagement profiles without doctrine or other guidance. However, few 
interviewees could imagine the utility of SUAS for persistent C4 and persistent EW. Without 
a basic understanding of these profiles, units cannot determine the true need for SUAS in 
their units. Furthermore, the lack of doctrine or other guidance impedes consistent 
understanding of the required training and support needed to allow units to fully use SUAS. 
Personnel Management Is Inefficient and Can Affect SUAS Operations 
Another issue that impedes SUAS maturity across the CE and GCE is the uneven 
availability of qualified operators. SUAS training is not centrally tracked in the Marine Corps, 
thus making it difficult to manage the Marine Corps’ inventory of trained operators. This can 
make it difficult for a unit to ensure that it has enough current, qualified operators to support 
its mission. For example, several units reported difficulty in maintaining visibility into its 
SUAS operators’ currency. Units also lose SUAS operators due to normal personnel 
rotations and are sometimes unable to secure other training opportunities in time to support 
a deployment.13 This concern is exacerbated by the TALSAs’ relatively limited training 
capacity and the relatively small number of operators already trained; rectifying a training 
shortage within a reasonable timeframe may not be feasible for some units. Finally, the 
need for effective SUAS personnel management will only grow as the Marine Corps 
reorganizes itself to more fully integrate SUAS and other technologies into its operations. 
Training 
We observed two training-related issues that negatively impact SUAS maturity 
across the CE and GCE. First, formal SUAS training (provided by the TALSAs) is focused 
                                               
 
 
13 User interview 
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on system basics and does not provide instruction on how to employ SUAS operationally. 
The remarks of one unit’s SUAS program manager are typical: 
My lance corporal had good enough training to operate, but he lacked the 
tactical aspect. Our biggest problem with SUAS is a massive gap between 
learning how to fly it and then how to use it tactically. The lance corporal 
gets to fly for half an hour one time a month. I’m here to bridge the gap and 
teach him how to find things through a sensor. What we don’t have is some 
type of institution that will standardize this training and bring lance corporals 
from being able to operate it, [to] fly[ing] it tactically. 
Second, current training areas may be insufficient to support all SUAS mission 
profiles. One of the biggest limiting factors is access to ranges where units can fly SUAS. 
Range control regulations at some bases limit units’ abilities to train effectively. For instance, 
Camp Lejeune–based units are not allowed to conduct SUAS handoffs without both pilots 
having visual contact with the platform.14 Also, units are not allowed to operate from a 
moving platform (e.g., HMMWV, LAV, etc.), although doing so is critical to exploiting SUAS 
in an operational environment. Current range restrictions may require units to spend extra 
time and resources to get exceptions, or such restrictions may not be waived at all. This 
prevents units from incorporating SUAS more fully into individual and collective training. 
Three Procurement and Allocation Models Address the Access Need to Varying 
Degrees 
From our mathematical matching and quantity identification process, we articulated 
two different allocation models based on different parameters we identified as essential and 
compared them to the Marine Corps’ status quo model. These alternatives helped us 
demonstrate what factors were drivers of cost and capability for investment in SUAS 
technology. The three models were 
• a status quo model that is based heavily on current Marine Corps procurement 
strategies 
• an economy buy model based on the full buy option that economizes by 
reducing access (and thus, total platform quantities) to platforms during some 
periods of a unit’s deployment cycle 
• a full buy model developed from our analysis that meets all identified strategic 
procurement and allocation goals  
Representative unit costs were used for all models and are shown in Table 3. 
Recommendations are shown in Table 4.  
Table 3. Representative Unit Costs 
EOTACS category Example Platform Representative Unit 
Cost 
2 (Nano/VTOL) PD-100 $51,000 
3 (Micro/VTOL) Instant Eye $18,000 
4 (SR/SE VTOL) SkyRanger $200,000 
5 (SR/SE FW) Wasp, Raven $293,500* 
6 (MR/ME FW) Puma $267,000 
7 (LR/LE FW) Stalker XE $1,547,770 
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Note. *Cost figure is an average of Raven and Wasp unit costs 
** Only direct material costs for example platforms are shown here. Costs are meant to be strictly 
representative; decision-making based on these costs should consider updated cost information or 
assumptions. 
Source: RAND and HQMC(CD&I) analysis 
 
Table 4. Representative CE and GCE SUAS Procurement and Allocation Recommendations to 
FY2025 by Occupational Field 
 Status Quo Economy Buy Full Buy 
 Quantity* Cost ($m) Quantity* Cost ($m) Quantity* Cost ($m) 
Infantry 1,676 160 2,434 274 2,634 289 
ANGLICO 30 8 12 11 36 31 
Artillery 30 8 63 45 108 65 
Communications 0 0 17 5 21 6 
LAR 20 6 282 86 322 96 
Armor 19 5 29 45 42 65 
Combat engineer 26 7 85 17 129 26 
Intelligence 7 2 9 2 12 2 
Law enforcement 0 0 26 5 39 8 
SIGINT 6 2 3 5 6 9 
Reconnaissance 26 7 159 6 237 9 
AAV 0 0 23 6 33 9 
Total 1,840 205 3,142 506 3,619 616 
Note. * Combined total of all Category 2-7 platforms 
Source: RAND and HQMC(CD&I) analysis 
 
Status Quo 
The status quo option was developed by HQMC(CD&I) prior to this research. This 
option expands the current SUAS inventory somewhat; it mainly procures more RQ-20B 
Puma platforms in response to some unit-level inputs but does not take the divestiture of 
Category 5 (SR/SE fixed wing) RQ-12A Wasp and RQ-11B Raven platforms into account. It 
preserves the current focus on infantry units. No Category 7 (LR/LE fixed wing) platforms 
are identified. No platforms are identified for assault amphibian, law enforcement, or 
communications units. It represents 50% of the full buy quantity developed from this 
analysis.  
Economy Buy 
The economy buy option provides similar expected platform availability to all OccFlds 
and echelons as the full buy option, but at reduced cost. In this option, active component 
infantry and light armored reconnaissance (LAR) units manage their SUAS inventories 
organically. Centralized training and logistics support agencies (TALSAs) continue to 
manage non-infantry and LAR unit inventories. Quantities are reduced to two-thirds of the 
full buy to account for typical force generation for typical unit deployment rotations; this 
makes platforms available to units undergoing pre-deployment training and deployment 
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cycles, but not during their post-deployment recovery phase.15 This cut 732 platforms across 
all categories from the full buy option and saves $78.25 million in direct material costs.  
Full Buy 
The full buy option fulfills our predicted demand and procures enough platforms to 
ensure availability for all units at any stage of the unit’s training and deployment cycle. 
TALSAs continue to manage non-infantry and LAR unit inventories.  
Findings and Recommendations 
The Marine Corps has made significant advances in developing its SUAS proficiency 
since 2015, when its current goals were articulated. Still, there is more potential in SUAS 
that the Marine Corps has not fully exploited. Separately, SUAS technology is advancing to 
meet commercial, as well as military, needs. This is an unusual confluence of circumstances 
that DoD and Marine Corps force development processes were not designed to 
accommodate. In that light, we offer the following recommendations to best leverage this 
emerging technology: 
• Invest significantly more (on the order of $500 million) over the next five to six 
years to redouble experimentation and conceptual development efforts. We 
recommend an investment strategy that prioritizes procurement of capabilities for 
infantry and LAR communities to help them further integrate SUAS into their 
operations and allows all other CE and GCE communities to explore the full 
range of utility that SUAS may provide. To enable that effort, procurement 
approaches should balance three elements: maximizing capability, minimizing 
technological regret, and minimizing cost.  
• Conduct further analysis into demand and usage to enable tailored procurement 
approaches. Further analysis is required of each of OccFld’s true demands for 
SUAS in each of five identified mission profiles. Additionally, the Marine Corps 
should facilitate the collection of more precise usage data, and analysis of SUAS 
market dynamics are needed to support SUAS investment decisions that can 
keep up with the technology’s fast development pace. 
• Research full range of DOTMLPF issues. Our analysis found that significant 
impediments to greater SUAS maturity in the Marine Corps are not related to 
material solutions. Further analysis of DOTMLPF considerations is required. We 
recommend that the Marine Corps review and refine its SUAS doctrine, 
manpower management, and training to fully cement operational insights and 
best practices already found. 
SUAS technology has significant potential to contribute to the force described in the 
Marine Operating Concept. However, this technology’s fast development unrelated to U.S. 
military needs demands a force development approach that relies heavily on fast iterative 
operational experimentation and conceptual development. Our assessment of previous 
                                               
 
 
15 This assumption is derived from typical deployment cycles and global force management 
processes; this ratio can be changed depending on substantive changes to these guiding principles. 
This economization was inspired by the example of MEU explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
equipment set sharing practices; only enough equipment is procured to outfit units training for 
deployment and currently deployed, but not those recovering from deployment. 
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Marine Corps SUAS investment decisions indicates that they were mindful of this; our 
recommendations provide a means to continue that approach as the Marine Corps scales 
up its SUAS investments.  
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Abstract 
As autonomous systems become more capable, end users must make decisions 
about how and when to deploy such technology. The use and adoption of a technology to 
replace a human actor depends on its ability to perform a desired task and on the user’s 
experience-based trust that it will do so. The development of experience-based trust in 
autonomous systems is expensive and high-risk. This work focuses on identifying a 
methodology for technology discovery that reduces the need for experience-based trust and 
contributes to increased adoption of autonomous systems. Initial research reveals two 
problems associated with the adoption of high-risk technologies: (1) end user refusal to 
accept new systems without high levels of initial trust and (2) lost or uncollected experience-
based trust data. The main research hypothesis is that a trust score, or trust metric, can 
influence the initial formation of trust by functioning as a surrogate for experience-based 
trust, and that trust in technology can be measured through an odds-based prediction of 
risk.  
Introduction 
We had better be quite sure that the purpose put into the machine is the purpose 
which we desire. 
—Norbert Wiener, 1960 
The use of technology by the Department of Defense (DoD) depends on its ability to 
perform a desired task. There are many issues associated with trust in technology that are 
increasing in importance as the U.S. military begins to acquire and deploy autonomous 
systems. In order to ensure the effective adoption of new innovations in technology, there is 
a need to establish a system of metrics that justify a level of technology trust. This proposed 
research has the explicit goal of investigating and recommending trust metrics by applying 
advanced analytical methodologies to increase the speed and effectiveness of the adoption 
of new technologies. This investigation proceeds by participating in an evaluation of 
technologies for use in evolving high-risk military applications. The trust metrics are 
measured in terms of the technology acceptance versus system control. 
Technology Trust 
Devitt (2018) implies that in order to meet the DoD requirements for increased speed 
of adoption for new technologies, there is a need to replace the model of developing trust 
over longer periods of time with a justifiable metric of trust. This research studies the 
effectiveness of establishing and introducing trust metrics on the evaluation and selection of 
technologies. The work participates in an ongoing assessment of autonomous systems for 
use in high-risk military applications throughout fiscal year 2019. A model is developed that 
optimizes the cognitive impacts of these trust metrics as they relate to the technology 
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selection and adoption process. The approach will be extensible and can be adopted into 
private industry. 
Research Problem 
The recent increase in the use and deployment of commercial technologies by other 
countries is a disruptive threat to the United States’ technological superiority. The rapidly 
changing technology landscape requires DoD laboratories to increase the speed at which 
they adopt new technologies (David & Nielsen, 2016). With declining budgets in research, it 
is imperative that the DoD establish new methods for rapidly adopting and effectively 
deploying new and emerging technologies whenever possible. 
Research Purpose 
As autonomous systems begin to surpass the capabilities of humans, there is a need 
to establish a level of confidence in a technology’s ability to perform as expected. The 
complexity of modern systems makes it difficult to establish a comprehensive metric of trust. 
Past research in technology trust focused on automation and methods to measure 
interpersonal person-to-firm relations, such as trust in a Web vendor or a virtual team 
member (McKnight et al., 2011). This research has the goal of establishing and measuring a 
comprehensive trust metric for individual pieces of technologies, such as autonomous 
systems, used in high-risk military applications. The development of a trust metric serves 
two purposes: first as a surrogate for experience-based trust by contributing to the formation 
of initial-trust and, second, as a collection tool for capturing experience-based trust data. 
Research into a “trust-discovery” methodology contributes to improved 
understanding of human-machine trust formation and the development of a technology-
literate workforce capable of accurately assessing new technology for a given operational 
scenario. This work first establishes a baseline definition of what it means to “trust” 
technology. It concludes with the development of a methodology leading to trusting relations 
between humans and technology. This work contributes to the literature in areas of trust in 
autonomous systems, technology adoption, and technologies intended for use in high-risk 
applications where failure or improper application can lead to severe consequences. 
Research Questions 
This study attempts to answer the following questions: 
1. How do varying levels of system control affect the development of trust in 
technologies used in high-risk military applications? The constructs researched 
include 
a. Perceived ease of use 
b. Perceived usefulness 
c. Intent to use 
2. How do anthropomorphic metrics affect the development of trust in technologies 





The following research approach is used: 
1. Study the evaluation process of autonomous systems for use in high-risk military 
applications. 
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2. Develop a conceptual framework for trust metrics that optimizes the technology 
evaluation process. 
3. Observe and record the results of both laboratory and field experimentation.  
 
The basic tenets of the experimental design are realized through a 2 x 3 factorial 
design (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. 2 x 3 Factorial Design 
  SYSTEM CONTROL 
  LOW MID HIGH 
TRUST 
METRIC 
NOT USED … …  …  
USED …  …  …  
Contribution 
The concept of a technology trust metric has applicability beyond the DoD. Private 
industry can greatly benefit from the concepts and methodologies developed in this research 
by applying trust metrics to the research and development of existing or new consumer 
technologies such as machine learning (ML), artificial intelligence (AI) systems, smart 
algorithms, and embedded technologies. These intelligent systems are transformative areas 
that will eventually integrate into all industries (e.g., self-driving cars, delivery drones, big 
data analytics, and the Internet of Things, where algorithms, machines, and computer 
systems are continually learning and evolving). 
This research also contributes to trust theory and provides an increased 
understanding of military technology acceptance. The recommendations provide a 
conceptual framework for how a military community develops trust in technologies for high-
risk missions and how varying factors influence the development of such a relationship. 
Currently, there is an effort within the DoD to perform such trust analytics, an effort in which 
this current research will participate. 
Organization 
Literature Review section: This review investigates existing literature that includes 
terms such as technology trust and risk, decision making, and technology-adoption models. 
A review of current and past theory on technology trust and decision making is developed in 
the Literature Review, which is then used to develop a comprehensive metric for assessing 
technology trust within the DoD. A proposed framework for a comprehensive trust metric is 
identified and introduced to the technology evaluation process. 
Experimental Design section: Both lab and field experiments are conducted to 
identify trust metrics. This research intends to leverage an ongoing DoD experiment 
reviewing and selecting a series of new autonomous systems. The existing data is collected 
from DoD active duty technology end users as well as civilian scientist support staff. The 
study investigates how varying levels of trust influence cognitive decision making as well as 
technology adoption. The primary product of this investigation is the experimental data 
obtained.  
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Literature Review 
The purpose of this section is to understand the formation of trust as well as analyze 
the constructs of a trust relationship. The idea of trust metrics is broken down into 
quantifiable sections based on leading theories. We conclude by presenting a conceptual 
framework for a technology trust metric based on what was learned from the literature as 
well as what is missing from the literature. 
This research was initiated through informal interviews that attempted to identify the 
factors that contribute to the use of technology in high-risk environments. The participants 
were a small group of active-duty military and veterans that deploy, or have deployed, with 
technology that posed great risk of physical harm should it fail. A number in this group 
experienced significant injury due to the failure of technology, and the potential for bias was 
noted. The open-ended questions were based on what the users did or did not like about 
using technology in high-risk scenarios. The initial coding of interviews revealed the 
following themes: 
1. Hands-on experience with technology is critical for establishing trust, and team-
based reputation for a technology is as important as personal experience. 
2. Users favor simple technology containing only the features needed to accomplish 
a mission, and users reject new technology in favor of older and more trusted 
systems. 
3. Personal investment in a mission is key to learning how to use new technology.  
These themes all have implications for the adoption of autonomous systems within 
the DoD. Advanced robotic systems have the ability to improve performance in a number of 
military roles while reducing risk to humans, and it is important to understand how to 
improve the adoption of such systems within the DoD. This initial research focused on 
technology in dangerous environments and reveals that adoption is highly dependent on the 
ability of the user to obtain the knowledge necessary to develop trust. This theme led to our 
initial literature review on understanding trust and how it applies to technology adoption. 
The literature review was developed through searches on both Web of Science and 
Google Scholar using combinations of search terms such as trust, knowledge-trust, 
technology trust, human-computer, human-robot, technology acceptance, trust attribute, 
trust risk, and risk score. The literature results were narrowed to 93 relevant articles. 
Knowledge 
The process of obtaining knowledge is fundamental to the establishment of trust. We 
therefore briefly review the epistemologies, or the processes for how a person gets to know 
something, as concepts important to this work. Early philosophers presented the two 
opposing views of the source of knowledge: rationalism or empiricism. 
The French philosopher Rene Descartes was an early rationalist who believed that 
we can only know something through reason, and that the only thing we can truly know is 
that we have consciousness. Descartes presented a methodology for knowing what is real 
that rejects a construct needed for the establishment of technology trust. He established a 
dualism that reduces our understanding to distinct areas of consciousness and matter but 
does not account for the senses. Our sense perception, he believed, is easily prone to error 
due to subjective interpretation. He believed that the senses are meant to simply get us 
around in the world rather than lead us to truth. In order to test our hypothesis of trust in 
technology, we must identify constructs that permit measurement of human interaction with 
technology, and technology interaction with its surroundings. 
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John Locke later introduced empiricism, which, contrary to rationalism, stated that all 
knowledge must be obtained through experience. The empiricists claimed that the senses 
were the only way to true knowledge, and that experience is much more accurate than 
anything the mind could ever reproduce through memory or reason. The theories presented 
by rationalism and empiricism both stand to contribute to the formation of trust through the 
application of reason-based knowledge and experience-based knowledge. (However, there 
is a limitation in that we lack a method for integrating these two forms of obtaining 
knowledge.) 
Further review reveals that modern philosophers reject the idea that knowledge is 
obtained exclusively through either rationalism or empiricism. The philosopher Immanuel 
Kant provided a synthesis between the two opposing theories. First, he noted that reason 
lacks the ability to create sensory experience; it is only through reason that we are able to 
accurately analyze the stimuli received through the senses. This theory represents a 
foundation for understanding the development of trust. Figure 1 represents a causal model 
based on our finding in literature that includes a synthesizing feedback loop to represent 
how we come to know something. 
 
 
 A Model of Inquiry Leading to Knowledge 
Trust 
Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) review over 72 definitions of what it means to know 
something well enough to have trust, and their work reveals a great deal of confusion and 
ambiguity surrounding the use of the term. The concept of trust appears to be subjective in 
nature, and the literature does not provide a commonly accepted definition across research 
disciplines. Agreement in the literature was found for the definition of trust in two small 
areas: (1) the basic premise of trust involves two actors, and (2) trust is a relationship in 
which one entity relies on someone, or something, based on a given criterion. Research into 
the meaning of a “given criterion” reveals an interchangeable use of the terms trust and 
confidence. The only noticeable difference in the use of these terms is that trust is based on 
decisions involving risk, whereas confidence involves decisions devoid of consequence.  
This literature review furthers its investigation into trust through researching 
interpersonal relationships. Leading theories on interpersonal trust present vulnerability and 
risk as the contributing factors unique to the development of such a relationship. Cho, Chan, 
and Adali (2015) surveyed the meaning of trust across academic disciplines and identified 
that it follows a basic premise involving risk. For example, they found that in psychology, 
academic researchers of trust assess the probability that individual behaviors are repeatable 
in situations that entail risk, and in sociology, researchers of trust assess the probability that 
one party will perform an action that will not hurt the interests of a dependent party or 
expose them to risk due to ignorance or uncertainty. 
Rousseau et al. (1998) define interpersonal trust as a psychological state of a trustor 
accepting vulnerability in a situation involving risk, based on positive expectations of the 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 288 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
intentions or behavior of the trustee. Boon et al. (1991) simplify the definition of trust as a 
state involving confident predictions about another’s motives in situations entailing risk. The 
majority of early research on trust involves person-person relationships and provides a 
starting point for our understanding of the process of developing trust. Figure 2 presents an 
operational model of interpersonal trust formation based on reviewed literature. 
 
 
 A Model of Interpersonal Trust Formation 
Adams and Webb (2002) describe two broad processes of developing trust between 
two individuals. The first is defined as “person-based trust,” which develops through 
repeated engagements, and the second is called “category-based trust,” which develops in 
the absence of direct experience. These definitions parallel the theories identified in our 
previous research into the epistemologies. Consequently, we modify interpersonal trust 
terminology to match our research by replacing “category-based” with “reason-based” and 
“person-based” with “experience-based.” 
Kramer and Tyler (1996) assess reason-based trust and present it as useful for 
understanding how one develops a trusting relationship when personal or social interaction 
is not possible. This type of trust often develops through someone’s membership in a 
familiar group or category. The factors contributing to reason-based trust can be social 
roles, training, or experience. In reason-based trust, the relationship is most commonly 
developed through a reputation that serves as a proxy for personalized knowledge and 
direct experience. These concepts lead to our first research hypothesis regarding the 
experience-based trust relationships. 
H1: An experience-based proxy will influence the tendency to trust or distrust. 
Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna (1985) assess that experience-based trust relationships 
develop over a long period of time through personal interaction. In their early research on 
trust, they describe three factors that influence the development of trust as competence, 
benevolence, and integrity. Their work also discusses the significance of the mental 
motivation behind the desires to establish a relationship and found it was strongly correlated 
to the factors that influence trust. Their work confirms a theme identified in our early 
interviews with users of technology in risk-application that emphasized the importance of 
personal investment. It also leads to our second hypothesis relating motivation to technology 
acceptance. 
H2: Increased personal motivation will increase technology acceptance. 
There appears to be general agreement in the literature reviewed that interpersonal 
trust consists of two categories: first, that trust is both reason-based and experience-based, 
and second, the strength of the trust bonds may differ. The concept of initial trust involves 
the development of a relationship based purely on reason and represents a weaker 
connection that can be explained by first impressions. The second category of experience-
based trust involves direct knowledge and regular interaction. This type of trust represents a 
stronger connection and is explained by relationships that develop over a longer period of 
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 Interpersonal Trust Lifecycle 
 
Technology 
The past research on interpersonal trust applies in many ways to trust in technology. 
This study sought out literature that contributes to the development of a methodology of 
technology discovery leading to person-technology trust. The potential for integrating 
interpersonal trust research into technology trust was discussed by McKnight et al. (2011). 
This research found that interpersonal trust is based on a trustee’s expectations and 
reliance on a trustor to perform as expected through benevolence, even though the trustor 
possesses the volition to choose to do what is right or what is wrong. Since technology does 
not possess volition (ability to choose), some researchers went as far as to dismiss the idea 
of trust in technology as irrelevant. However, recent advances in artificial intelligence refute 
the claims that technology lacks volition. This is confirmed in the vast amount of current 
research into how autonomous systems make decisions that can either harm or protect 
human life.  
Technology trust research is further represented in multiple disciplines of engineering 
and science. The major fields of technology trust research include, but are not limited to, 
artificial intelligence, command and control, human-computer interaction (HCI), data fusion, 
human-machine fusion, cyber security, and automation. Multiple models for researching 
trust that combine both human-like and system-like terminology are presented in the 
literature. Technology trust is a multifaceted area of research that integrates both human-
like measures and system-like measures. Three of the most frequently used human-like 
terms used to model technology are competence, benevolence, and integrity. The work by 
McKnight et al. (2011) and Lankton, McKnight, and Tripp (2015) consider the system-like 
alternate terms for technology trust as reliability, functionality, and helpfulness. A number of 
system-like measures of technology trust were identified that are outside the scope of this 
work but still important to ongoing trust research. These potential system-like measures 
include supply chain management, past vendor performance, hardware/software-oriented 
security, and network security. 
The majority of the language used to describe interpersonal trust can apply to 
technology trust. For example, the word benevolence is a very human-like attribute that is 
likely to appear in future literature on the decision-making capabilities of self-driving cars. A 
total of 86 factors and attributes related to interpersonal and technology trust were collected 
from the literature to form a random nomological network of trust terms. A factor is described 
as situational consideration of technology use that has the potential to influence trust, such 
as risk and time to operate. An attribute is a characteristic inherent to the technology such 
as its speed, power, and processing capability. The combined and unsorted list is presented 
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in Table 2. Future experimentation involves understanding the influence of these terms in 
the following areas: 
1. Factors that measure reason-based and experience-based technology trust 
2. Attributes that characterize technology trust as a proxy for experience  
 
Table 2. Nomological Network of Trust Factors and Attributes 
(Cho et al., 2015; DeVitt, 2018; Hoff & Bashir, 2015; McKnight et al., 2011; Schaefer, 2016) 
Ability Character Disappointment Importance Process Skills 
Adaptive Communication Disposition Incompetent Protect Stability 
Adoption Competence Dynamic Integrity Purpose Supportive 
Adversarial Completeness Easy Intelligibility Rationality Teammate 
Altruism Confidence Expectation Intent Recency Trainable 
Attractive Contract Experience Knowledge Reciprocation Transparency 
Autonomous Control Faith Learning Regret Uncertain 
Availability Cooperation Faults Likeable Relational Understandability 
Awareness Credibility Fear Monitored Relevance Unstructured 
Belief Credit Feeling Motives Reliability Utility 
Benevolence Decisive Frequency Perception Relief Validity 
Capability Delegation Frustration Performance Responsive  
Capital Dependability Helpfulness Popular Risk  
Centrality Difficult Honesty Power Robust  
Certainty Directability Hope Predictability Similarity  
 
Figure 4 represents the integration of technology trust with the interpersonal trust 
factors and attributes included in our nomological network of terms. 
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 Technology Trust Lifecycle 
A theory relevant to measuring and characterizing trust is found in the technology 
acceptance model (TAM) developed by Fred Davis nearly 30 years ago. This model plays a 
significant role in the majority of research investigating the factors and attributes that 
influence the acceptance of a technology. Venkatesh and Bala (2008) present the TAM’s 
ability to predict individual adoption and use of technology. The TAM assesses the 
behavioral intention to use a technology through two constructs: perceived usefulness (PU), 
which is defined as the extent to which a person believes that using a technology will 
enhance his or her job performance, and perceived ease of use (PEOU), which is defined as 
the degree to which a person believes that using a technology will be free of effort. These 
two variables are used to establish a relationship between external influences and potential 
system usage (Gefen, Karahanna, & Straub, 2003). In the work by McKnight, Choudhury, 
and Kacmar (2002), it was experimentally determined that the TAM variables do not predict 
continued use of a technology outside of initial acceptance and that trust in a vendor’s past 
technology does not translate to acceptance of subsequent technologies.  
Tétard and Collan (2009) address the challenges of adopting new technology in their 
work on the lazy-user theory. This theory states that a user will select the technology that 
demands the least amount of effort to do the job. This theory also addresses one of the 
themes identified in our early grounded theory study interviewing operators of technology in 
high-risk scenarios. The application of this theory places technology users at a 
disadvantage, particularly in high-risk military applications where trustors are known to avoid 
more capable technology for systems that are easier to understand. If an experience-based 
proxy can improve the accuracy of developing trust through increased technology literacy, it 
may lead to increased acceptance of more complex and capable technologies, thereby 
reducing the influence of the lazy-user theory. This leads to our third research hypothesis. 
H3: An experience-based proxy will decrease the influence of the lazy-user theory on 
technology acceptance. 
Conclusions 
The intent of this section is to identify gaps in research on trust in autonomous 
systems. It appears that a methodology of technology discovery that leads to trust is not 
available. This review reveals a clear distinction between reason-based trust and 
experience-based trust. It also suggests that users are willing to trust technology in high-risk 
environments and that an experience-based proxy may increase the quality of such a 
relationship and the pace at which it is established. Based on the finding in literature, Figure 
5 illustrates a conceptual framework for a causal methodology of technology adoption by 
introducing an experience-based proxy that is hypothesized to improve technology adoption. 
The impact of a proxy introducing inaccurate information is noted as significant but is 
outside the scope of this work. 
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 Conceptual Framework for Methodology Leading to Technology Trust 
 
Experiment Methodology 
This experiment investigates the formation of trust in technology and how it 
influences the adoption of autonomous systems for use in high-risk military applications. The 
formation of trust in technology is governed by two constructs: reason-based trust and 
experience-based trust. Existing literature presents the case for increased accuracy in 
technology selection through the development of experience-based trust. However, the 
development of experience-based trust is financially burdensome and takes much longer to 
form. In most military scenarios, developing experience-based trust presents high levels of 
risk for physical injury and harm. 
Introduction 
This experiment is designed to identify trust metrics and how they influence the 
formation of reason-based trust in autonomous systems used in high-risk military 
applications. The desired outcome of this work is the identification of attributes that can 
replace some of the burden required to develop experience-based trust. This research does 
not intend to demonstrate the validity of the theories behind technology acceptance; rather, 
this work investigates potential causal relationships between the manipulation of information 
and its effect on trust in technologies. 
The experiment is conducted in two phases. Phase one is a group administered 
experimental survey that employs manipulations of multiple theories of technology 
acceptance in order to collect data on reason-based trust in autonomous systems. Phase 
two consists of administering the same survey following extensive field testing and 
experimentation of the phase one systems to provide external validity.  
Metrics 
The goal of this work is to study the influence of trust metrics on the acceptance of 
autonomous systems in high-risk applications. However, the complexity of modern 
technology makes it difficult to establish generalizable metrics that can function as a proxy 
for experience-based trust. One area of research relevant to establishing such metrics 
involves the use of anthropomorphism, the attribution of human traits to nonhuman entities, 
to increase a trustor’s ability to accept and utilize technology. Waytz, Heafner, and Epley 
(2014) discuss the need for human-like mental models to consider technology as a 
trustworthy teammate. There are reported cases (Pak et al., 2012) where the tendency to 
anthropomorphize technology leads to situations in which humans give a higher degree of 
trust to a technology than is warranted. The inverse of this situation also exists in the 
development of a lack of trust in a human teammate caused by the introduction of 
technology with more capability and reliability. The work conducted by Waytz et al. (2014) 
includes a study that found test subjects were quicker to forgive a trustee’s mistakes and 
stay calm in high-stress situations when the trustee was a technology with human-like 
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attributes. This work provides a foundation for the establishment of our technology trust 
metrics. 
HAL Score 
In this work, we hypothesize that statistically significant differences will result in 
technology trust by anthropomorphizing an experience-based proxy. This hypothesis is 
based on leading theory used to increase cognition in students enrolled in a college-level 
computer architecture course. Over a period of 10 years, the author of this paper provided 
instruction to university year-three engineering students on the topics of digital design and 
computer architecture. The predominant challenge reported by students in end-of-year 
course evaluations was difficulty synthesizing the highly complex components of a computer 
into a usable system. Based on student feedback, a method for reducing complexity was 
developed by anthropomorphizing the components of a computer. This theory provided 
students with the context needed to understand how the pieces of a computer function 
together to create a whole system. The work resulted in increased student comprehension 
and an ability to describe a computer from the elemental circuits up to the most advanced 
concepts of computer engineering such as compilers and operating systems. 
To develop the measurement system needed for an experience-based technology 
trust proxy, we introduce the anthropomorphic technology categories of hardware, 
algorithms, and links (HAL) as illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
 Anthropomorphic Technology Trust Metrics 
 
In order to increase the familiarity for military end-users, the metrics are established 
through the HAL scoring system. The values of each HAL subsystem initially range from 0 to 
100 and lead to an equally weighted maximum score of 300. This scoring system is identical 
to the Physical Fitness Test (PFT) employed by the U.S. Marine Corps. The PFT scores 
three physical fitness tests, each scored from 0 to 100. The individual tests are pull-ups, 
crunches, and a three-mile run which result in a maximum combined score of 300. Future 
research intends to identify weights for the HAL score that accurately reflect the overall 
impact on trust. For the purposes of this experiment, we integrate the HAL score as a proxy 
for experience-based trust as shown in Figure 7. 
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 HAL Score Experimental Model 
Data Analysis Plan 
This study will employ Repeated Measures ANOVA. The variables in this study 
create a mixed design scenario. The first manipulated variable “metric” is a between-
subjects factor and applies a treatment between two groups. The second manipulated 
variable “System Control” is a within-subjects factor, and each subject receives all three 
treatments of low (autonomous), medium (remote-control), and high (tethered control). 
There are validity concerns due to fixed-effects seen in a repeated measure study. 
The participants may weight the variable “system control” based solely on whether or not 
they like the accompanying technology. To correct for such effects, techniques such as 
multilevel modelling may be employed in place of repeated measures analysis. 
Success in this research is realized through statistically significant results leading to 
a new theory on the causal relationship between anthropomorphic trust metrics and the 
intent to use an autonomous system. 
 
Table 3. Proposed Schedule 
Date Process 
March–April 2019 Data Collection 
April–May 2019 Data Analysis 
May 2019 Initial Findings 
July–August 2019 Field Testing 
September 2019 External Validity Data Analysis 
October 2019 Final Report 
 
Conclusion 
The topic of trust in technology is increasingly important to the DoD as outlined in the 
Defense Science Board Study on Autonomy (David & Nielsen, 2016), which states, “There 
is a need to build trust in autonomous systems while also improving the trustworthiness of 
autonomous capabilities. These are enablers that align RDT&E processes to more rapidly 
deliver autonomous capabilities to DoD missions.” 
This work involves the introduction of novel ideas to existing theories that relate to 
the formation of trust. This research focuses on the impact of trust towards the adoption of 
autonomous systems. We have established that trust involves a user assuming some level 
of risk. The only literature available on technology trust involves situations that expose users 
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to insignificant levels of risk. We posit that our research conducted on technology used in 
high-risk military application will reveal causality not identified in previous trust research. 
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Abstract 
There is a strong push to change from manned toward both unmanned and 
optionally manned systems within the Department of Defense. There are significant open 
questions about how the manned versus unmanned versus optionally manned options 
influence costs, adaptability, operational utility, and suitability for missions. The Institute for 
Defense Analyses developed an approach to address these questions that links underlying 
physical attributes and engineering relationships to mission attributes and costs. We discuss 
this approach, where it fits into the acquisition process, and how it can be used to 
quantitatively inform the unmanned versus optionally manned discussions at both a system 
level and fleet level. 
Background 
Today’s operational environment is complicated by many requirements that compete 
against one another for design resources (Freedberg, 2019).1 Of course, this is not the 
primary challenge—after all, trade studies have been around for a long time. The primary 
challenge is characterizing the trades among system attributes (including cost) in a manner 
that can inform and guide leadership decisions prior to the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
stage, rather than simply defending the selected alternative after the fact. In the end, this 
requires methods that leaders understand and visualizations that they can use. These 
                                               
 
 
1 “We were under three entirely different organizations previously,” Maj. Gen. Cedric Wins 
said. So RDECOM scientists and engineers would often be eager to offer their expertise to the future 
concepts teams, but “sometimes, though, quite frankly we might be late to the game,” he said. The 
futurists might have committed to a particular technology without realizing there was a better 
alternative or, worse yet, without realizing it just wasn’t ready for the real world.  
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methods must expose the implications of choices rather than mask them, long before 
detailed designs for the alternative approaches exist.  
The Institute for Defense Analyses’ (IDA’s) trade space framework—Deducing 
Economically Realistic Implications Via Engineering (DERIVE)—links engineering and 
physics analysis, operational constraints, and semi-parametric cost estimates. The goal is to 
increase the efficiency of the acquisition process by reducing friction between the program 
office, the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
especially at program initiation and during the early stages of development. 
IDA designed the DERIVE framework to link important technical inputs to 
programmatic and operational outputs in a straightforward, traceable, and transparent 
manner. The framework provides an analytic structure that could be used to build 
understanding and communicate intent. It could be especially helpful for programs whose 
complex interactions between requirements, operational restrictions, and technology—rather 
than any individual issue—drive acquisition outcomes. 
Trade Space 
The use of trade studies in engineering is not new. It has a long history in the 
technical community and has now been formally adopted into the Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition decision-making process. Recent experiences suggest that the Services’ 
trade-space tools are being used to inform their internal deliberations. However, several 
recent new-start proposals have been the subject of follow-on trade studies and amended 
AoA efforts, suggesting room for improvement. In particular, past trade studies have 
generally not been able to address high-level trades between competing design families 
(e.g., conventional helicopters vs. tilt-rotors), or affordability implications of design choices. 
Schedule delays associated with follow-on analyses can be avoided if the trade 
study processes and analytical outputs are structured to support both user and oversight 
objectives. The outputs of IDA’s DERIVE framework are constructed to achieve this goal by 
enhancing traceability and transparency of inputs, outputs, and decision-making. 
Traceability 
Traceability is used by systems engineers to manage technically complex endeavors 
by flowing down program objectives into discrete technical goals. Alternatively, students 
employ traceability to demonstrate to professors that they have a firm grasp of the nature of 
problems even if small errors are present in the analysis. Traceability can also be leveraged 
by the Services and program offices to demonstrate that they have rigorously analyzed the 
operational environment and have a firm understanding of the technical issues and 
programmatic consequences of a new program. 
The DoD asked IDA to develop and demonstrate DERIVE on a generic infantry 
fighting vehicle (IFV). The results of that effort will be used below to illustrate how DERIVE’s 
outputs are designed to foster traceability. 
Creating traceability requires exposing the objectives of the program, how they relate 
to technical assumptions, and how the various elements interact to drive results. An output 
of the DERIVE process traces the desired capabilities to the commensurate technical inputs. 
shows how key performance and programmatic attributes can be mapped to specific 
technical requirements for an IFV.  
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Table 1. Performance and Technical Traceability Matrix 
 
 
Cross-referencing the technical assumptions and desired capabilities in a single, 
compact form provides two benefits. First, it allows the program developers to articulate 
clearly the user’s goals and the technical requirements necessary to achieve those goals. 
Second, it allows the oversight community to understand the potential loss of capability if 
there are technical shortfalls during development.  
Similarly, shows how cost traceability can be achieved. Various cost categories are 
mapped to the data sources and assumptions used in generating the cost estimate. This 
traceability matrix allows oversight organizations to qualitatively assess the riskiness and 
fidelity of the estimate.  
Table 2. Cost Elements and Costing Assumptions and Data Sources 
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Finally, the logic used to estimate the costs and performance of the IFV trade space 
is described in Figure 1. In sum, the DERIVE framework helps program developers and the 
acquisition oversight community build a common understanding of the key technical, 
operational, and cost drivers of new capabilities being sought by the department. 
 
 




The DERIVE framework improves the transparency of the analyses supporting 
acquisition decisions. Figure 2 shows an output of the DERIVE framework for the IFV 
example. It enhances transparency by illustrating the entire trade space rather than a few 
point designs. Showcasing the full trade space demonstrates the thoroughness of the 
investigation and reduces the possibility of having to include additional cases. Also, instead 
of using a value function, the analysis simply highlights the desired point solutions and lists 
the rationale for the decision and the relevant trade-offs that were considered and accepted 
as part of the decision-making process. Showing trade space data, the rationale, and the 
resulting decision together serves to enhance trust, convey thoroughness, and reduce 
institutional friction. 
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 Infantry Fighting Vehicle Trade Space with Logic for Decision 
 
The outputs from DERIVE also make certain difficult trades obvious. For example, it 
is clear from Figure 34 that no vehicle carrying six or more dismounts can provide both full 
urban trafficability and force protection level 3 or higher. If there is a mission need for well-
protected fighting vehicles in urban environments, they will need to carry fewer personnel 
per vehicle. Similarly, force protection level 5 can only be obtained using advanced armors, 
with corresponding unit cost consequences. 
Thought Experiment 1: Urban Counterinsurgency 
Given mission need for a fighting vehicle that can maneuver in 90% of urban terrain 
and provide force protection level 3 or higher, what are the available options? Figure 2 
shows that such a vehicle cannot carry very many people; the space claim of human 
passengers induces a positive feedback on required cubic feet, and thus on areal surface to 
be armored, and thus on weight. This has consequences for concepts of operations—if it is 
not possible to preserve squad integrity in urban environments while preserving force 
protection levels, either squads will need to be divided or force protection levels will need to 
be reduced. Either of these leads to changes in how the force will fight. They key is that 
exposing these issues early puts the warfighter in charge of making the decision of what 
they value, since they ultimately have to manage the consequences. 
Thought Experiment 2: Optionally Manned Vehicles 
Recent advances in remotely piloted vehicle technologies and artificial intelligence 
(AI)–enabled autonomy have increased interest in optionally manned vehicles—that is, 
vehicles that are typically operated as manned vehicles with a human driver, but can 
sometimes be operated as remotely piloted or even autonomous vehicles. What are the 
costs and benefits of optional manning? Under what circumstances would an optionally 
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manned design be preferable to an unmanned design, or to a mixed fleet of manned and 
unmanned designs? We can use DERIVE to investigate these questions. 
In general, the principal benefits of unmanned systems arise from the absence of 
those requirements related to the presence of human passengers. Human beings and their 
equipment are heavy; they occupy space; they require environmental conditioning and 
protection against threats. Unmanned systems can thus avoid the weight associated with 
humans, their equipment, additional armor, heating and air conditioning systems, air 
purification systems, doors, seats, visual displays, manual controls, and so forth. They can 
be smaller than manned systems, potentially able to operate in more confined spaces and 
with lower observability. 
Optionally manned systems do not share these benefits. Instead, they incur all of the 
weight and space penalties of manned vehicles, plus additional requirements to support 
remote operation. This might include additional sensors, communications links, and onboard 
computational power. These added systems must also be configured so as not to interfere 
with manned operations—so that, for example, any cameras that provide the “driver’s view” 
for remote operation must not interfere with the driver’s sight lines during manned 
operations. 
In the end, the business case for an optionally manned platform must rest on the mix 
of missions the system is envisioned for, and the concept of operations that would make a 
mixed fleet of manned and unmanned systems impractical. DERIVE could be used to 
quantify these trades, informing decision-makers about the operational and cost 
consequences of design choices and force mixes before committing significant resources. 
Conclusion 
DERIVE and similar approaches provide a framework that can be used to engage 
and improve acquisition outcomes. DERIVE fuses a variety of information sources 
(capabilities, operational, technical, and cost) to enable more thorough analyses in support 
of decision-making and to reduce friction between program developers and the acquisition 
oversight community. DERIVE can also serve to make fundamental trades more apparent to 
senior decision-makers, avoiding misunderstandings about what is feasible and focusing the 
discussion on the relevant warfighter values. 
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Abstract 
The U.S. government regularly participates as a buyer in industrial markets 
where products are customarily sold through indirect marketing and distribution chains, 
separating buyers from manufacturers. In many cases, these marketing, distribution, and 
store-front activities add significant value for buyers, such as through pre- and post-sale 
service and support, improvements to product availability, and reductions in per-unit 
pricing (e.g., via economies due to warehousing, transportation, and ordering 
processes). Accordingly, the government (U.S. Small Business Administration) has, in 
some instances, issued class waivers to the requirements of the “non-manufacturer rule” 
(15 U.S.C. § 657s) when no small business manufacturers exist for a product, such that 
contracts can be set aside for competition among small business non-manufacturers. 
This study models the effectiveness of class non-manufacturer rule waivers on the 
utilization of small business concerns. The purpose of the research is to obtain a better 
understanding of market and industry conditions in which these waivers are successful 
at driving small business utilization, as well as conditions where class waivers, once 
issued, tend to be poorly utilized. A time series panel of data derived from several 
archival sources was used to estimate a fractional response model with a Bernoulli 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimation methodology. Findings indicate that NMR waivers 
work best to increase small business utilization in industries characterized by low 
concentration and low levels of price inflation. Understanding these factors will inform 
policy and regulation. 
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Introduction 
The Small Business Act of 1953 requires that a fair proportion of contract dollars 
be awarded, or set aside, to small businesses (Sakallaris, 2007). This is not a trivial 
directive as the public sector constitutes a huge market, approximately $2.1 trillion 
annually in the United States alone. This means that a tremendous amount of those 
public funds—$90.7 billion in fiscal year 2015 (Federal Procurement Data System, 
2015)—is deliberately funneled to small businesses at all levels (municipal, county, 
state, and federal) as a matter of public policy aimed at achieving socio-economic 
benefits. The current, government-wide procurement goal stipulates that at least 23% of 
all federal government contracting dollars should be set aside for small businesses with 
targeted set-asides for Women Owned Small Business (5%), Small Disadvantaged 
Business (5%), Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (3%), and Historically 
Underutilized Business Zones (3%). 
Not only are socio-economic procurement programs important to the public 
sector (Denes, 1997), they are also critical to the private sector. Small businesses 
constitute approximately half of the private-sector economy and 99% of all businesses 
(U.S. Small Business Administration [SBA], 2012). They account for 90% of exports and 
innovations (Cullen, 2012). Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are important 
to economic growth (Thurik & Wennekers, 2004; Wennekers & Thurik, 1999). SMEs 
differ from large businesses in job creation, strategic flexibility, and innovation 
(Audretsch, 2007). Consequently, economies with more SMEs are more competitive and 
have higher growth rates than those with fewer SMEs (Audretsch et al., 2006). 
Small- and medium-sized businesses are a fundamental element of the health 
and economic viability of the United States (Sperling & Mills, 2012). According to the 
National Economic Council, over the past 20 years, small and new businesses in the 
United States have been responsible for creating two out of every three net new jobs 
and employ half of the private sector workforce (Sperling & Mills, 2012). More 
specifically, small businesses are a foundational element to communities (i.e., 
populations less than 10,000 people) and play a significant role in the economic health 
of those communities (Yoshida & Deyle, 2005). Small businesses also service as critical 
participants in the supply chain (Qi et al., 2014; Logozar, 2013). 
Unfortunately, while the U.S. federal government annually seeks to award 23% of 
contract dollars to small businesses, it often fails to fully achieve its small business goals 
(FPDS, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). 
Impediments to small business contracting include contract bundling, strategic sourcing 
resulting in supplier rationalization, a lack of accountability for achieving socio-economic 
goals, a lack of small businesses in some industries, and many small businesses’ lack of 
interest in performing government work (Grammich et al., 2011). 
Given the criticality of small businesses to long-term economic viability, several 
laws, regulations, and programs have been promulgated to advance their cause. One 
such rule is the non-manufacturer rule (NMR), enacted by Section 303(h) of Public Law 
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100-656 and Section 210 of Public Law 101-574. According to 13 C.F.R. § 121.406,1 for 
a firm to qualify and represent itself as a small business concern on a federal 
procurement for an end item, it must either be the manufacturer (or producer) of that end 
item or meet additional criteria to qualify as a small non-manufacturer, including 
supplying the end item of a small business manufacturer, processor, or producer. As of 
2016, this rule applies exclusively to acquisitions in excess of the simplified acquisition 
threshold, although smaller acquisitions were previously subject to the rule (81 FR 
34243). Thus, the NMR allows a small business dealer who does not manufacture an 
end item (e.g., a wholesaler, a distributor) to compete as a small concern under set-
aside federal contracts to supply that product, provided that the manufacturer is a small 
business located in the United States and that certain other requirements of the NMR 
are satisfied (FAR 19.001). However, in some industries, or for some end items or 
classes of end items, no small business manufacturers exist. In such cases, a waiver to 
the NMR could be requested—in the case of a class waiver, by the prospective small 
business supplier, by the contracting officer, by an industry group, or by some other 
entity—from the Small Business Administration (SBA) such that, for example, a small 
business distributor can supply a product manufactured by a large business and still 
qualify as a small business concern under a set-aside contract. 
Granting class waivers in such markets dominated by large businesses should, in 
theory, open opportunity for small businesses distributors to secure federal contracts. 
From the buyer’s perspective, opening up markets to small business distributors should 
expand the available supply base under a small business set-aside, further enhancing 
competition and, in turn, reducing purchase prices (Chiang, Chhajed, & Hess, 2003). 
Furthermore, making more small businesses eligible to provide certain products means 
that more requirements can be set aside for small businesses, thereby increasing the 
amount of dollars awarded to small businesses and helping buying agencies meet their 
socio-economic goals. 
To date, however, the contribution of class waivers to the NMR to small 
businesses’ success in winning contracts is unknown. The purpose of this research, 
therefore, is to explore whether industry characteristics influence the effectiveness of 
class NMR waivers with regard to achieving their intended goal of improving small 
business utilization on federal purchases, and if so, to what degree. This research is 
important due to its implications not only for socio-economic program design but also for 
effective and efficient channel design. Allowing small businesses to compete as 
intermediaries broadens the competitive base of federal buying agencies; thus, 
economic efficiencies are also at stake. 
Generally, research has ignored key micro-level factors, especially in the context 
of small businesses. There are roughly 28 million small businesses in the United States, 
yet they are often ignored, despite the fact that ignoring SMEs in research is “in fact 
totally inappropriate” (Spence & Lozano, 2000, p. 43). Our scan of the last 10 years of 
the Journal of Small Business Management, Journal of Small Business Strategy, and 
Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship revealed only 48 B2B articles 
                                               
 
 
1 See, for instance, the requirements contained within Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) 52.219-1, Small Business Program Representations, which state that a firm representing 
itself as a small business concern must satisfy the criteria in 13 C.F.R. § 121.406. 
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representing 8% of all contributions. Most of these articles address various aspects of 
franchising. Furthermore, research in a business-to-government context is almost non-
existent. Only one article (Albano et al., 2015) addressed any aspect of small 
businesses in the public sector. 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Underlying theory relevant to 
waivers to the NMR is synopsized. Next, the study presents the research design and 
methodology, and then the study provides an analysis of the proposed model and 
reports the findings. Lastly, the study offers a summary discussion, including conclusions 
and implications.  
Literature Review 
Of all of the elements of a value chain, the marketing channel ranks highly in 
importance (Krafft, Goetz, Mantrala, Sotgiu, & Tillmanns, 2015), with wholesale 
distribution comprising revenues of $5.2 trillion in 2017. Nevertheless, they are not fully 
understood. Scholars have called for a more unifying theory of distribution channels 
(Ingene & Parry, 1995). Similarly, omni-channel research is largely void of theoretical 
grounding (Erdem, Kotzab, Teller, Yumurtaci Hüseyinoglu Isik, & Pöppelbuß, 2018). The 
interface between industry and government has also been identified as a promising 
research avenue (Krafft et al., 2015). 
Socio-economic programs have been used by both government and private 
sectors to develop local economies, develop labor capabilities, and expand their 
customer base. This macro strategy is well founded as “states with higher proportions of 
very small business employment do indeed experience higher levels of productivity 
growth, and Gross State Product growth, while having less wage inflation and lower 
unemployment rates” (Robbins et al., 2000, p. 293). Sourcing from small, minority-
owned enterprises can increase job creation and economic development in distressed 
regions (Carter et al., 1999; Walker & Preuss, 2008). In turn, the income from these 
businesses and employees thereof expand the firm’s customer base (Ram & Smallbone, 
2003). 
NMR waivers are one tool that allows government to fence off large business 
manufacturers and distributors from competing against small business distributors for 
contracts from the federal government segment. The lack of research into the 
contribution of class NMR waivers or the circumstances conducive to their effectiveness 
creates a sub-optimal situation where NMR waiver success—and the factors influencing 
or impeding success—are not well understood. Evidence suggests that industry 
characteristics significantly determine the success or failure of selected channels. NMR 
waivers provide remedy for small businesses who must deal with power and conflict 
against large businesses. 
Research on channel power and conflict emerged as a distinct research group in 
the 1990s by a study of the intellectual structure of retailing research (Chabowski, Hult, 
& Mena, 2011). At this time, channel competition was also identified as a distinct group 
of research. Matters of channel design continue to intrigue marketing scholars. Relevant 
to NMR waivers, a content analysis of recent channels research (2010–2012) identified 
vertical competition among seven key categories (Young & Merritt, 2013). Improving 
channel performance and coordination as well as lessening channel conflict and power 
were found to be prominent research themes, although with regard to small businesses, 
research has a strong franchise focus. The focus on the tension between small 
franchisees and large franchisors suggests that opportunistic use of power by larger 
channel members can have long-lasting effects on trust and performance (Winsor et al., 
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2012). This calls into question the efficacy of NMR waivers to reassure or encourage 
small businesses to engage in industries characterized by many large companies. 
Another stream of research surrounding omni-channel retailing identified three 
areas: channel demand side, channel supply side, and channel management and 
strategy (Erdem et al., 2018). The channel supply side area focuses on supply chain 
processes, with one group of papers addressing multi-channel fulfillment strategies. This 
particular stream of research is underserved while considered a promising frontier of 
inquiry (Erdem et al., 2018). In general, it appears that direct channels can be profitable 
when channel members (manufacturers and retailers) share profits. This suggests that in 
an environment with high price pressures (highly inflationary), small businesses will be at 
a disadvantage with regard to negotiating profit sharing with large manufacturers. 
From a supply management perspective (i.e., a buyer’s), channel design 
presents a special case of strategy. With increased outsourcing, supply managers often 
play the role of integrator, stitching together capabilities of suppliers into seamless 
processes ranging from product development to delivery (Parker & Anderson, 2002). 
Research suggests that the integration of product development, manufacturing process 
design, and supply chain design can contribute to a competitive advantage (Ellram, 
Tate, & Carter, 2007). The competitive advantage results from parallel cross-functional 
coordination and strong supplier involvement, which suggests that industries 
characterized by many small businesses may achieve more success and benefit more 
from NMR waivers. 
Firms concerned about corporate social responsibility often look to promote 
socio-economic goals. In this case, channels can be customized to the value offering as 
buyers seek qualified small business suppliers. Notwithstanding, best practices in supply 
management suggest that, in some circumstances, buyers should develop capabilities in 
strategic suppliers—termed supplier development in the literature (Krause, 1997). This, 
of course, alters the supply chain for certain material and component inputs. 
A key question in marketing channels is, Under what circumstances is a certain 
channel structure appropriate? Class waivers to the non-manufacturer rule provide an 
interesting test-bed to examine not only the effectiveness of a federal policy, but also the 
conditions under which a direct channel will prevail over an indirect channel. 
 
H1: There will be a negative, two-way interaction between industry-level 
price inflation and issuance of class waivers to the non-manufacturer rule, such 
that a waiver’s positive effect on small business utilization is attenuated when 
industry-level prices are highly inflationary. 
  
H2: There will be a negative, two-way interaction between industry 
concentration and issuance of class waivers to the non-manufacturer rule, such 
that a waiver’s positive effect on small business utilization is attenuated when 
industries are highly concentrated. 
  
H3: There will be a positive, two-way interaction between the proportion 
of small firms in an industry and issuance of class waivers to the non-
manufacturer rule, such that a waiver’s positive effect on small business 
utilization is amplified when there is a high proportion of small firms in an 
industry. 
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Data and Measures 
The SBA’s class waiver list as of January 1, 2015, includes 139 waivers covering 
72 NAICS categories (SBA, 2018), a majority of which cover chemicals, adhesives, 
metals, carpet, storage tanks, construction equipment, turbines, ammunition, office 
copiers, automobiles, computer equipment, televisions, medical equipment, aircraft, and 
furniture. 
To test the research hypotheses, a time-series panel was constructed using 
multiple sources of archival data. Data on the issuance of class wavers to the non-
manufacturing rule by the SBA were collected from the administration’s current class 
waiver list (SBA, 2018). This list contains information for each class waiver, including the 
applicable industry as identified the by North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) code, the type of product and an effective date for the waiver (the date the 
class waiver was posted in the Federal Register). A total of 148 class waivers are on the 
list, with waivers issued for products manufactured across 77 industries. Example class 
waivers include ice-making machinery, turbines, hospital furniture, ammunition, and 
turboprop aircraft. 
Data on the government’s utilization of small suppliers were collected from the 
Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which catalogs 
unclassified transactions between federal agencies and firms for the purchase of goods 
and services (Eckerd & Girth, 2017). In the context of government purchasing, a “small” 
firm is formally defined for each industry by the SBA. Criteria for determining firm size 
include the number of employees and/or average annual revenues. In FPDS-NG, 
government buyers report for each purchase whether the purchase was made to a small 
firm, based on representations made by the firm at the time of the purchase. We collect 
FPDS data on contracts across the U.S. government. Our period of analysis begins with 
Fiscal Year 2007, as significant improvements to FPDS data quality followed the 
passage of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (Lewis, 
2017). We do not collect FPDS data for transactions after 2015, as certain industry 
establishment data (described below) are not available beyond 2015. 
Lastly, to obtain information on industry characteristics, we obtain time-series 
observations on industries from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census 
Bureau. These data are detailed in the following sections. All economic data were 
collected in their unseasonal form. 
Dependent Variable 
We measure federal performance on the utilization of small businesses concerns 
as the proportion of awards to small businesses within a given NAICS code, on a given 
annual measurement occasion, as reported in FPDS-NG. We refer to this variable as 
UTILIZATION. The federal government similarly uses proportions to measure small 
business utilization, as has prior research into the determinants of performance of small 
business contracting programs (Smith & Fernandez, 2010). 
Treatments 
Our primary explanatory variable, TREATMENT, reflects waiver issuance and is 
identified by an occurrence of one or more non-manufacturer waivers issued to an 
industry in succession (i.e., within a six-month period), between the years 2007 and 
2015. For instance, three class waivers were issued in August 2010 to the computer 
storage device manufacturing industry (NAICS 334112) for automated data processing 
input/output and storage devices, support equipment and supplies, reflecting a 
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treatment. A total of 20 treatments occurred during the period of analysis, to a total of 20 
industries. 
Moderators 
Within H1, H2, and H3, we hypothesized that three industry-level moderators 
would moderate (amplify or attenuate) the effects of non-manufacturer rule waivers on 
small business utilization. The first moderator, CONCENTRATION, reflects the degree to 
which market share is concentrated within firms in an industry. Industry concentration 
data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau,2 of which the most recent data 
available is from the 2012 economic census. CONCENTRATION is measured using the 
50-firm Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a summation of squared market shares. 
Higher HHI values reflect greater concentration and may range to a maximum value of 
10,000. We utilize 2012 HHI observations as our CONCENTRATION measure, and log-
transformed the values to account for skew. As the economic census is performed every 
five years, the only other possible index is from 2007, at the start of our analysis. 3 As we 
later explain, we reserve the 2007 index instead for propensity score matching of treated 
industries (those receiving waivers) with untreated industries. Thus, our measure of 
CONCENTRATION remains time-invariant over the period of analysis. 
The second moderator, SMALLPROP, reflects the proportion of small firms in 
each industry, at each annual measurement occasion, operationalized as the proportion 
of firms in an industry having less than 500 employees.4 Data on the distribution of firms 
within industries by firm size were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistics of 
U.S. Businesses (SUSB),5 which provides distributional data on enterprises in the U.S. 
economy by size and industry. SUSB provides data on both firms and establishments, 
where establishments are locations where work is performed (e.g., business locations) 
and where one or more establishment may be nested within a firm (Headd & Kirchhoff, 
2009). We exclusively utilize firm data when calculating SMALLPROP. 
The third moderator, PRICEINDEX, is an annual, aggregate measure of the 
prices received by domestic producers within an industry for their output. We obtain 
industry-level price information from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), using the 
producer price indices (PPIs) that they develop on each industry through a process of 
systematic sampling within industries (BLS, 2016). We obtain PPIs in their nominal form 
and apply a natural log transformation, following Pelztman (2000). 
                                               
 
 
2 https://www.census.gov/econ/concentration.html  
3 An alternative source, Compustat data is a common alternative to U.S. Census 
Bureau’s concentration measure. However, it only accounts for public firms and correlates at a 
mere 13% with the Census Bureau’s data, which is considered highly reliable (Ali et al., 2009). 
4 This follows how industry-level data on firm size is reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) assigns various size standards to industries to 
classify businesses as “small” under its programs, and SBA standards may be based on 
revenues or number of employees, the latter of which may differ from 500 (although a threshold 
of 500 employees is common).  
5 https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb.html  
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Controls 
We include three controls to account for potentially confounding effects from 
other variables. First, we control for market competitiveness, as the average number of 
offers received by federal purchasers in response to solicitations within an industry, and 
at a given measurement occasion. Data on the number of offers received was collected 
from FPDS-NG. Specifically, the COMPETITIVENESS measure reflects the average 
number of offers received on RFPs that resulted in purchases. If no offers were received 
and thus no purchase was made, then the data would not be included within the dataset. 
However, if an RFP was later re-issued (which would typically be the case, possibly in 
some modified form) and resulted in a purchase, then the data would be included within 
the dataset. We control for competitiveness because it may be related to contract price 
and several of our explanatory variables, including industry concentration, thus posing a 
potential confound. Second, we account for growth in federal participation in markets for 
goods manufactured by an industry by including a control for the number of new contract 
awards within an industry, and at a given measurement occasion. Data on 
PARTICIPATION was also collected from FPDS-NG and is measured as the count of 
new contracts awarded by the federal government for goods manufactured by an 
industry. However, as this count of awards alone may not fully account for the nature of 
federal participation in markets, we include an additional control variable, 
OBLIGATIONS, which measures the total contractual obligations by the federal 
government on new contracts awarded by the federal government for goods 
manufactured by an industry. All three variables were log-transformed to reduce the 
effects of extreme values (positive skew) and to improve interpretability of regression 
coefficients. 
Matching by Propensity Score 
To further guard against potential confounds, we use propensity score matching 
to pair the 20 industries receiving a non-manufacturer rule waiver (“treatment”) during 
the nine-year period with a similar set of industries who did not, thus creating an artificial 
control group. Propensity score matching is a technique commonly used to reduce 
exposure to potential confounds in settings characterized by non-randomized 
assignment or self-selection on one or more treatment conditions (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983). Wangenheim and Bayón (2007) provide a detailed description of the propensity 
score matching process. A logistic regression of TREATMENT on a series of covariates 
including a count of pre-existing non-manufacturer rule waivers, small business 
obligations, and initial level of industry concentration was estimated using data from the 
year 2007. As 2007 is the first year in our sample, it reflects the initial conditions for the 
industries at the start of our analysis. The logit model fit significantly better to the data 
than did its null alternative (𝛸𝛸Δ2(4) = 20.11,𝑝𝑝 <  .01). To identify matches, we utilize 
caliper matching (Althauser & Rubin, 1970) with a tolerance of .20 of the standard 
deviation of the propensity score, following the recommendations of Austin (2011). We 
match industries without replacement with the objective of improving the precision of 
modeling results (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). Each of the 20 industries receiving treatment 
in our dataset successfully matched to a similar, non-treated industry, thus resulting in a 
balanced sample of 40 industries. As we have nine annual observations on each 
industry, out total sample size is 360. Descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. UTILIZATION 1.000        
2. TREATMENT -0.191 1.000       
3. 
CONCENTRATION 0.145 0.034 1.000      
4. SMALLPROP -0.112 0.147 0.235 1.000     
5. PRICEINDEX 0.146 -0.050 0.094 -0.167 1.000    
6. 
COMPETITIVENESS 0.030 0.011 0.100 0.161 0.112 1.000   
7. PARTICIPATION -0.433 0.165 0.102 0.169 0.012 -0.024 1.000  
8. OBLIGATIONS -0.740 0.204 -0.001 0.300 -0.105 -0.074 0.641 1.000 
Mean 0.446 0.317 5.149 0.776 5.014 1.668 7.635 18.840 
Standard Deviation 0.242 0.466 1.176 0.166 0.413 1.216 1.448 1.861 
Minimum 0.022 0.000 0.693 0.163 3.619 -1.611 3.497 13.314 
Maximum 0.998 1.000 6.172 0.991 5.779 6.458 11.265 23.021 
 
Model and Methodology 
A model of federal utilization of small businesses concerns as a function of class 




Given that the dependent variable is a proportion (a fraction) and is bounded 
between values of zero and one, estimation of the model using ordinary least squares 
can result in the prediction of values outside of the (0,1) interval (Papke & Wooldridge, 
1996). Further, residuals produced from an ordinary least squares regression are 
unlikely to meet the assumptions of homogeneity and, thus, bias is likely in standard 
errors under the ordinary least squares estimator (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 240). Smith and 
Fernandez (2010) provide a discussion of this issue in the context of modeling small 
business utilization proportions, and identify several potential solutions, including the use 
of a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation technique developed by Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996). We also adopt this approach, but utilize the extension of the 
technique proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (2008) for estimating fractional response 
models with panel data, a Bernoulli quasi-MLE (QMLE) estimator (Papke & Wooldridge, 
2008). Explanatory variables in QLME are specified as (1, 𝐗𝐗𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊, 𝐗𝐗�𝒊𝒊) (Papke & Wooldridge, 
2008, p. 124). As our interest is in change over time in the fractional response (i.e., the 
within-variance component), we limit our presentation of QLME results to those given by 
𝐗𝐗𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊. 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 314 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
Results 
Model estimation was performed in R (R Core Team, 2018). Estimates are 
presented in Table 2 and have been rescaled following the procedure given by Papke 
and Wooldridge (2008, Equation 3.11). As previously discussed, all three moderator 
variables (CONCENTRATION, SMALLPROP, PRICEINDEX) were centered about their 
grand means prior to entry into the regression equation. Thus, the coefficient for the non-
manufacturer rule waiver treatment, TREATMENT, reflects the model-estimated effect of 
a waiver issuance at average levels of industry concentration, when the proportion of 
small firms in this industry is average, and at average prices. At this point, the simple 
effect (simple slope) of the waiver treatment is not decidedly non-zero (β* = .036, t = 
1.704, p = .088). 
Table 2. Regression Results 
Explanatory Variable Estimate Unscaled Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
TREATMENT 0.036 0.098 0.058 1.704 0.088 * 
CONCENTRATION × TREATMENT -0.040 -0.123 0.047 -2.684 0.007 ** 
SMALLPROP 0.305 0.875 1.458 0.600 0.549 
SMALLPROP × TREATMENT 0.046 0.231 0.268 0.860 0.390 
PRICEINDEX 0.050 0.130 0.289 0.449 0.653 
PRICEINDEX × TREATMENT -0.106 -0.320 0.153 -2.095 0.036 ** 
COMPETITIVENESS (control) -0.023 -0.066 0.033 -2.017 0.044 ** 
PARTICIPATION (control) 0.036 0.092 0.045 2.057 0.040 ** 
OBLIGATIONS (control) -0.056 -0.153 0.083 -1.844 0.065 * 
Notes. *p<.10, **p<.05. CONCENTRATION, SMALLPROP, AND PRICEINDEX are grand-mean centered. 
 
Consistent with the expectations of Hypothesis 1, industry concentration 
(CONCENTRATION) has a statistically significant and negative moderating effect on the 
waiver treatment (t = -2.684, p < .01). Figure 1 depicts this interaction, providing simple 
slopes for the effect of the waiver treatment on small business utilization at high and low 
values of industry concentrations (± one standard deviation from the mean). Estimates 
and standard errors for the simple slopes were calculated using the mean vector and 
variance-covariance matrix for the model-implied coefficients (Spiller et al., 2013). When 
industry concentration is low, the waiver treatment has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on small business utilization (β* = .085, t = 2.876, p = .004). However, 
when industry concentration is high, the waiver has no discernable impact on small 
business utilization (β* = -.017, t = -.675, p = .500). 
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 . Interaction Plot of CONCENTRATION and Non-Manufacturer Rule 
Waiver Treatment 
 
The statistical model offered no support for Hypotheses 2, which suggested that 
the proportion of small firms in the industry (SMALLPROP) would amplify the effect of 
the waiver treatment. While the coefficient estimate for the interaction term was indeed 
positive, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the effect exists (i.e., differs 
from a value of zero) in the population (β* = .046, t = .860, p = .390).  
Hypothesis 3 was supported by the model. This hypothesis suggested that a 
waiver treatment would be less effective for industries experiencing high levels of price 
growth (PRICEINDEX). This implies a negative coefficient for the interaction term, as 
was estimated by the model (β* = -.106, t = -2.095, p = .036). The resulting interaction is 
depicted within Figure 2. When the industry price index (PPI) is low, the waiver treatment 
has a significant and positive effect on small business utilization (β* = .079, t = 2.657, p 
= .008). However, when the industry price index (PPI) is high, the effectiveness of the 
waiver treatment is attenuated, and does not appear to differ from a value of zero in the 
population (β* = -.012, t = -.406, p = .685). 
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This is the first study that we are aware of to examine, using empirical data, 
industry-level conditions that amplify or attenuate the effectiveness of non-mandatory 
small business programs, such as class waiver program for the non-manufacturer rule. 
The study also provides a unique context to study the efficacy of marketing channel 
designs under differing industry conditions. 
Our analysis demonstrates that industry-level factors strongly condition the 
effectiveness of class waivers to the non-manufacturing rule. For the “average” industry 
(e.g., as a measured by concentration, price levels, and the proportion of small firms in 
the industry), a class waiver may have little influence alone on small business utilization. 
This finding is not entirely surprising, given that the waivers are meant to be exceptions, 
and thus should not be expected to perform well in a general case (i.e., under general 
industry conditions). Yet, under the correct industry conditions, the waivers appear to 
have a robust, positive impact on small business outcomes. These conditions are 
discussed next. 
The statistical results for our first hypothesis point to the criticality of industry 
composition to the efficacy of class waivers and, more broadly, to the success of 
targeted small business policies and programs. We found that, when industry 
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concentration was high, issuance of a class waiver had no impact on the utilization of 
small businesses. Yet, when industry concentration is low, a waiver can produce a 
marked increase in small business utilization. Clearly, this result does not imply that the 
U.S. Small Business Administration should adopt a practice of broadly issuing class 
waivers within low-concentration industries. It does imply, however, that regulators and 
policy makers should consider the conditions present in the industry within the review 
and decision-making process for waiver issue: Low concentration can catalyze the 
waivers’ effects. If concentration in an industry is high, then regulators might instead 
seek alternative mechanisms to spur small business growth and development, such as 
through bonding and funding programs. 
Similarly, our results suggest that price stability—and the avoidance of high 
levels of industry price inflation—is critical to the success of the class waiver program. 
High industry-level prices nullified the positive effect that a class waiver to the non-
manufacturer rule might otherwise have on small business utilization. There are two 
potential explanations for this. First, transaction costs between channel partners tend to 
rise as instability and uncertainty increases. Not only might quantities of final demand be 
more uncertain, but channel members may be incentivized to alter ordering and 
inventory behavior, reducing the potential for up-stream channel members to capitalize 
on potential economies in production and logistics. If additional transaction costs accrue 
between manufacturers and resellers (e.g., wholesalers, retailers), then pricing through 
indirect channels may become less competitive. Further, when prices are on the rise, 
buyers looking to enter into medium or long-term relationships for a class of products 
may be less willing to pay for value-added services provided by channel partners (e.g., 
local post-sales support), given the risk of future price increases. 
Lastly, counter to our expectations, the data did not offer support for an 
amplification of the class waiver’s effect when industries were comprised of a high 
proportion of small firms. However, this absence of an effect may not be entirely 
surprising. On one extreme, a waiver could not be expected to fare well at increasing 
small business utilization in an industry devoid of small businesses. On the other 
extreme, an industry that is already highly saturated with small business may already 
experience high levels of utilization, and thus the marginal benefit of a waiver may be 
minimal. For this reason, the relationship may truly be a polynomial (e.g., a quadratic 
and inverted-U), such that the waivers effects are greatest when there is only a 
moderate proportion of small businesses operating within the industry. While we were 
unable to test this proposition with our data, we discuss it as an area for future research. 
Implications for Practice 
Government procurement leaders who seek to maximize all tools at their 
disposal in order to comply by laws that facilitate small business participation may be 
disappointed to discover that factors beyond their control may render waivers an 
impotent tool. This suggests that procurement leaders should first conduct market 
analysis of industry factors; a basic understanding of the economic and environmental 
conditions can augment the effectiveness of waivers, where they are effective. 
Waivers are least effective in industries characterized by high concentration and 
high price inflation, conditions that pose other procurement challenges. Knowing this, 
procurement managers who are forewarned of industry conditions can develop 
strategies appropriate to the industry and purchase circumstances. One could cite the 
success of specific examples of federal procurement initiatives that exhibit this 
approach, such as DIUx. DIUx caters to specific product-market-industry 
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characteristics—perhaps offices specialized by purchasing circumstances would be 
appropriate for certain other industries. 
Procurement managers might also consider the broader competitive and 
innovative benefits of providing certain resources to small businesses. Small businesses 
may suffer due to higher transaction costs relative to large businesses. At the individual 
business level, transaction costs for small businesses are usually lower (c.f., 
Paparoidamis et al., forthcoming), although purchase volume often would drive the use 
of many small businesses, for a greater sum of transaction costs than results from open 
market purchases from another large business. Facilitating inter-company information 
flows may be a strategy that re-empowers the NMR waiver so that it improves small 
business engagement. 
Implications for Theory 
Transaction costs enjoy an ample and well-established body of research with 
regard to government policies, yet relatively few studies connect transaction costs with 
channel design considerations in the context of government procurement. Environmental 
factors such as industry concentration and inflationary conditions may comprise the 
single most important consideration for the success of government initiatives to support 
small businesses, and these findings suggest that research should consider further 
moderator effects of environmental factors on government procurement policies. High 
industry concentration seemed to diminish the positive effects of waivers on small 
business, which may result from the relatively low transaction costs for large 
transactions among few large enterprises in highly concentrated industries, suggesting a 
primary role for transaction costs as an explanatory theory, at least for endogenous 
variables. 
On the other hand, Coase (1937) originally proposed that the limit of the firm will 
occur where marginal transaction (“buy”) costs will just balance marginal production 
(“make”) costs, so it may be that exogenous variables related to industry structural 
factors ultimately determine production and transaction costs. For example, 
technological and product life-cycle maturity may determine the degree of industry 
concentration and its subsequent effects on small business participation. Our results 
provide evidence for the importance of structural factors. To address this structural 
difference between industries with regard to the effectiveness of waivers, transaction 
cost theory suggests that publicly funded information exchange networks may reduce 
transaction costs for small businesses in order generate the same waiver benefits for 
high concentration industries as for low. Institutional theory may offer an alternative both 
as an explanation and a remedy, suggesting that the social and regulatory environment 
surrounding highly concentrated industries may explain the difference in waiver 
outcomes, while simultaneously providing an example to emulate. Specifically, one-size-
fits-all approaches to encourage small business participation may be infeasible, and 
tailoring of institutions may yield greater returns (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). 
Considering that traditional approaches have failed to resolve entirely the issue 
of sufficient federal procurement engagement with small business, new theory should be 
considered. Since small business policy is based in part upon creating healthier, more 
resilient, and more innovative economies, endogenous growth theory and the knowledge 
spillover theory of entrepreneurship may offer perspectives to study small business 
waivers that could explain our findings while providing guidance to public policy (c.f., 
Huggins & Thompson, 2015). 
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Study Limitations 
This study has several limitations that should be kept in mind. A primary 
limitation, and one that we share with other research utilizing archival data, is that we are 
unable to directly observe or measure mechanisms that we theorize to underlie effects. 
Indeed, while we believe the theory and mechanisms that we rely on to be plausible, we 
are unable to conclude through our data or statistical analysis that these are truly the 
mechanisms that are at work and that our specification is indeed “correct” (Cudeck & 
Henly, 1991). Second, as data is not available on the issuance of individual (vs. class) 
waivers to the non-manufacturing rule, we are unable to control for the role that these 
waivers might have on promoting small business utilization. It seems likely, for instance, 
that industries most conducive to requests and approvals of individual waivers would 
also be most conducive to requests for class waivers. 
Future Research Directions 
Class NMR waivers usually originate from small business intermediaries who 
want to be eligible for somewhat restricted markets (small businesses only via set-
asides). Future research could explore instances in which the buying agency originates 
the NMR waiver (i.e., an “individual” waiver) with the goals to understand (1) the 
circumstances in which this occurs, and (2) why it does not occur more often. 
Government buyers often do not conduct effective market research (Pang, 2018) and 
demonstrate a lack of commitment to small business goals (Hawkins, Gravier, & 
Randall, 2018). 
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Abstract 
The procurement of commercial items presents both opportunities and challenges for 
the Department of Defense. Among the challenges is the negotiation of “fair and 
reasonable” prices with suppliers where competitive sources are not relevant. This paper 
presents analyses to address this challenge for commercial aircraft that serve as the basis 
for military systems. Using insights from the economics literature on aspects of the 
commercial aircraft market, we develop estimating models for aircraft price that take into 
account both supply and demand drivers, across both aircraft models and time. These 
models are applied to the KC-46A airborne tanker program, prices of which are subject to 
negotiation. Other factors affecting the commercial aircraft market and aircraft used in these 
programs (Boeing variants) are also addressed. Lessons learned applicable to the general 
problem of negotiation of contracts for commercial items are enumerated.  
Background 
The procurement of commercial items presents both opportunities and challenges for 
the Department of Defense (DoD). Among the challenges is the negotiation of “fair and 
reasonable” prices with suppliers where competitive sources do not exist. The Institute for 
Defense Analyses (IDA) has performed a series of studies developing estimating 
relationships for the prices of commercial aircraft, variants of which figure in DoD acquisition 
programs (Harmon, Sullivan, & Davis, 2010). Unlike in the case of purpose-built military 
aircraft, DoD negotiators generally do not have access to the underlying costs or cost 
estimating relationships derived from historical costs for analogous items. Buying 
commercial aircraft is substantially different from buying military aircraft or commodity items 
from other types of commercial suppliers. Lessons learned from this past rese arch can 
help inform current Air Force negotiations on the prices of current and future systems; of 
particular interest is the KC-46A program. The lessons learned also have implications for the 
broader portfolio of the DoD’s commercial items purchases, particularly those bought in thin 
markets, and/or markets dominated by sellers with market power where competitive 
sourcing is not relevant. 
The Economics of the Commercial Aircraft Market 
The market for commercial aircraft with a range greater than 3,000 nautical miles 
(NM) is currently a duopoly, with Boeing and Airbus the only producers. In a duopoly such 
as this, the participants have a degree of market power not evident in more competitive 
markets. The suppliers’ choice of quantity (price) has an effect on market price (quantity 
demanded), as each supplier contributes a large part to industry output. Also, given learning 
in the aircraft industry, the choice of quantity for a given time period affects costs in future 
time periods. This combination of attributes means that for any given product line and time 
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period, price can be below marginal cost (startup period)1 or above marginal cost (mature 
program). In addition, given market power (the supplier faces a downward sloping demand 
curve), price discrimination is also evident. This contrasts with a competitive market in which 
all firms are price takers; the cost of production for any given firm does not affect the market 
price. All of these factors contribute to the difficulty in arriving at fair and reasonable prices 
for commercial aircraft. 
Overview of the Literature 
These observations are drawn from substantial academic literature on the economics 
of the commercial aircraft industry, presented in Harmon et al. (2010), in which price 
determination is an important aspect of much of the research. This literature provides 
important insights regarding potential drivers of aircraft price levels and movements over 
time. These studies show that, although learning will not affect purchase price to the degree 
evident in a contracting environment—as in the military aircraft procurement, where prices 
are negotiated based on cost—there still can be some effect (Baldwin & Krugman, 1988; 
Benkard, 2004; Irwin & Pavcnik, 2004). This should be true for anything that affects the cost 
structure of the industry or a given product line. For example, estimated price increases that 
followed the 1992 reduction in government subsidies were coincident with calculated 
increases in producer costs (Irwin & Pavcnik, 2004). Other possible cost drivers that could 
show up in price include labor productivity, secular trends, and cyclical movements. Some 
fixed costs will be “quasi-fixed”—portions of labor inputs that are sticky relative to production 
rate. This was noted in Kronemer and Henneberger (1993), a Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) study of labor productivity in the aircraft industry. The BLS found that labor 
productivity was highly procyclical—higher output measures were associated with higher 
productivity growth as quasi-fixed portions of labor were spread over more units. Their data 
also show a longer-term upward trend in labor productivity of 1.5% to 2.5% per year. 
Modeling Approaches  
The models of the aircraft industry presented in the economics literature have, by 
necessity, been abstracted from a complex reality. They have at least four things in 
common:  
• Use of a multi-period dynamic framework;  
• Rules guiding the strategic behavior of suppliers in a duopoly/oligopoly situation 
in which game-theoretic approaches are used to solve for industry equilibrium;  
• Inclusion of learning curves in the supply functions of the firms, while taking into 
account the dynamic effects of learning on firm decisions; and  
• Demand relations reflecting the derived demand of aircraft as an input to the 
production of air services.  
All the models take the manufacturers as value maximizers over an extended time 
horizon where the value function is, assuming a homogeneous product, for firm j,  
                                               
 
 
1  Due to learning-by-doing, the first quantity produced has a very high cost. Prices in the 
startup period are usually observed to be below marginal costs. 
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where Vj is the net present value for firm j, R is a discount factor and pjt, qjt, and cjt 
are the relevant price, quantity, and marginal cost.2 Modifications to this basic setup were 
made by the different researchers to reflect additional assumptions. The firms’ strategic 
behavior is portrayed either as quantity setting (Cournot game) or price setting (Bertrand 








, and current and future costs, through the learning curve. In the 
Bertrand game, choosing pjt will affect qjt, which in turn will affect future costs through the 
learning curve. The models vary in complexity and realism. For the simplest model, stated in 
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where ct is the marginal cost of the aircraft, zt is the shadow value of current 
production arising from reductions in future costs due to learning, s is the market share of 
the subject firm, and E is the demand elasticity (E > 0).3 
Example Program: KC-46A 
In the KC-46A program, government-funded development includes the creation of a 
new minor model of the 767, the 767-2C, which was not previously available to commercial 
customers. The 767-2C includes a combination of features available in other Boeing 
commercial aircraft, including freighter floors and doors, convertible passenger capability, an 
upgraded cockpit, and higher maximum take-off weight (MTOW). In addition, tanker mission 
system provisions are also incorporated; although these features were not available on 
previous Boeing commercial aircraft, they are “of a type” changes that commercial 
customers might specify (e.g., added provisions for non-standard buyer-furnished 
equipment [BFE]). Boeing has applied for a Federal Aviation Administration “amended type 
certificate” (ATC) for the 767-2C. Given the ATC, the 767-2C will be commercially available 
to other customers. All of these factors add challenges to the negotiation of fair and 
reasonable prices, as pricing history for direct commercial analogs do not exist. The effects 
of these challenges are mitigated by an acquisition strategy in which the initial competition 
between suppliers (resulting in the choice of Boeing over Airbus in February 2011) provided 
for price discovery. The award covered a Fixed-Price Incentive Firm contract for Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development along with Firm Fixed Price contract options for Low Rate 
                                               
 
 
2  The definition of marginal cost in most of this literature is not the cost of the last aircraft built 
during the time increment, but the average cost over that time period, implying the inclusion of recurring 
fixed costs.  
3  Denote demand with x. The price elasticity of demand is – (∆x/∆p) (p/x), which measures 
the percentage change in demand in response to a 1% change in price.  
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Initial Production Lots 1 and 2, and Not-to-Exceed (NTE) contract options with an Economic 
Price Adjustment (EPA) clause for Full Rate Production Lots 3 through 13 (DoD, 2016). It is 
at Lot 3 (FY 2017) where negotiation becomes relevant. 
Modeling Commercial Aircraft Prices 
We use least-squares regression techniques to define and test specifications of the 
price estimating relationships. Prices are treated as dependent variables and related to 
independent variables, which we hypothesize to be price drivers. In the case of least-
squares regressions, the functions are defined by parameter estimates on the independent 
variables, determined by minimizing the squared errors of the regression line from the actual 
data. The price estimating relationships take on the multiplicative form:  
 j
u
jj exfp ),( β= , (3) 
where pj is the value of the observed price for aircraft j, x j is the vector of 
independent variables,  is the vector of parameter estimates, and uj is the error term. 
Without loss of generality, assume that the equation takes on the intrinsically linear form 
with an intercept, one regressor x1 (price driver), and one dummy variable D, 
 jj
uD
joj exp 21 1 ββ
β= , (4) 
and then OLS regression techniques can be applicable. To do this, the equation is 
transformed to a log-log form: 
 .)ln()ln()ln()ln( 2110 jjjj uDxp +++= βββ  (5) 
OLS will produce parameter estimates of b0 ≡ ln(β0), b1 ≡ β1, and b2 ≡ ln(β2). Both β0 and 
β2 can be recovered by taking an anti-logarithmic transformation of b0 and b2 (i.e., by 
calculating 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏0 and 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏2). The parameter estimate b1 has a natural interpretation of elasticity, 
measuring the percentage change in price with respect to a 1% change in x1. The 
parameter b2 represents a change in price (∆p j/pj) when the dummy variable switches its 
value from 0 to 1.  
When describing the estimating relationships, information presented includes R2, 
adjusted R2, the standard error of the estimate (𝜎𝜎�), and the t-statistics (which are the ratios 
of the parameter estimates to their standard errors), as well as associated levels of 
statistical significance for each of the parameter estimates. We generally exclude variables 
whose parameter estimates are not significant at the 0.1 level, although some exceptions 
are made. In a linear model, R2 measures the proportion of the total variance in the data 
explained by the model. Although this is not strictly true for most of our models because they 
are nonlinear, the R2 analog provides useful information about the relative fit of the models. 
Adjusted R2 presents this information adjusted for the number of independent variables in 
the regression. R2 and adjusted R2 are calculated from the data and model after they are 
transformed back from log space to arithmetic space. 𝜎𝜎� is calculated in log space; it can be 
converted into minus/plus percentages of price in the original space by calculating values for 
�𝑒𝑒−𝜎𝜎�� − 1 and �𝑒𝑒+𝜎𝜎�� − 1. Measures derived from the standard errors provide information 
regarding the uncertainty of the estimates.  
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 328 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
Data 
The IDA team used data from airline industry consultants to build price estimating 
relationships for commercial aircraft. Airlines and manufacturers withhold transaction price 
information from public release, and Department of Transportation transaction price data for 
contemporary experience are not available. Although list prices are available on Boeing and 
Airbus websites, aircraft are generally sold at a substantial discount from list. The airline 
consultants estimate prices for a variety of clients including aircraft purchasers, lessors, 
insurers, and investors. They are coy about their estimating methods; they seem to 
extrapolate from a limited number of actual data points (often from their clients) based on 
financial valuation models.  
IDA’s previous analysis of the KC-767 purchase price (Nelson et al., 2003) noted 
uncertainties associated with reported aircraft price data: 
The complexity of the transactions comes from two sources: the variation in 
content from one sale to another, and the nature of the contractual 
arrangements involved. Both sources of complexity make it difficult to 
interpret any known historical sales prices.  
The content included in a given sale may on the one hand include spare 
parts, training, and maintenance support. On the other hand, the sales price 
may not include buyer furnished equipment such as interiors, in-flight 
entertainment, seats and galleys. Additionally, 767 aircraft, like most 
commercial models, are sold with a wide range of features such as upgraded 
avionics, engines, fuel capacities, maximum gross takeoff weight and cargo 
handling systems. 
This uncertainty was addressed for 767 pricing by collecting data from multiple 
sources, representing multiple years and transactions. This general strategy was expanded 
to the broader commercial aircraft market by statistically defining price estimating 
relationships. The goal was to abstract from the available data some reference value for a 
given aircraft model based on the consultants’ pricing data, regardless of the conditions of 
specific transactions or possible measurement error associated with the individual data 
points used. The regression analyses employed generated the expected values of prices 
conditioned on measures of aircraft utility and other price drivers. The statistical analyses in 
turn provided measures of estimation error that partially reflect uncertainties in the data. 
IDA price estimating research was first performed in 2009 to 2010 in Harmon et al. 
(2010) using data from Airline Monitor, AVITAS, and Morten Beyer & Agnew (MBA). These 
data included reported prices through 2009. The AVITAS and MBA data showed similar 
prices for the same aircraft model, while the Airline Monitor data showed consistently higher 
prices, particularly for wide-body (WB) aircraft. Also, Airline Monitor’s time series data 
showed almost no price variability between years, and price data for discontinued aircraft 
models were reported after they ceased delivery. As AVITAS did not include time series 
data by aircraft model, we chose to update only the MBA data; the updated data used in 
modeling included reported prices through January 2016. MBA presented “Base Value” and 
“Current Market Price” data—in most cases the two values were the same, but when they 
were different, we used the Current Market Price value. Prices were for typical airline 
configurations, including interiors/BFE.  
Table 2 shows the coverage by year for the MBA data used in the regression modeling. 
Note that there was a gap in data reporting in 2010 and 2011. 
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Table 2. Data Coverage 
Manufacturer Aircraft Years in 2010 Study Additional Years in 
2016 Update 
Airbus A330-200 1998–2009 2012–2016 
A330-300 1996–2009 2012–2016 
A330-300F NA 2014–2016 
A380-800 N/A 2012–2016 
Boeing 737-600 1998–2006 N/A 
737-700 1998–2009 2012–2016 
737-800 1998–2009 2012–2016 
737-900 2001–2005 N/A 
737-900ER 2006–2009 2012–2016 
747-8 N/A 2012–2016 
747-F N/A 2016 
767-200ER 1988–1991, 2000–2007 N/A 
767-300ER 1988–2009 2012–2013 
767-300F NA 2014–2016 
767-400ER 2000–2002 N/A 
777-200 1995–2006 N/A 
777-200ER 1997–2009 2012–2014 
777-200LR 2007–2009 2012–2014 
777-300 1998–2006 NA 
777-300ER 2005–2009 2012–2016 
777F NA 2014–2016 
787-8 N/A 2012–2014 
787-9 N/A 2016 
 
All dollar amounts are measured in calendar year (CY) 2016 dollars. The inflation 
adjustment is made using the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator as reported by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The effect of other economic factors (fuel price, 
world GDP, cumulative aircraft quantity) are weighted based on estimates from panel data 
analyses that are described later.  
Aircraft characteristics used as cost drivers in the regressions were open source data 
obtained primarily from the aircraft manufacturers’ websites. Price drivers were aircraft 
characteristics fixed over time reflecting utility to airlines. Different independent variables 
and subsets of data were included in the resulting price estimating relationships. Either 
MTOW, Seats and Range (Seat Miles4), or Payload was used as the primary driver. These 
drivers are presented graphically for the aircraft in the data sample in Figure 1.  
 
                                               
 
 
4  Seat Miles is a measure of an aircraft’s passenger-carrying capacity. It is equal to the 
number of seats available multiplied by the maximum range in miles.  
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 MTOW and Seat Miles for Commercial Aircraft Sample 
 
Data can be further broken down by aircraft model. An aircraft model is introduced, 
manufactured, and phased out over time. Therefore, a given model is usually observed in 
multiple years over a specific range of years. Some drivers change over time and model. For 
example, the variables representing and measuring utility (demand) and cost (supply) affect 
prices over time. The economics literature informs our choice of independent variables.  
Pooled OLS Models  
Our data were a mix of cross-section (data by aircraft model) and time series (for a 
given model). The time series data sample included observations from 1988 to 2016, 
covering periods that vary by model; the data ranges are shown in Table 2. Our empirical 
regression took the logarithmic form: 
 pjt = zjα +xjtβ +εjt , (6) 
where the j subscript indexed each model, z j was a vector containing a constant term 
and variables for each model that are fixed over time, and x jt was a vector of regressors that 
varied over model and time.  
In terms of the price estimating model, the aircraft-model-specific variables fixed over 
time (e.g., Seat Miles and MTOW) were contained in z j, while the xjts were the economic 
variables that changed over time and model (including delivery quantities to capture 
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used to estimate the model (Greene, 2002). Given positive diagnostics regarding z j, we 
chose to estimate the price estimating relationships using OLS.5 
For the aircraft model-specific variables (the z js) we found either Seats and Range or 
MTOW to be statistically significant. The MTOW specification allowed us to include freighter 
aircraft in the sample. The MTOW model showed a substantially better fit than the Seats and 
Range model. One reason for this may be the ambiguity regarding seating configurations for 
the passenger aircraft. We also tried different combinations and transformations of the 
constituents of MTOW (e.g., empty weight, weights for payload and fuel), but we found that 
MTOW fit the best. For the updated data sample, we did not find a freighter effect.  
For the economic variables, we experimented with different time lags and forms of 
world GDP growth (International Monetary Fund, 2016), fuel prices (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, n.d.), delivery rates, and aircraft cumulative quantity, as well as a time trend. 
As there were already substantial correlations between time, cumulative aircraft quantity, 
and fuel price, we used the de-trended series for GDP growth. 
The net effect of market cycles on aircraft prices is an interesting empirical question. 
There is a supply-side argument that higher production rates would mean lower unit costs 
and prices.6 The demand-side argument is that higher economic growth would raise the 
utility of aircraft to the airlines and prices would rise. Although these are two different effects, 
they were highly correlated with one another in the data. We found that higher GDP growth 
is associated with higher prices, and that measures of delivery rate were either statistically 
insignificant when entered with GDP growth or carried the same sign. In the end, we chose 
de-trended world real GDP growth, lagged two years, to capture the effect of market cycles 
on prices.  
The impact of other xjts were not ambiguous, as the demand and supply/cost effects 
were more clearly delineated. Fuel price was a demand-side driver, where higher fuel prices 
were expected to result in lower aircraft prices. Higher cumulative quantities should result in 
lower costs and prices. Long-term increases in productivity should lead to lower real prices 
over time for a given aircraft capability.  
For our preferred baseline pooled OLS regression, we identified five price drivers: 
maximum takeoff weight (MTOWj), cumulative quantity (CumQ_L1jt), de-trended world real 
GDP growth rate (WGDP_L2jt), fuel price (FuelP_L1jt), and calendar year (Yearjt), each of 
which is measured as explained below: 
• MTOWj is described above;  
• 4Enginesj is a dummy taking 1 if model j is a four-engine aircraft and 0 if it is a 
two-engine aircraft; 
                                               
 
 
5  Although there was evidence in the regression results that assumptions required for OLS to 
be the best unbiased linear estimator were violated (unequal error variances across 
panels/heteroskedasticity and correlation of errors across time within each panel/serial correlation), 
we judged alternatives to address these problems (generalized least squares or the use of cluster 
robust standard errors) inappropriate, given our data sample. 
6  There were also offsetting supply-side arguments; production spikes may be associated 
with increased prices for inputs and increasing marginal costs. 
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• CumQ_L1jt is the cumulative quantity for the aircraft family associated with 
aircraft model j at the end of the prior year;  
• WGDP_L2jt is world real GDP growth expressed as percentage deltas from the 
trend and lagged two years, where the trend is established using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997); 
• FuelP_L1jt is the real price of jet fuel lagged one year; and  
• Yearjt is the calendar year associated with each model j and time t.  
When estimating the model, we included a dummy variable for WB aircraft, along with 
an interaction term with the MTOWi variable. This resulted in a unique slope coefficient on 
MTOWi as well as a different intercept for WB. This meant a separate model estimated for 
each of WB and narrow-body (NB) aircraft, as shown in the specification presented in Error! 
Reference source not found.. Variations on both the MTOW and Seat Miles pooled OLS 
models included production rate for each aircraft family as an additional independent 
variable. Our estimated models follow (standard errors are included under the parameter 
estimates):  
• For WB aircraft: 
 ln(pjt) = 13.01+1.147 ln(MTOWj)−0.253 (4Enginesj) − 0.031 ln(CumQ_L1jt) 
                        (.140)                      (.039)                       (.008) 
           + 1.371 (WGDP_L2jt) – 0.038 (FuelP_L1jt ) −0.011 Yearjt, 
                  (.738)                          (.013)                         (.002) 
• For NB aircraft, the interaction terms result in a unique intercept and MTOW 
coefficient, with the remaining coefficients remaining the same as for WB aircraft: 
 ln(pjt) = 4.37 + 1.907 ln(MTOWj) 
                                                           (.738) 
Error! Reference source not found. compares MBA-reported data points to the 
projected prices using the estimated models.  
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 MTOW Panel Data Model 
 
All of the parameter estimates for the preferred model shown in Error! Reference 
source not found. are significantly different from zero at p = .06 or better. Estimates for the 
coefficient on CumQ_L1jt indicate equivalent price improvement curve slopes of 97.9%. This 
is much shallower than typical cost improvement curves and is consistent with the 
economics literature. The estimates on WGDP_L2jt suggest that if world real GDP growth is 
1 percentage point above trend two years prior to aircraft delivery (say, 4.4% versus the 
3.4% growth trend estimated for 2017 using the Hodrick-Prescott filter), the price will be 
1.4% higher than if GDP growth was at trend.  
Estimates for the fuel price coefficients indicated that a $1 per gallon increase in fuel 
price one year prior to aircraft delivery results in a 3.8% decrease in price. The 
reasonableness of this estimate was tested by an approach similar to that taken in Markish 
(2002), where changes in fuel costs were related to changes in discounted life cycle costs 
associated with the aircraft. Predicted changes in aircraft price associated with changes in 
fuel cost were around 10% of the change in the discounted life cycle cost associated with 
the same fuel cost change. This seems reasonable, given that substantial portions of fuel 
price changes will be passed along to airline customers or result in changes in demand for 
seats as opposed to being absorbed by the aircraft manufacturers as price decreases. Also, 
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The time trend parameters on Yearjt indicated a decrease in real prices of 1.1% per 
year. Note that the GDP deflator was used to escalate nominal prices to constant 2016 
dollars. For the recent period, this is consistent with a 1% annual rise in nominal prices.  
Price Discounts From List Price and Boeing Financial Data 
Estimates of transaction prices for commercial aircraft are often expressed as 
discounts from list prices. We calculated discounts from Boeing’s 2016 list prices (which 
were unchanged from the published 2015 values) using both the MBA data and estimated 
prices from the models, including error bounds. An example using the pooled OLS MTOW 
model is shown in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
  
 Discounts From 2016 List Prices: MTOW Model 
 
For the WB aircraft, the average discount for Boeing aircraft was 53% for the MBA 
data and 52% for the MTOW model estimates. Over the entire Boeing portfolios, the 
average discount was 53% for the MBA data and 52% for the MTOW model estimates. For 
the Boeing portfolio, we also calculated weighted average discounts. 
As a means of validating the models and the underlying MBA data, we calculated the 
weighted average discount for Boeing based on their reported financial data and aircraft 
deliveries for 2016. Boeing reported revenue by Segment including Commercial Airplanes 
(BCA), where revenue was booked at aircraft delivery. A small portion of BCA revenue is 
from commercial after-sales support (CAS) and was estimated to be $6.5 billion in 2014 
(Broderick, 2014). Extrapolating this value forward using the annual growth rate from 2011 
to 2014 of 6.4%, we arrived at a value of $7.355 billion for 2016.  
We calculated aircraft sales revenues by subtracting CAS revenues from total BCA 
revenues for 2016: 
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Annual delivery quantities by model (𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡) and list prices by model (
*
jtp ) are 
available for each model from Boeing’s website. Given these values, the weighted average 












t . (7) 
Replacing 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡with the model estimates for each model jtp̂  yielded the estimated 
















D . (8) 
tD̂  varied between 50.2% and 51.3%, depending upon which models were used to 
estimate jtp̂ . When the MBA values were used for jtp̂ , tD̂  = 50.1%. These results give 
some assurance, that at least at the top level, the MBA data and the models are consistent 
with Boeing’s revenue derived from aircraft sales. 
Another important result from the models was the estimated downward trend in real 
transaction prices over the sample period. Boeing applies a weighted average of input price 
inflation rates when escalating list prices from year to year. Given this, and the model 
results, we should expect calculated discounts from list prices to be increasing over time as 
list prices rise at a higher rate than transaction prices. This is what we see where 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 
increased from 34–39% (depending on assumptions regarding CAS revenue) in 2004 to 
52.5% for 2016 as calculated in Equation 7. These additional calculations using publicly 
available Boeing data also confirm modeling results and the underlying data used.  
Example Application: KC-46A 
In this chapter, we apply information from the economics literature, our modeling 
results, and other relevant data to help estimate “fair and reasonable” prices for the 
commercial aircraft platforms used for the KC-46A.  
The KC-46A’s commercial platform, the 767-2C, has features that have no direct 
analog in the commercial aircraft database. Boeing considers the platform to be based on 
the 767-200ER passenger aircraft, even though it has freighter floors and doors associated 
with the longer 767-300F. While the 767-300F is still in production, the last 767-200ER was 
delivered in 2008. The price estimating models do provide some flexibility in producing 
estimates of transaction prices. The model can take into account the implied value to the 
market of some characteristics of the 767-2C, such as the increased MTOW (415,000 lbs. 
versus 396,000 lbs. for the 767-200ER and 413,000 lbs. for the 767-300F).  
The competitive nature of the initial down-select, including NTE prices for production 
lots through the end of the planned program, meant that the fair value of all 767-2C features 
was revealed and should guide future prices. In other situations, one approach to 
addressing the value of like-type features would be to add their cost basis along with a 
representative mark-up to price. The costs could be based on analogies, cost estimating 
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relationships, or cost data from the seller. The government has the right to ask for seller cost 
data, although it need not be TINA-compliant. 
However, the overall market conditions and the specifics of the 767 production that 
were obtained at the time of the 2011 competition (including expectations regarding the 
future) are likely to be different now. The MBA data, price estimating models, and Boeing 
financials show a continuing downward trend in real prices. Also, given additional 767-300F 
orders and deliveries for Federal Express, the overall 767 program is delivering aircraft at a 
rate higher than planned in 2011; given the relationship between cost and price for a mature 
program (where the tz argument goes to 0 in the )  / )  - ((11 Es
zcp ttt −
+
=  equilibrium relation, 
and the denominator is less than 1), the delivery rates indicate a lower price, as fixed costs 
are allocated over more units in a given year. 
We are able to capture the overall price trend by applying the pooled OLS model 
using 767-2C characteristics and time series inputs, including projections to 2020. 
Projections for GDP growth and fuel prices are taken from International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) forecasts (2016), while additional deliveries reflect Boeing planned 767 delivery rates 
of two aircraft/month (up from prior values of one aircraft/month). This is shown in  
Error! Reference source not found., along with data and model results from the 767-
200ER, model estimates of the 767-2C, as well as data for the 767-300F. 
 
 
 Panel Data Model Estimates for the 767-2C With Comparisons 
The 2016 estimate for the 767-2C is $81.3 million in CY2016 dollars (note that this 
excludes KC-46A-specific provisions that are not captured in the model). Comparing this 
value to the model-predicted 2011 value shows an estimated decrease in price of 1.3%. In 
the case of 2017, the longer-term decrease in real prices is offset by price increases 
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years with estimated prices decreasing to 6% below the 2011 value by 2020.7 This indicates 
that there is room for negotiation below the NTE values determined in the 2011 competition. 
For later lots where the NTEs are subject to adjustment based on an EPA clause, if the price 
trends indicated by the data and model (including evidence from Boeing’s financial data) 
diverge from the price index specified in the EPA clause, there is additional potential to 
negotiate prices below the NTEs (as adjusted by the EPA). 
As mentioned in the description of the regression analyses, we cannot separate out 
the supply-side effects on price of increases in production rates from the demand-side 
effects (GDP growth in our preferred models) using the MBA data. However, given general 
knowledge of aircraft industry cost structures as well as specific information from Boeing’s 
financial reporting, we can analytically derive an estimate of cost effects of the higher 
production rates. The cost/price effects of increased 767 production rates can then be 
approximated by employing a “rate slope” term as estimated in DoD programs where price is 
based on cost.8 Information from Boeing financial statements regarding the cost of reducing 
747 production rates provides a way to calibrate the rate slope model for commercial aircraft 
production. With this information, estimates of unit costs and fixed cost percentages at 
different delivery rates can be calculated. This is shown in Error! Reference source not 
found., where delivery rates from 6/year to 18/year are included, consistent with 2015 
experience and forecasts through 2021. 
 
 Unit Cost and Fixed-Cost Percentage Estimates for 747 Production 
 
The curve fitted to the unit costs generalizes the relationship between annual 
quantities and unit costs; it is known as the “rate curve” relation, 
 ct = α qtβ, (9) 
                                               
 
 
7 This estimate is based on IMF forecasts of the price of Brent crude, which is projected to 
increase from an average of $43/barrel in 2016 to $54/barrel in 2019 (all nominal dollars). 
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where qt is the annual delivery rate. For the 747 example above, the estimated  
coefficient is -.146, corresponding to a 90.4% rate slope; this is within the range of 
parameters estimated for military aircraft programs. 
Taking model-estimated prices for the 767-2C and insights from the above 747 
analyses, we can estimate cost decreases driven by increases in production rates between 
the plan at Boeing’s 2011 bid and the current plan. These differences indicate a 38% steady 
state increase in production rate. Baselining cost values to 767-2C price estimates for 2015 
and applying the 15% margin assumption allows us to generate estimates of cost savings 
associated with the higher production rates. Using the 90.4% rate slope, we estimate annual 
unit cost savings of around $3 million (CY16) for the steady state years (2017 to 2026), 
corresponding to a 2% decrease in cost. 
The 767-2C presents a special case, as price discovery at the time of competition 
between alternative tankers means that there is less uncertainty for future purchases. 
However, we see in the application of our models and other information that there are both 
program-specific factors (higher than previously planned production rates) and overall 
industry trends (increases in nominal prices over time that are less than overall inflation) that 
would indicate prices below the NTEs could be negotiated for future lots. 
The long time horizon for the KC-46A program means that it is important to take into 
account both the effect of general industry pricing trends and changes in the specifics of 767 
production economics. Our analyses of both of these effects indicate that the government 
may be able to pay lower prices than the NTE prices set in the original competition. 
Commercial Aircraft Pricing Lessons Learned  
Commercial Aircraft Pricing Tools 
Price determination by negotiation for commercial items will generally only occur if 
the supporting markets are not purely competitive. In the case of commercial aircraft, the 
market is a duopoly where prices are above those that would be paid if the market were 
purely competitive. The specifics of this market have been explored in some detail in the 
economics literature. The resulting game-theory models are insightful but without much 
empirical gain. We were able to make use of the consultant-reported transaction prices to 
quantify price drivers, both on the demand and supply side of the market, through least-
squares regression analyses. These models explain most of the variance in prices across 
aircraft models and time; utility associated with commercial airline services, moving people 
and goods speedily across long distances, can be proxied effectively by a small number of 
variables, while supply/cost effects can be mostly captured in a few dimensions. An 
important insight from the models and supporting data is the long-run decrease in real 
commercial aircraft prices. This could have an important impact on the pricing of future KC-
46A procurements.  
The models are useful in establishing baseline values for commercial aircraft used by 
the military. In our application of the models to the KC-46A program, we needed additional 
tools and data to address specifics of that program/aircraft. This included cost drivers not 
captured in the models (production rate effects).  
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Implications for Other Commercial Items 
Several steps in the analysis of the commercial aircraft pricing for military 
applications would be relevant in negotiating prices for other commercial items: 
• Understand the market in which the seller operates. This would go beyond 
“market research” and should address market dynamics as described by 
economic theory. 
• Model market prices as they relate to both supply-side (cost) and demand-side 
(utility) drivers. This will be challenging in that most commercial items bought by 
the DoD and subject to price negotiation will not be as homogenous as 
commercial aircraft. 
• Make use of the seller’s publicly available financial data to put available pricing 
data into perspective—and to better understand the seller’s business model. 
• Given the existence of “like-type” modifications to items available on the 
commercial market, it may be advantageous to estimate the discrete costs of 
these modifications.  
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Abstract 
This paper is intended to disseminate initial outcomes of the NPS Research 
Acquisition Program “Dynamic Contracting of Verification Activities by Applying Set-Based 
Design to the Definition of Verification Strategies” project. Verification activities provide the 
evidence of contractual fulfillment. In current practice, a verification strategy is defined at the 
beginning of an acquisition program and is agreed upon by customer and contractor at 
contract signature. This research project shows that contractually committing to a fixed 
verification strategy at the beginning of an acquisition program fundamentally leads to 
suboptimal acquisition performance. This is caused by the uncertain nature of system 
development, which will make, as it progresses, verification activities that were not 
previously planned necessary and will make some of the planned ones unnecessary. 
Therefore, dynamic contracting of verification activities is necessary to guarantee optimality 
of acquisition programs in this area. Such an approach to contracting may be enabled by 
applying set-based design to the definition of verification strategies. This paper provides a 
summary of such an approach and contributes with a refined model of rework activities that 
may be undertaken to increase the confidence on the proper functioning of the system as 
verification results become known. 
Introduction 
Verification activities, which usually take the form of a combination of analyses, 
inspections, and tests, consume a significant part, if not the biggest part, of the development 
costs of large-scale engineered systems (Engel, 2010). Verification occurs at various 
integration levels and at different times during its life cycle (Engel, 2010). Under a common 
master plan, low level verification activities are executed as risk mitigation activities, such as 
early identification of problems, or because some of them are not possible at higher levels of 
integration (Engel, 2010). Therefore, a verification strategy is defined as  
aiming at maximizing confidence on verification coverage, which facilitates 
convincing a customer that contractual obligations have been met; 
minimizing risk of undetected problems, which is important for a 
manufacturer’s reputation and to ensure customer satisfaction once the 
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system is operational; and minimizing invested effort, which is related to 
manufacturer’s profit. (Salado, 2015)  
Essentially, verification activities are the vehicle by which contractors can collect 
evidence of contractual fulfillment in acquisition programs. 
In current practice, a verification strategy is defined at the beginning of an acquisition 
program and is agreed upon by the customer and contractor at contract signature. Hence, 
the resources necessary to execute verification activities at various stages of the system 
development are allocated and committed at the beginning, when a small amount of 
knowledge about the system is available (Engel, 2010). However, the necessity and value of 
a verification activity cannot be measured independently of the overall verification strategy 
(Salado & Kannan, 2018b). Instead, the necessity to perform a given verification activity 
depends on the results of all verification activities that have been previously performed 
(Salado & Kannan, 2018b). For example, testing the mass of a component is considered 
more necessary if a previous analysis has shown low margin with respect to the success 
criterion than if the analysis has shown ample margin. Thus, contractually committing to a 
fixed verification strategy at the beginning of an acquisition program fundamentally leads to 
suboptimal acquisition performance. Essentially, the uncertain nature of system 
development will make verification activities that were not previously planned necessary and 
will make some of the planned ones unnecessary (Salado & Kannan, 2018b). The former 
can be handled through change requests (CRs), but they require unplanned financial 
investments. The latter can be recovered in a few cases through negative change requests, 
but, in general, they imply a waste of the financial investment because the investment has 
been committed to the contractor.  
In this context, dynamic contracting of verification activities becomes necessary to 
guarantee optimality of acquisition programs in this area (Xu & Salado, 2019). Instead of 
contracting a predefined set of activities at the beginning of a project, the necessity and 
contracting of each verification activity (or subsets of them) are evaluated and executed as 
the system development progresses (Xu & Salado, 2019). Set-based design has been 
proposed as part of this research to support such a contracting approach (Xu & Salado, 
2019). Informed by the benefits of set-based design in conceptual design (Singer, Doerry, & 
Buckley, 2009), an overall set of verification activities is considered, but not contracted, at 
the beginning of a project. A vector of investment opportunities indicates the development 
stages in which verification activities may be contracted and executed. Based on their 
results, the set of remaining verification paths to the end of the system development is 
updated (Xu & Salado, 2019). 
This paper presents the current state of the research project and contributes with a 
refined model of rework activities that may be undertaken to increase the confidence on the 
proper functioning of the system as verification results become known. 
Background: Models of Verification Strategies 
Primary Characteristics of Verification As An Engineering Endeavor 
Consider  
a generic model of the expected utility , ,S p tE U    provided by a system S  
at time t  with respect to a set of preferences P , as given in Eq. (1), 
 ( )( ), , , , ,S P t U A t A nE U F S B S t P  =     (1) 
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where AS  is a set of system characteristics, ( ),t A nB S t  is the belief at time 
t  that those system characteristics will be exhibited by the system at a later 
time nt , and UF  is a set of expected utility functions, associated with 
beliefs on those functions, that map system attributes, beliefs of system 
attributes, and preferences to expected utility. (Salado & Kannan, 2018b) 
In this context, a verification activity is one that “affects at least ( ),t A nB S t ” (Salado 
& Kannan, 2018b). That is, a verification activity is one that, as a minimum, provides 
information about the system under development.  
For the purpose of this paper, two main characteristics of verification lead to the 
need for dynamic contracting of verification strategies. First, the value of each verification 
activity is not absolute, but depends on the results of prior verification activities (Salado & 
Kannan, 2018b). As explained in the introduction of this paper, this means that the value of 
a verification activity cannot be determined individually, but in the context of the knowledge 
at the time of executing the activity. Therefore, the expected value provided by a verification 
activity evolves as a function of the results of previous verification activities. Second, 
although verification activities are objective, the confidence that they generate is subjective 
(Salado & Kannan, 2018b). This means that not only prior verification activities influence the 
value of a verification activity, but also the engineer or the team in charge of processing and 
interpreting the results of a given verification activity do so. Given the long development 
times necessary in some large-scale systems, it is common that the team in charge of 
executing verification activities towards the later stages of the system development is 
different from the team that planned those verification activities early in the lifecycle. Hence, 
changes in the perceived value of a verification activity are inherent to the nature of a large-
scale system development, under the assumption that the teams will change as the 
development progresses. 
Mathematical Models of Verification Strategies 
In this paper, a verification strategy is understood to be a set of verification activities 
organized as an acyclic directed graph (Salado & Kannan, 2018a). A verification activity is 
understood to be the collection of information about a specific aspect of the system under 
development (for simplicity we will call this a system parameter) and verification evidence 
refers to such information. Furthermore, it is assumed that the level of confidence in the 
correct performance of the system is shaped by the system architecture (e.g., maturity and 
coupling of the system’s components) and the results of the various verification activities 
(Salado & Kannan, 2019).  
Mathematically, this understanding is captured by “modeling the engineer’s posterior 
belief distribution ( )|π θ s  based on his/her prior belief distribution ( )π θ  and the density 
function ( )|f θv , conditioned on the collected verification evidence v ”, where θ  is the 
system parameter that is verified and *V∈v  is a specific vector of verification results (or 
verification evidence) (Salado & Kannan, 2019). Using this mathematical framework, a 
verification strategy is modeled as a Bayesian network BN A B= ϒ ∪ ∪ , where (Salado & 
Kannan, 2019): 
• ( ),V Dϒ =  is a simple directed graph that captures the planned execution of 
verification activities. The set V  is a set of verification activities, and D  is a set of 
tuples ( ),a b , with ,a b V∈ , that describes the relative order in which verification 
activities are planned to be executed (Salado & Kannan, 2018a). 
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• ( ),ZA Dθθ=  is a simple directed graph that captures the properties of the system 
architecture, specifically the coupling between the different components forming 
the system, as well as their individual maturity. The set Zθ  captures the prior 
beliefs on the absence of errors in the system parameters, and the information 
dependencies between those parameters are captured in the set 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }, : , , |ZD a b a b f b f bθ θ= ∈ ≠a . 
{ }( ), ,ZB V Dθ ϒ=  is a simple directed graph that captures the ability of the 
verification activities to provide information about one or more system 
parameters, where ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, : , , |ZD a b a b V f b f bθϒ = ∈ ∈ ≠a . 
Resulting graphs modeling verification strategies can be reduced to a combination of 
a finite set of patterns (Salado & Kannan, 2019). Identification of patterns may aid in 
interpreting the role of the various verification activities within a strategy. For example, a 
dynamic network (as will be used later in this paper) indicates that certain activities may 
make some prior activities irrelevant once the new ones have been executed (Salado & 
Kannan, 2019). 
It should be noted that the previous notation may not be followed throughout the 
paper; it has been used here for consistency with the original source. 
A Concept for Dynamic Contracting of Verification Activities 
The concept for dynamic contracting of verification activities has been presented in 
Xu and Salado (2019) and is depicted in Figure 1 in comparison with the current approach. 
The following description is reproduced verbatim from the original source: 
 
In the current paradigm (top part of the figure), a contract for a verification 
strategy is fixed at the beginning of the system development program. The 
strategy is defined by the black dots connected by the orange line, which 
represent the verification activities that will be executed throughout the 
system development.  
 
Without loss of generality, it is possible to assume that such verification 
strategy was determined optimal at the beginning of the program, that is, 
with the knowledge available at that point in time. Consider now that the 
verification activity 1V  at 1t  shows a tight margin with respect to the 
expected result of the activity. This may lead to a lower than expected 
confidence on the system being absent of errors that triggers the need for 
an additional, unplanned verification activity 2V  at 1t . Because the contract 
was fixed, such an activity needs to be contractually introduced through a 
change request.  
 
Consider on the contrary, that the verification activity 1V  at 3t  showed 
much better results than previously expected. This may yield a higher than 
expected confidence on the system being absent of errors, potentially 
making verification activity 2V  at 3t  unnecessary or of little value, because 
of how confidence builds up on prior information (Salado & Kannan, 2018b; 
Salado, Kannan, & Farkhondehmaal, 2018). 
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Consider now the proposed set-based design approach, depicted on the 
bottom side of Figure 2. In this case, an optimal strategy is also determined 
at 1t . However, because the value of verification activities may change as 
results become available (Salado & Kannan, 2018b), a set (represented by 
the dotted lines connecting the dots) is considered instead of just one 
strategy, and only the first verification activity 1V  at 1t  is contracted at this 
point. This set is the set of all possible verification strategies that are 
consistent with the optimal verification strategy (that is, formed by all 
verification strategies that have the first activity in common).  
Assume then that verification activity 1V  at 1t  provides low margin with 
respect to the expected results, as was the case before. With the updated 
confidence level, a new optimal strategy is selected within the remaining 
set. Then, the set is reduced to include only those verification activities that 
are consistent with the new optimal strategy. In this way, verification activity 
2V  at 1t  is contracted as well. The process of identifying new optimal 
strategies based on updated confidence and reducing the set of remaining 
verification activities to those consistent with the new optimal strategy, 
continues at each t . 
Assume later in the system development that, as was the case when 
describing the current paradigm, verification activity 1V  at 3t  shows ample 
margin with respect to the expected result. The next assessment of the 
remaining optimal path yields a set of verification strategies that do not 
include verification activity 2V  at 3t . Based on this result, 2V  is not 
contracted at 3t . Consequently, this approach does not waste resources in 
activities that become no longer needed as verification evidence becomes 
available. (Xu & Salado, 2019) 
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This is the optimal 
strategy, agreed upon 
contractual signature.
Circled activity showed 
low margin. Unplanned 
purple activity needs to 
be added through CR.
Circled activity showed 
nominal margin. No 
change to strategy.
Circled activity showed 
ample margin. Yellow 
activity provides no 
value, but it is executed.
Coriginal= Ʃ Cblack dots Cfinal=Coriginal + ∆purple Cfinal=Coriginal + ∆purple Cfinal=Coriginal + ∆purple 
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This is the initial set of 
96 strategies, resulting 
from optimal.
Circled activity showed 
low margin. Do purple 
activity; reduce space to 
48 strategies.
Circled activity showed 
nominal margin. Follow 
optimal path; reduce 
space to 24 strategies.
Circled activity showed 
ample margin. Strategies 
with yellow activity are 
suboptimal; reduce space 
to 3 strategies. Choose 
one.
Cinitial= [a, b]; Set bounds depending on 
strategy. Invest only what it is performed.





















 Current vs. Set-Based Approaches for Designing Verification Strategies 
(Xu & Salado, 2019) 
Note. C: cost of executing verification; ti : verification events; /V: no verification; Vi: verification activity. 
 
Applying Set-Based Design to the Design of Verification Strategies 
The lack of knowledge in early design activities motivated the emergence of set-
based design (Bernstein, 1998). Set-based design is built on the principle of working 
simultaneously with a plethora of design alternatives, instead of converging quickly to a 
single option (Bernstein, 1998). As the knowledge about the system increases, suboptimal 
alternatives are discarded until a preferred one remains (Bernstein, 1998). A key aspect is 
that discarding is not an activity at a given point of time, like a traditional trade-off, but a 
time-continuous activity that occurs as new knowledge is available (Bernstein, 1998). A 
formal formulation of set-based design and how it makes product development resilient 
against changes in external factors is given in Rapp et al. (2018). The approach has been 
successfully applied in the conceptual stages of naval systems (Singer, Doerry, & Buckley, 
2009), graphic industry products (Raudberget, 2010), automotive products (Raudberget, 
2010), and aeronautic systems (Bernstein, 1998), among others.  
As discussed in the introduction, these findings informed the application of set-based 
design to the design of verification strategies (Xu & Salado, 2019). The benefits of set-based 
design were explored in a notional case study with synthetic data. Results indicated that set-
based approach yielded higher expected value. In addition, set-based design seemed to 
respond faster to adjusting its parameters than the benchmark when receiving information 
from verification evidence, which indicates “the benchmark approach is inefficient when 
compared against the proposed set-based approach” (Xu & Salado, 2019). Further research 
is necessary to confirm these findings, though. 
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The basic process proposed to apply set-based design to the design of verification 
strategies consists of the following steps (Xu & Salado, 2019): 
Step 1. Determine optimal verification strategy at Time 1. 
Step 2. Choose first (timewise) verification activity (or subset of verification 
activities). 
Step 3. Execute activity and update Bayesian network. 
Step 4. Determine optimal remaining verification strategy and return to Step 2. 
After each selection of an optimal strategy, the set of potential verification strategies 
is given by those strategies that share the first (timewise) verification activity (or subset of 
verification activities). Therefore, as the optimal remaining verification strategies are 
determined, the set shrinks until verification is completed.  
In addition, the set of verification strategies can be further reduced by eliminating 
those sets that are dominated by optimal strategies throughout the system development. 
This reduction is useful for managing the resulting complexity. An example of the evolution 
of the set of verification strategies after applying set-based design is provided in (Xu & 
Salado, 2019) and shown in Figure 2. At T1, the optimal verification strategy contains V1 at 
T1. Two results are considered; either the activity passes or fails. In each case, the optimal 
strategy out of the set of remaining strategies can be computed. In both cases, the optimal 
strategy contains V2 at T2. The process continues by assessing how the optimal strategy 
changes on each path as the results of the next verification activity (in this case V2 in each 
path) are known. This process is repeated until T5. It should be noted how the result of each 
verification activity changes the optimality of the remaining verification strategy. 
 

















































 Verification Path Tree  
(Xu & Salado, 2019) 
Overall in this example, 11 verification strategies dominate every other verification 
strategy in the set. Because of this, it suffices to work with an initial set of verification 
strategies (i.e., before T1) that contains those eleven strategies. In case V1 passes, the set 
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shrinks to contain five strategies (strategies 7 to 11) after T1 and before T2. Otherwise, the 
set shrinks to contain six strategies (strategies 1 to 6). This process continuous until 
verification is completed. This evolution is consistent with the set-based design paradigm, 
since multiple alternatives are considered simultaneously and some of them are 
progressively discarded from the set until a single alternative finally remains. 
A Refined Model of Rework 
Background 
In prior work, rework has been treated as a predefined decision based on the 
achieved confidence (Xu & Salado, 2019). Specifically, if the confidence in the correct 
functioning of the system (for example, as represented by parameter θ  in the section 
entitled Mathematical Models of Verification Strategies) would fall below a certain threshold, 
then a rework activity was considered to be executed automatically. In this paper, we 
present a model of rework activities that considers a different decision mechanism. In 
particular, a rework activity is initiated if a verification activity fails. 
Problem Statement  
Consider the simple overarching verification network in Figure 3. It represents the 
way in which a set of available verification activities provide information about a system 
parameter Sθ  (e.g., the mass of the system). In the figure, Cθ  represents another parameter 
that provides information about Sθ  (e.g., the mass of a system component), 1V  is a 
verification activity that provides information about Cθ  (e.g., a test of the mass of a system 
component), and 2V  is a verification activity that provides information about Sθ  (e.g., a test 














 Overarching Verification Network 
 
Five verification strategies can be devised by leveraging the overarching network 
(notation from Salado and Kannan, 2018a, is used): 
 
( )1 ,S = ∅ ∅  
{ }( )2 1 ,S V= ∅  
{ }( )3 2 ,S V= ∅  
{ } ( ){ }( )4 1 2 1 2, , ,S V V V V=  
{ } ( ){ }( )5 1 2 2 1, , ,S V V V V=  
It is assumed that 5S  is not meaningful, and therefore it will not be further 
considered. 
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The cost to execute a verification activity is denoted by Vσ . Table 1 lists the cost to 
execute each verification strategy. It is assumed that no overlap exists in the cost of 
executing the verification activities.  
 
Table 1. Cost to Execute Verification Strategies 
Strategy Cost function 
1S  ( )1 $0V Sσ =  
2S  ( ) ( )2 1 $200KV VS Vσ σ= =  
3S  ( ) ( )3 2 $200KV VS Vσ σ= =  
4S  ( ) ( ) ( )4 1 2V V VS V Vσ σ σ= +  
 
The cost impact associated to deploying the system with an error is denoted by Iσ . 
Table 2 lists the expected costs of impact for each strategy. It is assumed that 
10,000KIσ = . 
 
Table 2. Impact Cost of Deploying the System With an Error 
Strategy Cost function 
1S  ( ) ( )1I S IE S P eσ θ σ= = ⋅    
2S  ( ) ( )2 1|I S IE S P e V pσ θ σ= = = ⋅    
3S  ( ) ( )3 2|I S IE S P e V pσ θ σ= = = ⋅    
4S  ( ) ( )4 1 2| ,I S IE S P e V p V pσ θ σ= = = = ⋅    
 
Note that ( ) ( )3 4I IE S E Sσ σ=        because 1V  becomes disconnected from Sθ  once 2V  is known. 
Model of Rework Cost 
Rework cost is denoted by Rσ . The key aspect is that the cost of rework will depend 
on when the rework happens or, more accurately, on whether rework requires integration 
and de-integration activities or not. Hence, it is necessary to capture the cause of the error, 
as well as the moment in which the error is found. It is assumed that rework results in a state 
of knowledge equivalent to V p= . This is because in the theoretical framework used in this 
paper, system attributes are not accessible; the only verification evidence is Salado and 
Kannan (2019).  
Contrary to previous work, it is assumed in this paper that rework is performed as 
soon as a verification activity fails. This implies the following: 
• For 1S , ( )1 0RE Sσ =    because, since there is no verification activity executed, 
errors cannot be found and rework activities initiated.  
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• For 2S , ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 ,R RE S P V p C Cσ σ= = ¬ ⋅   , where ( ),R A Bσ  indicates that 
rework happens for assembly A when integrated at assembly level B. In this 
case, ( ),C C  means that rework happens on the component when it is at the 
component level (that is, when the component is not integrated at system level). 
Only ( ),R C Cσ  is considered in the model because, since no verification at 
system level occurs, errors can only be found at the component level.  
Calculation for 3S  becomes more sophisticated because while the failure is detected 
on a verification activity at the system level, the error may result from an error at system 
level and/or an error at component level (note that in some cases solving the problem at the 
component level automatically solves the problem at the system level, and in some cases 
the system level problem persists and also needs to be fixed). This needs to be considered 
in the calculation of the expected rework cost. The following basic algorithm is used: 
1. If an error is found, try to solve at system level. 
2. If not solvable, try also at component level. 
Note that a different algorithm could have been defined, trying to fix the problem at 
component level before trying at the system level. However, based on experience, it has 
been assumed that de-integration activities are less preferred. Under these conditions, the 
expected rework cost for 3S  is given by Equation 2: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 2 2, , | ,R R S C RE S P V f S S P e e V f C Sσ σ θ θ σ= = ⋅ + = = = ⋅       .  (2) 
The following aspect is of interest in the previous equation. Note that, if the 
verification activity fails, rework automatically happens at the system level. As stated, rework 
at the component level is performed only if the problem persists. This is modeled by the 
probability that there is an error at both the system level and the component level. This is 
because 
 
1. If the error was only at the system level, then the rework at system level would fix 
it. 
2. If the error was only at the component level, then there is not really a problem at 
system level and the fix would also work. 
3. The cost of rework at the system level is already accounted for, so this is why 
only the cost of the component level fixed is considered in that case. 
 
Calculation for 4S  builds upon the same idea: 
1. If the component level verification activity fails, then a rework activity at the 
component level occurs. Afterwards, if the system level verification activity fails, 
the same situation as in 2S  applies, with the difference that probability of errors 
is conditioned to the component level activity passed (because of the rework 
activity). 
2. If the component level verification activity passes and then the system level 
verification activity fails, the same situation as in 3S  applies, with the difference 
that probability of errors is conditioned to the component level activity passed. 
Under these conditions, the expected rework cost for 4S  is given by Equation 3: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
4 1 2 1 1 2 1
2 1
, | , |
, , | , ,
R R R
R S C R
E S P V f C C P V f V p S S P V p P V f V p
S S P e e V f V p C S
σ σ σ
σ θ θ σ
= = ⋅ + = = ⋅ + = ⋅ = = ⋅  
+ = = = = ⋅
   (3) 
Table 3 lists the corresponding rework cost used in the model. 
 
Table 3. Rework Costs 




C $200K $1,000K 
S n/a $500K 
 
Input Data 
Cost figures are synthetic and given in the previous section, Model of Rework Cost. 
Probability assignments use synthetic data and are given in Tables 4 through 7. Following 
the modeling approach presented in Salado and Kannan (2019), prior beliefs are assigned 
to system parameter nodes, which capture the initial belief on the state of the system (i.e., 
being absent of errors), and conditional probability tables are created for the verification 
activity nodes. Posterior beliefs are calculated for system parameters through Bayesian 
update of the outcomes of the verification activity nodes. Probability update was conducted 
in this study using the Bayesian Network Toolbox for MATLAB®, which estimates the 
posterior probabilities of all nodes by the variable elimination method.  
 
Table 4. Conditional Probability Table for System Parameter 
θC θS ( )|S CP θ θ  
Error Error 0.79 
Error No Error 0.21 
No Error Error 0.27 
No Error No Error 0.73 
 
Table 5. Prior Probabilities of the Component Parameter 
θC ( )CP θ  
Error 0.20 
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Table 6. Conditional Probability Table for Verification Activity V1 
θC V1 ( )1 | CP V θ  
Error Fail 0.73 
Error Pass 0.27 
No Error Fail 0.05 
No Error Pass 0.95 
 
Table 7. Conditional Probability Table for Verification Activity V2 
θS V2 ( )2 | SP V θ  
Error Fail 0.85 
Error Pass 0.15 
No Error Fail 0.18 
No Error Pass 0.82 
 
Results and Discussion 
Because of the size of the network and the input data, this case is not able to 
distinguish between the current acquisition paradigm and set-based design. However, the 
case is only used to explore the application of the refined rework model, so the case is still 
useful.  
Results are shown in Figure 4. Two time events are represented, one at Time 
Interval = 1 (denoted by T1) and one at Time Interval = 2 (denoted by T2). Verification 
activities V1 and V2 are conducted at T1 and T2, respectively. Solid continuous lines are 
used for visualization purposes. Bifurcations differentiate the cost of potential paths should 
the verification activity pass or fail. Because of the set up of the case, the cost differences 
are caused only by the rework actions. The paths with positive slope indicate that the 
verification activity failed and, consequently, a rework activity was initiated. On the contrary, 
the paths with negative slope indicate that the verification activity passed and, consequently, 
rework activity was not initiated. The key insight of the picture is the consistency with which 
rework at different levels of integration is treated, in line with the input data. As can be seen, 
the delta rework cost after V2 is larger than after V1. This is, as discussed, because not only 
is rework at higher integration levels more expensive, but also, there is a chance that the 
problem at system level is caused by a problem at component level. Such de-integration 
effort considerably increases the resulting rework cost. 
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 Plot of Verification Paths 
Conclusions 
This paper has shown that current approaches to contracting verification strategies in 
acquisition programs conflict with the inherent nature of verification. As a result, verification 
strategies in acquisition programs are set to suboptimality. This paper supports the idea of 
using dynamic contracting to overcome this problem. In this proposed approach, contracting 
of verification activities is spread throughout the system development. Instead of pre-
agreeing on a fixed set of activities, verification activities are contracted at different points 
during the development. In this way, the results of prior verification activities can be used to 
determine the optimal path going forward in the system development. 
Set-based design, which has been successfully applied in conceptual design and 
system architecture, provides a conceptual framework that can enable the dynamic 
contracting of verification strategies. Exploratory prior work seems to indicate that the set-
based approach is stronger than the current paradigms for contracting of verification to deal 
with the uncertain nature of system development, yielding strategies of higher expected 
value. This paper has synthesized the process to apply set-based design to verification 
strategies and pointed to how evaluating dominance of strategies may be helpful to deal 
with the complexity resulting from the size of the problem. 
Finally, this paper has also presented a refined model of the effects of rework 
activities in the expected value of a verification strategy. Although the model is still not 
sufficiently accurate of a real-life scenario, it improves prior work. Specifically, prior work 
relied on a predefined rework decision based on confidence thresholds. Instead, the 
proposed model considers that a rework activity is always initiated when a verification 
activity fails and considers its effect a function of the likelihood of such a verification result. 
In addition, and more importantly, it also incorporates the notion that rework may be needed 
at different levels of integration, requiring different levels of investment to solve the problem. 
It should be noted that the effort is ongoing and is planned to be completed within 
the timeframe of the NPS Acquisition Research Program’s “Dynamic Contracting of 
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Brigadier General Michael Sloane, USA—Brigadier General Sloane is the Program 
Executive Officer for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) in Orlando, Florida. PEO 
STRI executes a multi-billion dollar program annually, and is staffed by more than 1,000 military, 
government civilian and service support contractors. The organization also manages Foreign Military 
Sales programs which support more than 65 countries. 
Prior to this assignment, Brigadier General Sloane served as the Assistant Program 
Executive Officer Enterprise Information Systems (PEO EIS) from December 2016 - June 2018. His 
responsibilities included the integration of the Army’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems 
as well as the migration of the ERPs in accordance with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 
Army policies to the Defense Information Systems Agency data centers as part of the Army enclave. 
Prior to his position as Assistant PEO, Brigadier General Sloane served as the Chief of Staff to the 
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology). 
Brigadier General Sloane was commissioned as an Army officer after earning a Bachelor of 
Business Administration from Columbus State University in Columbus, Georgia. He earned a Master 
of Business Administration from Webster University while attending the Command and General Staff 
College. In 2012, he graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) with a Master 
of Science in National Resource Strategy and completed the Senior Acquisition Course. 
Brigadier General Sloane has had operational assignments as a platoon leader and company 
executive officer while serving four years in the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). In the 24th ID, he 
deployed for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, to Honduras for Joint Task Force 105 and 
to support Hurricane Andrew relief operations. His career includes a break in active duty service from 
1993 to 1997 during which he worked in corporate industry and started a Limited Liability Corporation. 
Upon recall to active duty in 1997, Brigadier General Sloane’s military duties commenced 
with three years in the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) serving as the Division Support 
Command S4 and as Commander, Bravo Company, 210th Forward Support Battalion. While 
commanding in the 10th Mountain Division, he deployed to the Balkans with the NATO-led 
multinational peacekeeping force, Stabilization Force 6. 
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In 2000, Brigadier General Sloane was assigned to Army Human Resources Command to 
serve as the Future Readiness Officer and an Assignment Officer. In 2003, following CGSC, he was 
assigned to the Missile Defense Agency’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System 
Project Office as the Assistant Product Manager for Missile Development and later as Assistant 
Product Manager for THAAD System Test and Evaluation. In 2006, he was assigned to the Office of 
the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 as the lead Personnel Policy Integrator for the Acquisition, Chaplain 
and Judge Advocate General Corps. From 2008 to 2011, Brigadier General Sloane served in PEO 
Soldier as the Product Manager for Soldier Clothing and Individual Equipment then, following ICAF, 
he served three-and-a-half years as the Project Manager for Soldier Sensors and Lasers, starting in 
2012. 
Brigadier General Sloane’s awards and decorations include Legion of Merits, Defense 
Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medals, Army Commendation Medals, Joint Service 
Achievement Medal, Army Achievement Medals, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Southwest Asia 
Service Medal (with three Bronze Service Stars), Global War on Terrorism/Service Medal, 
Humanitarian Service Medals, the NATO Badge, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Liberation Medals, 
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Army’s Search for a Better Uniform Camouflage Pattern―A 
Case Study 
Robert F. Mortlock, COL, USA (Ret.)—managed defense systems acquisition efforts for the last 15 
of his 27 years in the U.S. Army, culminating in his assignment as the project manager for Soldier 
Protection and Individual Equipment in Program Executive Office for Soldier. He holds a PhD in 
chemical engineering from the University of California, Berkeley, an MBA from Webster University, an 
MS in national resource strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and a BS in 
chemical engineering from Lehigh University. He is also a graduate from the Post-Doctoral Bridge 
Program of the University of Florida’s Hough Graduate School of Business. [rfmortlo@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
The development, testing, and fielding of combat uniforms for United States (U.S.) 
soldiers offers project management (PM) professionals an opportunity to analyze how 
programs progress through the U.S. defense acquisition institution. This case study centers 
on the U.S. Army’s decision to change the camouflage patterns on combat uniforms and 
equipment not only for soldiers stationed in war zones around the world, but also for soldiers 
in daily garrison operations stateside. The case study is broadly applicable to project 
managers, business managers, engineers, testers, and logisticians involved in PM within the 
private sector, while specifically targeting acquisition professionals within the government 
defense departments. Emphasis is placed on the development of critical thinking and 
analysis skills in the areas of stakeholder management and decision-making in a complex 
environment. The case is developed in two distinct parts. Part I allows PM professionals to 
analyze how to recommend a path forward to senior leaders with an increased chance of 
success of meeting desired objectives. Part II allows PM professionals to analyze how to 
recommend a set of options or courses of action for senior leaders to enable an informed, 
knowledge-based decision. 
Executive Summary 
The protection of American soldiers in combat was a top priority for senior leaders in 
the U.S. Army, DoD, and Congress. Camouflage on combat uniforms remained the most 
important contribution to the overall concealment of individual soldiers on the battlefield. 
Post-combat surveys from soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan indicated that better camouflage 
on combat uniforms contributed to increased combat effectiveness. Soldiers recounted 
combat missions in which they were close enough to the enemy to hear conversations 
without being seen. This contributed to the tactical combat dominance of U.S. soldiers. 
Basically, the enemy cannot kill what they cannot see. Effective combat uniform camouflage 
remained a significant combat multiplier for soldiers—increasing mission accomplishment. 
Army soldiers in Afghanistan faced diverse battlefield operating environments in 
combat operations. During a single mission, soldiers faced different terrains across various 
environmental backgrounds. Soldiers who wore combat uniforms and equipment with the 
universal camouflage pattern (UCP), a three-color digital pattern adopted by the Army in 
2005, did not effectively blend into the diverse backgrounds typical during combat missions. 
The UCP colors were not earth tone and were generally too bright—making soldiers easy to 
detect and providing ineffective concealment. To specifically address combat operations in 
Afghanistan, the Army selected a commercially available camouflage pattern called 
MultiCam© to be used on uniforms and equipment for deploying soldiers to Afghanistan. 
The Army named the commercially available MultiCam© pattern the Operation Enduring 
Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OEF CP). In the meantime, the Army focused on a long-term 
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camouflage strategy for soldier uniforms and equipment that would be effective across the 
diverse military operating environments and considered a family of three camouflage 
patterns—one suited for the woodland/jungle environments, one suited for desert/arid 
environments, and a transitional pattern suited for most other environments. 
This combat uniform camouflage case study encourages critical analysis of the 
Army’s combat camouflage uniform project at two key decision points. The case focuses on 
the development, testing, and procurement (also referred to as acquisition) of combat 
camouflage uniforms and equipment for U.S. Army soldiers. The case is interesting not only 
to project management (PM) professionals but also to warfighters who appreciate the 
importance of effective concealment for mission accomplishment and safety. Key project 
stakeholders are passionate about camouflage because it saves lives in combat, and all 
soldiers consider themselves subject matter experts on uniforms and camouflage—resulting 
in wide applicability. Decisions involved with the Army camouflage uniform effort involve a 
complex acquisition environment—requiring decision-making under uncertainty with 
consideration for performance, schedule, cost/affordability, legal risk, public perception, and 
congressional oversight. The combat uniform case study reinforces critical thinking in 
uncertain environments, documents lessons learned for sound PM for future application, 
and provides wide private-sector exposure to the complexities of public-sector acquisition 
and camouflage uniform development, testing, and manufacture in particular.  
The case study data enables readers to become familiar with the history of Army 
combat camouflage uniforms, the basics of combat uniforms in general, and camouflage 
testing in particular. Readers of the case analyze alternative strategies for the Army path at 
two critical decision points. Both decisions involve critical thinking, stakeholder 
management, decision-making with uncertainty, and strategic leadership by focusing on the 
development of recommendations that decision-makers can use to make the most informed 
decision possible. 
This case study centers on the U.S. Army’s decision to change the camouflage 
patterns on combat uniforms and equipment not only for soldiers stationed in war zones 
around the world but also for soldiers in daily garrison operations stateside. The case is in 
two distinct parts. Part I allows PM professionals to analyze how to recommend a path 
forward to senior leaders with an increased chance of success of meeting desired 
objectives. Part II allows PM professionals to analyze how to recommend a set of options or 
courses of action for senior leaders to enable an informed, knowledge-based decision. 
The case study has the following learning objectives: 
• Develop the ability to critically analyze a project at key decision points by 
identifying advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action—critical 
thinking. 
• Identify key stakeholders and understand their perspectives—stakeholder 
management. 
• Develop a method to compare alternative strategies or courses of action for the 
decision-maker and defend a recommendation—decision-making with 
uncertainty or ambiguity. 
• Compare alternative strategies and identify decision criteria used for the 
comparison—decision-making with uncertainty or ambiguity. 
• Identify second-order considerations or consequences of the recommended 
strategies—strategic management/leadership.  
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Part I (Path Forward, Development of a Strategy, Fall 2013) of the case study 
focuses on the Army program manager as he prepares for meetings in the Pentagon after 
learning that the original Army contracting strategy has hit roadblock. The following are key 
questions to be addressed: 
• Who are the key stakeholders in combat camouflage uniforms? 
• Who is the ultimate decision-maker? 
• How relevant was the test paradigm shift in this decision? 
• What is a realistic test and evaluation strategy and schedule leading to decision 
in terms of key program and testing events planned by quarter? 
• What options should the Army consider? 
• What criteria should the Army use to compare options and then select the best 
path forward? 
A key program management fundamental lessons learned from this part of the case 
includes not rushing to failure. Senior leaders and PMs must try to avoid the pitfalls of 
making rash decisions because the situation seems urgent. In this part of the case, it is 
probably best for the Army to take a strategic pause to let the congressional language 
become final, to and allow time to test additional patterns for which the government has data 
rights to avoid long-term affordability challenges. 
Part II (Camouflage Decision, Winter 2013/Spring 2014) of the case focuses again 
on Army PMs as they present the testing results to Army senior leaders to support a path 
forward. The following are key questions to be addressed: 
• Was $10 million spent over six years in the research, development, and testing of 
camouflaged uniforms a wise investment for the Army? 
• Were the options considered by the Army appropriate? Were other viable options 
not considered? 
• Was the source of funding (contingency funds or base budget funds) an 
important consideration? Why or why not? 
• What were the affordability considerations for the Army in this decision? 
• What were the important contractual and legal considerations in this decision? 
• How should the Army compare the options and select the best path forward? 
Some of the key program management fundamental lessons learned from this part of 
the case include the realization that even though performance and schedule are important, 
sometimes the preferred path forward must be decided by other criteria. PMs must bring 
together the information for the most informed decision possible. In this case, the PM has to 
understand the affordability/cost implications, legal risk, and the perspectives of key 
stakeholders including Congress, soldiers, U.S. Marine Corps, and the media. 
“The rest of the story,” or what the Army actually did, can be studied not as the “right 
answer” but to provide closure for readers. Many paths often lead to similar end results for 
acquisition development programs. The case study itself provides the epilogue to the first 
key decision on how the Army proceeded when the strategy hit the contracting barrier. For 
the second key decision point, the Army selected a pattern and named it the Operational 
Camouflage Pattern (OCP) to emphasize that the pattern’s reach extends beyond 
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Afghanistan to other Army military operating environments. Because the alternative 
camouflage patterns all tested similarly, the decision came down to other considerations. 
The digital patterns that were based on the U.S. Marine Corps patterns (MARPATs) were 
never seriously considered because Army senior leaders were concerned about the 
following three things: strict literal compliance to the restrictions in the Fiscal Year 2014 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the backlash from the U.S. Marine Corps 
leadership (who did not favor the Army leveraging the MARPATs), and the soldier/public 
perception of the Army choosing another “digital” pattern after the tepid response to the 
UCP adoption. The OEF CP pattern was not chosen because of affordability concerns. The 
Army continues to work on improving the force protection and concealment of soldiers 
through more effective camouflage for uniforms and equipment. 
Operational Camouflage Case Study 
Current Situation, October 2013 
Colonel Bob Smith sat in his office at Fort Belvoir in total disbelief as he read an 
email from the contracting officer stating that a contract for the Army to purchase the 
camouflage pattern had never actually been accepted by the contractor. The email came 
after Colonel Smith asked the contracting officer to send a copy of the signed contract. The 
contracting officer’s response was delayed by several weeks because Department of 
Defense (DoD) agencies were resuming normal operations after being shut down October 
1–16, 2013, with most federal employees furloughed, because neither an appropriation act 
nor a continuing resolution was enacted for fiscal year 2014. On the Friday afternoon before 
the shutdown, the contracting office reported the successful award of a contract to Crye 
Precision LLC for their camouflage pattern, commercially known as MultiCam©. Due to 
significant Army senior leader and congressional interest, notification of the contract 
awarded was documented in significant activities reports to the chief of staff of the Army and 
secretary of the Army levels.  
Now, Colonel Smith thought about how to notify the Army senior leaders that the 
contract was not awarded and that his team would have to develop options for the Army to 
consider going forward—both of these tasks were significant events considering the 
importance of the Army combat uniform camouflage decision. The Army had completed 
extensive combat uniform camouflage testing—testing that began in 2009 with reviews and 
a decision process that finally resulted in the selection of an acceptable camouflage pattern 
for Army combat uniforms (Program Manager Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment 
[PM SPIE], Program Executive Office Soldier [PEO Soldier], 2014c). Colonel Smith started 
to consider all the information needed to help Army senior leaders make an informed 
decision: the importance of camouflage to soldier force protection and mission 
effectiveness, camouflage testing basics, the history of the testing program, the status of 
soldier combat uniforms, and the affordability aspects of the decision. First things first—
Colonel Smith asked his deputy to immediately draft a notice to inform senior leaders that 
the previously announced award of the contract was premature. 
Background 
It’s Only Camouflage—How Important Can It Be on the Modern Battlefield? 
The protection of American soldiers in combat was a top priority for senior leaders in 
the U.S. Army, DoD, and Congress. The DoD committed considerable resources and 
funding over the years in research and development, resulting in advanced materials and 
manufacturing processes (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014c). These investments increased the 
combat effectiveness of the soldiers and their units. Camouflage on combat uniforms 
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remained the most important contribution to the overall concealment of individual soldiers on 
the battlefield. Reinforcing the importance of camouflage was the result of post-combat 
surveys from soldiers from duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which the majority of soldiers 
indicated that better camouflage on combat uniforms contributed to increased combat 
effectiveness. Anecdotal evidence from soldiers on the importance of camouflage came 
from recounted combat missions in which they were close enough to the enemy to hear 
conversations without being seen—particularly during night operations. This contributed to 
the dominance of U.S. soldiers and the “we own the night” tactical advantage of U.S. forces. 
Basically, the enemy cannot kill what they cannot see. Effective combat uniform camouflage 
remained a significant combat multiplier for soldiers. 
Army soldiers in Afghanistan faced diverse battlefield operating environments in 
combat operations (see Figure 1). During a single mission, soldiers faced many different 
terrains across various environmental backgrounds. Each of these environmental 
backgrounds contained different earth-tone colors, which required different matching earth-
tone colors in the combat uniform for it to effectively conceal a soldier from detection and/or 
observation. Soldiers who wore combat uniforms and equipment with the universal 
camouflage pattern (UCP), a three-color digital pattern adopted by the Army in 2005, did not 
effectively blend into the diverse backgrounds typical during combat missions. The UCP 
colors were not earth tone and were generally too bright—making soldiers easy to detect 
and providing ineffective concealment. 
 
 Army Needed Better Camouflage 
(PM SPIE, PEO, 2013a) 
The Army faced a critical question with respect to providing soldiers effective 
camouflage on combat uniforms and equipment: How many camouflage patterns should be 
adopted? Soldiers operating in diverse operating environments proved that the most 
effective camouflage pattern matched the colors of the background environment. A 
“chameleon” camouflage pattern eluded the Army due to low technological maturity level—
basically it was just not feasible to have a combat uniform with chameleon camouflage that 
would change color on its own to fit into its environment. Logistical and affordability 
considerations limited the Army from adopting a specific camouflage pattern for every 
combat environment. The Army settled on a strategy considering three camouflage 
patterns—one suited for the woodland/jungle environments, one suited for desert/arid 
environments, and a transitional pattern suited for most other environments (PM SPIE, PEO, 
2014c, 2013a; Office of the Secretary of the Army, 2009). In support of the combat uniform 
camouflage effort, the Army initiated an assessment of terrain throughout the globe. The 
Army Corps of Engineers classified the Army military operating environments across the 
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combatant commands as 44% transitional, 37% woodland/jungle, and 19% desert/arid 
environments (Ryerson et al., 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e). A woodland 
camouflage pattern would be very effective against backgrounds of darker brown and green 
colors and ineffective in dry arid regions (see Figure 2). On the other hand, a desert 
camouflage pattern would be very effective against backgrounds of lighter tan/sand colors 
and ineffective in woodland/jungle terrains. Finally, a transitional camouflage pattern would 
provide reasonable concealment against a broad range of environmental backgrounds. 
Seasonal considerations break down the woodland/jungle and transitional backgrounds 
even further to dormant (without leaves on trees) and verdant (with leaves on trees) 
classifications. 
 
 Camouflage Effectiveness in Different Environments 
(PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a) 
Camouflage Testing Basics 
The Army recognized that advancing the science of combat uniform camouflage 
testing was vitally important to enabling knowledge-based decisions on the most effective 
camouflage pattern. It was acknowledged that it was unaffordable to field-test various 
camouflage patterns in every possible environment and background. To gain a statistically 
robust data set to support decision-making, the Army developed a test and evaluation 
strategy that involved a paradigm shift (see Figure 3). The strategy leveraged four mutually 
supporting lines of effort (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014a, 2013a). Technical development 
testing consisted of photo simulation for pattern selection and spectral reflectance 
measurements for performance insights. Operational field-testing with soldiers consisted of 
static observation tests for pattern performance confirmation and maneuver tests for both 
pattern performance confirmation and operational insights. 
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 Camouflage Test and Evaluation Strategy 
(PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a) 
Normally, operationally realistic field-testing carried the most weight in decision-
making over less operationally realistic developmental testing. For camouflage testing, 
however, a more extensive data set could be obtained if computer-based testing techniques 
were used in which soldiers observed photos of camouflaged uniforms in different 
backgrounds representing the Army’s military operating environments (U.S. Army, Natick 
Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center [NSRDEC], 2009). The main effort 
for the test and evaluation strategy centered on the use of photo simulation to compare the 
effectiveness of camouflage patterns.  
Two different criteria existed to compare the effectiveness of camouflage: detection 
and blending. Camouflage testing determined detection and blending scores for various 
camouflage patterns in relevant military operating environments. Detection is the ability to 
pick out the camouflage pattern measured at different distances, and blending is how well 
the camouflage pattern matches the background once detected at a specific range. Photo 
simulation evaluations allowed for collection of significant data in many backgrounds and 
controlled variables (such as distance, movement, background, and brightness) so the 
difference in detection and blending scores could be attributable to different camouflage 
patterns. The word “simulation” referred to the fact that the technique simulated soldiers 
being outside at the various sites by looking at computers screens of photos of soldiers in 
camouflage uniforms. Camouflage pattern selection criteria was based on both detection 
scores (at ranges to 450 meters during the day and to 250 meters at night) and blending 
scores (at 50 meters during the day and at 25 meters during the night; Hepfinger et al., 
2010; Lacy & Rogers, 2014; U.S. Army, NSRDEC, 2004). 
A Basic Overview of Army Combat Camouflage Uniforms 
After basic initial entry training, the Army issued soldiers uniforms and other essential 
combat equipment classified as organization clothing and individual equipment (OCIE) and 
generally referred to as the soldier’s clothing bag. Part of this issue to soldiers was the army 
combat uniform (ACU). The ACU was the uniform that soldiers wore in daily garrison 
operations when not deployed to combat operations. The ACU fabric was a 50–50 mix of 
cotton and nylon, and came with the universal camouflage pattern (UCP), selling in the 
Military Clothing Store for about $90 for a coat and trouser set (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 
2014c). After they wore out, soldiers used their clothing replacement allowance to buy new 
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sets of uniforms. Examples of OCIE included the seven-layer Generation III Extended Cold 
Weather Clothing System (ECWCS), the field pack or rucksack (part of the modular 
lightweight load-carrying equipment [MOLLE]), and the ballistic vests (part of the improved 
outer tactical vests [IOTV])—all issued with the UCP. 
Beginning in mid-2005, the Army recognized the importance of protecting soldiers 
from battlefield hazards and included specific uniform requirements for protection against 
insects (resulting in permethrin treatment) and fire or flame (resulting in flame-resistant 
fabrics). When soldiers deployed to combat, the Army issued soldiers the Flame Resistant 
Army Combat Uniform (FRACU) with the UCP. The FRACU was made of 65% rayon, 25% 
para-aramid, and 10% nylon. The price of a FRACU set of coat and trousers averaged 
about $180 (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014c). Additionally, soldiers received the Flame 
Resistant Environment Ensemble (FREE)—the flame-retardant version of the ECWCS. 
Soldiers did not normally deploy with the clothing bag-issued ACU and ECWCS—those 
were for daily wear in garrison operations and in training. In 2011, the Army issued soldiers 
deploying to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the FRACUs and OCIE 
with the OEF Camouflage Pattern (OEF CP).  
Figure 4 displays a pictorial representation of the uniforms soldiers would typically 
have worn in the summer of 2013 around the world. Soldiers wore the ACU with UCP in 
most regions of the world, except in the Middle East. Soldiers wore the FRACU with UCP 
when deployed from combat operations in Iraq and Kuwait, while soldiers supporting combat 
operations in OEF wore the FRACU in OEF CP. 
 
 Common Operation Picture for Army Combat Uniforms 
(PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013) 
The Army remained very cognizant of the value of the combat uniforms and OCIE 
worn by soldiers and in the inventory. For example, based on the number of active, reserve, 
and National Guard soldiers both non-deployed and deployed, the ACUs worn by soldiers in 
their clothing bag valued about $131 million and turned over every year (PM SPIE, PEO 
Soldier, 2013a, 2014c). The value of OCIE worn by soldiers or in inventory with UCP totaled 
about $3.5 billion and turned over every 5–10 years depending on the durability of the items. 
Deploying soldiers to Iraq and Kuwait had another $170 million worth of UCP uniforms and 
OCIE. Uniforms and OCIE with the UCP totaled over $3.8 billion in value (see Figure 5). To 
support soldiers deploying to Afghanistan, the Army maintained uniforms and OCIE with the 
OEC CP with a value of about $1.4 billion. Based on the average monthly demand, the 
Army spent approximately $39 million per month sustaining UCP uniforms and OCIE from 
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the Army base operations and maintenance budget for an Army of approximately one million 
soldiers (active, guard, and reserve components; PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a, 2014c). 
 
 The Value of Camouflaged Army Uniforms and Equipment 
(PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a) 
Army Combat Uniform Evolution 
Figure 6 presents a brief recent history of Army combat uniforms since the adoption 
of the ACU with the UCP. In 2005, the Army adopted the ACU to replace the battle dress 
uniform (BDU) with the woodland camouflage pattern and desert camouflage uniform (DCU) 
with the desert camouflage pattern. The ACU was produced with the UCP—a three-color 
(urban gray, desert sand, and foliage green) digital pattern. The Army wanted a single 
combat uniform design with a single camouflage pattern. In camouflage blending tests (day 
and night) using photo simulation techniques, UCP provided the best average performance 
across desert, woodland, and urban environments compared to 10 other patterns. These 
patterns were marine pattern (MARPAT) desert, MARPAT woodland, Scorpion (a pattern 
developed by Crye Precision LLC under a contract with the Army), desert brush, desert 
track, desert/urban track, standard desert (DCU), woodland track, standard woodland 
(BDU), and woodland brush. The Army’s decision to adopt a digital pattern was influenced 
by the success of the U.S. Marine Corps’ digital patterns—MARPAT woodland and 
MARPAT desert. Ultimately, in testing, UCP provided better or equal concealment than 
other patterns in urban and desert terrains—obviously very important to the Army embroiled 
in combat operations in Iraq (U.S. Army, NSRDEC, 2004, 2005). 
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 Army Camouflage Uniform Timeline 
(Lacey & Rogers, 2014; PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a; U.S. Army, NSRDEC, 2005, 
2012) 
From the adoption of the ACU in 2005 until 2009, the Army received overwhelmingly 
negative feedback from soldiers in combat operations in Afghanistan about the suitability of 
the FRACUs in UCP for the diverse Afghan backgrounds, terrains, and environments (see 
Figure 1). As a result, in the fiscal year (FY) 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
Congress directed the Army to take immediate action to provide effective camouflage for 
personnel deployed to Afghanistan (U.S. House of Representatives, 2009). In September 
2009, the Army submitted a report to Congress on combat uniform camouflage that outlined 
a four-phased approach: Phase I—Immediate Action, Phase II—Build the Science, Phase 
III—OEF Specific Camouflage, and Phase IV—Army Combat Uniform Decision for a Long 
Term Multi-Environment Camouflage (Office of the Secretary of the Army, 2009). 
In November 2009, the Army completed Phase I by fielding two Army battalions 
(approximately 2,000 soldiers) with uniforms and OCIE in two different patterns. One 
camouflage pattern was Universal Camouflage Pattern-D (UCP-D)—a variant of UCP with 
coyote brown color added and less sand color—and the other pattern was commercial 
camouflage called MultiCam© produced by Crye Precision LLC. MultiCam©—a seven-color 
pattern that was in use at the time with U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan—was a variation 
of the original Scorpion pattern considered by the Army earlier in the UCP decision (PM 
SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a, 2014c). 
From November 2009 to January 2010, the Army conducted Phase II, which involved 
soldier feedback of the two fielded patterns (MultiCam© and UCP-D) as well as photo 
simulation (pattern-in-picture) evaluations by soldiers of six camouflage patterns (UCP, 
MultiCam©, UCP-D, Mirage, Desert Brush, and a Navy pattern referred to as AOR2), 
inserted into photographs of eight different OEF sites. Soldiers overwhelmingly preferred 
both MultiCam© and UCP-D with an edge in preference toward MultiCam© (PM SPIE, PEO 
Soldier, 2013a, 2014c). 
In February 2010, initiating Phase III, the Army selected MultiCam© as the pattern to 
be used on the FRACU and OCIE for deploying soldiers to Afghanistan. The Army named 
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the commercially available MultiCam© pattern as the OEF camouflage pattern (OEF CP). 
Because schedule and speed of delivery was critical, the Army encouraged Crye to enter 
separate licensing agreements with the companies that printed the OEF CP on FRACUs 
and OCIE. In July 2010, the Army began fielding uniforms and OCIE in the OEF CP to 
deploying OEF soldiers. The Army ended up paying about a 10% premium on every uniform 
or piece of camouflaged equipment that was camouflaged with OEF CP compared to 
uniforms equipment with UCP (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a, 2014c). At the time, schedule 
and getting updated camouflaged uniforms and equipment to field as quickly as possible 
trumped affordability concerns—especially considering that uniforms for combat operations 
in Afghanistan was funded by overseas contingencies operations (OCO) accounts.  
In December 2010, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) outlined an 18-
month competitive effort to lead a camouflage integrated product team (IPT) through the 
Phase IV effort for the Army’s selection of the long-term combat uniform and OCIE 
camouflage strategy to be effective in desert/arid, transitional, and woodland/jungle 
environments. The goal was to present the results to Army leadership in the fall of 2012 for 
a decision (Office of the Secretary of the Army, 2009). 
From January 2011 to June 2011, the Army scoped the Phase IV camouflage effort. 
Based on work performed by the Natick Soldier Research Development and Engineering 
Center (NSRDEC) completed in 2009, the Army knew that environmentally specific 
camouflage patterns outperformed (meaning provided more effective concealment) a single 
“universal” pattern (U.S. Army, NSRDEC, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012). The objective of Phase 
IV was to develop a “family” of three uniform camouflage patterns with a single coordinated 
pattern for OCIE to provide effective concealment across the globe in woodland/jungle, 
transitional, and desert/arid environments. A total of 22 family submissions from industry and 
the government competed in the first stage of Phase IV—18 family submissions were found 
be technically acceptable. These families of patterns participated in “pattern in picture” 
blending photo simulation evaluation. The patterns were judged based on the best legacy 
patterns in the Defense Department inventory (desert vs. a Navy pattern called AOR1, 
transitional vs. OEF CP, and woodland vs. a Navy pattern called AOR2) with family scores 
equally weighting the woodland, transitional, and desert environments. Five families of 
patterns (four commercial vendors and one NSRDEC submission) performed as well as or 
better than the legacy family of patterns. The four down-selected vendors included Crye 
Precision LLC, Kryptek Inc., Atlantic Diving Supply (ADS) Inc., and Brookwood Companies 
Inc. It is noteworthy that three patterns were visually similar in appearance: OEF CP (a 
baseline pattern), the transitional pattern proposed by Crye, and the transitional pattern 
submitted by NSRDEC named ScorpionW2. Each of these patterns was developed, 
changed, and optimized independently from the same base pattern called Scorpion—a 
pattern developed by Crye in the early 2000s under contract with the U.S. Army. All three 
patterns performed similarly in testing which served as a built-in, internal verification of the 
validity of the testing. At the time, even though the NSRDEC family performed well in source 
selection pattern-in-picture photo simulation testing, the Army decided not to continue to 
allow the NSRDEC family of patterns to participate in Stage II Phase IV testing because the 
family of patterns was not of consistent matching geometric shapes—one of the criteria 
established by the Army and required in the contracts with the four commercial vendors (PM 
SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a, 2014c). 
In January 2012, Phase IV contracts were awarded to the four down-selected 
vendors to produce fabric for test articles (both uniforms and OCIE) for the second stage of 
Phase IV, which would include field testing, extensive photo simulation evaluations, and lab 
testing (Natick Contracting Division, U.S. Army Contracting Command—APG, 2012a, 
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2012b, 2012c, 2012d). The contracts with each of the four vendors were firm fixed price 
(FFP) contracts, with periods of performance not to exceed 30 months to supply the Army 
with 1,000 yards of fabric to be used by the Army to fabricate testing uniforms and OCIE 
under separate “cut and sew” contracts. The contracts included FFP options for the 
government to procure the non-exclusive license rights for each of the proposed camouflage 
patterns. The competitive range to buy the license rights from the four vendors for a single 
camouflage pattern ranged from $25,000 to $2.1 million. Crye offered the set of patterns for 
$600,000 ($200,000 each for three patterns—woodland, desert, and transitional/OCIE), 
ADS offered the set for $533,000 ($133,000 each for four patterns—woodland, desert, 
transitional, and OCIE), Brookwood offered the set for $100,000 ($25,000 each for four 
patterns—woodland, desert, transitional, and OCIE), and Kryptek offered the set for $6.3 
million ($2.1 million each for three patterns—woodland, desert, and transitional/OCIE) 
(Natick Contracting Division, U.S. Army Contracting Command–APG, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 
2012d). Each of the four vendors signed a non-exclusive license agreement which provided 
the Army the option to obtain (for a single lump sum) the rights to use the material for the 
production of patterns for printing on an unlimited number of uniforms, individual equipment, 
and unit level equipment for U.S. government purposes (e.g., Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air 
Force, and Coast Guard, including their active and reserve components) excepting foreign 
military sales with successive renewable 10-year periods. 
From July 2012 to March 2013, the Army conducted the most extensive uniform 
camouflage testing ever undertaken. The 12 commercial vendors’ patterns (each of the four 
vendors had a woodland, transitional, and desert pattern along with a matching transitional 
OCIE pattern) and six reference patterns (UCP, OEF CP, MARPAT-W, MARPAT-D, AOR1, 
and AOR2) were printed on fabric, and the fabric was assembled into uniforms and OCIE 
(see Figure 7). 
 
 Phase IV Camouflage Patterns Tested 
(Mazz & Rowe, 2013; Rogers et al., 2013) 
Note. W refers to woodland, T refers to transitional, and A refers to arid. 
The photo simulation evaluations collected 91,486 data points in detection and 
blending tests (both day and night) using 39 different backgrounds from seven global 
locations. Field tests for static observations detections were conducted at three different 
locations, resulting in the collection of an additional 25,415 data points. Operational field 
tests with force-on-force soldiers were conducted at two locations, gathering another 973 
data points (Mazz & Rowe, 2013; PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a, 2014c; Rogers et al., 
2013). 
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The results of this extensive testing showed that all the vendor patterns in their 
intended backgrounds performed better than UCP—confirming the Army’s intent to replace 
UCP. All the vendors patterns performed similarly in their intended backgrounds—this “tight 
shot” group gave the Army many options and confirmed that overall pattern colors and 
brightness was much more important than pattern design when assessing concealment 
effectiveness. There was slight improvement in effectiveness of a family of patterns in their 
intended backgrounds over the performance of a single transitional pattern across the three 
background classes; however, the operational relevance of this improved performance could 
not be quantified. 
In May 2013, Army senior leaders approved the expanded use of OEF CP to replace 
UCP across the Army and the purchase of the non-exclusive government license rights to 
one of the competing vendors’ patterns (the Crye transitional pattern that was very similar 
and visually indistinguishable from OEF CP) offered as an option in the Phase IV contract 
(PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013b). Because all of the vendor patterns performed similarly in 
testing, the decision was based on other considerations, primarily affordability—the Army 
could leverage existing inventories of OEF CP OCIE and reduce the overall implementation 
costs to the Army.  
However, the announcement of the decision and implementation was delayed. Army 
senior leaders were hesitant to announce a uniform change decision during a time of 
intense budget pressure and with the threat of sequestration looming. More importantly, the 
draft FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was released, and it potentially 
limited the Army’s camouflage flexibility by prohibiting any new camouflage patterns unless 
all services adopted the new pattern. At the time, it was unclear whether the camouflage 
patterns tested in the Phase IV effort would potentially violate the NDAA restrictions. 
In August 2013, to avoid the threat of protests by Phase IV vendors and subsequent 
lengthy contractual challenges and to avoid potential violations of the new statutory 
restrictions in the pending NDAA, the Army changed its contracting strategy to pursue a 
sole-source contract for the non-exclusive license rights (i.e., government purpose rights) to 
OEF CP and to delay exercising any remaining Phase IV contract options until the FY14 
NDAA language was final (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013c). The vendor, Crye Precision LLC, 
indicated to the Army that the price for OEF CP would be similar to the price offered to the 
Army for the transitional pattern non-exclusive license rights in the Phase IV contract. 
In October 2013, Crye Precision LLC balked at the terms of the contract proposed by 
the Army for OEF CP. The contract terms for the non-exclusive license rights were identical 
to the Phase IV contract option terms. Crye Precision LLC now wanted considerably more 
money for OEF CP than they accepted for their transitional pattern. 
Part I: Path Forward, Development of a Strategy, Fall 2013 
All this information swirled around in Colonel’s Smith head as he prepared to meet in 
the Pentagon with Army senior leaders. Fortunately, for Colonel Smith, the chief of staff of 
the Army’s Office wanted the following specifically addressed in the meeting scheduled for 
December 2013: 
• How did this happen? How was a contract reported as signed that was not 
actually signed? What was the impact of the pending NDAA restrictions and how 
would the Army keep Congress informed? What was the impact on the Phase IV 
contracts? 
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• What was the schedule and a path toward an Army decision? What were the 
camouflage options, as well as key program and testing events considering the 
performance, cost, and schedule implications? 
• What were the risks associated with this camouflage decision? 
Based on the guidance from leadership, Colonel Smith and his team put together 
some options for the Army to consider (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014c):  
• Option 1: Continue to negotiate with Crye for the non-exclusive rights for OEF 
CP. The initial price quoted started at $65 million but reduced to a lump sum of 
$24 million or 1% royalty on the price of each camouflaged item. 
• Option 2: Exercise the Phase IV contract option for non-exclusive rights to the 
Crye transitional pattern. 
• Option 3: Renegotiate all the Phase IV contract options for the non-exclusive 
rights for the patterns with all four vendors and select a pattern after the 
renegotiations.  
• Option 4: Take a strategic pause and consider existing government patterns and 
patterns in which the government has license rights—for example, the NSRDEC 
pattern ScorpionW2. 
Colonel Smith asked his team if there were any other options and what the decision 
criteria would be to compare these courses of action. Performance of the patterns remained 
the Army’s most important criteria. However, cost/affordability was important, as well as 
schedule, congressional considerations (adherence to law), and litigation considerations 
such as the chance of protests and lawsuits challenging intellectual property rights to 
potential patent, copyright, and trademark issues.  
Colonel Smith realized this would not be an easy set of meetings at the Pentagon. 
Despite the importance of combat uniform camouflage, efforts to change camouflage face 
the challenges that all programs within the DoD face: a complex, bureaucratic defense 
acquisition institution (Mortlock, 2016). Any decision to change Army camouflage crosses 
multiple chains of command with different decision-makers because it affects both uniforms 
and equipment. Uniform changes are approved by the chief of staff of the Army (CSA)—and 
sometimes the secretary of the Army (SecArmy), if there is intense congressional, public, or 
media interest—after an approval recommendation from the Army Uniform Board. But 
camouflage also goes on organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), and each 
piece of soldier kit (cold weather clothing, rucksacks, weapons, bags for night vision sights, 
etc.) may have a different program decision-maker—either a program executive officer or 
the Army acquisition executive (AAE), depending on the acquisition category. Colonel Smith 
labored over how to pull together this information into a decision and what recommendation 
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Part II: Camouflage Decision, Winter 2013/Spring 2014 
Following a series of meetings in the Pentagon with Army senior leaders, the chief of 
staff of the Army issued the following guidance: Delay any immediate decision, ensure all 
options for the Army moving forward were rigorously tested, ensure the options considered 
met the intent of the NDAA by pulsing the congressional professional staff members, and 
provide an update to the secretary of the Army (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013d). The 
secretary of the Army subsequently approved the testing of transitional pattern alternatives 
for March 2014 with an anticipated decision pending successful and positive testing results 
in April 2014 (see Figure 8; PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014a). 
 
 Approved Revised Army Plan 
(PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014a) 
After being reprimanded for lack of proper program oversight and damaging the 
reputation of Army acquisition leaders in the Pentagon, Colonel Smith led his team to 
execute yet another revised strategy for combat uniform camouflage testing. In December 
2013, the FY14 NDAA became final and officially prohibited the services from adopting new 
camouflage patterns unless all the services adopted the new pattern (U.S. Congress, 2013). 
This new law restricted the number camouflage patterns considered going forward. The 
intent of the new strategy was to consider alternatives to OEF CP that provided equivalent 
or better performance, were affordable/fiscally responsible to implement, and were in 
compliance with the FY14 NDAA. The testing included three baseline reference patterns 
(UCP, MARPAT Woodland, and MARPAT Desert), OEF CP, and viable OEF CP 
Exhibit 1. Part I Case Study Discussion Questions 
• Who are the key stakeholders in combat camouflage uniforms? 
• Who is the ultimate decision-maker? 
• How relevant was the test paradigm shift in this decision? 
• What is a realistic test and evaluation strategy and schedule leading to decision in terms of 
key program and testing events planned by quarter? 
• What options should the Army consider? 
• What criteria should the Army use to compare options and then select the best path forward? 
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alternatives. These alternatives were the ScorpionW2 pattern and two digital transitional 
camouflage patterns (referred to as DTC1 and DTC2—patterns based on MARPAT but with 
four earth-tone based colors; see Figure 9). The Army had a series of meetings with 
congressional members who sponsored the NDAA legislation and professional staff 
members who wrote the actual language to ensure the patterns considered were within the 
intent of the law. Congressional leaders considered the DTC1 and DTC2 patterns in a “gray 
area” of the new restrictions and were noncommittal if these patterns met the intent of the 
law. Nevertheless, the Army decided to test these patterns along with the other patterns. 
 
 Patterns Tested by the Army at Fort Benning in April 2014 
(Mazz, 2014; PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014b) 
In April 2014, the Army tested alternative transitional patterns at Fort Benning in 
operational field tests with U.S. Army Sniper School Cadre and in photo simulation 
assessments using soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment (see Figures 10 and 11). The 
testing to support an Army decision was rigorous and met the intent of the Army CSA. The 
testing involved used sniper experts to assess the operational relevance of the patterns in 
operational field tests and 106 soldiers as observers of the patterns in 46 separate 
backgrounds in photo simulation evaluations—collecting 19,474 data points (Mazz, 2014; 
PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014b). 
 
 Operational Field Test Results 
(Mazz, 2014; PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014b) 
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 Photo Simulation Test Results 
(Mazz, 2014; PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014b) 
From the results shown in Figures 10 and 11, the Army came to the following 
conclusions: UCP performed poorly in all backgrounds (confirming prior results); OEF CP, 
ScorpionW2, DTC1, and DTC2 scored similarly across all background types; USMC 
MARPAT woodland performed well in woodland dormant backgrounds; and USMC 
MARPAT desert performed well in arid environments. The results confirmed that there was a 
“tight shot” group for the effectiveness and performance of the transitional patterns. The 
Army decision would probably come down to other considerations like affordability, cost, 
implementation and execution ease, schedule, contracting challenges, and intellectual 
property rights concerns (potential patent, trademark, and copyright challenges).  
Again, Colonel Smith assembled his team to consider the following options for CSA 
and SecArmy to consider (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2014b): 
• Option 1: Do nothing. Make no decision at this time and continue the current 
situation of issuing soldiers UCP uniforms and equipment for all missions, except 
in Afghanistan where they would continue to get OEF CP uniforms and 
equipment. 
• Option 2: Select OEF CP, accept the vendor’s terms, and expand its use beyond 
Afghanistan to become the standard pattern of all Army uniforms and equipment. 
• Option 3: Select ScorpionW2 and replace UCP uniforms and equipment over 
time when they wore out. 
• Option 4: Select a digital transitional camouflage (DTC1) and replace UCP 
uniforms and equipment over time when they wore out. 
Colonel Smith and his team considered these options the main courses of action for 
Army senior leaders to consider. The team debated the following decision criteria to apply to 
these options: performance, schedule, affordability/cost, legal risk, and the perspectives of 
key stakeholders such as soldiers, Congress, the Marine Corps, and the media. 
Colonel Smith prepared for another challenging sets of meetings and did not like the 
thought of going back into the lion’s den again with Army senior leaders in the Pentagon. 
This would be the third time he attempted to get a decision on camouflage for Army 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 374 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
uniforms and equipment. However, he knew that the decision was of utmost importance for 
soldiers in combat. Effective camouflage increased soldier combat effectiveness and 
improved force protection—saving soldiers’ lives in battle. Colonel Smith thought about the 
decision in terms of return of investment (ROI). From 2009 to 2014 (over six years), the 
Army spent less than $10 million in the research, development, and testing of camouflage 
patterns, but a camouflage change would affect the purchase of $5.2 billion of uniforms and 
equipment over the next 5–10 years (PM SPIE, PEO Soldier, 2013a, 2014c). Colonel Smith 
considered the research, development, and testing of camouflage patterns a wise 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the potential constraining effects of funding from mission-
oriented (e.g., NASA, DoD, DHS) public-funding agencies on the future growth of 
technology-based startups. Prior research on innovative, small-business government 
funding programs illuminates the beneficial nature of such public resources in overcoming 
resource limitations in launching new technology ventures. However, this research is based 
mainly on empirical analysis of non-constraining, grant-based relationships with science-
oriented public-funding agencies and does not explicitly take the perspective of the 
entrepreneurial firm. I fill this gap by analyzing the potential limitations of government 
funding on technology start-up survival and growth. I argue that those government funding 
programs that constrain a start-up’s strategic agility (i.e., limit opportunity discovery and 
exploitation) can have adverse long-term effects. By quantitatively examining over 27,000 
technology start-ups, I find that such agility-constraining resources increase the likelihood of 
start-up survival, but limit growth. This paper, therefore, contributes to strategic 
management, entrepreneurship, and public policy literature. 
Introduction 
“In any given new technology, entrepreneurs could fail to identify any opportunities, or could 
identify the wrong opportunities, making an explanation for the discovery of opportunities an 
important part of the domain of entrepreneurship research” (Shane, 2000). 
It is widely acknowledged that firms seeking to commercialize new technology 
ventures face significant resource constraints. Empirical evidence has shown that innovative 
companies suffer financing constraints for new technology ventures as conventional sources 
of for-profit capital (e.g., internal investment, VC, CVC) tend to under-invest in high-risk R&D 
(Howell, 2017; Lerner, 2012). In high-growth markets, where firms may experience fewer 
financing constraints, other resources become scarce. Acquiring technical talent, for 
example, can become a powerful constraint as ventures seek to scale in competitive labor 
markets (Kazanjian, 1988; Stern, Porter, & Furman, 2000). In combination, many firms fail in 
their attempts to bring new technologies to market. 
To overcome resource constraints, it has long been the policy of nation-states with 
growth-focused economies to subsidize new technology ventures. While all firms face 
resource constraints in launching technology ventures, small firms feel the effects of these 
constraints the strongest (Gans & Stern, 2000). Small firms tend to suffer from an ability to 
appropriate social returns from their innovations and are therefore more likely to under-
invest in new technology ventures (Anton & Yao, 1994). To counteract under-investment by 
small firms, governments have developed funding programs to subsidize innovation in small 
firms. These include such well-researched programs as the U.S. SBIR program (Howell, 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 378 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
2017; Link & Scott, 2010), the Chinese Innofund program (Guo, Guo, & Jiang, 2016; Wang, 
Li, & Furman, 2017), or the Swedish VINN NU program (Söderblom et al., 2015).  
These subsidies tend to be particularly salient to resource-strapped technology start-
ups (Kropp & Zolin, 2005). While small firms certainly face resource constraints, there are a 
large number of fixed costs for new firms that require additional resources. Thus, 
government funding programs that subsidize innovation in small firms tend to be overly 
prescribed by new firms. For example, in the U.S. SBIR program, 60% of all funding goes to 
firms under five years of age. Thus, technology start-ups are heavily represented in these 
early-stage R&D funding programs.  
Research regarding the impact of small-business innovation funding policies has 
mainly found positive results. Primarily taking the view of the government, scholars have 
shown that such programs increased knowledge-spillovers leading to broader economic 
growth, overcame financial constraints in resource-strapped geographies, and increased the 
number of new technology ventures started from scientific endeavors as well as the number 
of commercial products introduced to market (Audretsch, 2003; Audretsch, Link, & Scott, 
2002; Feldman & Kelley, 2006; Gans & Stern, 2000; Link & Scott, 2010). Of those scholars 
that have explicitly evaluated the impact of small-business innovation programs from the 
view of the firm, the majority have studied the effects of government funding on private R&D 
intensity (i.e., how much the firm spends internally on R&D), uncovering both 
complementary and substitutionary effects (Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015; Wallsten, 2000). In 
general, these findings have found that small-business funding programs have had a 
positive impact on economic growth. 
Interestingly, however, little research has explicitly investigated the impact of these 
programs on technology start-up performance. Recent research has indicated that scholars 
who study the effects of such government policies should expressly examine the nature of 
technology funding programs on entrepreneurial activity as opposed to grouping small 
businesses and start-ups under the same category (Hellmann & Thiele, 2017). Besides the 
large fixed costs of forming a new technology start-up, there exist significant differences in 
growth objectives and business models. What makes a small business successful, 
therefore, may not make a new firm successful. Given that prior research takes a macro-
approach at evaluating the effect of these policies on economic and firm performance, there 
remains a gap in understanding how small-business innovation funding programs impact 
technology start-up performance. 
This paper attempts to address this question by evaluating the potential negative 
influences of small-business funding programs on technology start-up growth. Specifically, I 
argue that while providing resources to technology start-ups increases the likelihood that 
they will survive, government-backed resources can impede growth by limiting a firm’s 
strategic agility. While resources remain critical for technology start-ups, that’s not all that 
necessary for a performant high-growth technology-start-up. Organizational research on 
entrepreneurial firms has illuminated how an entrepreneur’s cognitive and behavioral traits 
influence a new firm’s ability to discover and exploit optimal opportunities (Baron, 2007; 
Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). For example, scholars have shown that start-ups identify 
capabilities via cognitive frames that are generated through prior experiences (Baron, 2007; 
Baron & Ensley, 2006), engage in opportunities through rapid decision making governed by 
the firm’s standard operating procedures (Bakker & Shepherd, 2017; Eisenhardt, 1989; Ott, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2017) and are able to exploit opportunities via institutional bricolage 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005; Phillips & Tracey, 2007). In combination, new ventures with high 
strategic agility—the ability to recognize new opportunities, make important decisions about 
those opportunities quickly, and re-deploy institutional resources to exploit those 
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opportunities—are more likely to be successful. Thus, engaging with resources which 
constrain strategic agility may weaken firm performance. 
To test these theories, I analyze a matched sample of 27,730 dual-use technology 
start-ups. Dual-use technology ventures are a particularly appropriate research setting as 
they have the option to receive funding from both private sources of capital and mission-
funding agencies. Many technology ventures are considered dual-use (cybersecurity, 
artificial intelligence, etc.), thus making it a particularly important part of the high-technology 
economy (Lin, 2016). Funding from a mission-funding agency (e.g., militaries, space 
agencies, homeland security agencies) provides a particularly salient example of an agility 
constraining opportunities, as mission funding agencies often have unique, monopsony 
needs, restrictive contractually-based mechanisms, and pre-set resource allocation rules 
that limit a firm’s ability to discover and exploit opportunities. In combination, dual-use 
technology start-ups have multiple initial resource opportunities and therefore can select into 
potentially constraining ones. 
To test the impact of these programs, I employ a quasi-experimental design through 
a robust matching, cox-proportional hazard, and differences-in-differences approaches. 
Specifically, I assess the impact of the DoD’s SBIR program on technology start-up survival 
and growth (number of employees and revenue, logged). By collecting quantitative and 
qualitative evidence, I find that the DoD SBIR program provides much-needed sources of 
revenue for firms and that firms receiving SBIR contracts experience more extended survival 
rates. Interestingly, however, I find that firms who receive SBIR contracts from the DoD 
establish patterns of behavior that limit strategic agility. Quantitatively, I show that for SBIR-
start-ups, post-award growth is slower, as revenue is net-negative compared to a 
comparable set of industry peers.  
I make two contributions. First, I contribute to strategic management by introducing 
the concept of an agility-constraining opportunity. While prior research has focused on how 
firms become more agile by discovering and exploiting opportunities, this paper argues that 
discovering and exploiting an agility-constraining opportunity can have long-lasting adverse 
effects where competitors have multiple resource paths to pursue. Second, I contribute to 
policy research by detailing the conditions under which firms might be more or less 
successful when partnering with the government. Specifically, I show that the impacts of 
government funding for new ventures are distinct from more traditional small businesses. By 
showing how small-business funding programs can be determinantal for growth in new 
firms, I argue for new policy which takes entrepreneurial growth goals and business models 
into consideration. 
Research Setting  
I explore this question by investigating the impact of the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program on new venture survival and 
growth. The SBIR program was instantiated to specifically counter-act underinvestment from 
small businesses in new technology ventures (Audretsch, 2003; Audretsch, Weigand, & 
Weigand, 2002). Funding for the SBIR program is significant, with the total spending 
breaching $2.5 billion in 2017. Subsequently, the SBIR program remains one of the most 
well-researched small business programs and is a model for both OECD and non-OECD 
countries seeking to develop their innovation funding programs (Wang et al., 2017). 
Although prior research often investigates the U.S. SBIR program in its entirety, 
there is significant heterogeneity within the program itself. The SBIR program is funded 
directly by individual government funding agencies, such as the Department of Energy 
(DoE), National Science Foundation (NSF), or the National Air and Space Administration 
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(NASA). Specifically, each funding agencies allocates 3.2% of their annual extra-mural R&D 
budget (i.e., the part of the yearly budget dedicated toward funding R&D external to the 
organization) towards the SBIR program. Accordingly, each funding agency is allowed to 
decide how to allocate those funds, leading to significant heterogeneity in policy 
implementation. Variation in funding strategy includes differences in which technology 
sectors to fund (i.e., energy vs. space), the maturity of technology required prior to funding 
(i.e., basic through applied research), and the nature of the interaction between government 
agency and funded firm (i.e., grant-based or contractually-based relationships). 
To best research how government funding might constrain technology start-up 
strategic agility, the U.S. DoD SBIR program presents a particularly salient example. Prior 
research has focused primarily on science-oriented funding agencies funding new 
technology ventures through grant-based relationships (Bruce, de Figueiredo, & Silverman, 
2018; Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015). The DoD is a mission-oriented funding agency 
which caters to public-sector demands through contract-based relationships, which creates 
two significant differences from this prior work. First, while previous research generally 
studies the impacts of public funding programs administered by science-oriented funding 
agencies who fund firms to introduce new technology ventures to the private-sector market, 
mission-oriented funding agencies fund firms to introduce new technologies to public and 
private-sector markets. The DoD, for example, controls the market for military technologies 
and therefore invests in technology ventures which have the potential for commercial 
application internal to the military (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Mowery, 2009). As a result, 
DoD SBIR funding heavily incentivizes firms to develop products or services to meet military 
demands. 
Second, while prior research has generally studied the impact of funding programs 
which allocate funds through unrestrictive grant-based relationships, the DoD funds 
technology ventures through more restrictive, contractually-based relationships (Congress, 
1977; Flammer, 2018). In grant-based relationships, firms may adapt or alter their R&D 
activity as more knowledge is gleaned in the course of the R&D activity. In contrast, any 
change in R&D activity in a contract-based relationship requires a re-negotiation of the 
contract itself. As a result, DoD SBIR funding incentivizes firms not to adjust R&D activity. In 
combination, the public-sector demands of the DoD and the generally restrictive nature of 
contractually-based relationships make the U.S. DoD SBIR program a particularly useful 
context from which to measure the impact of small-business innovative funding programs on 
technology start-up performance. 
Theory Building and Hypotheses 
Research at the intersection of entrepreneurial strategy and technology start-up 
performance highlights three important firm-based performance outcomes: firm survival, firm 
growth, and innovations produced (normally assessed by patents or product introductions). 
Research intersecting technology start-ups and government funding has primarily evaluated 
the later and has generally found that government R&D funding dedicated to innovation 
results in both more technologies invented and products introduced (Audretsch, 2003). For 
example, the only two studies that specifically address the impact of mission organizations—
one on NASA and the other on the DoD—use survey and case-based evidence to show that 
SBIR-contract receiving companies report both an increase in the number of new 
technology ventures embarked and number of commercial products successfully introduced 
to market (Archibald & Finifter, 2003; Audretsch, Link, et al., 2002). Therefore, this paper 
focuses solely on the impact of the U.S. SBIR funding program on technology start-up 
survival and growth. 
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Government Funding and Firm Survival 
Entrepreneurial cannon on growth-focused technology start-ups has long 
emphasized the importance of acquiring critical resources quickly. These include access to 
capital, access to capable technical talent, and both technical and social legitimacy 
(Armanios et al., 2017a; Eberhart, 2017; Hsu, Roberts, & Eesley, 2007; Lerner, 1999). 
Finding and employing capital is vital given that technology start-ups incur significant costs 
before generating revenue. Finding and hiring technical talent is important given limited 
technical labor supply and the need to scale effectively and quickly. Gaining both technical 
legitimacy and social legitimacy is important to generate ties with resource providers (e.g., 
suppliers, customers, strategic alliances). In sum, for technology start-ups to survive, they 
must quickly acquire critical resources. 
Government funding can be particularly useful in providing such resources. First, 
government subsidy programs provide direct, non-dilutive capital to firms. The SBIR 
program offers, on average, up to $225,000 for an early stage contract. While this amount of 
funding might not be significant for larger, more established firms, it is precious for early-
stage companies. In comparison, the median angel investment round, which would be the 
comparable private capital funding mechanism, is ~$285,000. Furthermore, while the 
median angel investor charges ~8% equity for that initial investment, the SBIR program 
takes no equity stake (Knauss, Edwards, & Williams, 2017). Government funding is 
therefore particularly attractive to technology start-ups. 
Second, government funding provides access to technical experts. Access to 
government researchers is a critical part of government funding programs that invest in new 
technology ventures (Sauermann & Stephan, 2012). Across all U.S. funding agencies, for 
example, SBIR projects are administered by advanced-degree holding researchers who 
work directly with the funded companies (SBA, 2014). These government researchers 
spend significant time with the funded company to help the firm meet its funded R&D goals 
(Pahnke et al., 2015). The government also indirectly incentivizes interaction with non-
government backed technical experts as displayed in program selection biases. For 
example, Feldman and Kelley (2006) find that firms who partner with research institutions 
experience higher likelihoods of receiving government funding. Thus, technical talent is a 
crucial resource provided by government funding partnerships. 
Lastly, government funding supports technical and social legitimacy via certification 
and access to a stabilizing set of government ties. Given their resident technical expertise, 
partnering with a government organization is interpreted as a certifying stamp of technical 
legitimacy (Armanios et al., 2017b; Eesley, Li, & Yang, 2016). Studying 151 Chinese 
entrepreneurs who entered a funding partnership with the Chinese government, Armanios et 
al. (2017) showed that while the entrepreneurs benefited from the resident technical 
expertise (skill adequacy), those entrepreneurs who were relative unknowns in the social 
context benefited significantly more from the certification received by participating in the 
program. Explicitly, the technical quality of the entrepreneur is signaled by the government's 
certification of the firm. Similar research has been done investigating firms who partnered 
with the government in Finland (Autio & Rannikko, 2016) and Spain (Busom, 2000). 
Government partnerships also provide social legitimacy by enforcing a stabilizing 
series of political ties between government funding agency and firms. Research has 
illuminated that political ties generate important social legitimacy for firms dealing with 
uncertain environments (Hiatt, Carlos, & Sine, 2017; Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1990; 
Wang & Qian, 2011). For example, researching 282 airline ventures in 10 South American 
countries, Hiatt et al. (2017) found that those airlines which had political ties with the military 
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were more likely to survive in times of social unrest. Thus, the very nature of receiving a 
government contract can increase a technology start-up’s technical and social legitimacy. 
Given access to unique, technical, and high-capital resources, along with sources of 
legitimacy from technical certification and political ties, government funding provides a 
unique set of resources for technology start-ups. I argue that, in combination, these positive 
externalities of government funding make it much more likely for firms who receive 
government funding to survive relative to those firms who do not engage in such 
partnerships. This leads me to my first hypothesis: 
H1: Technology start-ups who receive government funding are more likely to survive 
than similar firms who do not. 
Government Funding and Firm Growth 
Entrepreneurial cannon has also established that firms grow by rapidly discovering 
and exploiting novel opportunities (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003; Hitt et al., 2001; Ireland, 2007; 
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Prior work in strategic management has introduced the 
concept of strategic agility—that is, the ability rapidly identify and engage in profitable 
opportunities—as a core trait of successful entrepreneurial firms (Doz & Kosonen, 2010; 
Ryu, Kwon, & Park, 2018). This can best be broken down into three distinct parts: identifying 
capabilities by employing multiple and heterogeneous cognitive frames, rapidly 
experimenting, evaluating, and selecting opportunities by applying reliable and repeatable 
standard operating procedures, and exploiting opportunities via bricolage (reconfiguring and 
deploying resources in novel ways). Technology start-ups that can effectively engage all 
three activities exhibit high strategic agility, allowing them to discover and exploit valuable 
opportunities which result in firm growth. 
When government funding constrains strategic agility, therefore, it may have a 
limiting effect on future growth. Given that the U.S. DoD SBIR program has unique, public-
sector demands and employs more restrictive, contractually-based relationships, firms who 
receive DoD SBIR contracts may experience impediments to growth. Specifically, I argue 
such funding programs impose two unique impediments on technology start-ups: 
institutional impediments, which limit opportunity identification, and structural impediments, 
which limit opportunity evaluation speed and resource bricolage, respectively. For example, 
by encouraging technical performance (a unique, public-sector demand) over-
commercialization, mission-funding agencies incentivize firms to seek professional 
opportunities for new technology ventures instead of growth opportunities for which to 
introduce new commercial products (Eesley, 2016; Sauermann & Stephan, 2012). In turn, 
the potential impediments caused by agility-constraining government funding may limit 
growth. 
Institutional Impediments 
Institutional impediments are initiated via differences in institutionalized norms and 
behaviors between mission-oriented government funding sources and that of technology 
start-ups. Norms of mission-oriented funding agencies, derived from the institution of the 
state, have been characterized by a focus on new technology ventures to support unique, 
mission-focused demands (Branscomb, 1993; Prendergast, 2002; Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012). For example, the primary objective of the U.S. SBIR program is to “fund 
innovative new technology ventures.” Conversely, norms of technology start-ups, derived 
from the institution of the corporation, have been characterized by a focus on resource 
acquisition, market-driven research, and controlling access to intellectual property 
(Liebeskind, 1996). I argue that by incentivizing technology start-ups to follow mission-
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oriented funding agency norms instead of technology start-up norms, government funding 
sources limit the ability for start-ups to identify growth opportunities. 
Scholars have shown that new firms often adopt the norms and behaviors of their 
critical resource providers. For example, Grégoire et al. (2010) showed that how start-ups 
recognize opportunities is driven by prior experiences and present network structure. Gulati 
& Higgins (2003) find a firm’s future experiences are limited to those made available by 
early-influencing partners, re-enforcing initial opportunity recognition behavior. Thus, for 
start-ups whose only experiences are constrained to interactions with mission-oriented 
funding agencies, opportunity recognition will be driven by a set of norms and behaviors that 
prioritizes new-venture formation over existing-venture growth. 
Indeed, interviews with entrepreneurs highlight some such effects. For example, the 
founder of one company who received multiple U.S. DoD SBIR awards pined over his failure 
to recognize commercial-funding opportunities. He stated, 
One of my regrets of course having wizened up after this [company 
failure due to slow growth] and maybe this is the lesson that is we should 
have gotten commercial funding earlier. … It wasn’t a question of not 
wanting to give away a part of the company or equity. I think we were just 
a little risk averse and weren’t sure, and I don't know why. Why we were 
risk averse to the idea of getting any commercial funding and things of that 
nature. So, in retrospect I think, had we 10 years ago gone and gotten 
some commercial funding, things would've been very different. 
He attributed his firm’s ultimate demise to not recognizing commercial opportunities, 
prioritizing winning multiple SBIR awards instead of pursuing alternative sources of revenue 
or investment. 
It, therefore, stands to reason that opportunities driven by the government, as 
opposed to commercial markets, become more salient as the ties with the government 
become stronger. While capitalizing on such opportunities may be beneficial for capturing 
the future government market, they may limit the opportunity to identify growth-focused 
opportunities. 
Structural Impediments 
Structural impediments are driven by the contractual nature of relationships between 
mission-oriented government funding agencies and their partnered firms. Contracts are a 
“binding agreement between a buyer (government) and seller (firm) to provide goods in 
return for compensation” (Congress, 1977). Unlike grants, when the public-funding sponsor 
has limited insight into R&D activity in the private firm, in contracts the public partner has a 
significant say, and imparts strategic direction, on the firm’s R&D activity. They are often 
executed on behalf of public, mission-oriented funding agencies as these agencies cater to 
specific public-markets with unique public-sector demands (David & Hall, 2000). For 
example, while both mission and non-mission funding agencies execute SBIR programs, 
SBIR-based public-private R&D relationships with the NIH (non-mission) collaborate use 
grants, while relationships with the DoD (mission) use contracts. Thus, those start-ups who 
engage with the U.S. DoD SBIR program do with through more intensive, contract-based 
relationships. 
Contracts impose two structural impediments which constrain strategic agility. First, 
government program managers enforce mission-oriented demands on firms. On one hand, 
mission-oriented demands result in highly organized and formalized approaches to R&D 
activity. On the other, it enforces a large time cost on behalf of the developing firm, which 
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limits the firm’s ability to rapidly experiment with emerging opportunities. For example, 
contracts require statements of work, which describe—to specific technical detail—the 
proposed R&D path as well as the ultimate contract deliverables. This requires significant 
work on behalf of the entrepreneur. For example, a private investor who invested in 10 
SBIR-receiving companies stated,  
There was a fairly involved process of actually negotiating the 
deliverables and the timelines and whatever went into an agreement that 
was crafted. I’m not sure if every single one of the applications needed it, 
but I’ve heard back from some of them that this took a bit of doing, that this 
was a fairly long process, because some of the funds were dispersed in 
transfers and they had to accomplish certain things, and so they had to put 
in place various goals and deliverables and things like that, so that took a 
bit of doing. 
Thus, engaging in contracts can impart significant time costs to the partnered firm. 
Second, if the technology start-up wishes to alter its development path, it requires 
contractual revisions. The Federal Acquisition Regulation, the U.S. federal law which 
governs contract usage, clarifies that contract change agreements are required when the 
firm or government funding agency wishes to change a Statement of Work. An investor 
discussed how that could be damaging to start-ups who are continually adapting as new 
information becomes available in the R&D process. He stated, “If, down the road, they [the 
start-up] suddenly had to change their funding allocation or something changed that they 
didn’t anticipate, and this renegotiation of the spending and the budgetary items took a little 
bit of time.” In turn, contracts make it difficult to pivot R&D as new information emerges. 
In combination, structural impediments constrain the ability to evaluate rapidly and 
deploy resources against, new opportunities. Lengthy contract negotiations limit rapid 
decision making, while contractual revisions restrict the ability to quickly re-deploy 
resources. In sum, although government-funding may increase firm survival, I argue that 
funding from mission-oriented funding agencies can impede growth. Specifically, institutional 
and structural impediments limit the ability of firms to recognize and rapidly exploit novel 
opportunities. Therefore, my second hypothesis is as follows:  
H2: Technology start-ups which receive government funding from mission-oriented 
funding agencies are associated with slower growth than firms who do not. 
Methods 
Data 
I analyze the associations between the U.S. DoD SBIR program and technology 
start-up performance over 15 years from 1997–2012. My sample comprises specifically of 
dual-use technology firms (referred to as “dual-use firms” from here on out). Dual-use firms 
are defined as technology firms who can sell products to the public or private sector. These 
firms comprise significantly large industries, such as aerospace, cybersecurity, and IT. I 
choose to analyze dual-use as they have multiple types of investors and a large variety of 
potential go-to-market strategies. They therefore represent a set of firms that face the 
question of if, and with whom, to receive funding from.  
I begin my sample by collecting the full population of new ventures who received 
funding from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Small Business Innovative Research 
(SBIR) program from 1997–2012. Out of the total DoD SBIR awarded firms in between 
these years, more than 60% of the companies who received SBIR contracts were new 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 385 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
ventures. A new venture qualifies any firm less than five years of age at the time of winning 
their first SBIR contract. 
Next, I collect data on all firms in the sample dating back to 1994, the year the 
government mandated SBIR contract-receiving companies register in Dun and Bradstreet, 
thus providing the best starting point for data collection. Although the oldest firm in the 
sample is founded in 1997, beginning data collection in 1994 allows controlling for financial 
capabilities up-to three years before receiving an SBIR award. Although my sample ended 
in 2012, I continue data collection through 2015 or until the firm declares bankruptcy, or is 
acquired. This allows for additional outcome analysis. One resulting strength of my data set 
is that it contains the entire population of new, DoD SBIR-funding receiving firms during this 
time. There are 1,965 total firms in my data set, all founded between 1997 and 2012. 
To develop a sample of dual-use firms, I next sample Dun and Bradstreet for firms 
with a similar founding year and SIC. Since firms register in Dun and Bradstreet when they 
seek a credit rating, the resulting data set is particularly complete (Eesley & Roberts, 2012). 
Specifically, I query every U.S. firm in Dun and Bradstreet founded between 1997 and 2012 
which shares at least one 4-digit Standard Industrial Code (SIC) in common with the SBIR 
receiving firms. Comparable firms are limited to the United States as all SBIR companies 
must be at least 51% owned in the United States. Four-digit SIC is a useful measure of a 
firm’s industry at the level of product offerings. For example, the 2-digit code 36 classifies 
“Electronic and Other Equipment” companies, while adding two more digits to get to the 4-
digit code of “3672” classifies the firm as producing “Printed Circuit Boards.” Combining 
these data sets, I compiled a total sample of 358,535 firms. 
My primary data set is was collected from the SBIR database (SBIR.gov) and Dun 
and Bradstreet. To measure venture-backed funding partnerships and pertinent, annual firm 
performance data, I utilized Thompson One and PitchBook. Where there were 
discrepancies, I turned to other data sources for clarification, include CapitalIQ, Crunch 
Base, and Data Fox. 
Measures 
Dependent Measures 
The first hypothesis measures the likelihood of firm survival. Given the lack of 
commonly-available standard performance information for newly formed private-ventures, 
firm survival is an important and commonly used metric of new-venture performance 
(Chatterji, 2009; Klepper, 2002; Paik, 2014). This is captured in two variables, exited and 
exit-date. Exited is measured by a binary variable of whether a firm goes out of business, 1 
if it goes out of existence and 0 if it still exists. This does not include acquisition or IPO, as 
those exit strategies may qualify as still “surviving,” although in a different format. Exit-date 
is qualified as the year in which the firm goes out of business. In combination, both variables 
are used to analyze the first hypothesis. 
For robustness, I also evaluate Acquired, as acquisition represents a potentially 
positive outcome for young firms and therefore a distinctly alternative exit strategy. Given 
the SBIR program’s data rights clauses, and that those rights are transferable through 
acquisition, SBIR companies who developed unique and innovative technologies are likely 
to become acquisition targets for larger firms. Acquired is measured by a binary variable of 
whether a firm was acquired, 1 if acquired and 0 if not.  
The primary aim of hypothesis two is to measure the influence of funding on 
entrepreneurial growth. I define growth in two dimensions, Log Revenue and Log 
Employees. Log Revenue is used as it is strategy invariant, as the majority of start-ups seek 
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revenue regardless of growth, IPO, or acquisition strategy (Eesley & Roberts, 2012). 
Specifically, I calculate log revenue as the log of revenue in each firm-year of operation. As 
employees indicate growth goals, I also include log employees. Log employees are 
calculated as the log of employees in each firm-year of operation. 
Independent Measures 
I operationalized my main explanatory variable of interest with SBIR-awardee. I 
measured whether a firm received government funding with an SBIR-awardee binary 
variable coded as 1 if the firm received an SBIR contract and 0 otherwise. Multiple awardee 
recipients were recorded in the Number of SBIR awards variable.  
Controls 
Given the different measures of performance, the following controls are either 
recorded at the founding, before award, or per firm-year, depending on the needs of the 
model. For assessing survival rates, our variables do not change in time. For evaluating 
growth, some variables—where required—are measured as lagged by one year. 
I measured whether the firm received venture-funding with a binary variable coded 
as 1 if the firm received VC investment and 0 otherwise. As prominent VCs may be more 
likely to influence innovation, I also measured relationship to high-status VCs for sensitivity 
analysis. VC’s eigenvector centrality in venture capital syndication networks was included to 
control for ranking, and the top 30 VCs were coded with a 1 in the binary variable Top-tier 
VC. 
Since older firms are correlated with higher revenues and more employees, I control 
for firm age. Firm age is the difference between the founding year as reported in the Dun 
and Bradstreet database and current year. As the industry is an essential discriminant in 
performance, I also control for the 4-digit SIC. I build on prior literature that uses this level of 
detail to describe industry effects (Zajac, 1988). I also control for the location with state. 
SBIR program restricts funding companies to which U.S. citizens own 51% of the firm. 
Therefore, all of the firms in our data set are U.S. based. State is a dummy variable across 
all 50 states. 
I control for firm technical resources with firm patents. I.P. owned and appropriated 
before SBIR or Venture award may affect both the likelihood of firms receiving an award and 
entering into a contractual arrangement. Patents are recorded as the total number of patents 
awarded in a given firm-year. 
I also include a standard control for founding team size. Larger founding teams are 
known to be correlated with higher performance outcomes. It is well acknowledged that the 
range of an entrepreneur’s ex-ante functional expertise and experience will influence 
organizational decisions, and therefore the greater the team size, the higher the functional 
collective knowledge (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Gompers, 2005). I measure team size by 
the number of founders (Pahnke et al., 2015). Founding team size is recorded as the total 
number of employees listed on Dun and Bradstreet at the time of founding (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990). 
I also control for Woman and Minority-owned businesses. The U.S. Small Business 
Association, which oversees the SBIR program, gives special attention to, and incentivizes 
participation from, woman and minority-owned businesses (Bramble, 2015; SBA, 2014). As 
a woman and minority businesses may be therefore more likely to apply to SBIR, they 
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represent a necessary control. Woman and minority are binary variables recorded as 1 if at 
least 51% owned by one or more women or minorities, respectively.1 
Finally, I control for temporal effects that might be correlated with performance 
outcomes given macroeconomic conditions beyond our control. Temporal effects are 
measured with yearly dummy variables from 1994 to 2015, strictly for growth models. 
Methods 
I take a quasi-experimental approach towards assessing our hypotheses. This 
involves a process that controls for selection through matching methods, by applying both 
strict sub-sampling and coarsened-exact-matching, and treatment, by applying cox-
proportional hazard model and differences-in-differences methods 
Matching 
The goal of the matching method is to generate matched sets of control-treatment 
firms that are as close as possible so they can be used to estimate the counterfactual in 
ways that are relevant for the outcome (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Given the large 
sample size available, I employ strict sub-sampling (Stuart, 2010). Strict sub-sampling 
matches firms exactly on matching covariates, resulting in K-1 matches (control to 
treatment). Given previous research that has applied similar methods, I matched firms on 
geographical location, founding year, and SIC (Goldstein & Narayanamurti, 2018; Pahnke et 
al., 2015). Altogether, I create matched sets of firms that receive SBIR. For the primary 
sample, this reduced total firms in the analysis to 27,730 firms, 1,414 received at least one 
SBIR contract.  
Cox Proportional Hazard 
To test the survival rate of firms, I build on previous literature examining firm 
longevity by employing the proportional hazards modeling as described by Cox (Audretsch 
& Mahmood, 1995; Mata & Portual, 1994; Suarez & Ulterback, 1995). This method uses a 
logarithmic transformation of a hazard of failure as the outcome variable. As firms 
experience a higher likelihood of failures, their hazard rate shifts upwards. The hazard 
model is 
ln  ℎ(𝑡𝑡) = lnℎ0(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋, 
where ℎ0(𝑡𝑡) is the baseline hazard function, X is a vector of covariates, and 𝑋𝑋 is a vector of 
the coefficients. The resultant prediction of the hazard function shows a value greater than 
0.5 if a firm is likely to exit relative to its control group. A negative value implies that a firm is 
more likely to survive. 
Difference-in-Differences 
I use a differences-in-differences approach to asses longitudinal performance. 
Estimating treatment effects by constructing a matched control group and analyzing panel 
                                               
 
 
1 The definition of minority is supplied by the U.S. Small Business Association and is publicly 
available. These include minority groups which are presumed to be socially and economically 
disadvantaged, such as African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Alaska Native 
Corporations, Indian Tribes, Native Hawaiian Organizations, Community Development Corporations, 
Asian Pacific Americans, and Subcontinent Asian Americans.  
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data using a difference-in-differences approach has shown to be a robust approach to 
evaluating policy treatments, such as government funding (Short & Toffel, 2010). This 
method yields separate estimates for selection and treatment effects and allows a 
comparison of treatments over time, which is essential when measuring changes in the rate 
of growth post-treatment. H1 is measured with Cox-proportional hazard model, while H2 is 
measured with the differences in differences approach. 
Results 
The central results of the paper are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Model 2, Table 2 
represents the impact of SBIR funding on start-up survival. Models 2 and 4, Table 3, 
represent the associations between government funding and start-up growth. Figures 1 and 
2 summarize these results by showing differences in firm performance pre and post-award. 
Table 1 presents covariate descriptive statistics, post-match.  
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
Table 2 represents the cox-proportional hazard model for firm survival. I find 
evidence to support H1. Model 2 shows that SBIR awards have a significant and negative 
impact on firm death, thus leading to higher survival rates. Specifically, these results indicate 
that firms which receive a contract early in their existence have a 60% greater chance of 
survival as compared to those similar firms which do not win a government contract. 
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Table 2. Exit: Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
 
Table 3 represents the differences in differences models for firm growth. I find partial 
evidence for H2. First, Models 2 and 4 (SBIR-awardee variable) indicate that SBIR contracts 
are awarded to higher performing firms. This indicates a significant and positive selection 
effect for SBIR awards, consistent with earlier research. Second, Model 2 (SBIR-awardee x 
After treatment variable) indicates weaker revenue growth post-award, while Model 4 
indicates stronger employee growth. Specifically, Model 4 suggests that contract-receiving 
firms experience ~10% greater employee growth post-SBIR award, while Model 2 shows 
that those same firms experience a 70% decrease in revenue. I return to these intriguing 
findings in the conclusion. 
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Table 3. Diff-in-Diff 
 
Figure 1 represents the differences-in-differences graphs. The graph on the left 
indicates that firms who receive SBIR awards have greater revenue before award, but firms 
who do not win SBIR awards experience stronger growth post award. As successful firms 
experience their initial sources of revenue during this period (between 2 and 4 years of age), 
this result is consistent with existing empirical research. The graph on the right indicates that 
firms who receive SBIR awards do experience stronger employee growth post award. 
 
 -Diff-in-Diff Plots for Revenue (Left) and Employees (Right) 
Note. Plots are interpreted by differences in growth post award. Non-SBIR receiving firms experience rapid revenue growth 
post award, while SBIR receiving firms experience greater employee growth post award. 
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Also of interest are a few covariates. Notably, the countervailing effects of venture 
financing indicate some intriguing results. Table 2 shows that venture raised has a positive, 
if not a significant impact, on firm death. While potentially counter-intuitive, this is mostly 
consistent with recent empirical research which indicates that venture capital accelerates 
both firm growth and firm death. Given that government funding protects against some of 
the volatility inherent in VC-backed growth strategies, we would expect to find differentiated 
results between government funding and venture funding. Table 3 shows, however, that 
venture-backed firms experience significant and positive impacts on future growth. Thus, 
raising venture may overcome some of the impediments inherent in government funding 
relationships. 
To further explore this variation, I separate and evaluate firms who receive venture 
before SBIR funding (ex-ante) against those who receive venture after SBIR funding (ex-
post). Table 4 shows the results for logged revenue. Interestingly, firms who receive venture 
ex-ante experience similar impacts on future performance. However, firms who receive 
venture ex-post have no significant lasting adverse effect on revenue growth post-award. 
This directional analysis provides further support for H2. Specifically, that raising venture 
capital post-SBIR-award may counter-act some of the government-funding impediments. For 
example, venture might open new pathways for opportunity recognition, overcoming 
institutional impediments. However, receiving venture before award would still leave firms 
open to constraining institutional and structural impediments. 
Table 4. Growth, Log Revenue: Diff-in-Diff 
 
Conclusion 
In Shane’s (2000) seminal work on opportunity discovery, he suggested that there 
exist “wrong” opportunities for new firms. That is to say, he hypothesized that there existed 
an opportunity that could offer immediate support to the entrepreneurial firm, but ultimately 
result in unforeseen adverse consequences. Yet, since Shane, little if any work has 
illuminated what a “wrong” opportunity might be. For the first time, this paper illustrates one 
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possible example, arguing that agility-constraining opportunities may provide critical 
resources for firm survival, but have damaging long-term consequences to firm growth.  
The results of this paper illustrate a particularly exciting outcome: that while mission-
oriented agency funding seems to have a constraining effect on revenue-growth, it has a 
positive and complementary impact on employment. Post-result interviews with 
entrepreneurs provided some additional context. For example, when asked, “What is the 
first thing you spend your SBIR funding on?” all interviewees claimed to allocate the funds 
towards hiring personnel. This is mostly consistent with the nature of DoD SBIR awards. By 
statute, all SBIR funding has to be allocated toward technically-oriented tasks. This means 
that SBIR funding cannot be spent on other, business growth tasks—such as sales or 
marketing. Given this additional information, it is easy to reconcile these differences 
between SBIR net revenue and net employment growth effects.  
Also of interest is the impact of venture funding. The DoD instituted a SBIR “fast-
track” program in 1995 to incentivize firms to pursue private capital along with SBIR funding 
by prioritizing the applications of firms who received third-party financing (Wessner, 2000). 
Reviews on the fast-track program have found that companies who receive both public and 
private capital experience commercialization rates five times greater than SBIR-receiving 
firms who do not participate in the fast-track program. This result is supported by Table 4. 
Therefore, while the fast-track program was initially established to keep relevant firms 
solvent through long contracting timelines, I argue that it has a more critical function with 
technology start-ups. Specifically, by incentivizing private capital, the SBIR program reduces 
potential institutional impediments by expanding a firm’s opportunity recognition space. 
There are limitations to this research. First and foremost, although matching via strict 
sub-sampling provides the most accurate quasi-experimental design results, the quantitative 
methodology concludes only strongly-supported associations, not causal inference. Second, 
one should not interpret these results as being a slight towards the U.S. DoD SBIR program. 
There exist significant and well-supported reasons why the DoD might fund companies via 
agility-constraining opportunities. Although mission-oriented funding agencies support 
technical innovation, their application for that technology may be significantly different from 
commercial applications. Furthermore, military applications have a comprehensive set of 
rigorous safety and robustness standards that the retail market does not. Thus, although 
these opportunities might be constraining to entrepreneurial growth, that does not mean that 
they are not necessarily so. 
However, important findings can be extrapolated for new policy. First, if funding 
agencies must employ a resource constraining opportunity, they should recognize the 
potentially damaging effects on technology start-ups. Instead, for those opportunities, 
perhaps the government should prioritize existing small business over start-up applications. 
Alternatively, the results indicate that if the military wishes to partner with entrepreneurial 
firms, it should take a less restrictive approach. Perhaps employing grants instead of 
contracts or allocating additional funds for firms to expand their institutional resources 
outside of the military market would significantly decrease negative associations between 
contract award and growth. Ultimately, the critical insight is that technology start-ups are 
different from small businesses, and should be approached as such. 
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Abstract 
Developing an information technology (IT) system to meet organizational needs is 
complicated, is often very extensive, takes a long time to realize, and is almost always 
costlier and more difficult than originally planned. To help with this complexity, many 
businesses use the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL)®  to guide the 
design, procurement, and operation of their IT systems. The ITIL is intended to optimally 
synchronize IT departments to function in accordance with the needs of the business. To 
further assist managers in monitoring the progress of their IT programs we developed a 
Bayesian Network stochastic model, the IT Decision Management System (ITDMS), to 
simulate the program’s evidence observations, complex interrelationships, and the 
dynamic/temporal relationships. Based on the Defense Business Systems Acquisition 
Probability of Success (DAPS) Model, a technical framework developed at George Mason 
University, the model aligns the sub-process of each ITIL phase in a Bayesian structure that 
allows a decision maker to assess program performance in specific subject matter 
knowledge areas and the overall likelihood of program success by considering both data 
and temporal uncertainty. The key difference between DAPS and ITDMS is the explicit 
incorporation of the utility and decision factors in the Bayesian influence diagram model. 
Introduction 
Information technology system development and management came to the forefront 
of the U.S. federal government in 1996 when the Clinger-Cohen Act was signed into federal 
law, mandating oversight and management of Information Technology. The issues were that 
many of the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Defense Business System (DBS) 
acquisition programs were too big, too complex, and too time-consuming (GAO, 2012). It is 
clear that developing an information technology (IT) system to meet organizational needs is 
not a simple task. It is often very extensive, takes a long time to realize, and is almost 
always costlier and more difficult than originally imagined. This is especially true for large IT 
projects. It was reported that on average (based on 5,400 IT projects), large IT projects run 
45% over budget, 7% over time, and are delivered with 56% less value (Bloch, Blumberg, & 
Laartz, 2012). A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report also indicates that of 10 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) programs the Department of Defense (DoD) identified 
as critical to business operations transformation, nine programs were experiencing schedule 
delays up to six years, and seven programs were facing estimated cost increases over $2 
billion (GAO, 2012). This occurred even though there were strict acquisition laws, 
regulations, policies, guidance, independent assessments, as well as technical reviews and 
milestone reviews to guide DBS acquisitions. A significant amount of data and large 
numbers of artifacts such as Program Schedule, Earned Value Management System 
(EVMS) Metrics, Business Case, and Systems Engineering Plan are generated during 
execution of DBS programs. These data/artifacts are commonly used by decision makers at 
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technical reviews and milestone reviews as evidence of program progress to support their 
acquisition decisions. However, the evidence by itself is, by nature, incomplete, ambiguous, 
unreliable, and often conflicting (Schum, 2001; Laskey, 2012), making integration of the 
evidence to finalize decisions a challenging endeavor.  
The most challenging issue is that there is often an abundance of data and evidence, but 
limited analytical tools to figure out what all the evidence means collectively, and how they support 
the hypothesis being sought. Good decision-making requires not only information and evidence, but 
also the inference and representation of the evidence to support the decision. There are currently 
limited means to aid DBS acquisition decision makers holistically and logically process all the 
available evidence efficiently and limited means to assimilate all evidence to identify program critical 
areas and the likelihood of achieving program success. This problem is not different from what other 
disciplines experience in a wide range of enterprises and in private sectors such as social services, 
transportation, and health care systems.  
To assist in managing this problem, a Probability of Program Success (PoPS) model 
developed in 2005 with a goal of identifying a program’s health using a scoring system (Department 
of Navy, 2012). While the PoPS model provides a logical framework to assess an acquisition 
program, the system aggregates the scores in a hierarchical manner and does not have a mechanism 
to model uncertainty or the complex interrelationships between key driving factors. In addition, PoPS 
is designed to represent a snapshot of the current status of the program; it does not factor in the past 
scores or how the current scores might affect the future scores. In other words, there is no built-in 
dynamic model in PoPS to predict the probability of failure at a later stage of the program. 
To address these issues, a Defense Business System Acquisition Probability of Success 
(DAPS) was developed (Tzeng, 2015; Tzeng & Cheng, 2015) to enhance the qualitative framework of 
PoPS with a sophisticated quantitative reasoning approach. DAPS is an expert-based model 
constructed using probabilistic graphical models (i.e., Bayesian Networks; Steven 2014; 
Khodakarami; 2009) to help decision makers collectively process the available evidence produced 
during DBS acquisition. Based on observations and inferences of evidence, the DAPS model can 
assess project performance in specific subject matter knowledge areas (KAs) and assess the overall 
likelihood for program success.  
DAPS was specifically designed for Defense Business System (DBS) acquisition applications 
to assess program success with no explicit linkage to decision makers’ subjective utility or 
recommended actions/decisions. This research aims to provide IT business managers a decision 
support tool by augmenting the DAPS with the popular Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
(ITIL) model. The key difference between the resulting Information Technology Decision Management 
System (ITDMS) and DAPS is the explicit incorporation of the utility and decision factors in the 
Bayesian influence diagram model as well as the incorporation of the ITIL process. It allows a 
decision maker to assess program performance at important checkpoints with recommended actions 
and the resulting likelihood of program success by considering both evidence and temporal 
uncertainty. 
Background Research 
Motivations and Background 
Large business acquisition programs experience a great deal of complexities, 
difficulties, and inefficiencies. Acquisition professionals, including systems engineers and 
project/program managers, constantly have to manage the scope, cost, schedule, and 
system quality of a project while trying to meet statutory and regulatory acquisition 
requirements. However, many of the system’s life cycle risks are currently assessed 
subjectively by imprecise qualitative methodologies and subsequently suffer from 
unforeseen failures as well as cost and schedule overruns. This is particularly the case for 
DBS and large IT systems where many programs critical to business operation 
transformation experience major schedule delays and/or significant cost increases (Office of 
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the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 
2006). 
To improve acquisition program performance, the GAO recommends a knowledge-
based acquisition framework for DBS (GAO, 2015). The GAO report states,  
A knowledge-based approach to product development efforts enables developers to 
be reasonably certain, at critical junctures or ‘knowledge points’ in the acquisition life cycle, 
that their products are more likely to meet established cost, schedule, and performance 
baselines and, therefore provides them with information needed to make sound investment 
decisions. (GAO, 2015)  
In short, sufficient knowledge reduces the risk associated with the acquisition 
program and provides decision makers and program manager higher degrees of certainty to 
make better decisions.  
The concept of the knowledge-based acquisition is fully adapted in this research and 
built into the ITDMS model. With the perspective of a program manager, the goal of the 
research is to develop a probabilistic reasoning quantitative system using a graphical model 
(Bayesian Networks) to facilitate evidence-based decision making for an IT acquisition 
process (Steven, 2014; Khodakarami, 2009). The previously developed DAPS model is 
extended by expanding the body of domain knowledge and adapted to IT and engineered 
system programs in general. In particular, to align information technology services with the 
needs of business, the ITIL model is incorporated into the overall system.  
The resulting ITDMS model could model processes, procedures, knowledge areas, 
and performance checklists as described by ITIL process that are not organization-specific 
but can be applied by any organization to ensure delivering value and maintaining 
competency. It could help systems engineers, program managers, and decision makers 
better analyzing the available data/evidence in relation to project success and thus make 
better decisions. ITDMS can be applied to support the difficult acquisition decisions to 
continue projects that will be successful and discontinue projects which will not, 
subsequently, maximize return on investment in large scale IT acquisition process. 
Bayesian Network and Knowledge Representation 
Bayesian Network (BN) is a formal language for representing knowledge about 
uncertain quantities. It is based on the Bayesian approach of probability and statistics, which 
considers prior belief and uses probability inference to update belief based on observed 
evidence. Bayesian Networks are direct acyclic graphs that contain nodes representing 
hypotheses, arcs representing direct dependency relationships among hypotheses, and 
conditional probabilities that encode the inferential force of the dependency relationship 
(Neapolitan, 2004). 
A BN is a natural representation of causal-influence relationships (CIRs), the type of 
direct dependency relationships built in the DBS DAPS model where CIRs are relationships 
between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect). BN was used to construct the 
DAPS model, assessing the observable evidence and make inference on the probability to 
meet the cost, schedule, performance quality, and scope goals. The evidence within the 
framework of an acquisition program includes the artifacts, technical plans, facts, data, and 
expert assessments that will tend to support or refute the hypothesis of program success. 
Evidential reasoning utilizes inference networks to build an argument of the observable 
evidence items to the hypothesis being sought (Liu, Yang, & Sii, 2002). For the case of DBS 
acquisition, the DAPS model argues for the hypothesis of program success or the 
alternative hypothesis of program failure based on the observations of evidence. 
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DAPS Bayesian Network Model 
DAPS was developed with a BN model using the Netica software tool (Netica, 2015). 
By using BN, DAPS was able to construct a complex inference network to measure the 
uncertainties in subject matter knowledge areas, assess the level of success achieved at 
knowledge checkpoints, and predict the likelihood for future program success or failure. 
The DAPS BN model contains a three-level structure, representing the three types of 
nodes/variables in the model. There are also three types of static arcs representing the 
interrelationships among the variables at a point in time, and one type of dynamic arc 
representing the temporal relationships from one point in time to another. For example, 
Figure 1 shows the DAPS model at the first knowledge checkpoint, Material Development 
Decision (MDD).  
 
 DAPS Knowledge Inference Structure 
(Tzeng & Chang, 2015) 
The knowledge checkpoint is the top-level node which cumulates all information 
about the DBS acquisition program at that decision point, assessing the likelihood of 
program success. It provides a cumulative measurement of success achieved by the 
program up to the current knowledge checkpoint and is the metric that decision makers can 
use to help decide whether the program has demonstrated enough certainty and maturity to 
move on to the next phase of the acquisition program. Knowledge checkpoints contain four 
knowledge area nodes as parent nodes: time, quality, cost, and scope knowledge areas. 
They represent the four direct measures of success which is defined in DAPS as meeting 
program time, cost, and quality goals within the program scope. There are 15 technical 
reviews and milestone reviews that align with the DBS acquisition process modeled in DAPS 
as knowledge checkpoints (Defense Acquisition University, 2003; Project Management 
Institute, Inc., 2008). Each knowledge checkpoint nodes contain two states describing the 
state of the program: “success” and “failure.” The probability of these states reflects the 
assessment of the program performance at the knowledge checkpoint.  
Knowledge areas are the second-level node that measures the certainty and maturity 
attained for that particular subject matter area of DBS acquisition at the knowledge 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 402 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
checkpoint. Knowledge areas in DAPS are derived from the nine Project Management Body 
of Knowledge (PMBOK) knowledge areas (Defense Acquisition University, 2003; Project 
Management Institute, Inc., 2008), integrated with the systems engineering elements of 
defense acquisition. It is further divided into the measurable (direct) and enabling (indirect) 
knowledge areas. Measurable knowledge areas include scope, cost, time, and quality 
subject matter areas which directly affect the measures of program success in DAPS. 
Enabling knowledge areas include general management, systems engineering, and 
procurement subject areas that do not directly affect the measure of program success, but 
however are important enabling factors that drive success.  
The dynamic arcs, starting from the knowledge area node at the prior knowledge 
checkpoint to the same knowledge area node at the posterior knowledge checkpoint, model 
the relationships of DBS acquisition through time. It represents the knowledge in a 
knowledge area at the prior checkpoint influencing the knowledge of the same knowledge 
area at the next checkpoint. DAPS uses knowledge area nodes to model the dynamic 
effects in the progression of knowledge during an acquisition project. Thus, each knowledge 
area node gains information from the observations at the current knowledge checkpoint, as 
well as the information cumulated from prior knowledge checkpoints. Figure 2 provides an 
example graph of the dynamic arcs in green arrows from the Material Development Decision 
knowledge checkpoint to the next Initial Technical Review knowledge checkpoint. 
 
 Knowledge Area to Knowledge Area Dynamic Arcs Example (Tzeng & 
Chang, 2015) 
The third and bottom-level nodes are the evidence nodes in the DAPS model. 
Observations of evidence are entered here at this level to drive inference for assessing a 
program’s probability of success. The only CIRs for this level are the arcs from knowledge 
area nodes to evidence nodes. Evidence nodes contain three states describing the state of 
the evidence: “outstanding,” “acceptable,” or “unacceptable.” These states reflect the risk 
assessment of the program in the specific knowledge area. Since these are the observation 
nodes, one of the states is chosen to describe the real-world observation of the evidence. 
This provides information to update the belief in the parent knowledge area. 
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The knowledge area nodes then propagate the information to combine the belief 
based on the evidence observed under the knowledge area, as well as the belief in other 
knowledge areas where there is a CIR relationship. Finally, the direct knowledge areas 
provide information to the knowledge checkpoint node to assess the belief in the knowledge 
checkpoint node states (success, failure), which completed the information flow within a 
static knowledge checkpoint. The information at the knowledge checkpoint is then passed 
on to the next knowledge checkpoint utilizing the seven knowledge area nodes through the 
dynamic arcs, where evidence node assessment observations will again be made. The 
information flow process is then repeated multiple times until the last knowledge checkpoint, 
Full Operating Capability (FOC), is reached. 
Decision Theoretic Approach With Bayesian Decision Networks 
To incorporate utility and decision factors into the DAPS model, we adopt an 
Influence Diagram (ID) (also called Bayesian Decision Network [BDN]) to enhance the 
DAPS model (Yoo, 2007). A BDN is a directed acyclic graph consisting of three types of 
nodes: decision, state, and value nodes. Decision nodes represent the decisions to be made 
and their set of possible alternatives. State nodes represent uncertain variables or 
hypotheses relevant to the decision problem. Value nodes are associated with decision and 
state nodes to characterize their benefits and costs. Arcs between two nodes represent their 
probabilistic causal influence or deterministic relationship. Figure 3 shows a simple BDN to 
represent various components related to R&D investment decision-making where the 
utility/value node representing benefits (market value) of the actions.  
Within BDN, the uncertainties and dependences among the state and decision 
variables are systematically captured by its explicit graphical representation, making it ideal 
for modeling decision problems such as the one in ITDMS. A BDN is able to update (assess 
or predict) the probabilities of the states of a variable given observation (evidence) from 
other related nodes. To facilitate efficient probabilistic inference for optimal decision, a 
decision-theoretic framework is adopted to evaluate and compare the expected utility of 
each decision (Zhang & Ji, 2006). The framework provides solid theoretical foundations and 
has the capabilities of integrating evidence and knowledge in a principled manner. In the 
framework, an optimal decision is the one that maximizes the overall expected utility.  
 
 A BDN for Modeling Product Investment Decision Making Under 
Uncertainty 
Modeling and Analysis 
ITIL Model Description 
The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a well-known industry-
standard for IT and cloud services (Gray, 2006). The ITIL functions as a guide to system 
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lifecycle management of IT systems, including acquisition and operations. ITIL helps 
organizations across industries offer their services in a quality-driven and economical way. 
The ITIL standard is a set of five volumes of guidelines that largely leave the implementation 
of the process up to the organization (Clydebank Technology, 2017; Agutter, 2012). As 
shown in Figure 4, the five main components of the ITIL service lifecycle cover various other 
sub-categories, including demand management, capacity management, release 
management, incident management, event management, etc. They are meant to cover all 
areas of IT service management.  
A core component of the ITIL model is the service strategy design, transition, and 
operation (Taylor, 2011). The goal is to provide a strategy for the service lifecycle in sync 
with the customer’s business objectives as well as to manage services within its scope. The 
strategies are designed to ensure that the service is fit for purpose and fit for use in order to 
add value to the customers. There are many benefits of using ITIL, such as lower operating 
costs, increased awareness of IT infrastructure status, higher customer satisfaction, and 
better help/service desk response. Furthermore, the non-proprietary and heterogeneous 
nature of ITIL enables it to be applied in almost any organization (Gray, 2006). Because of 
these benefits, ITIL has become a standard in IT service management and is experiencing 
significant growth and awareness worldwide. 
 
 
 ITIL Components for Service Management 
(Taylor, 2011) 
ITDMS Model Specifications 
The ITIL library (Clydebank Technology, 2017; Agutter, 2012) provides a set of 
detailed practices for IT service management. In the ITIL system, the broad lifecycle phases 
serve a similar function as the review phases in the defense acquisition process Defense 
Acquisition University, 2013; DoD, 2013). It was pointed out specifically that success or 
failure of ITIL implementations is hard to define and that strong project management is a key 
to implementation (Gray, 2006). Lengthy implementation, high risk, and the need for senior 
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evaluation of progress. This problem directly involves the Systems Engineering disciplines of 
Project Assessment and Control, Decision Management and Risk Management. To help 
overcome these difficulties, we integrate the ITIL library with the DAPS model to develop 
ITDMS. 
As in DAPS, in ITDMS the knowledge checkpoints are the project success indicators 
at certain stages of the acquisition process. However, unlike the 15 stages used in DAPS, in 
ITDMS, four of the five ITIL processes make up the knowledge checkpoints (KCs) from the 
DAPS model. Specifically, the four checkpoints are as follows: 
• Service Strategy (SVC_STRAT_KC) 
• Service Design (SVC_DSGN_KC) 
• Service Transition (SVC_XSN_KC) 
• Service Operation (SVC_OPS_KC) 
These four ITIL lifecycle phases roughly correlate to the Initial Technical Review 
(ITR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Initial Operational Capability (IOC), and System 
Final Review (SFR) of the defense acquisition process in DAPS. The fifth process, Continual 
Service Improvement, does not fit into the construct of a checkpoint in that the process is 
ongoing and cyclical, representing an already fielded system and not a new 
development/deployment. This process might be addressed through a series of ongoing 
cyclical knowledge checkpoints, however, that option is not addressed herein, but could 
form an area of future work. As an aside, one might notice how the above processes closely 
align with the Systems Engineering phases of Concept Development, Production, and 
Utilization and Support. 
Although the ITIL processes are meant to cover a particular phase of IT service 
management, and the reviews mentioned above are approval points, the activities and 
measurements conducted during each of the individual ITIL processes correlate with the 
activities one would perform prior to the decision to move to the next phase of an acquisition 
cycle. As shown in Figure 4, each of the ITIL phases have a number of formal processes, 
sub-processes, procedures, tasks, and checklists that are applied by an organization to 
successfully integrate new or updated IT functions (Gray, 2006; Clydebank Technology, 
2017; Agutter, 2012; Taylor, 2011). 
In the ITDMS we use these process outputs as evidence supporting the knowledge 
areas that inform the knowledge checkpoint. As with the DAPS model, the knowledge areas 
in ITDMS represent the complex interrelationships of a successful program and organize the 
evidence of sub-processes, as well as provide input to the knowledge checkpoint. The 
seven knowledge areas are further defined into measurable (direct) knowledge areas, which 
can be considered direct and qualitative measures of success, and enabling (indirect) 
knowledge areas, which although qualitatively measurable, are considered as an enabling 
factor to success (Tzeng, 2015). Seventeen procurement subject matter experts were 
interviewed to collect the necessary data for network structure and probability specification 
for the model (Tzeng & Cheng, 2015). The subject matter experts (SME) opinions were 
converted into the conditional probability tables associated with the knowledge areas. 
The measurable (direct) knowledge areas to knowledge checkpoint are as follows: 
• Time Management—schedule plan, schedule progress, schedule performance, 
earned value schedule metrics 
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• Cost Management—cost estimate, cost expenditure, cost performance, earned 
value cost metrics 
• Scope Management–Scope of project—objectives, goals, requirements and 
specifications, work performance requirements 
• Quality Management—product performance, defects, product verification, 
validation, acceptance, product supportability, data deliverable  
Direct knowledge areas are considered directly measurable, where the effects of the 
knowledge area can be directly quantified and are considered an indicative measure of final 
project success outcome. Indirect knowledge areas are not considered directly measurable 
to project success, where the effects of the knowledge area are not easily quantifiable and 
are not commonly used as a measure of final project success outcome. 
The enabling (indirect) knowledge areas to knowledge checkpoints are as follows: 
• Procurement Management—planning and execution, contract solicitation, 
contract terms, software licensing agreements 
• Systems Engineering Management—project integration, project risk 
• General Management—staffing and human resources management, 
communication, environmental management, budgeting and funding, project 
management plan, program charter 
ITDMS Model Development 
In ITDMS the evidence nodes of the DAPS model are replaced by the process and 
sub-processes associated with each of the ITIL services. The linkages to the knowledge 
areas were determined by a review of the sub-processes and metrics associate with the 
respective ITIL process. For instance, the financial planning sub-process for service strategy 
knowledge checkpoint provides evidence of the cost knowledge area. 
The ITDMS is enhanced by adding two decision nodes and the associated 
value/utility nodes to each knowledge checkpoint. The first decision is whether to conduct a 
separate review of the program in addition to the evidence used to determine the probability 
of a success or failure of the program. If it looks like the program is going to be successful 
from the evidence, the model does not recommend a review. However, if the program 
evidence indicates that there is a possibility of failure, the program manager may decide to 
conduct an independent review. There are three types of reports that may come out of the 
review; a positive report, a negative report, or no report, where the no report is included for 
completeness. The cost and time knowledge areas provide the evidence of the type of 
report given. Since a review costs money and time, there is a value associated with the 
review and the value node “Conduct_Review_Value” accounts for this value in the model.  
The next decision required of the program manager, based on the knowledge 
checkpoint success/failure rating and the review recommendation, is whether to continue 
with the project. In this case, there are three choices: continue the project as it is, continue 
the project with modifications to the schedule or budget, or do not continue the project. The 
decision to continue the project also has a value and the “Continue_Project_Value” node of 
the mode accounts for this value. The project probability of success, the review 
recommendation, and a decision to continue the project determine the value of the 
recommendation. For example, the value table reflects this with a high value given for a 
project that has a high success rate, receives a positive review report, and is chosen to 
continue. Figure 5 shows the ITDMS at the Service Strategy knowledge check point with the 
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conduct review and continue project decision nodes. The complete DBN model is shown in 
Figure 6 where the interconnections between the phases can be seen explicitly. 
 
 ITDMS Model at the Service Strategy Knowledge Checkpoint 
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 The Complete ITDMS Model 
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Scenarios and Case Study 
We developed several scenarios to demonstrate the functionality of the ITDMS 
model. For example, in a scenario where a company has chosen to significantly upgrade 
their existing IT systems and will use ITIL as a guiding principle. Although the company can 
choose which sup-processes they want to use, for completeness in demonstration we will 
assume that the company will use all sub-processes associated with each ITIL phase. In 
setting up the BN for their acquisition project, the leadership of the company has assigned 
subjective utility values for their decision nodes. For example, Figure 7 shows the values 
assigned for the decision of whether to conduct an additional review of the program in the 
Service Strategy phase. Due to the time and cost associated with a review, there is a 
positive value assigned to a successful program not requiring a review. Likewise, a review is 
most important when a program that is in threat of failure, so the managers also assigned a 
high value for a conducting a review of a failing program. Conversely, a negative value is 
assigned to the case where a review would not be conducted for a failing program. Finally, 
conducting a review of a successful program will not necessarily be good or bad, so a 
neutral value (0) is assigned to that choice.  
Similar reasoning is followed for the decision whether to continue with the program 
given the probability of program success and the results of a review if one were conducted. 
Because there are two inputs to this decision (knowledge checkpoint and review results) the 
set of values is much more complex. In summary, most value is associated with continuing a 
successful project and terminating a program in trouble. Relatively high value is assigned to 
continuing a program with some modifications, such as extra resources or timeline changes 
if a positive review is received on a failing program. An example of the assigned values is 
shown in Figure 8.  
 
 Values Assigned to Decision Value Node for Program Review 
Let’s suppose that after completing some initial work developing their Service 
Strategy, the program manager conducts a review of progress to date. In our scenario the 
program has a mixture of two outstanding, seven acceptable, and three unacceptable sub-
processes. Since a majority of the sub-processes are satisfactory or better, all the 
knowledge areas show a high probability of “Good” progress and the model predicts the 
program has a 70% probability of success (see Figure 9). Due to this high chance of a 
successful program, the model places a higher value (1,351 vs. 1,221) on not conducting a 
program review. Let’s say that the decision maker follows the model’s advice and decides 
not to conduct a further review and that option is chosen in the model. The result is that the 
model then places a higher value on continuing the project (Yes: ~1,200; No: ~900; Yes, 
with modification: ~1,100; see Figure 10). It should be noted that there is no reason that the 
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program status be accessed only once during the phase. The program manager can use 
this assessment periodically or as situations warrant throughout the program. 
 
 
 Values Assigned to Continuing Project Value Node 
With the assumption that the decision maker has chosen to continue the project and 
we have proceeded to the Service Design Phase. A few months into this phase, the project 
manager again calls for another program assessment. However, here we find that things in 
our scenario are not going as well. Let’s say here that the program has taken a turn for the 
worse and now several sub-processes in the Service Design Phase have unacceptable 
ratings (2 outstanding, 8 acceptable, 4 unacceptable) as shown in Figure 11. Many of the 
knowledge areas are now “Marginal” and this has pushed the probability of program 
success down to 43%. The model now places more value in conducting an in-depth review 
(~750 vs. ~650 in favor of review). If the program manager follows this recommendation and 
chooses to conduct the review, we find that there is a 66% probability the review will be 
negative. 
Finally, let’s assume the review is conducted, but shows that, with some changes to 
the program funding, it will be successful. We’ll consider this a positive review 
recommendation and the model recommends continuing the project with modifications. The 
decision maker chooses to provide additional funding to the project and thus continue the 
project with modifications (see Figure 12). These modifications could include schedule 
changes, budget adjustments, or personnel changes as the program manager and decision 
makers see fit. On the contrary, if the review did come back negative, the Continue Project 
decision node would reflect more value to ending the program. Again, the program manager 
can opt to proceed to the next phase, Program Transition, or remain in the Design Phase 
and conduct another program assessment after changes are made. 
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 Service Strategy Scenario 
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 Service Strategy Scenario Without Program Review 
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 . ITDMS Service Design Phase With a Failing Program 
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 Service Design Phase Recommendation Given a Satisfactory Review of 
a Failing Project 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
This research developed a potentially useful model/tool to help the systems 
engineering and IT acquisition professional. Specifically, a quantitative probabilistic 
reasoning system using BDN to model nonlinear and dynamic relationship within IT 
acquisition process was developed to gauge program performance and suggest necessary 
actions. The resulting ITDMS model demonstrates the ability to provide IT managers and 
decision makers an analytical tool to assess the probability of success with the 
recommended actions at various points of the project.  
The contributions of this research effort include (1) development of a quantitative 
system to aid decision makers holistically process the available IT acquisition program data 
and evidence, providing key project success measurement in each of the management 
areas, and a measurement of success at a review milestone (the knowledge checkpoint); 
and (2) prediction of future project success with recommended actions through a dynamic 
Bayesian decision network. The advantage of this approach is its attempt to put the 
complexity of the ITIL process into a simple model. It is well known, however, that when one 
is trying to encode a complex problem like the large and highly interconnected one in this 
study with a simplified model such as a dynamic Bayesian Network, one encounters the 
trade-off between computational complexity and accuracy.  
Future work on the model would be to measure the model with a real-world example 
of a company or organization using ITIL in their IT service acquisition to determine if it 
provided correct recommendations. Additionally, a user-friendly interface could be added to 
the model to enable personnel who are unfamiliar with the Bayesian Network model to input 
data and receive easily interpreted outputs. Finally, the model is organized for managing an 
IT system using the ITIL structure from ground-zero to full service implementation. Not all IT 
acquisitions require the complete ITIL structure and a decision maker may only need to use 
a few phases of the structure. Therefore, it would be useful to provide a model that is 
adaptable to the user needs. 
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Abstract 
Lead Systems Integration (LSI) is an acquisition strategy that employs a series of 
methods, practices, and principles to increase the span of both management and 
engineering acquisition authority and control to acquire a System of Systems (SoS) or highly 
complex systems. LSI is effectively a “marriage” of program management and multiple 
functional disciplines which must work together cooperatively to assert and execute trade 
space in the SoS given multiple constituent system acquisitions. To successfully plan, 
develop, and manage an SoS, a comprehensive development, acquisition, and 
implementation strategy is required. Our previous research defined the LSI Enterprise 
Framework as a means to engineer and manage the capabilities and interdependencies of 
an SoS, that can be executed by the government LSI, across multiple systems, programs, 
and stakeholder levels. This paper highlights the results from our Fiscal Year 2018 
Acquisition Research Program effort. It discusses the integration of the LSI with other 
processes, used by Navy System Commands (SYSCOMs), to engineer and manage SoS, 
and provides a blueprint for a more complete governance approach.  
Introduction 
We need … to seek creative solutions to today’s and tomorrow’s complex 
problems. … We need to change where it makes sense, adapt as quickly 
as possible, and constantly innovate to stay ahead of our adversaries. Our 
ability to adapt more quickly than our enemies will be vital to our future 
success. —General R.B. Neller, USMC (2016) 
To stay ahead of our adversaries, the military must improve the capability of its 
systems. These systems are becoming increasingly complex, and so has the effort to 
develop them. To achieve the improved capabilities, gaps/shortfalls in systems are being 
filled by integrating them with other systems that possess the required capability. Some of 
these systems are legacy systems, some are new systems, and some are systems still 
under development. Furthermore, these systems do not just need to be integrated, they 
need to be interoperable. They need to speak the same language, use the same units, and 
if more than one system can sense the same things, they need to determine which data is 
more accurate. 
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In the early 2000s, a few high visibility government projects were failing. They were 
strongly criticized because of cost and schedule overruns, and apparent conflicts of interest. 
There were multiple contributing factors in these failures: SE practices were not adequate to 
define and manage these complex programs, they were producing unprecedented System 
of Systems (SoS) with constituent systems that were in various levels of development, and 
government procurement policies changed in the 1990s. Additionally, the government did 
not have the necessary visibility into these projects to foresee impending problems because 
contractors were performing the design and integration work. These contracted systems 
integrators often re-allocated resources or funding between disparate programs/program 
offices or even chose which programs (or contractors) would be used. This led to numerous 
potential conflicts of interest as well as a loss of control and oversight by the government. 
The acquisition and management of mission capabilities across the SoS lifecycle 
require the complex integration of interdependent new and legacy systems from the lowest 
component level to the highest enterprise level. The challenge of integrating these disparate 
constituent systems into an SoS is that they are developed and procured asynchronously, 
usually by different program offices, and often across different enterprises.  
Heretofore, Navy System Commands (SYSCOMs) have been using different 
approaches to address SoS issues. The two most prevelant approaches are Lead Systems 
Integration (LSI) and Navy Integration and Interoperability (I&I). LSI is an acquisition 
strategy that employs a series of methods, practices, and principles to increase the span of 
both management and engineering acquisition authority and control to acquire an SoS or 
highly complex systems. The Navy I&I provides an SoS and governance process to identify 
gaps in Naval missions and to develop and coordinate solutions across system boundaries. 
Navy I&I provides a more detailed strategy than LSI, but is focused primarily on the early 
phases of the SoS lifecycle. LSI is more broadly defined, but lacks the details sufficient for 
an implementation strategy that can be used across the SoS lifecycle. Each of these 
processes provide clarity to a portion of the challenges faced by government personnel 
conducting complex SoS integration. However, none stands alone as a prescriptive 
document to enable the full spectrum of activities required to engineer and manage an SoS. 
Both LSI and Navy I&I have a common foundation: the System of Systems 
Engineering and Integration (SoSE&I) “Vee.” The SoSE&I “Vee” provides a model of the 
high-level activities that need to be performed in engineering and management throughout 
the SoS lifecycle, but fails to provide implementation guidance, and equally important, it 
doesn’t suggest who performs these activities. Neither LSI or Navy I&I address the full 
spectrum of the problem. However, LSI provides the broadest framework to address the 
SoSE&I “Vee.” Given that the LSI Enterprise Framework offers the broadest perspective, 
further defining and enhancing, LSI activities using the SoSE&I “Vee” as the foundation, was 
used as the premise of this research. 
This paper highlights the results from our Fiscal Year 2018 Acquisition Research 
Program effort. It discusses the integration of the LSI and I&I processes with the SoSE&I 
“Vee,” and establishes the foundation that provides a blueprint for a more complete SoS 
governance approach. The revised process model includes inputs, outputs, and guiding 
principles of each phase to yield an implementable solution that can be employed 
throughout the SoS lifecycle. 
Existing System of Systems Processes 
This research considered the two previously mentioned strategies in relation to the 
SoSE&I “Vee” to address the Navy’s overall problem with LSI. Systems and SoS are 
becoming more complex, and emerging threats are proving themselves to be more 
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pressing. As a result, a critical need for integrated and interconnected systems has 
emerged. The implementation of SoSE&I using LSI techniques must be developed to 
adequately influence the ever-increasing complexity of the national defense enterprise. 
System of Systems Engineering and Integration “Vee” 
Essential to the understanding of this research is an understanding of the SoSE&I 
“Vee.” An SoS is "a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and task-
oriented systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities" 
(Vaneman & Budka, 2013, p. 2). Further defining an SoS is the attribute where the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology), Systems and Software Engineering [ODUSD(A&T)SSE], 
2008). SoSE&I incorporates the basic tenants of SE within the SoS framework and results in 
"planning, analyzing, organizing, and integrating the capabilities of a mix of existing and new 
constituent systems into an SoS capability greater than the sum of the capabilities of the 
constituent systems" (Vaneman, 2016). SoSE&I thus becomes the framework of choice for 
solving tomorrow’s problems as they relate to pressing and emerging threats to the United 
States. The SoS approach to national defense provides the structure to develop new 
capabilities through the integration of new and constituent systems. A common foundation 
for delivering these complex systems is captured in the SoSE&I “Vee,” which has built upon 
the traditional SE “Vee.” 
The SoSE&I “Vee” is depicted in Figure 1 (Vaneman, 2016). This high-level depiction 
of the SoSE&I “Vee” provides useful context in using the overall SoS architecture for 
performing top-down engineering (as in traditional SE) and performing bottom-up verification 
and validation. 
The SoSE&I “Vee” begins at the upper-left side with SoS Architecture & 
Requirements Development. In this phase, the user needs are defined and transformed into 
technical requirements that can be executed by the system program office (Vaneman, 
2016). The purpose of Architecture and Requirements Development is not only to 
understand the overall mission needs and establish the boundary of the SoS of interest, but 
also to uncover the requirements for the individual constituent systems needed to achieve 
the mission capabilities, their respective interfaces, and to manage and implement SoSE&I 
processes. It is equally important to develop a comprehensive plan to align systems that are 
meant to work together for mission success, provide a foundation from which resources can 
be prioritized to maximize user needs and budget issues, and establish an overarching 
requirements baseline to improve integration and interoperability across the SoS (Vaneman, 
2017). 
The bottom of the SoSE&I “Vee” represents the systems engineering activities that 
are performed by the program offices of the constituent systems. Several individual system 
SE “Vees” are depicted to illustrate that many constituent systems are developed and 
managed concurrently, with each system at different maturity levels within its own lifecycle. 
In this phase, the focus is on the development, sustainment, and management of individual 
systems (Vaneman, 2016). 
The upper-right side of the SoSE&I “Vee” represents the SoS Mission Assurance 
activities. Mission Assurance is defined as “the part of systems engineering and integration 
activities which, by means of a combination of design validation, product verification, and 
systems test, provides the systems engineers, design team, and customer with a high 
degree of confidence in the successful execution of the required system functions” (Guarro, 
2007, p. 14). More plainly, as one moves along the right side of the SoSE&I “Vee,” the 
Mission Assurance process ensures SoS success is documented in the context of mission 
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success from the integration of systems to the operations and sustainment of the SoS. If 
individual systems meet their individual requirements but SoS interoperability and 
certification are not achieved, a reassessment of the requirements that were flowed down to 
the constituent systems is required to be performed in order to ensure individual capabilities 
combine to provide a more useful SoS capability. Similarly, if the SoS performs adequately 
but is unsupportable or unsustainable, its requirements will need to be reassessed. Another 
critical step in this process is the integration of the SoS’s constituent systems. 
 
 
 The SoSE&I “Vee” 
 
The final component of the SoSE&I “Vee” is SoS Governance and Management. 
While not formally described as a process, Governance and Management is a cornerstone 
of an effective SoS and is comprised of the set of rules, policies, and decision-making 
criteria that will guide the SoS team to achieve its goals and objectives (Vaneman, 2016). As 
the complexity of modern SoS increases, the multitude of technical and managerial activities 
involved become more entangled. As a result, a strong SoS governance and management 
approach is imperative to address complex emergent issues and those directly related to the 
triple constraint of cost, schedule, and performance.  
The Lead Systems Integration Enterprise Framework 
As stated earlier, Lead Systems Integration is an acquisition strategy that employs a 
series of methods, practices, and principles to increase the span of both management and 
engineering acquisition authority and control to acquire an SoS or highly complex systems. 
The LSI function is to assert and execute SoS and stakeholder trade space to affordably 
optimize integrated mission capabilities across the SoS lifecycle (NPS LSI Cohort #1, 2014). 
The roles of the LSI are similar to the roles of any systems engineer or system integrator 
within a program office. The primary difference is the span of LSI design and integration 
authority that persists throughout the SoS lifecycle (Vaneman & Carlson, 2017). 
The LSI Enterprise Framework defines a means to engineer and manage the 
capabilities and interdependencies of an SoS that can be executed by the government LSI, 
across multiple systems, programs, and stakeholder levels. The LSI Enterprise Framework 
(hereafter known as the LSI Framework) captures the complex, interdependent, and mission 
capability areas through four enterprise levels to characterize the systems from the 
enterprise to the component level (NPS LSI Cohort #2, 2015; Vaneman & Carlson, 2017). 
Figure 2 (NPS LSI Cohort #2, 2015) depicts the LSI Enterprise Framework. This framework 
allows for the alignment of key LSI activities across the enterprise by aligning appropriate 
touchpoints to the various LSI levels and tasks. 
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The foundation of the LSI Framework are the four LSI levels. The Enterprise Level is 
the top layer of the LSI Framework that consists of a variety of stakeholders, from one or 
many organizations that represent the complex, socio-technical systems that comprises 
interdependent resources of people, information, and systems that must interact with each 
other and their environments to achieve mission success (Giachetti, 2010). It is at this level 
where the capabilities required to achieve enterprise mission success are defined, 
decomposed into mission capabilities, and allocated to the SoS level to be satisfied as 
mission capabilities (Vaneman & Carlson, 2018). While the majority of the LSI engineering 
and management activities occur below the enterprise level, this level is important because 
this is where organizational, policy, and resource decisions are made for the LSI (Vaneman 
& Carlson, 2018). 
 
  Lead System Integration Enterprise Framework 
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The Mission Wholeness Level is where a collection of supporting constituent 
systems and programs are brought together to support end-to-end capability effectiveness 
for the designated mission areas. Accomplishing a mission that cannot be satisfied by a 
single system alone has always been an SoS endeavor, but integrating the multiple systems 
together has frequently been left to small communities consisting of a few systems or the 
operators themselves (Department of the Navy, 2013). Many LSI governing efforts, at the 
System of Systems Level, involve a collaborative partnership of multiple program offices, 
versus a more directive effort that may occur at lower program levels (NPS LSI Cohort #1, 
2015). Individual capabilities and functions are allocated to constituent systems for 
implementation (Vaneman & Carlson, 2018). 
The System Level is where a combination of functionally related physical elements 
are integrated into a usable, system to achieve the system capability. In this level, the 
emphasis is on traditional systems engineering and development activities. However, two 
significant roles are important to the LSI. First, the LSI must ensure that the SoS level 
organization has sufficient insight into the individual programs within the SoS to understand 
the functionality and interoperability that will result from the engineering and design effort. 
Second, the LSI must ensure a strong governance model is in place that provides the 
technical authority to govern system baselines so that the system delivered for integration 
into an SoS meets the requirements that were allocated to it (Vaneman, 2016). In addition to 
the LSI’s role in ensuring system integration to an SoS, an LSI may be used for the 
engineering and development of a complex system, where the system is composed of major 
sub-systems, and a large number of interacting components (Vaneman & Carlson, 2018). 
The lowest level of the LSI Framework is the subsystem/component level. This level 
consists of the allocated sub-systems and components that by themselves may, or may not, 
provide a usable standalone end product. These are the lowest level building blocks 
required for any LSI effort and may be managed by a team in a larger program office, or 
may be managed separately by sub-system program offices (NPS LSI Cohort #2, 2015; 
Vaneman & Carlson, 2018). 
Given the breadth of an SoS acquisition effort and recognizing that an LSI’s 
resources to manage an effort are limited, an LSI must be able to efficiently focus on the 
highest payoff “touchpoints” of control or influence to assert and execute trade space—
aligned across the enterprise—to enable organizational agility. Although previous research 
has discussed inherently governmental functions for an LSI at a high level, there has been 
unclear specific applicability to current program processes and organizations—and some 
definitions also did not fully account for multidisciplinary functions that extend beyond 
systems engineering (NPS LSI Cohort #2, 2015; Vaneman & Carlson, 2017). 
The LSI Framework defines 12 key touchpoints (shown in Figure 2) that apply across 
all domains as the essential “high payoff” functions and activities. These LSI touchpoints are 
the functions that assert and execute SoS, complex system, and stakeholder trade space to 
affordably optimize integrated war fighting capabilities across the system of systems 
lifecycle. These touchpoints do not necessarily define new processes, but do identify how 
existing processes can be enhanced and used more efficiently (NPS LSI Cohort #2, 2015). 
For a detailed discussion of the LSI touchpoint see Vaneman and Carlson (2017). 
Universal enabling resources—staffing and workforce development, policies, 
resource management, and the authoritative data context—are those resources that support 
LSI-unique execution at any of the touchpoints to assert and execute the trade space. 
These four enabling resources and inter-related enablers apply at all levels in the LSI 
Enterprise Framework, and are outside the responsibilities of the typical program offices. 
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However, the LSI must be aware of these activities, and navigate within them (Carlson & 
Vaneman, 2018). 
Finally, governance empowers decisions across the enterprise by providing a set of 
decision-making criteria, policies, processes, and actions that guide the stakeholder 
architecture to achieve the enterprise goals and objectives (Vaneman & Carlson, 2018). 
Navy Integration and Interoperability 
Navy Integration and Interoperability (I&I) provides SoS and governance processes 
to identify gaps in naval missions, and to develop and coordinate solutions across system 
boundaries. To identify the mission gaps, system interaction and behaviors are derived from 
an enterprise view of naval operational environments and mission objectives (Department of 
the Navy, 2016). Navy I&I is an important concept to this LSI research because I&I provides 
detailed processes in the SoS Architecture and Requirements phase of the SoSE&I “Vee” 
whereas the LSI Framework provides a general overview of the needed processes. These 
processes together largely focus on the Mission Engineering “Vee,” which is very similar to 
the SoSE&I “Vee,” and they can easily be extrapolated to SoSE&I. This Integrated 
Capability Framework (ICF) is shown in Figure 3 (Vaneman & Carlson, 2018). 
 
 Integrated Capability Framework Use Cases Applied to the SoSE&I 
“Vee” 
The I&I process begins with a Warfare Capability Baseline (WCB) assessment which 
“uses the concept of a kill chain to organize, or model, the functions performed in the 
execution of a mission” (Department of the Navy, 2016, p. 12). The goal of the I&I process is 
to accomplish four distinct tasks: (i) address materiel gaps identified by the WCB; (ii) build 
mission-based architectures as a basis for system acquisition; (iii) use I&I decisions as a 
driver to SE reviews and gate processes; and (iv) share mission related information across 
Systems Commands (SYSCOMs). 
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As it relates to the SoSE&I “Vee,” the first step in the I&I process is the definition of 
the mission needs and requirements. The significance of this important first step is that it 
establishes the needs for system development of the constituent systems within the SoS. 
The mission needs and requirements serve as the primary input to the SoS Architecture and 
Requirements Development portion of the SoSE&I “Vee,” and provide a constant reference 
for technological progress checks.  
Following Mission Definition, I&I establishes the SoS interfaces involved based on 
the required mission parameters, requirements, and capabilities. This accounts for 
organizational relationships and helps to define SoS capabilities and needs. The common 
framework provided by I&I seeks to “facilitate enterprise level engineering across the 
SYSCOMs and enables efficient system integration and effective force interoperability” 
(Department of the Navy, 2016, p. 5). This helps lay the ground work needed for individual 
system design and development. 
As can be seen in the ICF, the I&I process is intended to support the warfighter 
through a mission-based focus on SE, support to the acquisition process by identifying 
consistent requirements for the SoS early in the process and assisting with analysis efforts 
through a common I&I repository. Though the I&I process is intended to span the Mission 
Engineering “Vee” (or SoSE&I “Vee”), it is largely focused on requirements and interface 
definition and does not provide much SoSE&I detail. As such, the process does not stand on 
its own.  
Use of the ICF enables consistent and more complete definition of Naval warfighter 
needs, and ensures that all stakeholders from initial concept to test and training understand 
what the definition of success is for any new or upgraded system. Additionally, training and 
testing efforts can use the same missions defined in the front end to perform the operational 
tests and training exercises, ensuring that the systems and sailors are tested and trained in 
accordance with planned missions. Use of Fleet-defined operational requirements, captured 
through ICF Mission Models, helps system and platform requirement definition and design, 
providing a validated and complete mission context including planned operational use during 
system development. The mission definition also provides system and platform owners with 
a thorough set of interoperability requirements and ensures existing capabilities are not 
duplicated. Finally, when completed with operational and system/platform measures tied to 
mission desired effects, the ICF enables analysis of I&I issues and mission gaps, and the 
tracking of closure for each one within the SoS (Department of the Navy, 2016). 
The Evolution of the LSI Enterprise Framework 
Evolving the LSI Enterprise Framework From the SoSE&I “Vee” Model 
Lead Systems Integration, and Navy I&I, have emerged as the leading strategies to 
address SoS issues within the Navy. While each strategy offers insights and partial solutions 
to the challenges posed by the SoS engineering and acquisition environment, neither 
addresses the problem that spans the entire SoS lifecycle. One of the goals of this research 
is to expand the LSI concept by defining an implementation strategy that can be used the 
across the SoS lifecycle phases and organizational boundaries (Carlson & Vaneman, 2018). 
As previoulsy stated, the SoSE&I “Vee” can be used as the common denominator or 
foundation between LSI and Navy I&I. The LSI Framework represents the process, at a high 
level, so it can be used to better understand, engineer, and manage the SoS. However, it 
does not provide the necessary detail for operational use. Navy I&I discusses portions of the 
SoSE&I “Vee,” in more detail than is offered by the LSI Framework, and could be used to 
better define the SoS. However, Navy I&I is mostly concerned with the SoS Architecture and 
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Requirements Development Phase of the SoSE&I “Vee.” Essentially, LSI provides the 
breadth across the SoSE&I phases, while Navy I&I captures the depth of one of those 
phases. 
The four top level functions of the SoSE&I “Vee” are shown in Figure 1. These four 
functions can be decomposed further to provide additional, actionable detail. The SoSE&I 
“Vee” model does not include the inputs and outputs for each function, the rules and policies 
governing the activities, or the skills needed to perform those activities. These elements are 
needed to fully develop an LSI implementation strategy. 
To better understand the SoSE&I functions, each were analyzed for inputs, outputs, 
controls, and position descriptions. Using the Integrated Definition Function Model (IDEF0), 
the SoSE&I functions can be expanded to incorporate both the LSI and Navy I&I processes. 
Figure 4 shows a generic depiction of the IDEF0 model. The functional activities (shown in 
the box) are represented by the SoSE&I functional activities. The inputs (entering from the 
left) and outputs (exiting from the right) are represented by the inputs to, and outputs from, 
each SoSE&I functional activity. The controls (entering from the top) are represented by 
acquisition policies, the LSI touchpoints, and guidance elements defined in the Navy I&I ICF. 
The mechanisms (entering from the bottom) represent the SoS acquisition position 
descriptions (knowledge, skills, and abilities) needed to perform the functional activities 
(Carlson & Vaneman, 2018). 
 
 SoSE&I IDEF0 (Level 0) Model 
Using the IDEF0 construct, the Navy I&I and LSI processes were analyzed to 
determine how they may further govern the SoSE&I functions. Figure 5 (Carlson & 
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Vaneman, 2018) shows the SoSE&I “Vee” as an IDEF0 model. The model illustrates the 
interdependencies throughout the entire process flow from initial requirements through 
support of the fielded systems. The correlation between the LSI and I&I processes, 
embedded on the SoSE&I “Vee,” provides the blueprint for a more complete SoS 
governance approach with a more executable set of guidelines and should result in an 
enhanced mission-based SoS development and LSI management effort. 
 
 
 Expanding the SoSE&I “Vee” to an IDEF0 Model 
Carlson and Vaneman (2018) further define each of the SoSE&I functions, into 
subsequent IDEF0 views, to the next level of decomposition. The basis of this further 
defintion is the decomposed SoSE&I “Vee” model (Vaneman & Budka, 2013; Vaneman, 
2016). The entire decomposition of the SoSE&I “Vee,” and subsequesnt development of the 
corresponding IDEF0 views is beyond the scope of this paper. 
For illustration purposes, the decomposition of the SoS Architecture and 
Requirements Development function is discussed next. (The interested reader can find 
details of these decomposed SoSE&I functions in Vaneman and Budka, 2013; Vaneman, 
2016; and Carlson and Vaneman, 2018.) 
SoS Architecture and Requirements Development 
The SoSE&I “Vee” begins at the upper-left side with SoS Architecture & 
Requirements Development. In this phase the user needs are defined, and then transformed 
into technical requirements that can be executed by the system program office (Vaneman, 
2016). The purpose of Architecture and Requirements Development is not only to 
understand the overall mission needs, and establish the boundary of the SoS of interest, but 
also to uncover the requirements for the individual constituent systems needed to achieve 
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the mission capabilities, their respective interfaces, and to manage and implement SoSE&I 
processes. It is equally important to develop a comprehensive plan to align systems that are 
meant to work together for mission success, provide a foundation from which resources can 
be prioritized to maximize user needs and budget issues, and establish an overarching 
requirements baseline to improve integration and interoperability across the SoS (Vaneman, 
2017). 
The decomposition of the SoS Architecture and Requirements Development stage, 
as depicted in Figure 6 (Vaneman & Carslon, 2018), relies heavily on existing I&I and LSI 
processes to provide the guiding principles, or controls. When depicted in this fashion it is 
clear that neither the existing I&I processes nor LSI Touchpoints covered the entirety of this 
phase. However, once combined, a more complete process begins to emerge. 
 
 
 SoS Architecture and Requirements Development Phase 
Conclusion 
Lead Systems Integration seeks to reduce risk in the affordable optimization of 
integrated warfighting capability acquisition efforts across the SoS lifecycle, and to increase 
the speed of capability delivery to the warfighter. It can be executed within existing 
organizations via enhancements to legacy processes, methods, and practices if the 
workforce is trained and motivated to think and act differently. The LSI Enterprise 
Framework provides an effective set of tools, resources, and concepts to help incrementally 
incentivize this cultural evolution. 
To achieve this goal, the Navy should increase systems engineering and SoSE&I 
technical and management depth and breadth across the workforce by hiring professionals 
trained in advanced systems engineering concepts. Additionally, the adoption of a directed 
universal approach to SoS management, such as that presented in this report, should be 
implemented across the Navy Enterprise in order for LSI to be truly successful. Not only are 
well-trained personnel required to ensure success, but top-down directed guidance that is 
common to all Naval Systems Commands for LSI in SoS will enable this approach. 
Additionally, a directed universal approach to SoS management, such as that 
presented in this report, should be implemented and enforced across the Navy Enterprise in 
order for LSI to be truly successful. Not only are well-trained personnel required to ensure 
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success, but top-down directed guidance that is common to all naval SYSCOMs for LSI in 
SoS will enable this approach. 
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Abstract 
Digital engineering changes how systems are acquired and developed through the 
use of model-centric practices and toolsets. Enterprises face new challenges in this 
transformation, including potential for emergent vulnerabilities within digital engineering 
environments. While vulnerability analysis of products and systems is standard practice, 
examining vulnerabilities within the enterprise itself is less common. This research is 
responsive to the imperatives of the newly released DoD Digital Engineering Strategy that 
calls for enterprises to mitigate cyber risks and secure digital engineering environments 
against attacks from internal and external threats, mitigate known vulnerabilities that 
present high risk to DoD networks and data, and to mitigate risk posed by collaboration 
and access to vast amount of information in models. This paper presents progress on the 
ongoing research that focuses on uncovering cascading vulnerabilities as related to digital 
engineering practice and supporting environments, with special focus on cybersecurity-
related vulnerabilities. The approach uses Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) as a mechanism 
for better enabling program leaders to anticipate and respond to vulnerabilities within the 
enterprise. The current investigation is examining enterprise-level vulnerabilities and 
investigating potential interventions. 
Introduction 
Vulnerability assessment of products and systems has been actively investigated in 
recent years, resulting in a family of useful techniques now commonly accepted as good 
practice (LeSaint, Reed, & Popick, 2015). The assessment of vulnerabilities within the 
enterprises performing engineering has received relatively little attention. While many of the 
existing techniques for systems vulnerability assessment will still be useful, some adaptation 
and additional techniques are necessary. The urgency of investigating this has increased as 
a result of digital engineering transformation as it changes how systems are acquired and 
developed through the use of model-centric engineering practices and new types of 
environments within the enterprise.  
Ongoing research has investigated the use of Cause-Effect Mapping as a 
mechanism for better enabling program leaders to anticipate and respond to vulnerabilities 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 431 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
as related to model-centric enterprises and their enabling environments (Mekdeci et al., 
2012; Rovito & Rhodes, 2016; Reid & Rhodes, 2018b). A Reference Cause-Effect Map 
(CEM) for model-centric enterprises resulting from the work to date shows promise for 
considering the cascading vulnerabilities and potential intervention options. In the continuing 
investigation, the Reference CEM and other analytic techniques are being further developed 
and evaluated. Intervention approaches are being identified and mapped to cascading 
vulnerability chains, providing options for mitigation. 
Background 
Background is provided in the following subsections to characterize digital 
engineering and model-centric enterprises. Prior research papers (Reid & Rhodes, 2018a, 
2018b) provide additional background information. 
Digital Engineering (Model-Centric Engineering) 
Digital engineering (sometimes referred to as model-centric engineering) involves 
using integrated models across disciplines, subsystems, lifecycle stages, and analyst 
groups. It uses models as “authoritative source of truth,” to reduce document handoff and 
allow for more continuous evaluation. By collaborating through models, there is reduced 
communication time and rework in response to requirement changes. Most discussions to 
date focus on engineering practices and methods to overcome implementation difficulties. In 
any system, however, non-technical factors (human factors, business, and organizational) 
influence engineering effectiveness and model-centric decisions (Reid & Rhodes, 2017; 
German & Rhodes, 2017).  
Current program leaders have significant experience with processes for acquiring 
and developing systems, and use this experience to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities. 
Limited experience exists with digital engineering practice and model-centric supporting 
environments, however. This situation, coupled with the increased model integration and 
model longevity, means that emergent uncertainties (policy change, budget cuts, disruptive 
technologies, threats, changing demographics, etc.) and related programmatic decisions 
(e.g., staff cuts, reduced training hours) may lead to cascading vulnerabilities within digital 
engineering enterprises, potentially jeopardizing program success. New practices and 
enablers are needed to assist program leaders in identifying vulnerabilities within the digital 
engineering environment, and to determine where interventions can most effectively be 
taken. 
Model-Centric Environments 
Model-centric environments have many elements, including computing infrastructure, 
networks, software tools, models, data sets, data storage, and human actors. These 
environments may come under attack from internal and/or external threats. Some of these 
elements exist in traditional engineering, but some are new or changed under digital 
engineering practice (Reid & Rhodes, 2016). New modes of collaboration through models 
and data are emerging. The quantity of and types of models, digital artifacts, and data has 
greatly increased. Collaboration between the many enterprises involved through digital 
engineering (government agencies, contractors, suppliers, etc.) results in significant 
increases in data flowing across networks. As new toolsets are introduced into enterprise, 
there are potential risks related to how proficient the workforce is in using these tools and 
whether there are sufficient controls in place in the management of the digital artifacts 
produced, as well as the overall supporting infrastructure. The DoD Digital Engineering 
Strategy (2018) calls for the mitigation of these risks and vulnerabilities (Figure 1).  
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  DoD Digital Engineering Strategy Calls for Mitigation of Risks and 
Vulnerabilities 
(DoD, 2018) 
Vulnerabilities as Causal Chains 
Vulnerabilities are effectively expressed as the causal series of events connecting a 
hazard to the system and/or failure that results. Cause-Effect Mapping is a vulnerability 
assessment approach that consists of a mapping of causal chains that connect an 
exogenous hazard to a system degradation or failure, termed a terminal event (Mekdeci et 
al., 2012). Terminal events are broadly defined and include any form of value loss. A casual 
chain can be defined as a series of events, with each event causing or being an integral part 
of the cause, or the next link in the chain. A hazard (spontaneous event) is a system or 
environmental state that has the potential to disrupt the system. A vulnerability is defined as 
causal means by which one or more hazards results in the system disruption/value loss. 
Accordingly, a vulnerability chain is defined as a conceptualization and representation of 
vulnerability as a causal chain, emphasizing that vulnerabilities are not discrete events. 
Vignette 
Figure 2 shows a very simple example of a vulnerability chain, where an external 
trigger disrupts effectiveness of engineering activities, as triggered by increased cost of the 
commercial software used by the enterprise. This is illustrative of how a rather simple 
external change may cascade into interim impacts, and ultimately lead to a failure later in 
the program. 
 
 Example Vulnerability Chain With Intervention Point (in Blue) 
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Describing this as a vignette, the vulnerability is as follows: 
A particular piece of simulation software that your company has used on 
similar projects in the past is licensed from commercial software vendor. 
The license contract is up for renewal soon and the price goes up 
significantly. This could result in the preferred modeling software being 
unavailable for use in this program leading to the selection of an alternate 
software tool that the team has less (or no) experience with. Due to this 
lack of experience with the new software, assumptions underlying the 
model may be misunderstood by analysts and thus inaccurate simulation 
results are generated. This may not be noticed until either verification or 
validation when the system or subsystem does not behave according to the 
predicted performance levels. 
One identified intervention point is shown in the blue box in Figure 2. Executing this 
intervention would require that program leadership recognizes when the external trigger is 
imminent or occurring and act quickly to avoid loss of modeling capability. Alternately, there 
may be other points of intervention along the chain. While this analysis is quite simple, more 
sophisticated applications of graph theory and probabilistic modeling can be conducted 
using a well-developed Reference CEM. For instance, if probabilities, likelihoods, or time 
scales of each event transition are known, techniques such as Markov Chain Modeling, 
Monte Carlo Analysis, and Bayesian Networks can be brought to bear, weighting each arc of 
the graph instead of treating them equally (Reid, 2018). 
Cause-Effect Mapping 
Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) has been demonstrated as a useful approach to 
vulnerability analysis for systems, programs and enterprises (Mekdeci et al., 2012; Rovito & 
Rhodes, 2016; Reid & Rhodes, 2018a, 2018b). An example CEM for a supply chain case 
vulnerability assessment (Rovito & Rhodes, 2016) is shown in Figure 3. The hazards are 
external to the perspective of the defined user, and are thus sometimes called external 
triggers. An intermediary event is any unintended state change of a system’s form or 
operations which could jeopardize value delivery of the program and/or enterprise. 
Interventions are actions that eliminate or mitigate a vulnerability to break the causal chain.  
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 Example CEM of a Supply Chain 
(Rovito & Rhodes, 2016) 
A CEM is created for a specific class of decision-maker (e.g., program manager). 
The hazards (referred to as “spontaneous events”) are exogenous from the point of view of 
the decision-maker for which the CEM was constructed. In this way, the cause-effect 
mapping approach avoids “blaming someone else” by making all hazards exogenous. The 
decision-maker has control over only the intermediary events. While not necessarily at fault 
for any of the vulnerabilities, the decision maker has the responsibility and authority to 
choose if, and how, to address these. 
As shown in Figure 4, a causal chain may have multiple points for breaking the 
chain, for instance to correct weak security controls and/or to prevent unauthorized access. 
The first might be a policy/process intervention and the latter might be a technology 
intervention. The decision to execute one/both of the interventions will depend upon unique 
factors, such as the cost to implement, color of money available, specifics of the situation, 
and so forth.  
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 Example of Two Alternative Placements for an Intervention in Causal 
Chain 
The basic steps to create a new CEM are not application specific and are detailed in 
Rovito and Rhodes (2016) and Reid and Rhodes (2018b). The stakeholder generates the 
CEM (or tailors a Reference CEM) by listing potential hazards posed to the program and 
then traces the consequences of each of these hazards through the intermediary events to 
the final terminal events. The process is then done in reverse: taking the terminal events, 
adding in any that are still missing, and working backwards on how these might come about. 
The causal connections between each intermediary event are examined to see if there are 
any additional connections not previously noticed. Finally, lessons learned databases, case 
studies, and other experts are consulted to generate additional hazards, intermediary 
events, causal connections, and interventions, as well as to verify existing ones. It is 
envisioned that any of these steps can take place either formally, using automated tools to 
enumerate possible vulnerabilities, or informally, relying upon the stakeholder’s own 
experience. CEM is fundamentally a qualitative analysis method, though it can be readily 
adapted into a more quantitative form, by specifying probabilities of transition to each 
intermediary (Reid & Rhodes, 2018b). 
CEM has previously been applied in a case study of a Maritime Security System of 
Systems (Mekdeci et al., 2012) and to a supply chain case (Rovito & Rhodes, 2016). More 
recently, an earlier phase of this research developed a Reference CEM for use by program 
managers to assess enterprise-level vulnerabilities in the digital engineering/model-centric 
environment (Reid & Rhodes, 2018b). This work, which was based upon literature reviews, 
interviews with experts, and other sources, sought to provide program leaders with an entry 
point into for considering such vulnerabilities. Potential use cases are discussed in Reid and 
Rhodes (2018b). Key benefits include increased understanding of the causal path and the 
interrelationships between vulnerabilities. 
Cause-Effect Map for Model-Centric Programs and Enterprises 
CEM provides an effective way to describe cascading vulnerabilities within a digital 
engineering enterprise. Figure 5 shows the Reference CEM generated in this research using 
literature reviews and interviews with experts, among other sources. Nineteen intervention 
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points are identified as potential opportunities for breaking causal chains that may be 
triggered by external events.  
 
 Reference Cause-Effect Map 
(Reid, 2018) 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 437 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
External triggers that result in similar vulnerability chains are grouped together in the 
map. By “similar,” we mean that these vulnerability chains either involve many of the same 
intermediary events or that they involve the same part of the program. For this map, the 
external triggers were classified into three different domains, defined as follows: 
• Force Majeure (red boxes): This is a general term for an event that is the result of 
actions beyond the possibility of the program enterprise (not just the program 
manager) to influence. Thus it includes both malicious action and general, 
unforeseeable events such as Technological Change. 
• Policy (green boxes): An event that is the result of intentional decisions made at 
the organizational or enterprise level. In the case of a government-run program, 
this includes oversight from Congress and the general public. Non-government 
organizations may still be impacted indirectly by such oversight, but their 
proximal triggering event would be different.  
• Private Sector (orange boxes): Any event that is the result of the actions of one 
or more private-sector firms outside the program enterprise. 
The purple boxes are the terminal events. 
The intervention points on the Reference CEM (Figure 5) are shown in Table 1, 
where an invention action is defined for each point.  
Table 1. Intervention Points for the Reference CEM Shown in Figure 5 
(Reid, 2018) 
Point # Intervention Action 
1 Initiate internal assessment and a public relations strategy 
2 Initiate various non-monetary benefits (e.g., 9/80 schedule) to encourage employees to stay 
3 Seek to share resources and employees with other programs 
4 Hire employees with prior experience with the new software 
5 Compartmentalize sensitive information 
6 Obfuscate sensitive data with false or misleading information 
7 Create documentation and curation processes within the program  
8 Institute handover periods to benefit from contractor expertise 
9 Reevaluate the training regime and needed fields of expertise 
10 Increase the amount of testing conducted 
11 Increase use of contractors/consultants to maintain expertise level 
12 Reevaluate the requirements with the client and other stakeholders 
13 Design for modularity to minimize impact on system 
14 Negotiate with client/end-user to see if they are able to pay for the software 
15 Maintain isolated but readily accessible back-ups of data 
16 Conduct reviews/comparisons of models between lifecycle stages 
17 Use multiple independent simulations or component checkers 
18 Maintain isolated, independent backup equipment while primary equipment is evaluated 
19 Conduct regular “red-team”/penetration test exercises 
 
Observations on Intervention Points 
Reid (2018) found that intervention points identified in the Reference CEM (Figure 5) 
tend to be in the first half of the vulnerability chains, with several immediately after an 
external trigger. This suggests the need for monitoring for potential or imminent external 
triggers and being ready to respond as soon as, or even in advance of, their manifestation.  
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The Reference CEM can be used to guide the attention to various vulnerabilities. For 
instance, it should be noted that within the “active modeling” set of intermediate events 
(inside the blue box of Figure 6) there are relatively few intervention points identified, despite 
the high number of vulnerability chains that pass through that section of the Reference 
CEM. The primary intervention point identified in that section, number 7, is “Create 
documentation and curation processes within the program” (see Table 1). 
This relative lack of intervention points may represent the unfamiliarity of program 
leaders with digital engineering processes and how to intervene in them. This suggests that 
further work would be useful in identifying potential interventions in this section of the map 




 Excerpt of the Reference CEM Highlighting the “Active Modeling” 
Portion 
(Reid, 2018) 
While this portion of the chain has one intervention identified, certain vulnerability 
chains have multiple intervention points identified at multiple stages. For instance, several of 
the vulnerability chains that pass through the Needs Change event have three intervention 
points each (and the others have at least two), as shown in Figure 5. 
According to Reid (2018), this suggests there may not be as much of a concern 
about these vulnerabilities, due to the multiple options of intervention available and the fact 
that several are positioned multiple events into the chain, giving significant time for 
response. 
An experienced program leader will find some of the listed intervention points to be 
common sense. For instance, one of the interventions (number 12) following the Needs 
Change event (see Table 1) is “Reevaluate requirements with the client and other 
stakeholders.” This degree of occasional obviousness is not unique to CEM but is true of all 
vulnerability assessment techniques. The point of these techniques is not just to identify new 
vulnerabilities and interventions, but to consistently track and assess them so that all options 
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are available. A case in point is that even experienced pilots still use a checklist (and 
surgeons really should be; Haynes, Berry, and Gawande, 2015).  
It should be noted that the Reference CEM shown in this paper does omit 
vulnerabilities and interventions that are entirely unchanged. For example, practices like the 
security clearance system and restricting the use of digital storage media will remain 
necessary, effective interventions that are not significantly impacted by MCE environments. 
Some historically successful methods may be conflict with MCE environments, for example, 
the use of SCIFs has been quite successful in preventing unauthorized access to data. The 
typical use of a SCIF in design, where a small number of engineers work on a task isolated 
from the outside world, is not directly compatible with an MCE environment structured 
around model integration and collaboration across teams and locations. While this problem 
has been previously considered and ways to mitigate this conflict have been proposed (e.g., 
Reid & Rhodes, 2016), no silver bullet to resolving these tensions exists and it is likely that 
the increased use of MCE will result in both the exacerbation of some current vulnerabilities 
and the creation of new ones. 
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities 
Literature review and interview-based research have provided useful insights 
throughout the research. As the initial research progressed, the importance and urgency of 
considering the cybersecurity vulnerabilities shaped the second phase of study to focus 
more specifically on these. Reid (2018) conducted interviews with systems engineers and 
program managers from a variety of fields, including defense, aerospace, manufacturing, 
and semiconductors. The interviews explored these program cybersecurity vulnerabilities in 
general, and in context of model-centric approaches. Four issues commonly were cited: 
• Cybersecurity needs to be thoroughly considered much earlier than it commonly 
is, preferably in the proposal generation stage. 
• Program managers and systems engineers are sometimes intimidated by 
cybersecurity issues and thus seek to pass them onto specialists later in the 
acquisition process. 
• MBSE and MCE toolset developers and proponents have not done a thorough 
enough job of considering programmatic cybersecurity vulnerabilities, though the 
tools are thought to be quite effective at designing for cybersecurity in regard to 
end-systems. 
• Traditional programmatic cybersecurity defensive practices tends to quite 
effective in traditional engineering programs, but the increased use of MCE, 
particularly for multi-site collaboration, could change this (Reid & Rhodes, 
2018a). 
Non-Technical Influences and Impacts 
One set of vulnerabilities that came up repeatedly in both the interviews and 
experiment sessions in our research (Reid & Rhodes, 2018a) were those that passed 
through the reputation harm intermediate event, as shown in Figure 7. 
Despite the frequency that the potential for this vulnerability was raised by experts, 
few interventions were proposed for post-breach. According to Reid (2018), this suggests 
that leaders of digital engineering enterprises may need better understanding of potential 
vulnerabilities leading to breaches in context of digital engineering, as well as more 
knowledge on how to respond to breaches, particularly prominent ones, instead of solely 
how to prevent them. While there is evidence in the private sector suggesting that the 
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reputation harm incurred by a prominent breach does not significantly impact the firm 
(Lange & Burger, 2017), contractors to the government are known to suffer significant 
financial penalties due to breaches, even when such a breach is unrelated to their 
government duties (Braun, 2014; Overly, 2017). In a defense acquisition environment, there 
is thus significant incentive to having program leadership (and the enterprise as a whole) 
well-prepared to respond to major breaches. 
 
 
 Reputation Harm Vulnerabilities 
(Reid, 2018) 
Relevant Research From Other Fields 
Huff, Medal, and Griendling (2018) present a methodology for performing 
vulnerability assessment and decision analysis of critical infrastructure using the approach 
of model-based systems engineering. The work focuses on physical security of critical 
infrastructure. Some of their findings may provide useful insights for vulnerability 
assessment of infrastructure within model-centric enterprises.  
The literature on the manufacturing sector offers interesting observations and new 
research of relevance to vulnerability assessment of model-centric enterprise environments. 
Burnson (2017), discussing a recent Deloitte study on cyber vulnerabilities in manufacturing 
supply chains, states “one-third of all manufacturers sampled admitted to not having 
performed any cyber risk assessments of the industrial connected devices operating on 
factory floors.” While data is not available, from discussions with experts in the engineering 
domain, it seems likely that there would be a similar situation in regard to whether cyber risk 
assessments have been performed for model-centric engineering environments with 
connected hardware and software. 
DeSmit et al. (2016) discuss research on cyber-physical vulnerability assessment in 
manufacturing systems that uses an approach that employs intersection mapping. 
According to these authors, “no literature is aimed at assessing cyber-physical vulnerabilities 
for manufacturing systems.” With similarities of manufacturing facilities with facilities used in 
model-centric enterprises, their research may offer useful insights to our research. DeSmit et 
al. (2016) describe their approach as “based on the principle that vulnerabilities in 
manufacturing systems occur at intersections (and intra-sections, referred to collectively as 
intersections) of cyber, physical, cyber-physica,l and human entities that embody a 
manufacturing system.” Similar to the CEM approach, their method maps intersections and 
assesses the impact at intersection nodes. They evaluate five characteristics: loss of 
information, inconsistency, relative frequency, lack of maturity, and time until detection. In 
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their method, vulnerability impact assessment (Low, Medium High) is assessed for the 
characteristics at each of the nodes. This offers an interesting approach to qualitative 
assessment measures for vulnerability. Another noteworthy facet of their work that 
resonates with our research is that human entities are included in defining intersections. 
Discussion 
Knowledge gathered in this research indicates that program leaders do not formally 
grapple with vulnerabilities within the program and overall enterprise to the extent they do 
with vulnerabilities related to the end-system. Cause-Effect Mapping, with re-conceptualizing 
vulnerabilities as causal chains, enables program and enterprise leaders to identify 
connections, categories, and potential interventions in the vulnerability chains. The research 
indicates identifying external triggers and representing vulnerabilities as chains enables a 
more detailed assessment of how interim cascading events can result in significant terminal 
outcomes. Use of the CEM approach assists in understanding these causal chains, and 
decomposes a vulnerability in a manner that encourages finding multiple options for 
mitigation. Particular choices for disrupting a harmful causal chain are useful for considering 
where and when to place interventions based on the specific nature of the situation. 
Limitations 
While a fully-developed generalized CEM Reference Map could provide overall 
benefit to digital engineering programs, the fact that enterprise and programs are unique 
makes it difficult to accomplish this without much more extensive application and study. 
Secondly, digital engineering practice and supporting infrastructure are still evolving, so 
limited knowledge exists at present. Nonetheless, programs and enterprises may derive 
significant benefit by the activity of constructing a reference map for their unique situation. 
The process of generating the map invokes thoughtful discussion and anticipating potential 
hazards that may have been introduced as a result of the digital transformation. The 
approach of considering vulnerabilities as casual chains yields rich discussion, regardless of 
whether an overall map is developed. This research has demonstrated the approach to 
constructing a CEM Reference Map and illustrates content included in the map; a fully-
developed comprehensive reference map will require a more extensive investigation. 
Research Directions 
There are several areas of desired future research direction. First, additional study is 
needed on leading indicators of vulnerability in digital engineering enterprises, along with 
potential mitigation strategies. Specific approaches to quantification of interventions in 
breaking vulnerability causal chains is desired, as related to cost, benefit, importance, 
frequency, etc. Additional research on dynamic simulation using System Dynamics (SD) with 
CEM is a promising area to explore given the complexities that will be inherent in a fully 
populated reference CEM (further discussion is found in Reid, 2018). Implementation of an 
interactive method used to perform vulnerability assessment using a reference map is a 
future area of inquiry. Additional research is needed to identify relevant investigation in the 
systems engineering field; for example, Wach and Salado (2018) describe a plan to discover 
patterns of unknown vulnerabilities associated with SysML. And, further collaborative 
research with government and industry is desired to identify additional vulnerability chains 
and enable testing and scaling the method. 
Summary 
In summary, digital engineering transformation naturally introduces new 
vulnerabilities within programs and enterprises. Causal chains provide a useful way to 
understand how external triggers lead to cascading intermediate events that result in 
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specific outcomes. Understanding a vulnerability chain provides program leaders with 
increased knowledge and options for inserting interventions to avoid undesired vulnerability 
outcomes. With more experience and knowledge of vulnerabilities inherent in digital 
engineering practice and infrastructure, the systems community may find it valuable to 
establish a generalized Reference CEM that can guide future programs and enterprises to 
assess and manage vulnerabilities, leading to more successful program outcomes. Related 
research on model curation views a CEM Reference Map as an enabling tool (Rhodes, 
2019) for vulnerability assessment of enterprises. 
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Abstract 
Like any organization, the DoD still relies on security analysts who can ensure that 
security requirements are satisfied. Relying on one expert’s opinion can be risky, because 
the degree of uncertainty involved in a single person’s decision could increase with time, 
memory failure, or inexperience. In previous work, we introduced the multifactor quality 
measurement method (MQM) where we reduce this risk by collecting security ratings from 
multiple experts with documented expertise in specific technical areas of cybersecurity. The 
next step is to automate the scenario generation where less experienced IT personnel can 
create scenarios that correspond to their own system architecture using our tool. The 
automation allows one to crowdsource security assessments from experts. The tool will 
collect and analyze the expert ratings and return the results to the original requestor. In this 
paper, we propose our designed prototype for the tool and we share the results of 
evaluating the prototype on 30 students who are completing a master’s degree in 
cybersecurity at Carnegie Mellon University. Based on the qualitative and usability analysis 
of responses, our proposed method is shown effective in systematic scenario elicitation. 
Participants had a 100% task completion rate with 57% of participants achieving complete 
task-success, and the remaining 43% of participants achieving partial task-success. Finally, 
we discuss our findings and future directions for this research in systematic scenario 
elicitation. 
Introduction and Background  
Organizations, including the DoD, rely on security experts to evaluate system 
security and determine appropriate mitigations (Garfinkel, 2005, p. 5; Hibshi, 2016; Hibshi, 
Breaux, & Broomell, 2015). Despite the abundance of requirements that are available in 
security checklists and control sets, such as the NIST 800-53 control set (“NIST/ITL Special 
Publication (800),” 2015) security analysts continue to rely on their own experience and 
background knowledge when analyzing system security (Hibshi et al., 2015; Hibshi et al., 
2016). Checklists are convenient because they generally apply to systems; however, they 
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lack the context needed to assess the threat against a specific configuration (Haley et al., 
2008). Claims that negative events are unlikely is difficult without being explicit about one’s 
trust assumptions (Haley et al., 2008). Moreover, mapping the checklist to threat scenarios 
or other requirements is laborious process repeated by an analyst for each system. Finally, 
security requirements are not independent; instead, they work together in composition with 
different priorities and inter-dependencies to improve overall security (Garfinkel, 2005, p. 5). 
Recently, we examined the effect of context and requirements composition on 
security requirements expert ratings (Hibshi et al., 2015; Hibshi & Breaux, 2017). In that 
work, we used factorial vignettes in which requirements and system constraints are 
variables in a scenario description. We use scenarios from four technical areas: networking, 
operating systems, databases, and web applications (Hibshi et al., 2015; Hibshi & Breaux, 
2017). The result is a new method that we call the multifactor quality measurement (MQM) 
method. The MQM process, which relies on using scenarios expressed in natural language 
text, would greatly benefit from introducing automation. The automation would involve using 
a tool where less experienced IT personnel can create scenarios that correspond to their 
own system architecture. The IT personnel could crowdsource security assessments from 
experts, and the tool would then analyze the collected data and send the results back to the 
IT personnel.  
In this paper, we prototype the tool for scenario elicitation from IT personnel. Since 
eliciting scenarios in natural language text format can be an ad hoc process with possible 
ambiguity, we build our tool prototype using a scenario language based on a simplified 
process model of iterative scenario refinement. The model consists of three steps: (1) 
eliciting an interaction statement that describes a critical action performed by a user or 
system process; (2) eliciting one or more descriptive statements about a technology that 
enables the interaction; and (3) refinement of the technology into technical variants that 
correspond to design alternatives. In the upcoming sections of this paper, we will provide 
more details about the prototyped model and the results of its evaluation. 
Systematic Scenario Elicitation 
We now describe our approach to study the activity of systematic scenario elicitation. 
The approach assumes a model of structured scenario elicitation that results in a user story 
(Cohn, 2004) in natural language text that we refer to as scenario throughout this paper. To 
describe the model, consider the example text scenario shown in Figure 1. The example 
starts with an interaction statement, which is a statement that describes a critical action 
performed by a user or a system process. The interaction statement used in the example is 
specific to a domain (healthcare) but can also be stated more generically with no domain. 
Next, appears the descriptive statement, which describes a technology that enables the 
interaction.  
For any type of technology, based on the stakeholder’s needs and environment, 
there could be a variety of design alternatives to identify. To accommodate this diversity, the 
model allows a stakeholder to define a variable for a technology and list the design 
alternatives as different levels of that variable. In the example shown in Figure 1, we define 
a $Network variable with three possible levels. 
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 Example of a Text Scenario 
The model is intentionally limited to these three elements: interaction statement, and 
one or more descriptive statements that each contains a variable with levels. This limitation 
is necessary to identify and isolate sources of error in scenario generation. In the future, one 
could imagine studying more advanced scenarios with nested levels of interaction and 
description.  
Stakeholder Input 
To elicit scenarios from stakeholders, our approach involves three steps 
corresponding to the model elements described above:  
1. Interaction statement elicitation: where stakeholders are asked to provide a 
domain of interest and a related interaction statement in the following format:  
 As an < actor >, I want to < action > so that < purpose >. 
2. Descriptive statement(s) elicitation: where stakeholders are asked to provide one 
or more descriptive statements.  
3. Technology refinement: where stakeholders define variables to represent the chosen 
technology and define a number of levels representing different design alternatives. After 
defining their own variables, stakeholders are asked to rank these variables based on a 
certain quality (e.g., security). 
Scenario collection from users is completed online through online forms that 
prototypes the forms used in the design of the tool. The scenario elicitation process is 
accompanied with explanatory text and training material. For example, we use the text 
shown in Figure 2 to explain interaction statements to stakeholders. We follow a similar 
approach to explain the descriptive statements, the variables, and the levels.  
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Evaluation of the Model 
We designed a prototype and test the model on stakeholders in the form of an online 
survey. The survey consists of several forms that corresponds to the forms used in the 
prototype. Our target population is stakeholders interested in the cybersecurity domain. At 
the beginning of the survey, we explain to participants that the end goal of these tasks is to 
construct a vignette, which we define to participants of the survey as: a story that people 
read before making an important decision. The vignette adds context to help the person 
make a more informed decision.  
Going through each step in the model, we provide stakeholders with definitions and 
running examples to help understand the concepts needed to perform the task related to 
that step (see Figures 1 and 2). The study participants are asked to provide their input 
following each explanation and training. For example, following the training shown in Figure 
2, participants are asked to provide an interaction statement for their domain of interest 
(they have been presented with training materials and example domains prior to being 
introduced to the interaction statement).  
Upon task completion, we ask participants to rate their own experience performing 
the tasks in the user study. We ask them to rate the difficulty of each individual task on a 7-
point scale. In addition, we ask participants about the likelihood (using a 7-point scale) of 
using a tool for scenario creation that is similar in design to the exercise that they just 
completed. We repeat this likelihood-of-use question twice: for someone inside the 
participant’s organization, and for someone outside the participant’s organization. This 
repetition encourages participants to think more broadly about the possible broader benefits 
of the tool prototype that they just have tried even if they do not see a direct benefit to 
themselves in using such tool. We also allowed participants to provide additional open-
ended comments.  
Lastly, we ask participants to answer 14 security knowledge questions and standard 
demographic questions (e.g., gender, age, and years of experience).  
We recruited participants from who are enrolled in a well-recognized information 
security master’s degree program in a top university in the United States. Each participant 
was compensated with a $25 Amazon gift card.  
Analysis of Participant Responses 
We are interested in the effectiveness, efficiency, and user-satisfaction of the 
proposed three-step scenario elicitation model. We next describe how we analyze and 
measure these components: 
• Effectiveness is concerned with a stakeholder success in completing a task while 
maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy (Frøkjær, Hertzum, & Hornbæk, 2000). In 
our results we measure effectiveness using task completion rates. To account for task 
accuracy, we differentiate between full task success, where participants complete the 
task with no missing information or errors; and partial task success where participants 
complete the task with some errors or missing information.  
• Efficiency is concerned with the resources a stakeholder consumes to complete a task 
while maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy (Frøkjær et al., 2000). In our study, we 
use task completion time to measure efficiency.  
• Satisfaction is concerned with stakeholders’ attitudes when using a system (Frøkjær et 
al., 2000). To measure participants satisfaction with our model, we use rating scales to 
ask study participants to provide their perception of task difficulty and their projection of 
likelihood-of-use. 
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The constructs shown above rely on qualitative analysis of study participants 
responses. We use grounded analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2007; Glaser, 1978) and coding 
theory (Saldaña, 2012) to code participants open-ended, text responses. The following is an 
explanation of how we analyzed the data to help measure the three constructs listed above 
and to provide qualitative insights.  
• Domains: Participants were asked to list their domains of interest and the 
interaction statement. Using open coding, we review participant answers and 
categorize the elicited domains into a broader domain category. For example, the 
forensics domain is categorized into the broader domain of cybersecurity, and 
the banking domain is categorized into the broader domain of finance (finance 
can include corporate investment for example).  
• Interaction Statement: A full interaction statement should contain the actor, 
action, and purpose. We coded interaction statements as complete if the 
participant provides a full interaction statement, and incomplete if participant 
provided an interaction statement that is missing the purpose. We coded empty 
responses with N/A, and non-statement responses (e.g., words and phrases) as 
not provided.  
• Descriptive Statement: A correct descriptive statement should follow the format 
shown in the example shown in Figure 1 and must contain a variable preceded 
by the ($) sign. We coded descriptive statements as correct if the participant 
provides a descriptive statement using a format similar to the training, partial if 
the participant provides partial text that still can be comprehensible as a 
descriptive statement but is missing the variable or the dollar sign ($) preceding 
the variable, and incorrect if otherwise. We also coded the relationship between 
descriptive statements and interaction statements with one of the following 
codes: related if a strong relationship can be derived from the text; semi-related if 
the relationship can be derived but is not obvious; and not related if otherwise.  
• Variables: Initially, we coded a variable correct if it correctly represents a 
technology that can have multiple design alternatives (levels), and incorrect 
otherwise. Later, we added the code: level if the variable is not perceived as a 
broader category of its level, but rather is perceived as another level (e.g., the 
variable “home network” is coded as level, if the participant provides “employer 
network” and “public network” as levels). Variables that are missing the dollar 
sign ($) are coded as partial. 
• Variable/level structure: We coded the structure as correct if the participant 
provided variables and levels in the expected format where variables are a 
broader technology category of the levels, and we coded the variable/level 
structure to be incorrect if otherwise.  
Training material used in the experiment includes an example of a $Network variable 
with three possible levels (see Figure 1). The levels shown to participants are technical 
variants of different network configurations that vary in their security strength (some levels 
are more secure than others). For each variable/level combination, we assigned codes that 
best describe the relationship between the levels and the variable they are supposed to 
refine. In cases where the variable is missing or wrong, then we code the relationship 
between the levels themselves. The codes, or concept labels, follow the Glassier view of 
open coding, wherein the codes emerge from the data without any pre-defined initial code 
set (Glaser, 1978).  
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Inter-Rater Reliability 
When coding qualitative data that is subject to different interpretations, it is 
recommended to use multiple raters and calculate inter-rater reliability where researchers 
use statistical measures like Cohen’s Kappa to measure above chance agreement (Cohen, 
1968) and be able to judge the quality of the code set being used (Cohen, 1968; Saldaña, 
2012). We use two coders for our data set (the first and second authors), and we calculate 
Cohen’s Kappa for each coded data type separately. Our calculated Kappa averaged at 0.9, 
which is considered good agreement (Cohen, 1968). Next, the disagreements were resolved 
to reach complete agreement to finalize the dataset for analysis.  
Results 
We now present our analysis results. We collected scenarios from 30 participants. 
The mean time that a participant used to complete the scenario elicitation tasks including 
training is 24 minutes. 
Demographics 
All participants have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field and 
are currently enrolled in a graduate information security program at a top U.S. university. 
Out of the 30 students, three participants already work for industry and one works for the 
U.S. government. The mean score for participants on the security knowledge test is 58%. 
Table 1 summarizes the demographics statistics of study participants.  
 




Gender Male 21 70% 
 Female 8 27% 
 Prefer not to say 1 3% 





Less than 1 6 20% 
1–2 years 13 43 % 
3–4 years 7 23 % 
5–7 years 4 13% 
Age range 18–24 18 60% 
 25–34 12 40% 
Took job training in security 27 40% 
Self-taught security knowledge 12 57% 
Security Knowledge Score  Scored above 60% 12 31% 
Scored between 40% and 60% 16 41% 
Scored below 40% 2 5% 
 
Task Completion 
All 30 participants completed the user study from start to end, and they provided a 
domain of interest. The task completion rate that maps to our research questions is related 
to constructing a scenario using the three steps of providing an interaction.  
We define three completion categories: full completion when a participant completes 
the interaction statement and at least one descriptive statement with its associated variables 
and levels with full accuracy; partial completion if a participant completes the interaction 
statement and at least one descriptive statement with its associated variables and levels 
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with partial accuracy; and failure if a participant did not provide an interaction statement and 
did not provide any description statements with an associated variable. Since our evaluation 
of responses relies on qualitative analysis, we show in Table 2 how we classify full accuracy 
vs. partial accuracy based on the codes used in the grounded analysis.  
Based on our definitions above, our study data shows that 57% of participants 
achieve full completion (17 responses), 43% achieve partial completion (13 responses), and 
0% failures.  
When analyzing the 13 partial completions, we found four participants providing 
incomplete interaction statements that did not include a purpose, five participants did not 
precede the variables with a dollar sign ($), three participants used another level instead of 
a broader category for levels, and one participant who provided a variable with levels that do 
not relate or show a clear variable/level structure.  









Interaction statement  complete incomplete Not provided, N/A 
Descriptive statement  correct partial incorrect 
Variable  correct partial, level incorrect 
 
Participant Satisfaction 
We measure participants interaction using participants ratings of task difficulty and 
likelihood of use. All 30 participants provided ratings for task difficulty and likelihood of use, 
and only eight participants provided additional open-ended comments.  
Task Difficulty 
Table 3 summarizes the participant feedback about the task difficulty involved in 
scenario creation. For the first four tasks: understanding vignettes (i.e., scenarios), 
understanding interaction statements, crafting interaction statements, and understanding 
descriptive text; almost half (between 48–63%) of participants were skewed toward easy 
ratings (somewhat easy, easy, and very easy combined). For the later four tasks shown in 
Table 3, participants feedback is less skewed in any direction. By assigning numeric values 
to the 7-point scale (with 1=Very Easy and 7= Very Hard), we found that the mean value for 
all tasks ranges between 3.1 and 3.9, which is slightly below Neutral (Neutral=4), leaning 
towards the easy category.  









































Understanding vignettes  13% 33% 7% 27% 17% 3% 0% 
Understanding interaction statements 7% 27% 30% 20% 10% 3% 3% 
Crafting interaction statements 3% 14% 31% 24% 21% 0% 7% 
Understanding descriptive text 3% 20% 33% 20% 17% 3% 3% 
Crafting descriptive text 0% 13% 30% 13% 40% 3% 0% 
Understanding variables 7% 17% 17% 30% 23% 3% 3% 
Crafting variables 7% 7% 23% 23% 30% 7% 3% 
Understanding levels 10% 13% 13% 27% 17% 10% 10% 
Crafting levels 7% 13% 20% 27% 17% 7% 10% 
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Likelihood-of-Use 
Table 4 summarizes participant feedback about the likelihood of using a tool similar 
to what was presented in the study by the participants themselves or someone else inside or 
outside their organization. In general, participants were slightly more skewed towards 
unlikely. Three participants explained in their open-ended comments that they did not fully 
understand the end goal of the tool presented in the survey. By looking at their performance, 
these three participants still managed to complete the required tasks. These observations 
suggest that participants might not been able to project the benefit of using the language 
proposed in the tool, which affected their projection of likelihood-of-use. 
 
Table 4. Participants’ Feedback About Likelihood of Using a Vignette Generation Tool 
If this tutorial was integrated into an 
online tool for crafting vignettes that 
can be used later for running user 















































would YOU use such a tool 10% 13% 23% 17% 13% 23% 1% 
would someone IN your organization use 
such a tool 
10% 3% 7% 33% 27% 17% 3% 
would someone OUTSIDE your 
organization use such a tool 
17% 10% 13% 17% 30% 7% 7% 
 
Discussion, Future Work, and Conclusions 
In this paper, we introduced a language for scenario elicitation that is based on a 
three-step model that elicit structured parts of natural language text from stakeholders. 
When the natural language text parts are combined, the end result is short scenario 
template with a variable that can take different values of varying levels of technologies. The 
varying technologies allow us to compare different technology alternatives that can be 
further evaluated by other analysts, stakeholders, or domain experts. We present results 
from our evaluation of a user study where we examine the usability of our introduced 
method. Our analysis results for this preliminary study suggest a promising future in this 
area, because we had no empty responses or failures. The task completion is 100% divided 
between 57% full accuracy, and 43% partial accuracy.  
Unlike previous research in requirements engineering where scenarios were 
produced from formal representations that more closely correspond to models, our method 
relies on guiding stakeholders to create scenarios presented in natural language text. Using 
a structured approach in collecting statements has shown a benefit in collecting scenarios 
that share similar syntax and differ in semantics. This uniformity has a number of benefits, 
as follows:  
• Scalability and more systemized collection process, where a requirement 
engineer can tailor our method based on the domain of interest and use it to 
collect natural language scenarios from a larger participant pool. Systemizing 
natural language scenario elicitation offers more scalability and coverage 
compared to collecting unstructured stakeholder narratives. 
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• Homogenous stakeholder scenarios that result from using a structured 
approach in our method. Scenarios written in natural language are known to be 
more user-friendly to the stakeholder, but without proper structure, the process 
becomes ad-hoc and scenarios will be highly heterogenous with no unifying 
pattern that can help an analyst parse different scenarios. In our results, all 
elicited scenarios shared a common structure, even in cases where participants 
had partial accuracy.  
• Systemized scenario analysis, which is a result of the homogeneity feature of 
scenarios collected using our proposed method. Following a uniformed syntax is 
a feature that facilitates the parsing of natural language text, which allows 
requirements engineers to analyze and validate scenarios using systemized 
means and automated tools. In our experiment, we were able to systematically 
analyze the data and we found the process to be less time consuming than 
analysis done on unstructured natural language text collected, for example, in 
user interviews and focus groups.  
• Real capture of stakeholder experiences and domain knowledge because 
our method allows stakeholders to write scenarios using natural language text, 
where they only learn a certain structure to arrange their words. In our 
experiment results, the security domain knowledge was evident in the elicited 
scenarios.  
Going forward, our future research involves introducing more automation to the tool. 
We envision that using our tool, an analyst would be able to build their own scenario and 
then send out invitations for experts to rate the overall security and the individual security 
requirements, and to provide further requirements that can enhance the ratings. Such a tool 
would have a great impact on the DoD and other organizations in the public and private 
sectors, because it would help systemize the evaluation of security components using real 
experts’ input.  
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Abstract 
The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA) required 
federal contract, grant, loan, and other financial assistance awards of more than $25,000 be 
displayed on a publicly accessible and searchable website to give the American public 
access to information on what the federal government spends every year and how it spends 
the money. Federal acquisition databases, such as those maintained by usaspending.gov 
and fpds.gov, serve this purpose. These databases contain contract information for all U.S. 
departments for the last 20 years. However, little has been done to dig into the data and 
extract the information that may provide valuable insights on potential ways to improve the 
efficiency of acquisition management. This paper takes a data science approach to 
assessing and enhancing the quality of the databases and to discovering patterns that can 
be potentially useful for acquisition research and practice. 
Introduction 
Defense acquisition consists of different data silos. These data silos have both 
technical and cultural origins. The capabilities to draw upon data across information systems 
hold huge potential for improving defense acquisition and procurement. Acquisition planning 
and management involves many decision-making and action-taking processes that cover a 
complex environment including actual acquisition, contracting, fiscal, legal, personnel, and 
regulatory requirements. A sound decision-making process has to rely on data—high quality 
data. Often the available data is dirty, outdated, incomplete, or insufficient for the expert to 
make a decision. On the other hand, there are enormous amounts of data on the web that 
can be utilized to crystalize the needed information.  
The paper will investigate how to leverage the information in public data sources to 
complement the internal data in order to support effective acquisition planning and 
management. The research is based on publicly accessible government acquisition 
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databases at usaspending.gov and fpds.gov. Both databases host federal spending data 
from the last two decades and contain millions of records with detailed information about 
each contract. These rich repositories of data provide a great opportunity for us to learn from 
the past practices, and, hopefully, to gain some insights that can help us design better 
strategies for managing future projects.  
A preliminary study showed that the acquisition data suffer from the quality problems 
as do all other real-world data. To achieve high quality data analytics, we have to improve 
the quality of data. Our previous research demonstrated the feasibility of using online 
information from reputable sources to fill the missing values and correct erroneous or 
inconsistent data of acquisition databases. The research in this paper takes that a step 
further. It aims to enhance the acquisition data with online information so as to discover 
patterns that otherwise would not be able to be found.  
Trust is a key issue for using online data. In fact, the web has not only changed our 
ways of sharing and seeking information, it has also altered traditional notions of trust due to 
the fact that the information can be published anywhere by anyone for any purpose, and 
there is no authority to certify the correctness of the information. It is often up to the 
information consumers to make their own judgement about the credibility and accuracy of 
information they encountered online. Unfortunately, in the world nowadays, people are 
flooded with fake news and internet scams. Thus it becomes even harder for an information 
seeker to discriminate between true and false information. To make the situation even 
worse, even when data are deemed trustworthy, assessing the data quality in this big data 
era still brings many challenges. First, the diversity of data sources brings abundant data 
types and complex data structures and increases the difficulty of data integration. Second, 
data change very fast and the timeliness of data is very short, which necessitates higher 
requirements for processing technology (Cai & Zhu, 2015).  
This paper explores only the usage of information from credible and reputable 
sources to enhance the data analytics ability. However, investigating appropriate methods to 
assess web data quality, to identify and acquire credible and accurate information will be 
one of our future research topics. 
Research Methodology 
The research work follows the Data Enhancement and Analytics System framework 
shown as Figure 1 (Wu, Tudoreanu, & Wang, 2018).  
 
 Framework of Data Enhancement and Analytics System 
Our research methodology contains the following steps: 
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• Compare the data between fpds.gov and usaspending.gov in terms of their 
structures, contents, and quality. 
• Apply data analytics techniques to discover patterns about past acquisition 
projects. These patterns might help us to identify the room for improvement in 
future projects.  
Comparison of FPDS and USASPENDING Data 
Both usaspending.gov and fpds.gov sites are publicly accessible and have the 
contract information of all U.S. departments since 2000; however, the data in two sites are 
organized in different structures with a different number of attributes. The data in 
usaspending.gov are categorized under prime award and sub-award. The types of spending 
include contracts, grants, loans, and other financial assistance. For each spending type, the 
data is organized into two structures: prime award and sub-award. For example, information 
on contracts is organized into two tables: one for prime contracts and the other for sub 
contracts. Data in fpds.gov is organized using a unified structure. We downloaded the 
spending data of the Department of Defense and stored them on a MYSQL database 
server.  
Table 1 shows the structure of tables from each website, where the fpds row is from 
fpds.gov, and the other rows are from usaspending.gov. Here, RecCnt and ColCnt represent 
the number of records and number of columns in a table respectively; CompleteCols and 
SingleValCols represent the number of columns with no missing values and number of 
columns with only a single value across all records; and EmptyCols and IncompleteCols 
represent the number of empty columns and the number of columns with missing values 
respectively.  
Table 1. Profiling of FPDS and usaspending Tables 
Table Name ColCnt CompleteCols/ 
SingleValCols 
EmtpyCols IncompleteCols 
PrimeContracts 221 50/1 0 162 
SubContracts 101 41/0 3 57 
PrimGrants 67 32/5 2 33 
SubAGrants 101 29/4 25 47 
fpds 210 74/3 1 136 
A close study of these tables reveals that the fpds table is similar to the 
PrimeContracts table from usaspending.gov in terms of their contents. Thus, the remaining 
part of this section compares only these two tables in terms of their schema, data coverage, 
and quality. 
To facilitate the data comparison, attributes are classified into two categories: identity 
attributes and non-identity attributes. Identity attributes provide identity information for a 
contractor, contract, funding agency, etc. Examples of identity attributes include project 
identifier, contractor identifier (such as a DUNS number), business name, address 
information, phone, fax, etc. Non-identity attributes do not provide any identity information.  
Attribute Naming Convention 
PrimeContracts uses key description abbreviation to construct attribute names. Fpds 
groups attributes into categories. It then uses a key descriptor plus a category prefix to 
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name an attribute. Compared to the PrimeContracts table, fpds attributes have longer but 
easy-to-understand names. The fpds attribute categories and the number attributes for each 
category are shown as in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2. FPDS Attribute Categories 
Schema Mapping 
Schema mapping between the two tables are performed manually based on the data 
dictionary provided by each database. There are 180 common fields in the two tables even 
though these fields are named differently in each table. The remaining 30 attributes in fpds 
and 41 attributes in PrimeContracts are found only in their own table. Due to space 
limitations, Table 2 only shows the partial mapping results. 
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Table 2. Schema Mapping Between fpds and PrimeContracts Tables 
(a) Mapping of Common Attributes 
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(b) Unique Attributes of Each Table 
 
Quality Assessment 
Due to the space limitation, only the quality assessment of key identity attributes is 
presented here. Quality assessment is performed on the dimensions of column 
completeness, and field length consistency of attributes that have fixed-length values. Table 
3 shows that the fpds table has a higher column completeness measure than the 
PrimeContracts table. Figures 3 and 4 show the field length distribution of the PIID (prime 
project ID) and prime contractor DUNS numbers respectively. Since the PIID is a system 
wide identifier for each prime project, it is assumed to have a fixed length. But there are 
some exceptions in both the fpds and PrimeContract tables. Similarly, the DUNs number is a 
9-digit value. Any DUNS numbers other than 9-digit are considered incorrect.  
Table 3. Column Completeness 
Table Name ColCnt IncompleteCols %CompleteCols 
PrimeContracts 212 162 23.6% 
fpds 210 136 35.2% 
Unique Attributes
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 PIID Length Distribution 
 
       
 DUNs Number Length Distribution 
Record Mapping 
Record mapping matches records of the two tables if they represent the same entity. 
In fpds and PrimeContracts, each contract is considered as an entity. Since both tables 
contain the contract information from the Department of Defense, record mapping provides 
a way to measure the data consistency between them. Record mapping is a typical entity 
resolution process. It requires comparing fields of records to determine whether they belong 
to the same entity or not. If records have common key identifier attributes, mapping them is 
rather straightforward; otherwise, the non-identifier attributes have to be used to determine 
how similar the records are. Unfortunately, the fpds and PrimeContracts tables don’t have a 
common record identifier, thus record mapping must rely on the common attributes of two 
tables. 
Considering the number of attributes and records in the fpds and PrimeContracts 
tables, record mapping is a very complicated and time-consuming process. Thus, the first 
phase of mapping is performed on sample data instead, and it considers only the following 
identity attributes when matching records: PIID, dunsnumber, vnedorlocationzipcode, 
vendorlocationstate, vendorlocationcity, vendor_countrycode, vendor_phoneno, and 
vendorlocation_streetaddress. Here, PIID denotes the primary project ID that is unique to 
each project. Dunsnumer denotes the 9-digit DUNS number of the primary contractor of a 
project. vnedorlocationzipcode, vendorlocationstate, vendorlocationcity, 
vendor_countrycode, vendor_phoneno, and vendorlocation_streetaddress represent 
address and telephone information of a primary contractor. Two records are considered to 
represent the same entity if their values on each of the above attributes match. 
The following steps are performed to prepare the sample datasets: 
• A random sample of 5000 PIIDs that exist in both tables is drawn.  
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• The corresponding records of these PIIDs are retrieved from the fpds and 
PrimeContract tables respectively and they are stored into separate datasets, 
denoted as datasets Df, and Du.  
• As data quality issues will adversely affect the record matching result, data 
standardization and transformation are performed. Duplicate records and records 
with missing values are removed.  
• The equijoin is applied on two datasets, and the resulting dataset is denoted as 
Djoin.  
Figure 4 compares the number of distinct values of each identity attribute among 
three datasets Df, Du, and Djoin. It shows that Du consistently has more distinct values for 
each attribute than Df. The number of distinct values for each attribute in table Djoin indicates 
the number of attribute common values between Df and Du. 
 
 
 Number of Distinct Values by Attributes 
Figure 5 shows the relative consistency measure of each attribute of one table in 
terms of the other table. For example, 98.3% of dunsnumbers in Df are also found in Du, 
while only 84.3% of dunsnumber in Du are found in Df; 96.7% of vendorzipcodes in Df are 
also found in Du, but 81.2% of vendorzipcodes in Du are found in Df. The reason behind 
these discrepancies is that, given a prime award ID, there are more distinct records in Du 
than in Df. Possible root causes may include the following: fpds.gov and usaspending.gov 
collected the data at different granularity levels, the fpds database may miss some records, 
or the usaspending database may have to keep multiple records for the same prime award 
as these records have inconsistent values and it is not clear which values are right and 
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  Relative Consistency Measure of Each Attribute 
Data Analytics 
The goal of data analytics is to discover hidden and interesting patterns that can be 
potentially useful in planning future acquisition projects. Since we are not the domain expert 
on acquisition data and policies, we decide to take data science approach and start the data 
analytics with a hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Critical contractors are those that provide unique products and 
services. They could be the weakest link in a supply chain, because if they failed, it would 
be hard to find alternatives to fill their places.  
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the standard used by 
federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of 
collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy. 
NAICS code describes the business specialization of a company.  
There are 379 distinct NAICS codes among all contractors. Seventy-eight NAICS 
codes have only one contractor associated with it. This means in the current pool of DoD 
contractors, these 78 contractors are critical contractors as no other DoD contractors are 
doing the same business. It is possible that there are companies that, outside the DoD 
contractor pool, are associated with these NAICS codes. On average, each of those critical 
contractors is involved in 37 different projects. The top 10 critical contractors with the most 
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Table 4. The Top 10 Critical Contractors With the Most Number of Projects 












For those highly demanded contractors, most of them are big and well-established 
companies, but a couple of them are small companies that appear to provide very unique 
products and services. These companies could be a potential weak point in a project/supply 
chain and may critically affected the overall outcome of a project if they fail. 
Hypothesis 2: A primary project usually has hundreds of contractors working on it. 
These contractors spread out in different geographical locations. Some may be located in an 
area with a high risk of natural disasters such as earthquakes, flooding, hurricanes, 
tornados, and so forth. Some natural disasters, like tornados and earthquakes, are hard to 
predict. Thus, it would be always beneficial to consider those risk factors when planning a 
project. Possible strategies include using contractors located in low-risk areas, or 
intentionally selecting contractors that are spread out in different geographical locations, or 
having backup plans in place to handle any emergencies. 
We have obtained the natural disaster data for each U.S. county between the years 
1950 and 2018 from the National Centers for Environmental Information (Formerly the 
National Climatic Data Center [NCDC]). The data cover all types of natural disasters, 
including floods, tornados, hurricanes, blizzards, high winds, flash floods, hail, dust storms, 
and so forth. 
This project focuses on disasters that could cause severe damages and significantly 
affect the normal life and business operations of local communities such as tornados, 
hurricanes, floods, and blizzards. Since the world weather has changed quite fast in recent 
decades, we decided to use the NCDC data of last 20 years to identify whether an area is 
prone to a natural disaster based on the following criteria. The high-risk flooding areas are 
identified as those that have at least 10 episodes of floods in the last 20 years; the high-risk 
hurricane areas are those that have at least one hurricane in last 20 years; the high-risk 
wildfire areas are those that have at least one wildfire that lasted more than one day in last 
20 years; and the high-risk tornado areas are those that have at least one category 3 or 
above tornado in the last 20 years. Table 5 shows the number of subcontractor zip codes 
belong to each disaster type. 
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Table 5. Number of Subcontractor Zip Codes Vulnerable to Each Disaster Type 
Disaster Type Flood Hurricane Tornado Wildfire 
# zipcodes 5959 780 1182 1831 
 
Our analysis found that there are 6,786 natural disaster–prone zip codes of the 
principal places where the work is performed for a subcontract. Some of these zip codes are 
vulnerable to more than one disaster type. The natural disaster–prone areas are further 
categorized into four classes based on the number of distinct disaster types that has been 
observed in that area during the last 20 years.  
Table 6 shows the distribution of subcontract principal place zip by the number of 
disaster types along with the distribution of subcontractors located in those zip codes. The 
column %zip_population indicates the percentage of zip codes (of a category) with regard to 
the total number of subcontract zip codes, and %DUNS_population indicates the percentage 
of DUNs in each category of zips with regard to total number of subcontractor DUNS 
number. 
Table 6. Distribution of Subcontractor Principal Zip and DUNS 
#DisasterTypes #zipcodes %zip_population #duns % DUNS_population 
1 2165 7.8% 13373 42.3% 
2 3548 12.9% 10965 34.6% 
3 1004 3.6% 2733 8.6% 
4 69 0.25% 141 0.44% 
Total: 6786 23.7% 27072 86.0% 
 
Subcontractors that are located in an area vulnerable to all four disaster types are 
considered to have a high risk. Table 7 shows the top 10 projects with the highest number of 
high-risk contractors. 
Table 7. Top 10 Projects With the Highest Number of High-Risk Contractors 
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It would be interesting to know the percentage of high-risk contractors in past 
projects. There are total 588 projects have at least one high-risk subcontractors. Figure 6 
shows the distribution of projects by their percentage of contractors that are vulnerable to all 
four types of natural disaster. A close study reveals that the majority of 129 projects in the 
last bin with more than 90% of subcontractors in high-risk areas have only one 
subcontractor. More than half of 588 projects have less than 10% of subcontractors in high-
risk areas. Ideally, a project should have as few as possible high-risk subcontractors.  
We believe the information on high-risk areas of natural disasters is beneficial 
because it helps project managers calculate the risk of a project and develop strategies to 
mitigate the risk to the minimum.  
 
 Distribution of Projects by Percentage of High-Risk Subcontractors 
Related Work 
This section summarizes some related work in the fields of federal acquisition data 
analysis.  
Tudoreanu et al. (2018) investigated employment data in an attempt to correlate 
changes in employment with negative modifications to contracts. Such correlations can be 
explored to infer hidden and undisclosed contractors. Hidden contractors may pose the risk 
of becoming a weak, stress point of a project and would affect the overall outcome of the 
project.  
Wu et al. (2018) proposed a framework based on data science approach that aims to 
utilize the online information to assess and improve acquisition database quality as well as 
to find the hidden patterns to further acquisition research. The main component of the 
framework is a web-search and text mining module, whose main function is to search the 
internet and identify the most credible and accurate information online. 
Apte, Rendon, and Dixon (2015) explored the use of Big Data analytic techniques to 
explore and analyze large dataset that are used to capture information about DoD services 
acquisitions. The paper described how big data analytics could potentially be used in 
acquisition research. As the proof of concept, the paper tested the application of Big Data 
Analytic techniques by applying them to a dataset of Contractor Performance Assessment 
Report System (CPARS) ratings of 715 acquired services. It also created predictive models 
to explore the causes of failed services contracts. Since the dataset used in the research 
was rather small and far from the scope of big data, the techniques explored by the paper 
mainly focus on traditional data mining techniques without taking into account big data 
properties. 
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Black, Henley, and Clute (2014) studied the quality of narratives in CPARS and their 
value to the acquisition process. The research used statistical analysis to examine 715 Army 
service contractor performance reports in CPARS in order to understand three major 
questions: (1) To what degree are government contracting professionals submitting to 
CPARS contractor performance narratives in accordance with the guidelines provided in the 
CPARS user’s manual? (2) What is the added value of the contractor performance 
narratives beyond the value of the objective scores for performance? (3) What is the 
statistical relationship between the sentiment contained in the narratives and the objective 
scores for contractor evaluations?  
Conclusion and Future Work 
This research presented a data science approach to compare and analyze publicly 
accessible acquisition databases. The research explored the usage of online information to 
enhance the internal data in order to discover the hidden patterns in the data. The research 
has collected natural disaster information from the National Centers for Environmental 
Information. This information can be helpful in identifying high-risk locations and contractors 
located in those locations.  
Future work will focus on the following two directions. First, explore more data 
analytics techniques to discover patterns that are potentially useful to the acquisition 
research community. Second, research effective text mining techniques for assessing web 
data quality and retrieving credible information from online sources. 
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Abstract 
Acquisition data lay the foundation for decision-making, management, insight, and oversight 
of the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) acquisition program portfolio. A large amount of 
information—based on statutory and regulatory reporting requirements and used for program 
execution, oversight, insight, and analysis—is collected on the higher cost major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAPs; referred to as Acquisition Category [ACAT] I programs). However, 
the DoD also makes additional smaller investments that are categorized as ACAT II–IV acquisition 
programs, pre-MDAPs, and Defense Business Systems, and the current program data 
environment features varying definitions, policy, collection methods, and use cases across the 
DoD. RAND researchers documented the DoD status quo for identifying, collecting, and storing 
acquisition data from different programs, performed an initial gap analysis, and developed 
recommendations that build on what the OSD and Service acquisition information managers have 
accomplished to date and that move the DoD toward a common framework for data governance 
and management. 
Introduction 
Acquisition data lay the foundation for decision-making, management, and oversight of the 
Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) weapon system acquisition portfolio. This information is collected 
to meet statutory and regulatory reporting requirements and to support program execution, insight, 
oversight, and analysis. The DoD groups its acquisition programs into categories. Acquisition 
categories (ACATs) refer to dollar values of the investment,1 and ACAT I programs cost the most 
(DoD, 2017).2 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2015, p. 1),  
                                               
 
 
1 At the time of this writing (October 2018), there was some debate within the DoD over whether 
Middle Tier acquisition programs have ACAT levels. Middle Tier programs are new, so the specifics are still 
being worked out. 
2 According to DoD (2017, p. 28), Dollar value for all increments of the [ACAT I] program: estimated 
by the [Defense Acquisition Executive] DAE to require an eventual total expenditure for research, 
development, and test and evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $480 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 constant 
dollars or, for procurement, of more than $2.79 billion in FY 2014 constant dollars. 
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In Fiscal Year 2014, DoD requested $168 billion to develop, test, and acquire 
weapon systems and other products and equipment. About 40 percent of that total 
was for major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) or Acquisition Category 
(ACAT) I programs. The remaining approximately 60 percent of the budget request 
included, among other investments, funding for DoD’s non-major ACAT II and III 
programs. 
The GAO has documented the challenges of gaining insight into ACAT II–IV in a 2015 
report (GAO, 2015). 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the RAND Corporation National Defense 
Research Institute to document the DoD’s status quo for identifying, collecting, and storing ACAT 
II–IV acquisition programs, then perform an initial gap analysis and recommend actions that could 
move the DoD toward a common framework for acquisition program data. This analysis builds on 
four earlier studies on Issues with Access to Acquisition Data and Information in the Department of 
Defense (Riposo et al., 2015; McKernan et al., 2016; McKernan et al., 2017; McKernan et al., 
2018). This report should be of interest to government acquisition professionals, oversight 
organizations, and, especially, the analytic community. This research was sponsored by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense3 and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of 
the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development 
center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant 
Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence 
Community. For more information on the RAND Acquisition and Technology Policy Center, see 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/about/atp.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on 
the webpage). 
The DoD Lacks Visibility Into ACAT II–IV Acquisition Programs 
In response to a GAO question, DoD senior leadership asked staff to examine the 
performance of ACAT II–IV programs. The program data required to perform this analysis was not 
readily available. As one step in meeting this information need, the Acquisition Data office within 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment has been working 
with the Services over the past few years to track and collect ACAT II–IV program information more 
efficiently.4 Challenges include the scarcity of data on lower ACAT programs; the inconsistency of 
the ACAT II–IV data that are collected at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and 
Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) levels; and the question of what kind of oversight makes 
sense for ACAT II–IV programs to ensure that proper management oversight, portfolio analyses, 
and other assistance is available while minimizing the burden on program managers (PMs). The 
challenges of gaining insight into ACAT II and III programs are described in the 2015 GAO report, 
which concludes that the DoD cannot provide reliable data on the number, cost, or performance of 
ACAT II and III programs (GAO, 2015, p. 6). 
The current program data environment as described here features varying definitions, 
policy, collection methods, and use cases across the Components and the OSD. The result is that 
basic questions (e.g., How many programs are in each Component?) cannot be easily and 
consistently answered, and the DoD lacks the ability to understand trends and program execution 
                                               
 
 
These thresholds are for ACAT I programs but are not applicable for ACAT IA programs. 
3 This study was commissioned by Mark Krzysko, Director, Acquisition Data, within the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. 
4 The prior name of this organization was Acquisition Resources and Analysis, Enterprise Information 
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 
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status at an aggregate level for these portfolios. The program data environment also has little 
coordination across Components and the OSD except through largely ad hoc interactions of 
acquisition information managers in each organization. However, some level of basic agreement 
exists on a core set of data, particularly at the ACAT I level, and the need for quality data suitable 
for a variety of use cases remains constant, along with a colloquially expressed data management 
goal to “enter once, use many.” 
Congressional interest in this area has increased over the past several years. Recent 
NDAAs recognize the potential benefits of a common data framework and environment. As of late 
2018, the DoD does not know exactly how far away it is from a common acquisition data 
framework; however, the organization does have an understanding of some of the actions that 
need to occur and has taken definitive steps to move toward a common data framework for 
acquisition program data. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense asked the RAND 
Corporation to identify how the OSD and the Components go about collecting program data, then 
perform an initial gap analysis and recommend actions that could move the DoD toward a common 
framework for acquisition program data. 
Our approach for this study included analyzing current policy in the OSD and the Services 
and holding discussions with subject-matter experts throughout the DoD to understand the policy 
and data frameworks for ACAT I–IV programs. We also collected information on ACAT I as a 
benchmark for comparison because ACAT I programs have a well-established data framework, 
developed through use over several decades and reflecting agreement between the OSD and the 
Services. 
Key Findings 
The OSD and the Services have created procedures that in effect align the collection and 
transmission of data with OSD and congressional information requirements, and use formal 
communication mechanisms (e.g., the Acquisition Visibility Working Group [AVWG] and the 
Acquisition Visibility Steering Group [AVSG]) as instruments to help standardize and talk through 
information management challenges. The OSD and the Services have also recently created an 
Acquisition Program List (APL) that consolidates Service-level lists of ACAT programs in one 
location in the OSD’s Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE). The U.S. Navy and the 
U.S. Air Force (USAF) currently use mixed methods in which some data are digitally pushed to 
DAMIR and other data are input manually. The Army manually inputs program data directly into 
DAMIR. 
Overall, we found that the OSD and Service policy and data environments for ACAT 
programs are very similar. Based largely on ACAT I program statutory, regulatory, and policy 
information requirements, there appears to be a shared recognition that program data are required 
to support multiple use cases and a general agreement that program data include the same core 
information related to cost, schedule, performance, and risk. 
Additionally, there appears to be a shared understanding of the definitions of those program 
data even as the specific metrics used and preferred by leadership in the OSD and the Services 
differ somewhat. Furthermore, the Services have created procedures that in effect align the 
collection and transmission of data with OSD information requirements. Within the past decade, the 
USAF and the Navy have intentionally aligned their centralized program information systems—
Project Management Resource Tools (PMRT)5 and Research, Development, and Acquisition 
                                               
 
 
5 PMRT’s predecessor, the System Metric and Reporting Tool, was also used as part of the 
alignment. 
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Information System (RDAIS)—to the OSD’s program information system, DAMIR. The Services 
have also moved toward closer collaboration with the OSD. The USAF and the Navy currently use 
a mixed method in which some data are digitally pushed to DAMIR by PMRT and RDAIS and other 
data are input manually. Currently, the Army manually inputs ACAT I program data directly into 
DAMIR in the absence of a centralized program information system within the Army. The 
movement of both the USAF and the Navy toward the use of “pushing” and “pulling” information 
between information systems is driven in part by the need to reduce the burden on program offices 
through sharing common information across a broad range of information requirements (i.e., enter 
once, use many) and also to achieve some efficiencies by taking advantage of improvements in 
technology. The convergence by the Services and the OSD on the limited common data framework 
as described has taken a considerable amount of effort, collaboration, and time (likely more than 
10 years). 
Our summary assessment of key attributes of the program data policy and management 
practice environment appears in the following list and in Table 1. 
• Information governance. The policy environment for ACAT I program information is 
well established; the OSD and the Services have similar acquisition policy frameworks, 
including information governance for program data. The Services are responsible for 
promulgating policy for ACAT II–IV. For the most part, information governance for ACAT 
II–IV programs is similar to that of ACAT I.  
• Roles, responsibilities, and authorities. Policy generally specifies acquisition-related 
roles, responsibilities, and authorities (RRA) for ACATs. Nevertheless, RRA are fairly 
consistent across the Services for ACAT programs of all levels with centralized authority 
(the Defense Acquisition Executive [DAE] or Service Acquisition Executive [SAE]) and 
decentralized responsibility for execution (program executive officers [PEOs] and PMs). 
Across program types and organizations, the program is responsible for collecting and 
reporting most program-level data. 
• Use cases. Use cases are the demand signal for acquisition program data and often 
identify the data required, both explicitly and implicitly. The use cases for acquisition 
program data—program management and execution, oversight, statutory and regulatory 
reporting, and portfolio analyses—appear to be largely similar across the OSD and the 
Services and across ACAT levels.  
• Processes. The milestone, event-driven acquisition process is well defined in policy 
and is fairly consistent in its attributes across organizations and ACAT levels. The 
process both generates program data through program execution and consumes 
program data in milestone decisions and technical reviews.  
• Authoritative data and definitions. Best practices in data management assume that 
each unique data element (or data field) is identified and associated with a precise 
meaning or content. The OSD, the USAF, and the Navy have authoritative data fields 
defined in their information systems for ACAT I programs; the Air Force and the Navy 
carry those definitions down to the smaller ACAT II–IV programs. The OSD, the USAF, 
and the Navy also have data dictionaries available to system users. The Army inputs 
ACAT I program data manually into DAMIR, and ACAT II–III program data are captured 
in briefings that appear to follow a standard template. The Army also tracks basic 
information on ACAT II–III program data in the Army Acquisition Program Master List 
(AAPML), which resides in DAVE within the OSD. The AAPML provides basic counts of 
programs by level, phase, or Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). Apparent differences 
in specific data elements reported and the definitions of those data elements across the 
OSD, the Army, the Navy, and the USAF largely occur because the specific data 
elements and metrics reported are tailored to a particular organization’s culture, its 
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historical precedents, and the preferences of that organization’s current senior 
leadership (i.e., how the current leadership wishes to view the information for decision-
making). The underlying data—the cost, schedule, performance, and risk information 
captured and reported at the program level—tend to be similar or the same. This 
consistency is partly because some data elements are defined in statute (e.g., unit 
cost).  
• Data, business, and system rules. The Services have created procedures at the 
ACAT I level that, in effect, align the collection and transmission of data with the OSD 
requirements for program data and other acquisition information. In general, the rules 
underlying data definitions are present in data dictionaries for the OSD, the USAF, and 
the Navy (the organizations that have such dictionaries). However, rules underlying 
business processes and information systems are not explicitly stated in guidance or 
user manuals we reviewed except for the USAF’s Monthly Acquisition Report (MAR). 
• Access, security, and dissemination. Access and security appear to be largely the 
same across program types and organizations. Access to data is largely determined by 
the owner of those data, and rules about granting access to users are designed into the 
information systems hosting the data. Information security policy is set predominantly by 
the chief information officer (CIO), chief management officer (CMO), or chief data officer 
(CDO) of an organization; these policies are reflected in certification procedures and 
data access and dissemination rules. 
• Quality and completeness. Data quality—accuracy, validity—is not explicitly dealt with 
in policy or data management practice, but data quality could be addressed during the 
approval processes within the Services. Completeness, in contrast, is explicitly 
addressed in data management policy and practices across ACAT levels and 
organizations. Completeness in this context means whether required data were 
submitted on time.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Framework Attributes for ACAT II–IV Acquisition Programs 
(DoD, 2007) 
 
Attributes OSD USAF Army Navy 
Information 
governance 
• Responsible for  
DoDD 5000.01a and DoDI 5000.02 
policies (overall acquisition and 
statutory/regulatory information 
requirements) 
• Aligned to OSD 
• ACAT I acquisition process and 
information requirements clearly 
defined 
• Aligned to OSD 
 
• Minimal ACAT II–III discussion 
except defines all ACAT levels and 
statutory and regulatory information 
requirements 
• ACAT IV level not defined 
• USAF ACAT II–III 
information governance 
similar to ACAT I 
governance 
• Detailed USAF ACAT I–III 
acquisition information 





• Navy ACAT II–
IV information 
governance similar to ACAT I 
governance 
• Detailed Navy ACAT I–IV 
acquisition information 




• Generally specified in policy for ACAT I–IV programs (except OSD does not define ACAT IV programs) 
• Limited responsibilities for 
program information collection, 
storage, and dissemination 
• Limited and decentralized responsibilities for 
program information collection, storage, and dissemination 
• One main office responsible for 
management of various ACAT I 
program information 
• Air Force Acquisition 
Executive organization 
dedicated to managing 
ACAT I–III data 
• Army PEOs 




ACAT I–IV data 
• Navy Acquisition Executive 
organization dedicated to 





• PMs generate or collect the majority of program information 
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Table 1. Comparison of Framework Attributes for ACAT II–IV Acquisition Programs (Continued) 
 
Attributes OSD USAF Army Navy 
Processes • Milestone, event-driven 
acquisition process well defined in 
OSD policy 
• Milestone, event-
driven acquisition process 
well defined in USAF 
policy 
• Milestone, event- 
driven acquisition 
process well defined 
in Army policy for 
ACAT I programs but 
less defined for ACAT 
II–IV programs 
• Milestone, event-driven 
acquisition process well defined 
in Navy policy 
• Process both generates program data through program execution and consumes program data in milestone decisions 
and technical reviews 
Authoritative data and 
definitions 
• Authoritative data fields defined in 
DAMIR/DAVE information systems for 
ACAT I programs 
• Authoritative data 
fields defined in USAF 
PMRT information 
system for ACAT I–III 
programs 
• Army uses OSD’s 
authoritative data 
fields and definitions 
for ACAT I 
information 
• Has authoritative 
source for limited 
ACAT II–IV 
• Authoritative data fields 
defined in Navy RDAIS 
information system for 
ACAT I–IV programs 
• Core data elements appear largely the same (e.g., cost, schedule, performance) but are presented differently across 
OSD and Services 
• Specific data elements and metrics tailored to organization’s culture, historical precedents, and preferences of the 
current senior leadership 
Data, business, and 
system rules 
• At the ACAT I level, OSD has worked with USAF and the Navy to 
electronically align collection and transmission of OSD-required 
data 
• Army uses OSD 




inputs ACAT I 
information 
• ACAT I electronically 
aligned with OSD (see first 
comparison to the left) 
• Does not manage business 
rules for ACAT II–IV programs; 
documented some for ACAT I 
programs 
• Business rules for 
ACAT II–III program 
information are 
documented for MAR 
• Army uses 
OSD information 
system for limited 
ACAT II–IV 
information 
• Business rules for ACAT II–
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• Access and security appear largely the same across program types 
and 
organizations 








ACAT I information 
• The AAPML user guide 
describes how Army 
secures, provides 
access, and 
disseminates its limited 
ACAT II–IV 
information 
• Aligned with OSD and 
USAF comparison to the 
left 
• Access to data determined by owner of that data (often the originator of the 
data; e.g., a program office) 
• A user’s account is granted permissions for inputting, viewing, and using 
data appropriate to user’s role in the acquisition process 
• Information security policy is set predominantly by CIO, CMO, or 
CDO of an organization 
Quality and 
completeness 
• Data quality—accuracy, validity—not explicitly addressed in policy or data management practice 
• Completeness explicitly addressed in data management practices across ACAT levels and organizations; typically refers to 
whether required data was 
submitted 
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Alignment of OSD and Service data policy and management environments creates 
efficiencies and potential savings with respect to program data collection, storage, 
processing, and sharing. Adopting common definitions on acquisition program data enables 
the Services to interact more seamlessly with OSD data systems; they can still tailor their 
own Service-specific data systems, metrics, analyses, and visualizations to satisfy the 
preferences of senior leaders and Service-specific use cases. 
Achieving a common data framework across both program types and all 
organizations is a complex task. It requires some degree of alignment of attributes of both 
the policy and data environment. At a minimum, there needs to be agreement on a core set 
of data to be recorded (defined in policy) and the definitions of associated data elements 
and data fields; information governance organizations and processes need to be established 
and aligned to manage and oversee data-related activities. Use cases defined in policy and 
practice do not need to align precisely, but the underlying data required by those use cases 
do. Technical parameters of the information systems also do not need to align perfectly, as 
long as it is possible to transfer data between them without introducing errors. 
A major challenge in achieving a common data framework is overcoming cultural 
barriers that often prevent data-sharing and transparency. ACAT I programs have a 
common framework, but this framework is only partially reflected in current law, regulations, 
policy, and guidance. Services coordinate with the OSD in different ways for ACAT I 
programs; for ACAT II–IV, Services largely use the ACAT I data framework (data 
definitions), share program lists, and use the OSD APB module but do not share cost, 
schedule, and performance information with the OSD. Semantics (definitions, data 
elements, and business rules) for smaller programs are reflected in Service policies or user 
guides to varying degrees. In all cases, the Services are actively improving their data 
governance and management practices for both internal use and coordination with the OSD. 
Options to Consider for Improving the Current DoD Program Data Environment 
Acquisition program data managers in the DoD appear to agree that movement 
toward a common data framework or environment in some form would be beneficial across 
the entire DoD enterprise. More importantly, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Sustainment and other DoD leadership cannot have insight into their missions without 
these data. Examples of potential benefits are improved communication, data-sharing, 
leveraging of existing data systems (as opposed to developing, operating, and maintaining 
Service- or program-unique data systems), improved transparency, and improved data 
quality. Standardization and consistency within a common data framework could also 
improve analysis and program decision-making by enhancing analysis and facilitating a 
shared understanding of how to interpret results. 
The intent of data management is to improve program management by providing 
higher-quality, consistent information to inform a variety of acquisition use cases. Data 
management emphasizes data standards—which can be common across organizations and 
program types—not just status reporting. We have identified five actions that we believe will 
facilitate continued progress toward a common environment for acquisition program data 
and improve acquisition data management in the DoD. Some recommendations are 
improvements or actions that reinforce recent trends while other recommendations are new 
(e.g., an enterprise acquisition data strategy). 
Implementation of the options presented here will require some additional focus 
because the current acquisition environment is in the midst of significant change from 
multiple congressional mandates. Some implementation concerns are a workforce that 
tends to focus on process rather than data (both a cultural and training issue); the recent 
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changes to the acquisition organizational structure within the OSD; and changes in RRA 
through the delegation of the majority of MDA to the SAEs.1 
Continue the AVSG/AVWG to Facilitate Information Governance 
The AVSG and AVWG structures provide an important forum for information 
governance. The AVSG convenes senior leaders from the OSD and the Services whose 
offices are directly responsible for acquisition program information, and it can be a useful 
mechanism for aligning policies. The AVWG, which pulls together information managers 
who are responsible for establishing data management practices, facilitates communication 
and collaboration and pro- vides a mechanism for aligning data management practices 
across organizations and program types. We recommend continuing the AVSG/AVWG as 
an important element of information governance. The recent reorganization of the OSD 
acquisition organizations and the rebalancing of MDA toward the Services offers an 
opportunity to make information governance through the AVSG/AVWG structure formal and 
explicit. Membership and participation can be adjusted to reflect both the new organizations 
and new acquisition authorities. 
Promulgate an Acquisition Data Strategy for the DoD 
Currently, no enterprise-wide strategy exists for acquisition program data.2 Such a 
strategy— developed collaboratively with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Sustainment, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering, and the SAEs—could set the parameters of a common data framework and 
environment. It could also encourage sharing of ideas and experiences, improve data 
transparency and access, and establish goals for a common data framework. An enterprise 
acquisition program data strategy could become a significant element of acquisition 
information governance. The DoD might want to consider addressing the need for core 
definitions in this strategy, along with considering communication mechanisms and other 
best practices in information management. 
Focus Initial Efforts on Identifying a Core Set of Acquisition Program Data 
Small steps and incremental change are often easier and more effective than trying 
to do everything at once. We therefore suggest developing an initial common data 
framework based on a small set of core program data appropriate for all program types and 
use cases. (This is in addition to the APL that has been recently added to DAVE.) At first, 
these data might be just program descriptive information; additional data elements could be 
                                               
 
 
1 Section 825 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (as amended) 
states that the milestone decision authority [MDA] for a major defense acquisition program reaching 
Milestone [MS] A after October 1, 2016, shall be the service acquisition executive of the military 
department that is managing the program, unless the Secretary of Defense [SECDEF] designates … 
another official to serve as the milestone decision authority. 
See also 10 U.S.C. §2430[d]. Section 901 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 instituted a 
major reorganization within the OSD and created three new positions: Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and a 
CMO. 
2 The USAF CDO is working toward a Data Architecture Charter and Data Services 
Reference Architecture for “all” USAF data (including acquisition data) and has set a vision to foster a 
data-driven organization by enabling Air Force activities through Visible, Accessible, Understood, 
Linked, and Trusted data. 
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added incrementally. The focus should fall on the underlying data, not the specific metrics 
preferred by a particular senior leader. This recommendation builds on the success that 
information managers have already achieved through both formal (i.e., AVWG) and informal 
mechanisms, and following through on this action would build positive momentum toward a 
common data framework by enabling the institutionalization of small successes. For 
example, the common data definitions already in place for ACAT I programs would provide a 
good starting point because they are already defined and do not create additional burden to 
collect. In addition, the Air Force and Navy have already extended some of those definitions 
to lower ACAT-level reporting. 
Leverage Existing Program Data Infrastructure 
In this context, infrastructure means established information systems and 
applications running on those systems as well as approved and agreed-upon definitions for 
data elements and data fields. There is no reason to invest in all new Service- or 
application-specific information systems when existing systems can be expanded or 
otherwise modified to accomplish the same end. 
Establish a Common Definition of a Program and Program Start 
Acquisition program data collection begins with the definition of a program.3 Until an 
activity is officially declared a program, many of the information requirements do not apply. 
These activities can be for weapons, business systems, and Middle Tier efforts, to name a 
few. The high variation in the number of ACAT III programs counted among the Services 
suggests that the definition of a program might differ. DoDI 5000.02 (DoD, 2017) currently 
defines program start at MS B for ACAT I programs; policy is unclear as to when ACAT II–IV 
programs officially start. 
This lack of clarity raises several questions that need to be answered: 
• Who is the authoritative source for identifying when an activity becomes a 
program? 
• When is a given set of activities both related enough and mature enough to 
declare it a program? 
• What information should be documented and reported about a program early in 
its life cycle? 
We recommend that the DoD develop a single definition of a program. The definition 
should include criteria and procedures for declaring program start, as well as a 
determination of the minimum program data needed at program start. A small set of program 
descriptive information can usefully be documented and applied across program type and 
size. This information should include program name, a unique identifier, mission or 
capability description, and basic cost and schedule estimates (recognizing the uncertainty of 
the last two data elements). 
                                               
 
 
3 The Air Force, the Navy, and the Army have provided the OSD with APLs that are now stored in the 
OSD’s DAVE for ACAT I–IV programs. Although there is still not agreement across the DoD on the definition of a 
program, this nevertheless reflects progress since 2015, when the DoD could not provide the GAO with a list of 
non-major programs. 
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This study has documented the current policy and data environment for acquisition 
programs. Given the large shift in organizational RRA within DoD acquisition over the past 
few years, now would be the ideal time for the DoD to take additional strides in improving 
how it manages its acquisition information and consider a common data framework for its 
acquisition programs by its data governance function. 
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Abstract 
This research describes how a FAR Part 10 market research report can be 
generated by integrating acquisition data from multiple government-maintained public 
databases into a single portal. This effort builds upon the wealth of federal acquisition data 
made public through several initiatives to increase government transparency and data 
sharing, including the DATA act of 2014. The overall study aims to demonstrate how 
inefficiencies in the acquisition process can be addressed through tailored design of data-
driven decision support tools. 
Introduction and Motivation 
Acquisition processes are time and resource intensive and rely heavily on staff 
experience and expertise. Unfortunately, this expertise can be hard to find. In particular, the 
process for creation of market research reports is not standardized; they are typically 
compiled manually by relatively inexperienced staff who may not have the time or 
knowledge to integrate relevant data from different sources. As a result, given the overall 
acquisition strategy and execution rely heavily on elements of this market research, there is 
potential for significant downstream decision-making inconsistencies and delays.  
Over the past few years, however, the federal government has made a large amount 
of acquisition data publicly available. The data is predominantly historical in nature and 
presents an opportunity to help develop automated decision support tools, in this instance 
supporting market research. Unfortunately, these datasets are of varying size and scope 
and are typically siloed. Even when valuable and relevant datasets are identified, they may 
be difficult to access or the relationships between them are not immediately clear. Greater 
research efforts are required to better understand the overall landscape of this data and its 
potential for practical use. 
This research addresses a preliminary first use case application of public data 
sought to aid the development of a FAR Part 10 market research report by integrating 
acquisition data from multiple government-maintained public databases into a single portal. 
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Background and Past Research 
A literature review to understand the current applications of data analytics and use 
cases for data-driven acquisition decision making determined that 
a. The use of predictive analytics is being studied within government agencies as well 
as academia and private industry: 
• Dai and Li (2016) discussed the development of applications for non-
government “armchair auditors” to analyze acquisitions data; as data is not in 
a consistent format, analysis is difficult without a standardized application. 
Applications included data reliability, suspicious supplier detection, abnormal 
pricing, and abnormal bidding. 
b. Research has focused on using analytics to improve the following acquisitions 
functions: 
• Cost estimations/budget overruns: Adoko, Mazzuchi, and Sarkani (2015) 
proposed a predictive model that analyzes the impact of system performance, 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL), schedule, risk, and reliability on the 
Nunn-McCurdy significant cost overrun guidelines. Tracy and White (2011) 
generated models to estimate the cost of completion of contracts at varying 
stages of completion. Morgan (2013) uses data analytics to evaluate the use 
of performance-based contracts as a cost-saving measure. Reed, Keller, and 
Fallon (2016) review cost per dollar obligated measurement in defense 
contracts and show the use of analytics to show trends beyond dollars spent. 
• Requirements development: Dargan et al. (2014) developed a statistical 
model of the relationship between requirements quality and operational 
results, using data from the DoD and DHS. 
• Performance: Knudsen and Blackburn (2016) propose a predictive model to 
examine project schedule performance. Apte, Rendon, and Dixon (2016) 
explored how the DoD can leverage acquisition data, specifically contractor 
performance information, in identifying drivers of success in services 
acquisition using big data techniques. Guillaume-Joseph and Wasek (2015) 
used historical aspects of software project failure to develop a predictive 
model that can be used in acquisitions. 
• Regulation: Patrignani (2014) evaluated the impact of changes to the FAR in 
2009 on contractor misconduct focusing on the impact of penalties for 
misconduct using statistical analysis. Tkach (2017) examined USSOCOM’s 
acquisition and procurement processes, policies, and challenges and 
provides insight into nontraditional DoD contracting by studying historical 
data. 
c. A variety of analytical methods are being used: 
• Natural Language Processing (NLP)/text mining: Gao, Singh, and Mehra 
(2012) developed a tool (Contract Miner) to extract data from service 
contracts using NLP. Yang et al. (2013) developed a prototype NLP tool to 
analyze contract service agreements (CSAs). Chalkidis, Androutsopoulos, 
and Michos (2017) studied how legal contract element extraction can be 
automated using NLP and machine learning. 
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• Predictive regression: Miller (2012) examines the use of text mining in 
acquisitions management and combines that with predictive regression 
models to determine cost estimate changes. 
• Bayesian/statistical modeling: Knudsen and Blackburn (2016) used a 
Bayesian model to predict schedule performance. 
• Agent-based simulation: Schwenn et al. (2015) introduced a research 
methodology for examining the U.S. weapon procurement system as a 
complex adaptive system (CAS) and using agent-based modeling (ABM) to 
identify significant causal factors that contribute to the performance of the 
procurement system. 
While the research indicated that federal acquisitions data can be analyzed to 
improve performance, there was limited evidence of its use at an agency- or government-
wide level.  
Data Sources and Integration 
Phase one of the project involved collecting data from a variety of public sources, 
identifying relationships between the sources, and completing any required data cleaning 
and integration. The team collected over 20 GB of data dating back to 2013 from the 
following public acquisition data sources: 
a. USA Spending—Contract spending records for the U.S. government, 2013–
2017; 
b. System for Awards Management (SAM)—List of all contractors eligible to 
contract with the federal government and an exclusions list of contractors 
excluded from contracting with the government; 
c. Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS)—
Contractors' performance and integrity records; 
d. Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG)—Government-
wide procurement and spending database; 
e. FBO.gov—General portal of entry for competitive acquisitions and corresponding 
documentation to include requirements; and 
f. Interagency Contract Directory—Procurement and spending between U.S. 
government agencies. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, we identified existing relationships between the sources as 
well as primary keys between the datasets that allowed them to be linked. In most cases, 
the linking key was the Dun & Bradstreet (DUNS) contractor number and/or the contract 
number. The Interagency Contract Directory was not used in the final Market Research 
prototype, so it is excluded in the figure. 
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 Data Source Map 
 
Significant data cleaning was required, including the removal of duplicate records, type 
coercion, correction of data quality issues, and removal of nonsense characters. Data was stored 
using a combination of PostgreSQL and MongoDB databases. 
Market Research Portal Overview 
Phase two of the project consisted of developing the Market Research Portal 
prototype, a use case that demonstrated the data integration capabilities of the data 
warehouse. The team used standard agile development practices and leveraged both 
subject matter experts and user interactions to perform usability studies and evaluate 
features.  
The Market Research Portal provides a market research report template as well as a 
system that supports an approvals process, review of older reports, and tailored instruction 
or template modifications by a supervisor. The key improvement of this portal over existing 
technology is that it automatically brings in data from the sources described previously. 
Based on the desired acquisition category (as defined by NAICS and/or PSC code), the 
portal filters to relevant vendors registered to do business with the government and provides 
contract history. The portal assists the user in identifying potential contractors who may or 
are already providing supplies and services to the government for similar requirements with 
additional refinement parameters such as dates and dollar amount. The portal also allows 
the user to search for similar requirements from other agencies and develop their own initial 
requirements validated by research. Lastly, the portal allows email correspondence with 
industry. The team applied agile development practices to update the application using 
feedback received from sponsors and user groups. All features were designed to meet 
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A diagram of the project technical architecture is included in the appendix. 
Walkthrough of Prototype Features 
The set of features described next was created based on a series of user stories 
developed by subject matter experts, which were then adjusted or supplemented by user 
testing and feedback. 
1. Login and Report Overview: The system is protected by a user login and 
password; this can be tailored to a specific government agency or to use a CAC 
card. Once logged in, a user encounters a list of generated reports. The user has 
an option of creating a new report, editing an existing report, sharing a report 
(e.g., for approval), exporting a report, or deleting a report. 
2. Report Creation: When a user creates a new report, they give the report a title 
and limit the scope of the report using a NAICS and/or PSC code. These codes 
are later used for database search and aggregation. The user supplies a 
narrative description of services and other relevant background information. They 
also provide specifications of supplies/services as well as a list of requirements. 
Additionally, they specify the period of performance. 
3. Vendor: The user is then able to explore the set of potential vendors. This 
vendor list is already filtered based on the NAICS/PSC information initially 
provided. The user may search the vendors for specific keywords and may also 
filter the vendors by whether they have been awarded contracts previously, by 
various small business categories, by the dollar value of past contracts, and by 
whether they have performance or integrity issues recorded (based on FAPIIS 
records and SAM exclusions).  
For each vendor, the user has the opportunity to examine information 
about prior contracts and select vendors they are interested in researching 
further.  
4. Research: For each vendor selected, the user may enter notes, assign 
requirements to the vendor, and view vendor contact information. The portal also 
gives the user the option to send a standardized email to each vendor asking for 
answers to questions and to get quotes. The research phase also allows the user 
to search FBO for similar requirements by NAICS or description and also 
provides a list of Government-Wide Acquisition Contracts (GWACs) that meet the 
requirements. 
5. Analysis: In analysis, the information from all the previous phases are merged 
together into a single summary that the user can annotate and view. The analysis 
section has the greatest room for growth based on individual organizations’ 
needs (discussed below). 
6. Recommendations: Finally, the user can summarize their findings into a 
recommendation, which may include details such as contract type, contract 
vehicle type, solicitation strategy, key differentiators for source selection, and the 
identification of strong candidate contractors. The report can then be exported to 
a pdf, saved for later, or sent for approval to others. 
 
Additional potential features are discussed in our conclusions. 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 486 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
User Testing and Review 
Initial user testing leveraged MITRE subject matter experts who had extensive 
experience in creating market research reports as previous federal employees or contracted 
support staff. We also received feedback from several sponsors during the design and build 
process. Consistently, we were told that a tool like this would reduce the time required to 
complete the highly manual portion of the market research process (finding, accessing, 
extracting the data from many sources, then aggregate and execute reviews of information) 
and would enable users to dedicate more time into their thought-driven analysis and 
benchmarking of strategy and approach to the acquisition. Many of the features discussed 
previously were derived through user testing and interviews, including the ability to contact 
potential vendors through the tool. Test users also helped to identify which contract 
information was most relevant for their analysis, and which vendor characteristics they 
would like to be able to use as a filter. One feature that was highlighted frequently as 
important and increasingly relevant was the ability to determine a contractor’s small 
business status and to compare that vendor’s contract history with other vendors. 
In the future, we will quantify the value added by this tool by running a controlled 
experiment. In the experiment, several users will be asked to create a market research 
report using either a simple template (that is similarly formatted to the portal report) or using 
the designed prototype leveraging all the data sources. Users will be asked to (a) report time 
required to complete the report and (b) describe how well they believe they were able to 
complete each report and their experience building the report. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
It is evident that leveraging historical acquisition data can play a part in expediting 
administrative acquisition functions, in this case as part of the fully standardized market 
research report, which can then inform decisions. The realm of decisions aligned to the data 
sources selected in this research addresses estimates, contractor responsibility, integrity 
and performance, alternatives for contract type, contract vehicle type, and meeting small 
business goals. The generated report is another stepping stone towards standardizing the 
onset of educated consumerism (market expertise) in the public sector. The prototype is 
designed to demonstrate the viability of such a tool when it leverages these types of data 
sets. An assessment of technologies and sources should be made when making a business 
case for such a tool on a case by case basis for each agency. The MITRE Corporation–
developed prototype demonstrates the value added by integration of public acquisition data 
sources into a single, easy-to-use system. Since MITRE is a manager of the Federally-
Funded Research and Development Center, this prototype design and utilization is available 
to the public sector for its application completely free of charge. Transfer of the prototype will 
identify frameworks, templates, and processes needed to adopt the construct for federal 
agency use.  
Ongoing research will include going beyond the data synthesization and into how 
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